$Unique_ID{COW03637} $Pretitle{262} $Title{Tanzania Chapter 1D. Zanzibar to the End of World War I} $Subtitle{} $Author{Irving Kaplan} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{african tanganyika british colonial war government africans authorities education world} $Date{1978} $Log{} Country: Tanzania Book: Tanzania, A Country Study Author: Irving Kaplan Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1978 Chapter 1D. Zanzibar to the End of World War I The Anglo-German Agreement on East Africa of 1890 provided for the British Protectorate over Zanzibar (including Pemba). Technically the control of internal affairs and succession to the sultanate were left in the hands of the traditional rulers. Great Britain was to take over foreign affairs. In fact British control was gradually extended to all aspects of internal administration and finance, including the sultan's income, and most key posts were eventually filled by British personnel. In 1896 the British determined the succession to the throne, and the sultan became even more dependent on them than earlier ones had been. In 1913 the essentially colonial status of Zanzibar was acknowledged by the transfer of Zanzibar's affairs from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. A British resident replaced the consul general, and Zanzibar was placed under the jurisdiction of the governor of the East African Protectorate (then the name for that part of Kenya from the coast to the eastern edge of the Rift Valley). The British formally abolished the slave trade in 1876, but they moved slowly in enforcing the law and did not abolish slavery itself until 1897, in part because they feared effects on the labor supply, in part because they saw Zanzibar as an essentially Arab state, the social system of which would be disrupted by the freeing of a substantial number of African slaves. Provision was made for compensation to slave owners by the state, and the slaves themselves were required to take the initiative in applying for freedom. Moreover the use of slave labor was not made a crime, and some kinds of slaves (for example, concubines) were exempted from the law. No employment programs for freed slaves were devised, and former slaves were subject to vagrancy laws if they were without a job or fixed residence. For these reasons, the lack of free land and an improvement in working conditions, relatively few slaves applied for freedom in the first decade or so. In 1909 a law eliminated compensation for slaves freed after 1911, a sanction that speeded up their emancipation. Nevertheless forms of hidden slavery and semislavery remained, and there was no program for helping ex-slaves adjust to their freedom. Some of them became tenants on clove plantations, exchanging their labor on the plantation for the right to build a house and plant food crops on a small plot nearby. The demand for labor was apparently not filled by these tenants, and many of the migrants from German East Africa who came for the clove harvests stayed on as squatters. In these early years, and later, the British persisted in seeing Zanzibar as an Arab nation. Although the Arabs had lost much of their authority to British administrators, the sultan remained, and Arabs were given special consideration with regard to such matters as government positions and education. Tanganyika from the End of World War I to World War II The British had established a rudimentary administrative structure in 1917. Sir Horace Byatt, who had been administrator of the territory while it was occupied by British troops, became its first governor. British administration was formally established by the Tanganyika Order in Council, which empowered the governor to make ordinances but directed him to respect "native law and custom." The Executive Council, consisting of the governor and his four highest officials, was formed and the High Court instituted. On July 22, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations formally gave Tanganyika the status of a mandated territory, making Great Britain responsible for the "peace, order and good government of the territory" and for promoting "to the utmost the material and moral wellbeing and the social progress of its inhabitants." Although the Permanent Mandates Commission of the league superintended the mandatory powers neither it nor the council of the league had effective authority. The power of the commission was minimal. Such influence as it had depended on the willingness of the European state holding the mandate to respond to its appeals. In the case of Tanganyika, the commission's comments on some matters, particularly labor conditions, had some effect. In the long run the fact that Tanganyika had been a mandated territory was significant in that it became a candidate for trusteeship under the United Nations (UN) after World War II, a status that had greater consequence than that of a mandate under the League of Nations. After the British takeover all Germans, including missionaries, were expelled. During the war estates had fallen into decay, overseas trade had stopped, and African production was neglected. Many Africans had been away serving as soldiers or porters, and disease and famine had taken a toll. It has been estimated that thousands of African porters died during the war and that 30,000 Africans had perished because of famine. Others died in battle. Given this difficult situation and his lack of personnel and money, Byatt moved slowly in his brief period as governor. He retained the German administrative districts and permitted the more experienced maakida to remain in power. Local administrative officers were permitted to make their own arrangements for local government. In 1924 Donald Cameron, appointed as governor of Tanganyika, introduced the system known as indirect rule, the basis of which was the use of traditional sociopolitical systems as an integral part of colonial administration. These systems were to be gradually adapted to new needs and methods. It was felt that not only would Africans gain experience in managing their own affairs without the dislocation resulting from the institution of an entirely new system, but that it would be easier to implement new social and economic policies if the traditional rulers became the agents of such change. In addition to the political and philosophical considerations influencing the decision to introduce the system there were others: at that point in the history of British colonialism, there were comparatively few persons ready to become colonial administrators at local levels, and Great Britain either did not have or would not allocate the money to pay them. The notion of indirect rule had been developed in Northern Nigeria, an area characterized by large-scale, hierarchically organized states, which, if somewhat different from those of Western Europe in the early twentieth century, seemed to the British to warrant the kind of system they introduced. Typically when they came to a territory like Tanganyika in which such states were rare if not nonexistent, they looked for chiefs that would fit into the system of indirect rule and either misinterpreted what they found or tried to convert what they found into what it should have been. In any case the process of adaptation was often not so gradual. Beyond that, the colonial authority's insistence that the chiefs, whether traditional or newly made, act as agents of change eventually led to situations in which many chiefs, whatever the basis of their traditional legitimacy, were seen by their people largely as agents of the colonial regime. In general the colonial authorities tended to assume that traditional authorities had more power than in fact they did, and they also tended to overlook the traditional sanctions and checks that a chief's people had been able to apply if they were unhappy with his rule. Under Cameron's governorship the districts were grouped into eleven provinces, and a secretary for native affairs was appointed. The Africans in positions of authority worked under the direction of the provincial and district commissioners. A series of ordinances formally gave local African authorities executive, judicial, and financial duties. These authorities were to maintain law and order, and later they were required and empowered to undertake certain social services. Their financial duties involved the collection of taxes, part of which was reserved for local use. Soon after his arrival Governor Cameron also created the Legislative Council consisting of fourteen official and up to ten unofficial members nominated by the Governor. In the second category there were, in practice, five (later seven) Europeans (always British subjects) and two (later three) Asians (then called Indians). There were no Arab or African representatives. This composition of the council was maintained throughout the term of the mandate. Article 6 of the mandate stipulated that the laws, customs, rights, and interests of the African population should be considered in matters of land allocation and that there should be no transfers of land except between Africans without official consent. Until 1923 former German estates were leased by Europeans and Asians on a yearly basis. The Land Ordinance of that year made all land public land but recognized existing rights and titles. It forbade new grants of freehold, granted leases of up to ninety-nine years, and stated that no more than 5,000 acres could be leased to a non-African unless approved by the colonial secretary. Later that year and again in 1930 certain heavily populated areas were closed to further encroachments by non-Africans. In 1925 Germans were allowed to return to Tanganyika, and over the years a variety of other settlers arrived. In the long run the two largest European groups were Germans and Greeks. In the 1930s the depression, more favorable conditions in Kenya, and perhaps a fear that Hitler might succeed in his demand for a return of the territory slowed the arrival of new settlers. The Asian population of roughly 10,000 in 1921 had grown to 25,000 by 1931. All had their origin in the Indian subcontinent, but by the beginning of World War II a fair number had been born in East Africa. Asians did not constitute a homogeneous community. Many came from Gujerat (and Gujerati was the single most important Indian language in East Africa), but many had originated elsewhere, and there were significant religious differences among them. In addition to Hindus there were several different groups of Muslims, Sikhs, and even a few Parsis. A number of Asians had benefited economically from the German defeat, having acquired nearly all of the real estate in Dar es Salaam and many of the German sisal estates. George Delf reports in Asians in East Africa that in 1939 "the Indian economic interest in Tanganyika was estimated at 13 million [pounds sterling], including 17 percent of non-African agricultural land, 90 percent of town property, 80 percent of the cotton industry, 80 percent of sisal production, 50 and 60 percent of import and export trade and 80 percent of transport services." By no means all Asians were rich, or even well-off. If the 80,000 acre sisal estate of the Karimjee Javanjee family suggests the wealth at one end of the spectrum, the hundreds of small general stores (maduka; sing., duka) run by Asians, most of them in rural areas, indicates the other end. After a slow start agricultural production rose steadily during the 1920s until it far surpassed the levels reached during the German period. Like the Germans the British encouraged the production of Arabica coffee by the Chaga on Mount Kilimanjaro and of Robusta by the Haya west of Lake Victoria. African farmers were, in fact, responsible for a large part of the territory's coffee production. The British emphasized export crops because of their potential as revenue earners. Little attention was given food production until World War II when territorial self-sufficiency in food became a goal. Some gold was produced near Lake Victoria and along the Lupa River, and its production rose rapidly in the middle 1920s, but gold was not to be an important resource in the long run. In general agriculture, whether for subsistence or the production of export crops, was to remain by far the most important sector of the economy through World War II and beyond. Diamonds were discovered near Shinyanga in 1940, but mining employed relatively few persons. Revenues derived directly or indirectly from various kinds of taxes covered the territory's expenses by 1926, thus conforming to the British government's wish that its colonies be self-sufficient, but that self-sufficiency could be attained only by not attempting too much. Then and later much of the income derived from export crops or mining was not reinvested in Tanganyika given the liberal rules on the export of earnings. An attempt was made in the late 1920s to expand government services, but the depression of the 1930s caused a swift retrenchment. After 1925 the government placed special emphasis on education for Africans, responding to critical reports on the educational situation by the Ormsby-Gore East Africa Commission of 1925 and by an advisory committee on African education. Until that time there had been a number of mission schools and a very few government schools. Mission schools continued to be important, but a few more government schools were established, and beginning in 1927 grants-in-aid were given to schools established by African communities. Such grants were extended to Asian schools in 1929. Education suffered cuts during the depression, however. Those cuts meant that the problems connected with the development of technical and secondary education that had just begun to get under way could not be solved in the 1930s. Education beyond the secondary level was not really available until after World War II and then only at a single college for all three British East African territories. The development of so-called Native Authorities proceeded by adapting the principles of indirect rule to the exigencies of efficient administration as the colonial authorities saw them. Often the size of the chiefdoms characteristic of many of the mainland's ethnic groups was thought to be too small to warrant paid chiefs, and some of the chiefs in any area were thought to be either too uncooperative or uneducated to perform the tasks required of them. If lack of cooperation or education were the sole problem, a chief might be retired early to make way for a brother or son who would be more satisfactory. If, in addition, an unsatisfactory chief's domain were too small, consolidation of two or more chiefdoms might take place; a chiefly family then lost its rights and privileges. These developments did not always occur entirely at the initiative of the colonial authorities: ambitious chiefs careful to cooperate with district and provincial commissioners were sometimes able to influence consolidation if only because the presence of these chiefs suggested an alternative to the existing situation. In some instances the use of the chiefs as agents of change led to difficulties between them and their people, although widespread problems were not to occur until after World War II (see The Road to Independence, this ch.). For example, when the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) was established in the 1930s among the Chaga and made the mandatory marketing agent for the coffee they produced the chiefs were expected to help enforce that requirement. At the time private buyers were prepared to pay more to the producer than the KNCU, and in 1937 riots broke out, focused primarily against the cooperative but also expressing bitterness against some chiefs. By 1929 there were enough African teachers, minor civil servants, and others with some degree of Western education to form the African Association. It had a number of branches on the mainland, often located at district headquarters, and in 1939 the African Association of Zanzibar affiliated itself. Many of the association's activities were social and educational, but it did express political views from time to time in the 1930s. Another organization, the African Commercial and Welfare Association, whose members consisted of traders, businessmen, and urban workers, was also fairly active in the 1930s, but it was the African Association that survived into the postwar era to become the nucleus of increasing political activity. Tanganyika was not a battleground during World War II, but the territory felt the effects of the war: approximately 80,000 Tanganyikans served in the British forces, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia against the Italians, on Madagascar, and in the Burma campaign. Emphasis was placed on self-sufficiency in food production, and after the Japanese seizure of plantations in Southeast Asia new stress was put on the production of sisal, and rubber production once again (and briefly) became important. Transportation facilities were improved, but education and medical care for civilians were given little emphasis. The estates of 3,025 Germans (who had been repatriated or were interned) were managed by neighboring British farmers, by the staff of the Custodian of Enemy Property, or by companies. District officers, often preoccupied with other matters, gave the Native Authorities greater rein, and some of them took the opportunity to aggrandize their power even beyond that permitted or demanded by the colonial regime, thus alienating themselves from their people. Zanzibar to World War II Political change in Zanzibar in the period from 1918 to 1945 was slow. The British colonial regime had developed a fairly efficient bureaucracy, and the financial policies of the sultanate had been reformed. In 1926 the Executive Council and the Legislative Council were introduced. The latter, chiefly an advisory body, had limited lawmaking responsibilities. Except for the highest posts, which were filled by European officials, the senior positions in the bureaucracy were held by Arabs and a number of the minor ones by Asians. The Shirazi, descendents of Middle Easterners and Africans, and other Africans of mainland origin were not involved, a situation that in part reflected the British conception of Zanzibar as an Arab state, in part the fact that the largely rural Africans (including the Shirazi) had little access to the available educational facilities. Africans were also excluded from the unofficial side of the Legislative Council until 1946 when the first Shirazi was appointed. As they had been since the nineteenth century, clove and coconut plantations held by Arabs remained the significant elements in the agricultural sector of Zanzibar's economy; earlier attempts to develop other crops had failed. Commercial activity was chiefly in the hands of Asians, some of whom also held large mortgages on many Arab-owned plantations. Several ethnic organizations emerged in the interwar period, but they did not become bases for political party formation until after World War II. The Arab Association was formed in the early 1920s primarily to seek compensation for losses deriving from the emancipation of slaves. The depression of the 1930s led to the increasing dependence of Arab landowners on Asian creditors, and the association turned its attention to defending their interests against the latter. The African Association was formed by mainlanders in 1934 and the Shirazi Association in 1939. Both were essentially welfare organizations and had some of the characteristics of unions but were not active politically. At this time there was a considerable gulf between the mainlanders and the Shirazi who, unlike the mainlanders, saw themselves as subjects of the sultan and shared adherence to Islam with the Arabs. The members of the African Association, however, maintained their connections with the mainland, and in 1939 the association affiliated with the African Association in Tanganyika. The Indian Association, concerned chiefly with financial and business matters, was formed in 1910 but, unlike the others, did not become politically significant after World War II. The Road to Tanganyika's Independence In 1945 neither the colonial government nor the relatively few Africans with a national-as opposed to a parochial-perspective foresaw independence in sixteen years. In 1954, however, when Julius K. Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) burst upon the scene, the issue was drawn, and the question was how quickly the Colonial Office in London and the colonial authorities in the territory, particularly those at the highest levels, would adapt to the new situation. In fact the Colonial Office and territorial officials were by no means always in concert in their initial perspectives on political, economic, and social development or in the way they reacted to specific stimuli in Tanganyika or in Great Britain. In addition a change in the international status of Tanganyika provided a new framework for the plans formulated by the colonial authorities and for the expression of internally generated political expression. In 1946 Great Britain reluctantly agreed to place Tanganyika under the trusteeship system established under the UN, reluctantly because several features in Chapter 12 of the United Nations Charter stipulated changes in the old mandate system of the League of Nations: among other things, representatives of the trust territory were to sit on the Trusteeship Council, and missions were to visit each territory every three years. However reluctant Great Britain may have been, international opinion immediately after the war seemed to demand trusteeship. Once under the system the territory was not only subject to periodic visiting missions but to questionnaires concerned with political and constitutional matters. Moreover nationalists could find a forum at the Trusteeship Council, and petitions for redress of grievances could be submitted to it directly. Tanganyika Africans took advantage of these opportunities at one time or another. Nevertheless the direct impact of Trusteeship Council suggestions to the Tanganyika government was not very great. In the late 1940s senior officials at the Colonial Office supported by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, anticipated the growth of nationalism in the colonial areas and sought to persuade the authorities in the African territories to take account of the educated Africans already in place, to bring more Africans into the civil service, including its higher reaches, and to make provision for more popularly elected members even if still a minority in the legislative and executive councils. Moreover it was suggested that representative local governments replace the Native Authorities who were either traditional chiefs or modeled on the notion of chieftainship. It was assumed that such elected local governments could not only provide experience in self-government for rural Africans but would have a better chance of gaining the support of local population for economic development. This view turned out to be prescient. The East African governors rejected these proposals. They and many of their senior subordinates distrusted the educated Africans and persisted until very late in seeing the chiefs as the only legitimate representatives of the African. The Tanganyikan authorities were also extremely slow in preparing Africans (and for that matter, Asians) for the administrative service, that is, as district officers. Moreover local government reform, which did take place little by little was intended first to make the colonial regime more effective rather than to prepare for its demise, and then to be a barrier to the effectiveness of TANU and as a way of retaining a substantial voice for Europeans and Asians. Economic and Social Development The perspective of the Colonial Office having been rejected, the territory's colonial authorities embarked on a series of related policies, which political scientist Margaret Bates has summed up as "one of social engineering, in which changes were to be brought about by a paternal Tanganyika government, working in general alliance with sympathetic settlers, businessmen, missionaries and members of the small westernized African community." The involvement of the latter was predicated on their acceptance of policies in the formulation of which neither they nor the population at large had been consulted. In 1946 the Ten-Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika Territory was issued (revised in 1950) as the guide not only for efforts at economic development but also to provide the basis for ancillary plans, such as the one for education issued in 1947. Perhaps the greatest emphasis was put on agriculture, transportation, and education. Little attention was paid to the development of industry, a consequence in part of Kenya's head start and the tendency to see it as the major locus of industry in an increasingly interrelated East Africa. In the government's view, improvements in the educational system were essential to economic development, and a fair amount of money was devoted to it. The education plan itself and the government's perspective on Tanganyika's needs were, however, limited, perhaps because there was no sense of urgency about preparing Tanganyikans to rule themselves. The plan stressed primary schooling; some attention was to be given to secondary education but very little to education at university or advanced technical levels. The number of Tanganyika Africans entering Makerere College in Kampala, Uganda, the sole East African college in the plan period, was much smaller than the numbers from Kenya or Uganda, although Tanganyika's population was roughly the same as that of Kenya and exceeded Uganda's. This was in part a consequence of the very slow progress of primary and secondary education in Tanganyika before the war, but it also reflected the government's doubts about the desirability of having large numbers of African with higher education in the territory, at least in the early 1950s. In 1947 about 7.5 percent of Tanganyikan children were in schools, and it was hoped to have all eligible children in primary school at the end of the plan period. This was not achieved; moreover only one child in ten went to school beyond the fourth year. In part this failure to meet the goal was a consequence of lack of money and trained teachers. There were ethnic groups, such as the Chaga, who did better at their own expense. Minor additions to the existing railroad system were made in response to specific needs, but these needs were short-lived, and the additions had no long-run value. The development plan placed the greatest emphasis on road construction, a decision then and subsequently supported by a number of analysts. For most of the period between 1946 and independence, however, the government stressed the construction of first-class asphalted roads in the face of great increases in cost, leading to an extraordinary drain on Tanganyika's limited resources. The standards were lowered in 1955, and as Tanganyika neared independence greater emphasis was put on building graveled feeder roads, still expensive because many areas had to import the materials but perhaps more useful in the long run to African peasants who had to get their produce to the market. Cyril Ehrlich, writing on Tanganyika's economy in the period from 1945 to independence puts it plainly: "In 1945 Tanganyika was desperately poor." He attributes this in small part to the exigencies of war, but the basic problems in his view were other: a harsh environment and an ill-educated population; "an infrastructure whose sparseness and inadequacy was remarkable even by the standards of tropical Africa;" a negative administrative policy toward economic development; and an uncertain international status that was a barrier to investment and entrepreneurial activity. These obstacles were not overcome. Again in Ehrlich's words, "Tanganyika entered the 1960s as one of the poorest and least developed of African countries." Part of the problem, before the war and after, was the lack of money; in the 1930s because of the depression, later because Great Britain itself took a long time to recover from the effects of the war and in some instances extracted wealth that might have remained in Tanganyika. Initially the single largest source of grant aid was Great Britain's Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme; a little came from the United States as Marshall Aid. There were also some internal resources, and a substantial amount was borrowed. An export boom in the late 1940s and early 1950s (of sisal and other cash crops) also generated a good deal of revenue, although governmental policies precluded its generating even more. The government tended to be very reluctant to anticipate such revenue and to plan for its spending, however, in part because the one extraordinary expenditure of money, the Groundnuts Scheme, had turned out so badly. It must be noted further that shortages of men and materials in the plan period outside the government's control would have set limits on a more imaginative and aggressive program. The Groundnuts Scheme, begun in 1947, was formulated not in Tanganyika but by the Ministry of Food in Great Britain and later turned over to its representative, the Overseas Food Corporation. It was a disaster. Great Britain, suffering from balance-of-payments problems and hoping to earn dollars as well as provide peanut oil to relieve shortages at home, poured millions pounds into the project in the hope of turning 5,000 square miles of Tanganyika into a major producer of groundnuts (peanuts). The emphasis was on large-scale mechanized agriculture. A virtually uninhabited tract of land east of Dodoma was chosen. Preliminary investigation was superficial, and no experimentation was carried out before men, money, and machines were poured into the area. The soil was poor and unsuited to the use of heavy machinery. Lack of rain in 1947 and 1948 contributed to the failure of the first harvest. By 1949 there was a second bad harvest, and in 1951 the scheme was abandoned. The local people knew the territory as the land of perpetual dryness, but they hadn't been asked, nor for that matter had local colonial agricultural officers. The scheme had no major direct impact on the Tanganyikan economy, but it may be argued that the same amount of money invested in a number of better planned and less grandiose projects might have had a positive effect. That kind of investment was not forthcoming because the scheme was conceived not as a contribution to the development of Tanganyika but as a contribution to the British economy. The income of Tanganyikans and of the Tanganyika government was also affected by British policy. For example, the territory's sisal industry dominated the world market from 1942 until the mid-1950s, but it did not reap all the benefits it might have nor did the government derive as much revenue as it could have because from 1941 to 1948 the British government had an agreement to buy at prices substantially below those available elsewhere. Prices were increased in 1946 and again until the end of the agreement, but it has been estimated that the industry lost about 11 million pounds in that period, and whatever revenues the government might have derived from that sum were also lost. Sisal was almost exclusively plantation grown, and the loss was felt directly by its non-African owners. It is possible, however, that some revenue could have been reinvested in replacement of sisal plants and development of capacity with implications for the comparatively large African labor force on the plantations. A similar British policy also affected some of the peasant producers of coffee. For example, from 1946 to 1952 the British government was the sole purchaser, at a fixed price, of coffee grown by the Chaga and marketed by the KNCU. At the insistence of the Chaga who were aware of world market prices, the agreement was ended in 1952. It may be argued, as indeed it was, that the original contract provided a guaranteed base price for the peasant producers, permitting them to get under way after the war without the risk of fluctuating prices. Nevertheless the British were not quick to take the initiative to change the policy. Although in principle government plans emphasized measures that would show a quick return, in practice, as Ehrlich points out, a great deal of money was spent on transport, particularly on first-class roads, which were not only costly but inadequate for developing areas and hardly used in backward ones. Much less money went into communication, and the expenditures on roads were much greater than total expenditures on agricultural and veterinary services. Perhaps more important was the tendency of the government to distort the idea of self-sufficiency in food production, at least in the first half of the period (to 1953 and sometimes later). Self-sufficiency came to be seen not as a territorial matter but as a provincial or district one, each such unit being expected to provide for itself. In practice such a policy tended to entrench subsistence farming. A territorial perspective would have emphasized market exchange of different products cultivated in different parts of the country. It is perhaps ironic that the burgeoning (and sometimes fully flowered) African participation in a partial market economy in the nineteenth century should have been, in effect, smothered in the twentieth (see Raiders and Traders: The Nineteenth Century, this ch.). Efforts to increase production in specific areas took the form of improving agricultural techniques and land usage imposed by fiat through and enforced by the Native Authorities. The rules governing cultivation and animal husbandry varied from place to place and in their degree of complexity, but their violation was treated as a criminal matter, and many of the so-called criminal cases heard in the courts of the Native Authorities dealt with these matters. Although some of the practices enforced may have been desirable from a purely technical point of view, others were of doubtful value. In any case widespread resentment of these rules and the way in which they were enforced provided TANU with a degree of support in the rural areas that might not have been otherwise forthcoming, at least so soon (see The Emergence of TANU, this ch.).