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Country:     Tunisia
Book:        Tunisia, A Country Study
Author:      Harold D. Nelson
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1986

Front Matter

Foreword

     This volume is one of a continuing series of books prepared by Foreign
Area Studies, The American University, under the Country Studies/Area
Handbook Program. The last page of this book provides a listing of other
published studies. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign
country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political,
and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of
those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of
the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static
portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the
cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to
cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to
the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their
dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on
which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the
national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the
social system and political order within which they live.

     The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings of
Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of
the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official
documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of
scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for
factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in
future new editions.

Director
Foreign Area Studies
The American University
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20016

Acknowledgements

     The authors are grateful to those individuals in various international,
governmental, and academic organizations who gave of their time, data, special
knowledge, and authoritative perspective on Tunisia. Gratitude is also
extended to members of the Foreign Area Studies support staff who contributed
directly to the production of this book. These persons include Catherine L.
Connor, Denise R. Barber, and Andrea T. Merrill, who edited the manuscript and
the accompanying figures and tables; Harriett R. Blood and Gustavo Adolfo
Mendoza, who prepared the graphics; Ernest A. Will, publications manager;
Wayne W. Olsen, administrative assistant; Gilda V. Nimer and Karen Leitch,
librarians; and Jesse L. Williams and Lisa C. Young, who keyboarded the
manuscript. The book was indexed by Kathryne Kozak and phototypeset by
Margaret Quinn.

     The aesthetic touches that enhance the book's appearance are the work of
Mr. Mendoza, whose illustrations appear on the cover and the title pages of
the chapters. The inclusion of photographs has been made possible by the
generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies. Special
appreciation is extended to those persons who contributed original camera work
not previously published.

Preface

     This third edition of Tunisia: A Country Study replaces the second
edition, which was researched and written in late 1978 and published in 1979.
At the time the second edition was finished, Tunisia was at the beginning of
its third decade of independence from French administrative domination. Under
the charismatic leadership of President Habib Bourguiba, the young republic
had gained a significant international reputation as an Arab state seeking to
achieve national development goals through a pragmatic course that borrowed
liberally from the concepts of free and centrally planned Western societies.
Now, seven years later, the third edition views the results that have been
achieved as Tunisia nears the end of its third decade of sovereignty.

     Like its predecessor, the third edition seeks to provide a compact and
objective exposition of Tunisia's dominant social, economic, political, and
national security institutions and, hopefully, to give the reader some
appreciation of the forces involved in contemporary national life. In
presenting this new study, the authors have relied primarily on official
reports of governmental and international organizations, journals, newspapers,
and material reflecting recent field research by scholarly authorities.
Detailed information on many aspects of the society, however, was not always
readily available, and gaps in the data as well as varying interpretations
existed among some of the sources consulted. Where appropriate, these gaps and
inconsistencies have been cited in the text. Should readers require greater
detail on core area topics, the authors have noted the availability of
amplifying materials in bibliographic statements at the end of each chapter.
Full references to these and other sources used or considered are included in
the detailed Bibliography.

     The literature of Tunisia is frequently confusing because of the tendency
to mix English and French transliterations of Arabic words, phrases, personal
names, and place-names. For the most part, the authors of this study have
attempted to reduce this confusion by adhering to the system of French
transliteration, inasmuch as that is the form generally used in Tunisia, where
half of the people speak French in addition to the official language, Arabic.

     Arab personal names are often particularly confusing to the Western
reader. A man's name includes his paternal genealogy and sometimes also
indicates his family name, his tribal affiliation, and his village or region
of origin. For example, a man named Abd al Rahman ibn (or ben) Qasim ibn
Mohammed (or Mohamed) El (or Al) Hamma would be recognized as the son of
Qasim, the grandson of Mohammed, and a native of the town of El Hamma. The man
would be addressed as Mister (or his title, if any) Abd al Rahman. In spoken
Arabic, names are elided, so that in this instance the name would be
pronounced as if it were spelled Abdur Rahman. On many occasions the Western
press spells such names as Abdel (or Abdul) Rahman, implying incorrectly that
the man's first name is Abdel and that his last is Rahman. Many Arabic names,
such as the one in this example, are designations of the attributes of God
(Allah). Abd al means a slave or servant of, and Rahman means merciful; thus,
the name literally means the slave or servant of the Merciful (God).

     Where foreign and technical words and phrases have been used in this
study, they have been defined briefly where they first appear in a chapter, or
reference has been made to the Glossary, which is included at the back of the
book for the reader's guidance. The dictionary used was Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary. All measurements are presented in the metric system,
which is used in Tunisia. A conversion table will assist those readers who are
not familiar with metric equivalents (see table 1, Appendix).

Country Profile

[See Global Map: Map of Tunisia on the Globe.]

Country

     Formal Name: Republic of Tunisia.

     Short Form: Tunisia.

     Term for Citizens: Tunisian(s).

     Capital: Tunis.

     Flag: Rectangular red field with white circular portion in center; red
crescent encircles red five-point star within white center.

Geography

     Size: About 164,000 square kilometers; 1,600 kilometers of coastline.

     Topography: Dominant natural feature Dorsale mountain chain, which
extends across north-central portion of country from northeast to southwest.
North of Dorsale, terrain uneven and generally mountainous except where
Mejerda River, country's only major perennial stream, passes through fertile
floodplain. Southward from Dorsale, region of semiarid plateaus gives way in
extreme south to Tunisian portion of Sahara.

     Climate: Mediterranean climate prevails north of Dorsale, with only
moderate seasonal variation. Occasional frosts in interior, but temperatures
seldom drop below freezing. Dorsale acts as rain shadow; precipitation
decreases progressively, and average temperatures increase southward. Extreme
diurnal variation in temperature in Sahara. Heavy morning dew supplements
scanty rainfall along central portion of eastern littoral to make possible
prosperous olive and cereal culture.

Society

     Population: Estimated at 7.2 million in mid-1985. Rate of natural
increase about 2.6 percent annually, but substantial emigration of workers to
other countries each year reduced actual rate of growth to about 2.5 percent.
In 1983 number of Tunisians living abroad estimated at 300,000. In 1984 ratio
of 102 males to 100 females and about 42 percent of population under age 15.
Roughly 47 percent of population urban as compared with 40 percent in 1966 and
30 percent in 1956.

     Ethnic Groups and Language: Population mixture of Arab and indigenous
Berber stock. Unlike other North African countries, where Berber population
clusters continue to form important ethnic minorities, arabization of Tunisian
Berbers has long been virtually complete. Arabic official language, spoken by
nearly all. French, however, spoken as second language by one-half of
population, remains principal language of business.

     Literacy: According to 1980 estimate, approximately 50 percent of
population over age 15 considered literate. By gender, rate about 67 percent
for males and 33 percent for females; gap closing rapidly with increasing
female school attendance.

     Health: Conditions of health and sanitation improving steadily, and most
of formerly serious endemic diseases eliminated or under fair degree of
control. Diseases of infancy and early childhood, however, remain major
hazards; more than one-half of all deaths occur among children under age five.
Shortage of medical personnel of all kinds prevails, particularly in rural
areas.

Economy

     Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1984 amounted to TD6.23 billion; real
growth rate averaged around 7 percent in mid-1980s.

     Agriculture: Largely traditional with small modern sector; major crops
cereals, olives, olive oil, citrus fruits, potatoes, tomatoes, dates, and
fish. Provided about 13 percent of GDP and 32 percent of employment in
mid-1980s.

     Manufacturing: Fast-growing sector; marked growth among those industries
making textile, chemical, electrical, and mechanical products. Provides about
12 percent of GDP.

     Mining: Petroleum dominant product followed by phosphates and natural
gas. Provided about 10 percent of GDP.

     Foreign Trade: Exports mainly petroleum, natural gas, phosphates,
phosphate derivatives, textiles, and olive oil. Imports largely machinery,
semifinished products, and foodstuffs. Imports exceeded exports in mid-1980s;
tourism and remittances from Tunisians working abroad reduced deficit only
slightly.

     Currency: Tunisian dinar (TD-see Glossary).

     Fiscal Year: Same as calendar year.

Transportation and Telecommunications

     Roads: Network of about 23,700 kilometers of surfaced roads; most modern
segments of system in north, particularly around Tunis.

     Railroads: About 2,150 kilometers of track reaching most of country's
main urban centers and phosphate mines in southwest.

     Ports: Major ports at Tunis, Bizerte, Sfax, Sousse, Gabes, and Sakhira.

     Airports: International airports at Tunis, Bizerte, Monastir, Sfax, and
on Jerba Island.

     Telecommunications: Major urban centers well served by telephones and
telex, including automatic international dialing; member of Intelsat and
Arabsat.

Government and Politics

     Government: Republic under president, who serves as both head of state
and head of government. Habib Bourguiba declared president for life in 1975
after having been elected unopposed four successive times. Day-to-day
administration under Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali and Council of Ministers
(cabinet), both responsible to president.

     Legislature: Unicameral chamber of 136 deputies elected by direct
suffrage for five-year term. Election to Chamber of Deputies in 1981 swept by
National Front Coalition dominated by Bourguiba's Destourian Socialist Party
(Parti Socialiste Destourien-PSD). Chamber generally approves president's
legislative program and budget without significant change.

     Legal System: Modern legal codes adopted after independence reflect
influence of both French law and sharia (sacred Islamic law). Code of Personal
Status, dealing with family, marriage, and divorce, considered radical by Arab
standards, notably with respect to rights of women. Three tiers of courts with
original and appellate jurisdiction; judgments subject to power of annulment
by highest tribunal, Court of Cassation.

     Administrative Subdivisions: 23 governorates (provinces), each composed
of several delegations, in turn divided into sectors. In 245 communes and
municipalities, local self-government exercised by elected councillors,
subject to review by governor.

     Politics: Influence of PSD, only legal party between 1963 and 1981,
pervasive at all levels of government. Under Constitution, Mzali in line to
succeed Bourguiba, although more conservative rivals within PSD likely to
contest his leadership aspirations. Three opposition groups-Movement of
Socialist Democrats, Popular Unity Party, and Tunisian Communist
Party-officially sanctioned but impeded in efforts to campaign against PSD.
Growing Islamist movement not yet legalized as political party.

     Foreign Relations: Officially nonaligned but oriented toward West.
Rejects policies of more radical Arab states, urging moderation on
Israeli-Palestinian issue and other Middle Eastern problems. Stresses
solidarity among northwestern African states (Magh-rib). Relations with United
States marked by warmth, although Washington regarded as too uncritical in its
support for Israel.

National Security

     Armed Forces: In 1985 armed forces, collectively known as Tunisian
National Army, included army of 30,000, air force of 2,500, and navy of 2,600.
Conscription for one-year tour of duty irregularly enforced for male citizens
aged 20. Over 85 percent of army composed of draftees; career personnel
dominated in other services.

     Major Tactical Units: Army included two combined arms brigades (each with
one armored battalion and two mechanized infantry battalions); one elite
paracommando brigade; one brigade of desert troops; and reconnaissance,
artillery, air defense, and engineering units. Air force maintained one
fighter squadron formed in 1985, one light-attack squadron, one training unit,
and one helicopter wing; inventory of about 20 combat aircraft. Naval forces
included one frigate, eight fast-attack craft (six armed with
surface-to surface missiles), and several patrol vessels.

     Foreign Military Assistance: United States major arms supplier providing
bulk of armor and aircraft acquired in 1980s. France important source of
equipment and training since Tunisian independence. Sweden and Italy also
prominent suppliers of military equipment in 1980s.

     Defense Expenditures: According to Tunisian government figures,
appropriations for Ministry of National Defense in 1985 amounted to TD225.1
million. Of this figure, TD102.6 million allocated from current budget (9.8
percent of total) and TD122.5 million from capital budget (10.9 percent of
total). Total defense costs 10.3 percent of total central government
expenditures in 1985 and about 3.6 percent of GDP.

     Internal Security Forces: All government internal security forces under
authority of Ministry of Interior. Surete Nationale performed most urban
police duties. Garde Nationale had responsibility for rural police affair and
border patrol.

[See Figure 1.: Republic of Tunisia, 1985]

Introduction

     Tunisia forms part of the region that its early Arab conquerors called
the "island of the west" (jazirat al maghrib)-the land between the "sea of
sand" (the Sahara) and the Mediterranean Sea. According to tradition, other
regional members are Morocco, Algeria, and the northwest portion of Libya
known as Tripolitania, but in more recent times Mauritania has often been
included. Tunisia has stood throughout history as a bridge between this Arab
west (the Maghrib) and the Arab east (the Mashriq). Jutting into the
Mediterranean midway between Gibraltar and the Suez, the country's
northeastern promontory commands the narrows between the African continent and
Sicily that divide the great intercontinental sea into eastern and western
basins. From this strategic location Tunisia has been depicted by its
promoters as an important crossroads between Africa, the Middle East, and
Europe.

     Smallest of the Maghribi nations, Tunisia is roughly the size of the
state of Missouri. Bounded on the north and the east by an extensive
coastline, the small country shares its other frontiers with much larger
Algeria and troublesome Libya (see fig. 1). Tunisians and their Maghribi
neighbors have a common language, religion, and cultural heritage and, in
large measure, a common history as well. The area has been a locus of trade
and colonization almost since the beginning of recorded time. Its people are
ethnically a mixture of Arab and indigenous Berber stock, but succeeding waves
of Carthaginians, Romans, Spanish Muslims, Ottoman Turks, and-more
recently-French and Italian settlers have had a profound effect on cultures,
social structures, and values.

     Independent since 1956 after 75 years as a French protectorate, Tunisia
is regarded not only as the most modernized of the Arab countries but also as
the most Westernized. Under the French, Tunisians were exposed to a
progressive European society whose methods of government and business
administration left indelible marks. Advanced plantation agriculture
transformed the fertile coastal regions into export-oriented production
centers. The French education system introduced foreign political
concepts-most notably nationalism-to Tunisian youth. After 1934 an indigenous
independence movement, the Neo-Destour (New Constitution) Party, began active
resistance to the continuation of the protectorate. The movement was led by a
forceful, charismatic Tunisian named Habib Bourguiba.

     The new order drew its social and political values from the Sahil, a
coastal plateau region heavily influenced by its continued exposure to
foreigners. In marked contrast to the more arabized remainder of the country,
the Sahilian community was intensely industrious, flexible in accepting new
methods, independent and rather secular in spirit, and highly cooperative.
Bourguiba and the vanguard of the nationalist movement were all of Sahilian
origin. After independence, rather than fashion a nation based on pride and
extremism, these men sought to accustom the people to a realistic assessment
of the new republic's position in the world and to a pragmatic, flexible
approach to the problems of national development. Many observers believed
Tunisia not only would attain its goal but also would do so through a
democratic governmental system and a free society. Certainly it enjoyed a
combination of advantages rarely matched in other emerging sovereign states.

     From the outset Bourguiba's leadership was a major advantage. Popularly
hailed as the Supreme Combatant for his role in the struggle for national
independence, he had no competitors in gaining public recognition as "father
of his country." Widely regarded as capable, incorruptible, progressive, and
committed to a compassionate, humanistic philosophy regarding the Tunisian
people, the national leader was respected-even revered-by a citizenry eager to
follow his lead. A popular political party already existed as a potential
vehicle for mobilizing the masses in the development effort. An efficient,
uncorrupted civil service and a well-trained cadre of technicians inherited
from the protectorate period stood ready to administer the new state and its
modernization plans. The issue of Tunisification (replacement of foreigners by
Tunisians in the civil service and the education system) and arabization
(replacement of foreign languages by Arabic as the official tongue) lacked the
emotional and dysfunctional impact that had accompanied similar actions in
newly independent neighboring states.

     Although there was some geographic sectionalism, the deep tribal or
ethnic cleavages with which other North African states had to deal were
largely nonexistent. Moreover, Tunisia's independence struggle had been a
political manuever rather than a military encounter, and it had united the
country without causing the mass destruction suffered, for example, by
neighboring Algeria in its own agonizing war of independence. Particularly
heartening was Tunisia's affinity for the Western cultural and social aspects
of its heritage and its avowed friendship with the West, despite an official
foreign policy of nonalignment.

     The republican Constitution endorsed the separation of executive,
legislative, and judicial powers; provided for regular elections; and included
a bill of rights designed to protect individual freedoms. Although clearly
democratic in its intent, the fundamental law permitted the president to
exercise broad and unqualified executive powers within the context of a
single-party state.

     The political organization of Bourguiba and his fellow nationalists was
renamed the Destourian Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Destourien-PSD) in
1964. A populist party active at all levels of the society, its chief
functions were to rally public opinion behind government policies and to
channel local reactions upward to the national leadership. The PSD's goal
was to ensure national unity, which in political terms meant confining free
political competition within the framework of a single party; the habit of
discipline among a large and stable majority could counterpose opposition
minorities while providing them with a channel for the expression of their
views. Formally the party-like the government-purported to be representative
and democratic, but in practice it too was subject to executive guidance that
transcended statutes. From its educated elite, the loyal party membership
learned to accept this seeming contradiction as an example of pragmatic
flexibility.

     Bourguiba, the country's first president (and its only one since his
assumption of that office in 1957), became a pioneer among Arab leaders in
declaring his intention to bring about social modernization within the
framework of Islam, the national religion. Postindependence history has in
large part been a chronicle of progress achieved in this endeavor, and the
reforms attained have amounted to a social revolution in a Muslim environment.

     In most countries where Muslim Arabs are predominant, the fountainhead of
traditional social and political values is Islam, the religion brought to
Tunisia by the Arabs in the seventh century. The word of God (Allah), revealed
to the Prophet Muhammad and recorded in the Quran, provides Muslims with an
integrated structure ordering all personal, social, and political aspects of
life. After Tunisian independence, however, the traditional social order,
particularly as it affected the family and women, was gradually supplanted by
a system based on liberal values, and the government became the leader in
effecting change. Responsibility for social security and education, formerly
accepted as the duty of the extended family, was assumed by the state. With
varying degrees of success, religious rituals, family law, and social customs
became targets of official pressure and legislation in the name of equality
and productivity-values regarded as critical to the goals of modernization
and national development.

     Significantly, the reforms and development planning as a whole were
undertaken in the name of traditional concepts. For example, two of the
fundamental social values preached by Islam-obedience to authority and
protection of the helpless-reappeared in the principles of "guided democracy"
and state welfare fostered by the Bourguiba regime. Assuring Tunisians that
only the "outmoded and obscurantist" aspects of the traditional culture were
being transformed because they stood in the way of national development,
Bourguiba abolished the traditional sharia courts, reformed religious
education, outlawed polygyny, legalized birth control and abortion, and
brought about change in the religion-based system of landholding.

     In the process of carrying out Tunisia's social revolution, the
government gave great emphasis to the role of education in its design
for national development. It plowed the largest single share of each annual
budget into education; public school enrollments soared, and the national
literacy rate advanced-particularly for women. Modern health and welfare
programs also received prominent support from the government. Many of the
reforms were opposed by conservatives and religious traditionalists, but
modernization was seen by the Tunisian political elite as an adaptation
of Islam to contemporary imperatives rather than as a denial of the
religion's basic tenets. In the mid-1980s modernization had yet to
penetrate the more remote parts of the countryside, where farmers and a few
nomadic communities continued to live in the relatively traditional social
environment. But in the cities the process had progressed so far that there
were growing signs of reaction against it.

     The cost of economic development has been a heavy burden on the
national economy, as typified by an education system that provided free
schooling for all Tunisians from the elementary through the university level.
In 1985 about half of the country's 7.2 million people were under the age of
25-a statistic that demonstrated the scope of continuing budgetary
requirements. Ironically, the economy was unable to provide jobs for the
increasing number of graduates, a situation that had potentially serious
political implications.

     Although endowed with only a modest resource base, Tunisia achieved a
remarkable record of economic progress during the 1960s and 1970s.
Predominantly an agricultural country, it nonetheless made important strides
toward industrialization as a result of extensive foreign aid, pragmatic
planning, and little public resistance to the adoption of modern values.
During the 1970s, economic growth averaged a phenomenal 7.6 percent annually,
attributable to steady expansion of the hydrocarbons sector, an increase
in manufacturing, and high receipts from phosphate exports and tourism. Per
capita income rose substantially, earning for Tunisia the classification of
a middle-income developing country, according to standards established by the
World Bank (see Glossary). But when the economy became more narrowly based
on petroleum in the late 1970s, a downturn in the country's prosperity was not
long in coming. Foreign demand for oil weakened in the early 1980s, as did
the market for phosphates, and a slump in tourism occurred as a result of
economic sluggishness in potential travelers' own countries. Severe drought
conditions brought poor harvests to Tunisia's agricultural sector, and food
imports increased.

     The resulting slowdown in growth revealed basic structural weaknesses in
the economy, including substantial government subsidies for imported consumer
goods. In the mid-1980s both the budget and the balance of payments current
account suffered major deficits, inflation increased, and unemployment became
one of Tunisia's most severe problems. The government attempted to redress
its economic problems, but restrictive measures, such as reducing subsidies,
increasing consumer goods prices, and freezing wages, sparked worrisome
public disturbances.

     In retrospect, there seems little doubt that the reforms introduced in
the Tunisian society stemmed to some degree from Bourguiba's determination
to neutralize long-standing conservative Muslim power. But his chosen path
toward national development, modernization, and economic well-being carried
with it certain inherent problems and dangers. The emphasis on national unity,
centralization of power, and efficiency undermined local contributions to the
development effort. In stressing uniformity, pluralism was shunned. The result
has been an inability to accept nonconformity and criticism, as well as a
refusal to permit-much less accommodate-political dissent, which the regime
has equated with a lack of patriotism.

     Long supported by popular consensus and a Tunisian tradition of strong
central government, Bourguiba has consolidated his authority over all levels
of political administration and has extended his personal influence to most
aspects of national life. Adopting a paternalistic attitude toward the nation,
he has ruled in a manner as authoritarian as that exercised by the bey of
Tunis, who preceded him in the days of the preindependence monarchy. But he
has made a practice of keeping political issues before the people and of
explaining government policy through press conferences and speeches.

     Internal political opposition generally has been kept in bounds by
adroit personnel management. The president shuffles government and party
officials frequently to discourage the development of factions and
eliminates those regarded as threats to the status quo. Bourguiba's
perception of his role as the primary molder of national solidarity is
perennial, and, ever conscious of his place in Tunisia's history, he loses no
opportunity to remind his fellow citizens of their debt to him. "There is
not a Tunisian," he is fond of stating, "who does not owe being a free
citizen in an independent country to me."

     Despite his continued active participation in the affairs of state, the
Tunisian leader in early 1986 was no longer the vigorous activist he had
been in an earlier era. His age officially given as 83, Bourguiba has a long
history of health problems for which he has sought repeated medical attention
both at home and abroad. Still recovering from a heart attack suffered in late
1984, he has reduced his official schedule accordingly. Much of the burden
of executive responsibility has been assumed by Mohamed Mzali, the PSD
protege Bourguiba chose for his prime minister in 1980. Having been declared
president for life by the national legislature in 1975, the aging Supreme
Combatant presides over a nation that is in the process of cultural, social,
economic, and political transition.

     There are signs that the ailing president may no longer be capable of
providing the strong-fisted leadership that once characterized his government.
Social unrest has been generated by rising unemployment, particularly among
the youth in urban areas. Political rivalries have arisen within the PSD,
which functions mainly as the medium through which the leadership's wishes are
communicated to the people. Aspiring politicians have increased their
maneuvering as hopeful contenders for the government's top office once its
aged incumbent passes from the scene. Unrest stemming from a re-awakening of
Islamist (see Glossary) fervor has raised the public issue of whether
Tunisians should abandon their support of the government's Western approach to
nationbuilding and return instead to the traditional principles and practices
of their religion. Many observers fear that the country's unity and stability
have been threatened by pro-Western and anti-Western rivalries and that if
they are not contained and managed intelligently, Tunisia could become the
Lebanon of North Africa. Solutions to these problems have been difficult to
achieve as the country has continued to exist in a political twilight zone
awaiting the end of the Bouguiba era.

January 1986                                Harold D. Nelson

     As noted on the title page, the authors finished research and writing in
January 1986. Because of protracted problems of phototypsetting, however,
preparations for printing were not completed until late 1987. During the
intervening period, Tunisia experienced significant political changes. The
ensuing is a brief summary of some of the more important.

     In July 1986 Bourguiba dismissed Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, the person
he frequently had identified as his chosen successor (see Presidential
Succession, ch. 4). In addition, Bourguiba divorced his wife, Wassila, who for
a long period had exercised considerable influence and who was believed to
favor a gradual loosening of political controls. During the next fifteen
months, Bourguiba continued to make abrupt personnel changes. Many observers
concluded that a niece of Bourguiba, Saida Sassi, and others were encouraging
Bourguiba in his reluctance to delegate decisionmaking power and expand the
political process.

     On October 2, 1987, Bourguiba suddenly replaced the incumbent prime
minister with Minister of Interior Zine al Abidine Ben Ali, a 51-year-old
former army general. On November 7 Prime Minister Ben Ali announced over Radio
Tunisia that a panel of six physicians had determined that Bourguiba had
"become totally incapable of fulfilling the duties of the presidency." Ben
Ali stated that "in accordance with Article 57 of the Constitution, we . . .
assume the presidency and the supreme command of the armed forces." The new
president asserted that the time had arrived for "a republican regime that
respects the institutions and provides the prerequisites for a responsible
democracy." Although Ben Ali also was lavish in his praise of Bourguiba's
contributions to the nation, he declared that "there is no room for a life
presidency, nor for an automatic succession in which the people are not
involved." Ben Ali announced that his government would propose new legislation
on parties and the press so that Tunisians could participate in "political
activities that truly rely on a plurality of political parties and popular
organizations."

     Later in the day Ben Ali assumed the chairmanship of the PSD, the third
major post that Bourguiba had filled. Ben Ali appointed Hedi Baccouche,
formerly minister of social affairs and director of PSD, prime minister and
secretary general of the party. In interviews with foreign correspondents, the
new prime minister emphasized that the new cabinet included only four
ministerial changes. Observers noted one important change, however, in the
designation of Mahmoud Mestiri as foreign minister. Mestiri had served in the
previous cabinet as secretary of state for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he
had previously been posted as Tunisia's ambassador to Paris, Moscow, and the
United Nations. Baccouche confirmed that although Ben Ali had been critical of
the succession procedure by which he assumed the presidency, he intended to
adhere to the provisions of the Constitution by serving until the next
election, which was scheduled for 1991.

     A few hours after taking power, Ben Ali announced the promotions of
several military officers, including the elevation of the army chief of staff,
Youssef Baraket, to general and Major General Said el Kateb to lieutenant
general. A Colonel Youssef Ben Slimane reportedly also was promoted to
lieutenant general, as was Idaa Netar, who became the new chief of staff of
the air force, replacing a nephew of Bourguiba, who along with several other
relatives and close associates of Bourguiba was placed under temporary house
arrest. President Ben Ali retained Slaheddine Baly as minister of state in
charge of national defense and appointed Ali Nourddine as director general of
national security, a position that Ben Ali had held in the mid-1980s (see
Internal Security, ch. 5).

November 23, 1987