$Unique_ID{COW03634} $Pretitle{262} $Title{Tanzania Chapter 1A. Historical Setting} $Subtitle{} $Author{Irving Kaplan} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{tanzania groups area early bantu iron peoples century political african} $Date{1978} $Log{Wood Carving*0363401.scf Figure 2.*0363403.scf } Country: Tanzania Book: Tanzania, A Country Study Author: Irving Kaplan Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1978 Chapter 1A. Historical Setting [See Wood Carving: Wood carving from a Nyamwezi Chief's throne.] The union in 1964 of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania joined two entities whose connections before the nineteenth century had been few and whose political, social, and economic systems in the precolonial and colonial eras were quite different. Moreover there were overwhelming differences in size between the two islands constituting Zanzibar and the land mass of Tanganyika. Their populations in the mid-1970s-roughly 15.5 million for the mainland and about 500,000 for Zanzibar-indicate the proportions at the time of union and earlier. Early in the second millennium A.D. Zanzibar was one of a number of coastal and insular city-states oriented to the Indian Ocean trade, Islamic in culture, and inhabited by a mixed, largely Afro-Arab population. The mainland had been peopled over a very long period by a number of groups that were different linguistically, culturally and, in some respects, physically. By the second millennium, however, Tanganyika's population was composed chiefly of groups speaking Bantu languages, using iron implements, and relying on agriculture (supplemented by hunting, gathering, and fishing) for subsistence. The arrival and mixing of groups on the mainland continued through the nineteenth century. In the course of this process each amalgam evolved its own social and political institutions. Bantu (and non-Bantu) groups were, however, generally characterized by relatively small-scale political units. Even when such units were linguistically and culturally similar a sense of ethnic identity encompassing all of them emerged very slowly. By the late eighteenth century Zanzibar became the seat of an Omani dynasty, and by the early nineteenth largely Arab-owned clove plantations dependent on slave labor dominated its domestic economy and that of Pemba. Not long after, trading links (including the slave trade) between Zanzibar (and its dependencies) and various groups in the mainland's interior were firmly established, directly and indirectly affecting the economies and politics of mainland societies. By mid-century European traders had established themselves in Zanzibar, but the chief official presence was that of the British who were there to stop the sale of slaves to Europeans. Except for a few explorers the only Europeans on the mainland before the 1880s were missionaries, Roman Catholic and Protestant, of diverse origin. Substantial success in converting Africans was not to occur until the twentieth century, however. An ancillary but important task, that of bringing Western education to Africans, was also begun and became a major mission responsibility throughout the colonial period. In 1885 Germany authorized the German East Africa Company to administer what had become a German colony in the division of Africa arranged by the European powers. The company's ineptitude led to the German government's assumption of administrative responsibilities in 1890. For the rest of the nineteenth century and much of the first decade of the twentieth, the German colonial authorities began the development of the territory at the same time that they dealt with African recalcitrance, including a major rebellion in 1906. By the time they had instituted unchallenged control only a short interval remained before the onset of World War I and the loss of the colony to British troops by 1917. In 1922 the mainland, now called Tanganyika, became a League of Nations mandated territory administered by Great Britain. Meanwhile Great Britain had established a protectorate over Zanzibar (including Pemba and a coastal strip later ceded to the Germans). In principle the sultan continued to rule, but the British increasingly dominated administration and government finance. Despite their subordinate role in government and their growing dependence on Indian merchants and financiers, the Arabs, particularly the Omani elite, maintained their social status. That status was supported by the British who thought of Zanzibar as an Arab state through the colonial period, although Arabs constituted less than 20 percent of the population. In the interwar period political, social, and economic development in Tanganyika proceeded slowly. The territory lacked easily exploitable natural resources, and much of its land was characterized by poor soils, uncertain rainfall, and tsetse fly, making it unsuitable for cultivation or herding. The considerable investment required for more rapid social and economic development was not forthcoming from Great Britain for a variety of reasons, including the depression of the 1930s. The Tanganyika government, in part as a matter of principle, in part to cope with a shortage of personnel, instituted the system of indirect rule. The system entailed administration through traditional chiefs or their analogues on the assumption that as natural rulers they would be the appropriate channels not only for the maintenance of law and order, but also for gradually introduced change. The demands made on chiefs by authorities, their increasing dependence on the regime for approval, and the use of chiefs to introduce unpopular measures (even more marked after World War II) led to distortion of the precolonial relations between chiefs and people, and chiefs gradually lost their legitimacy. By the end of World War II, despite the slow pace at which the educational system had developed, a number of literate Tanganyika Africans, many of them working at lower levels in the civil service, had appeared on the political stage organized as the Tanganyika African Association (TAA). Local political agitation and organization had also begun in some rural areas, often set off by resentment of rules governing agricultural and herding practices imposed through and enforced by the Native Authorities (chiefs and their appointed subordinates). These resentments, coupled with antipathies accumulated over the years, and the political movements that grew out of them were to provide a significant basis for mass support for the nationalist party that emerged in the mid-1950s. The TAA began to ask for elected representation at various levels and to protest the operation of a de facto color bar in most political, economic, and social relations. Resentment generated by the color bar was focused on European colonial authorities and settlers; part of it was turned against Asians, almost ubiquitous in the kinds of commercial enterprise and civil service positions to which Africans were beginning to aspire and often considered more remote than Europeans by Africans. The colonial government responded to these manifestations of discontent slowly and attempted to carry out its own, sometimes uncertain, plans for development, predicated on colonial rule for a long period. The authorities emphasized growth in the educational system, continuing development in plantation agriculture and cash cropping by peasant smallholders, and road construction. They also intended a very gradual introduction of elected representatives in the Legislative Council and at local levels. Closely associated with the notion of election was the notion of multiracialism calling for the representation for both Europeans and Asians equal to that of Africans who vastly outnumbered them. This point of view, urged by the governor of Tanganyika from 1949 to 1958, was disliked by the ordinary African and was to provide a major issue for African nationalists. In July 1954 the TAA became the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) under the leadership of Julius K. Nyerere. Rejecting multiracialism (and tribalism) TANU emphasized the African nature of Tanganyika and called for African majorities at all levels of government. It was the first African organization to indicate that independence was its ultimate goal, but it set no timetable for self-rule. Despite the obstacles the colonial authorities put in its way TANU, sparked by Nyerere's leadership and eloquence, rapidly, gained membership and support. By 1958 internal and external developments had opened the way to self-government, achieved in September 1960; independence quickly followed in December 196l. Progress toward independence in Zanzibar, initially slow, gathered steam in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The situation in Zanzibar and Pemba was not simple, allegiances and antipathies based on race, socioeconomic class, and religion cutting across one another. In the end the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) achieved a popular majority, but a coalition of two minority parties held a parliamentary majority when independence was granted in December 1963. In January 1964 a revolution led to the ouster of the Arab-led coalition and the end of the sultanate. On April 26 Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (later the United Republic of Tanzania) (see fig. 1). The reasons for the union were complex and are not altogether clear. In any case there were no significant implications for the internal political and economic systems of the mainland or the islands. Zanzibar maintained its autonomy in virtually all matters. Only in 1977 when the ASP and TANU formally became one under the name of the Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi-CCM) were tentative steps taken toward the integration of the two territories (see ch. 2). From self-rule in 1960 to the mid-1960s, Tanganyika was a de facto one-party state, but TANU was given a subsidiary role as Nyerere and his colleagues sought to function in terms of the parliamentary system given by the independence constitution prepared by the British. They also relied heavily on British civil servants and assumed that development necessarily required a great deal of foreign aid, British and other. These assumptions gradually gave way in the face of internal discontents and conflicts with the Western powers. The internal pressures, present from the beginning, arose from Nyerere's reluctance to Africanize the civil service too swiftly lest expertise and efficiency be diminished and from his unwillingness to cater to what he considered African racialism. Nevertheless some adjustments were carried out. Nyerere also struggled with the concept of democracy: in his view the Western notion implied a win-lose system in which different interest groups sought to maximize their power and influence at the expense of others. An African system implied the consensus of a moral community in which the welfare of all was considered. To approximate the latter, amendments to the constitution formally instituted a one-party state. It is doubtful that most of his colleagues shared Nyerere's philosophical orientation, but they had no difficulty in accepting the change: a one-party system confirmed their oligarchic experience and their certainty that as leaders of the independence movement they had a right to rule. Nyerere, however, was not fully satisfied. He saw signs of an incipient class division in the country, not only between well-off party and government leaders on the one hand and peasants on the other, but also between urban and rural Tanzanians and among the peasantry where the structure of rewards for enterprising farmers was leading to significant economic differentiation in the rural areas. A basic tenet in Nyerere's philosophy was equality, and after tentative writings on socialism in the early 1960s he explicitly urged the institution of a socialist economy and society in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and other official expressions. Like his conception of democracy, Nyerere's idea of socialism was based on his perception of traditional African communities. The growing wealth of party and government leaders was dealt with by instituting a leadership code; the code required that they give up most of their sources of wealth other than their salaries, a step that led to some disgruntlement but was in part, at least, effective. Above all, Nyerere's conception of socialism was founded on his view of the nature of the traditional African rural community, and it was oriented to the axiom that the great bulk of the mainland's population would remain agricultural. This set of ideas and assumptions accounts for the salience of the idea of ujamaa in the years after the Arusha Declaration. Ujamaa, inadequately translated as familyhood, refers to a pattern of equality, cooperation, interdependence, and sharing presumably characteristic not only of the family but also of traditional rural communities, even if they are not composed of kin. Given Tanzania's essentially rural character, ujamaa was to be made concrete in ujamaa villages. But if a mode of village social and economic organization was to go hand in hand with economic development and the provision of social services to which all Tanzanians were entitled, the dispersed communities characteristic of much of Tanzania would have to give way to nucleated ones-a process that came to be called villagization. After a slow start and a good deal of coercion, villagization proceeded rapidly in the mid-1970s; ujamaa as a set of attitudes and social arrangements took hold much more slowly, a fact recognized by Nyerere and others (see ch. 2; ch. 3; ch. 4). The idea was not abandoned, however; it was assumed that the process would take longer and that it could not be coerced. A second salient point in the Arusha Declaration was the notion of self-reliance (kujitegemea). Both leaders and followers had come increasingly to assume that economic development depended on huge quantities of aid from foreign sources, untenable and unfortunate in Nyerere's view. He did not reject such aid (and it was, in fact, still very important in the late 1970s), but he considered the attitude an obstacle to hard work by Tanzanians. One of TANU's early slogans was "Freedom and Work" (Uhuru na Kazi); the latter intended to disabuse Tanzanians of the idea that independence alone would bring the millennium. His insistence on self-reliance was consistent with the earlier notion. These attempts to institute socialism involved a degree of coercion. Further, it has been assumed that a consensus existed and that opposition to that postulated consensus could stem only from a selfish perspective or from external sources, and suppression has followed (see ch. 2; ch. 5). Nevertheless public and private criticism of specific programs and, indeed, of instances of coercion does occur, and the government takes account of it, even if after the fact. A comparison of Tanzania with other African states of roughly similar size and population suggests that it faces some problems that others do not and is free of some that trouble others. As a consequence in part of its history as one of the three East African territories governed by the British it had only a rudimentary industrial base at independence, the bulk of industrial investment having gone to Kenya. Except for diamonds, expected to run out in the not distant future, it lacked mineral resources. Some of its land was very good, but much of it was not, and the good land often supported excessively dense populations. There has been some progress in economic development, but Tanzania reached independence as a very poor country, and it has, in many respects, remained so (see ch. 4). Like most African states Tanzania is ethnically heterogeneous; as many as 120 ethnic groups have been identified. Nevertheless ethnic relations have not become a political issue, in part because no single group is large enough to have become dominant (the largest constitutes no more than 13 percent of the population) in part because, except in a few cases, ethnic identification is not deeply rooted (see The Peopling of Tanzania, this ch; ch. 3). Moreover Nyerere himself and most other leaders are adamantly opposed to what is usually called tribalism. This does not mean that ethnic awareness does not affect local social and political relations, or that differences in culture and in the economic situations of ethnic groups have not affected perceptions and actions; it does mean that conflict in ethnic terms is not nationally salient. Tanzania has also been fortunate in that a combination of historic factors and TANU's insistence have given it a lingua franca, Swahili, that has become very widely known and provides an opportunity for most Tanzanians to become literature without learning a completely alien language. If divisiveness on ethnic grounds is not a critical issue in Tanzania, it is not clear that efforts to minimize economic differences between urban and rural populations and in the rural areas will not lead to other difficulties. For example, some of the economic differences in rural Tanzania are based on the differences between the natural environments in which specific communities (ethnic groups or large segments of them) have the luck to be located. Whether such differences can be leveled without generating a sense of unfairness is doubtful. Perhaps more important is the problematic nature of Nyerere's assumptions and vision. In the circumstances there is no articulated opposition to that vision, but there are indications that many Tanzanians do not share his emphasis on economic equality. Moreover Nyerere's assumption that his goals are rooted in traditional values may well be misplaced (see ch. 3). Nyerere's popularity is not at issue, and his sense of the direction in which Tanzania should move remained the formal basis of public policy in the late 1970s, but whether his goals are really those of ordinary Tanzanians is another matter. The Peopling of Tanzania With other countries in eastern Africa (Kenya and Ethiopia), Tanzania may have seen the emergence of the earliest ancestors of mankind, but no connection can be traced between those ancient hominids or, for that matter, the earliest known Homo sapiens in the area and any element in the modern population. Some of the ancestors of the present inhabitants may have been in the area more than 10,000 years ago; others came as late as the nineteenth century. But the antecedents of the great bulk of the population arrived over a period of many centuries beginning some time in the first half of the first millennium A.D. and continuing into the eighteenth century. The process was gradual: small groups of people moved in stages from a point of departure, arrived in the area, and adapted to local conditions. If a desirable niche was occupied leapfrogging might take place, or the earlier inhabitants would be absorbed or driven out. Often a group's first area of settlement was not its last. The community as a whole or some segment of it might find itself uncomfortable for ecological or sociopolitical reasons with its then current situation and move on. The Mainland Before the Iron Age The earliest inhabitants of mainland Tanzania to which some of its peoples may be tentatively linked were hunters and gatherers some of whose shelters, stone tools and weapons, skeletal materials, and rock drawings have survived. These people were certainly in the area 3,000 to 5,000 years ago, and it is likely that they were present much earlier. It has been suggested, on the basis of a variety of evidence, that they were a part of a once relatively widespread peoples, sometimes called Khoisan speaking, most of them localized for many centuries in southern and southwestern Africa where Europeans came to call them Bushmen and Hottentots. The Sandawe and Hadzapi in northcentral Tanzania are thought to be remnants of these early inhabitants (see ch. 3). By the beginning of the first millennium B.C. parts of the Rift Valley of Kenya and northern Tanzania were occupied by a cattle-herding people using stone tools (and bowls) and resembling the Cushitic-speaking peoples of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia). On the basis of linguistic and other considerations scholars consider southern Ethiopia the point of origin of peoples speaking Cushitic languages, and it is argued that some of them began to move south through the Rift Valley before the first millennium B.C. There is no evidence that they migrated south of central Tanzania, and it is likely that they lived interspersed with the hunters and gatherers who had preceded them in the area. One site, that at Engaruka between lakes Natron and Manyara in northcentral Tanzania, suggests that some of the Southern Cushitic speakers turned to iron and agriculture roughly in mid-first millennium A.D., but most remained pastoralists. What seem to be remnants of these early Southern Cushitic peoples are still found in northcentral Tanzania: the Iraqw, one of the larger ethnic groups, are among them (see ch. 3). The Early Iron Age and the Coming of the Bantu Sometime in the first half of the first millennium A.D. small groups of iron-using people, acquainted with agriculture, entered Tanzania and other parts of eastern and central Africa. These people probably spoke Bantu languages, a set of tongues spoken in historical times by most Africans living south of the equator and by substantial numbers north of it. There is considerable agreement that the ultimate point of origin of their ancestors (the pre-Bantu) lies in western Africa (probably southern Nigeria and Cameroun). The location of later centers of dispersal remains in dispute, but there is no doubt that those entering Tanzania came initially from a westerly direction whatever their point of entry into the territory. All but one of the authenticated and dated early Iron Age sites in Tanzania have been found in the north. Those west of Lake Victoria are apparently part of a series of related finds in the interlacustrine area: southern Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and eastern Zaire; a similar site has been discovered on the other side of the lake at Urewe in Kenya. Another set of sites has been excavated in the foothills of the Pare and Usambara mountains in the northeast and in the Digo Hills between Tanga in Tanzania and Mombasa in Kenya. The only dated early Iron Age site farther south is that at the Uvinza brine springs not far from the eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika. The pottery there, however, resembles that found in Zambia rather than that turned up in the interlacustrine area to the north. Early Iron Age sites have not yet been discovered in southern Tanzania, but it may be assumed that Iron Age Bantu-speaking cultivators reached some part of the area as they clearly did in northeastern-most Zambia immediately south of the Tanzanian border. The early Iron Age Bantu, limited by the kinds of crops (mainly vegetables) available to them and apparently lacking cattle, settled chiefly in the moister, more easily worked areas. Those in the interlacustrine area stressed fishing rather than hunting as a supplementary source of food. All relied to some extent on gathering. It is unlikely that there was much contact or conflict between the Iron Age cultivators and the hunting and gathering groups on the one hand or the pastoralists on the other given what must have been a generally sparse population and the fact that each of these groups had adapted to somewhat different ecological conditions. The Later Iron Age Significant changes in the distribution of the Bantu-speaking peoples began to occur when peoples of non-Bantu origin moved down from the north bringing cattle and cereals, permitting a more intensive exploitation of areas hitherto more or less unoccupied. In a number of cases, particularly in the interlacustrine area, new political forms gradually emerged in the course of contact between disparate peoples (see Social and Political Differentiation to the Late Eighteenth Century, this ch.) [See Figure 2.: Early Iron Age Sites and Non-Bantu Intrusions Source: Adapted from Figure 17, "The Later Iron Age Intrusion," in Roland Oliver "The East African Intrusion," in Roland Oliver (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 3, from c. 1050 to c. 1600, Cambridge University Press, 1977.] The northerners who moved into Tanzania from, roughly, the early centuries of the second millennium to the eighteenth century A.D. were, in linguistic and cultural terms, of three kinds: Central Sudanic, Nilotic, and Paranilotic (see fig. 2). In many cases whatever their cultural contributions to the Bantu already present, they were linguistically, culturally and often, biologically absorbed by them. It has been hypothesized that the first of these peoples to arrive were speakers of Central Sudanic languages, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries located chiefly in the northeastern Zaire and southwestern Sudan but thought to have been a significant population in northern Uganda many centuries ago. Themselves Iron Age people but, unlike Bantu then living in East Africa, grain cultivators and cattle herders, they seem to have affected the ecological adaptations of the interlacustrine Bantu and to have contributed some terms to the local languages (e.g., the currently used word for cow). There is no firm evidence that Bantu contact with this first set of northerners (who probably infiltrated the interlacustrine area slowly and in small groups) led to significant changes in social and political organization, but it is likely that there were some. In any case whatever their contributions to interlacustrine society and culture, the Central Sudanic speakers came eventually to speak Bantu languages; there are no remnant groups in the area. Again on the basis of fragmentary evidence it has been suggested that groups speaking Paranilotic languages (referred to as Southern Paranilotes) reached that part of Tanzania just east of Lake Victoria sometime in the first half of the second millennium A.D., having come ultimately from an area in what is now southeastern Sudan and westernmost Ethiopia. One set of peoples, now known collectively as the Kalenjin, came no farther south than the Kenyan Rift and the highlands immediately to the west of it, but another (linguistically and socially different) group of Southern Paranilotes, the Tatog (sometimes known as Dadog) reached central Tanzania south of lakes Manyara and Eyasi. The historian Roland Oliver (in the Cambridge History of Africa) has offered the hypothesis that these Tatog, remnants of which some are still to be found scattered in the area (Bantuized as Tatoga), brought cattle and cereal farming to central Tanzania. On less substantial evidence it has been suggested that people referred to as Eastern Paranilotes arrived, via the eastern side of the Rift Valley, in the environs of Mount Kilimanjaro and the nearby plains and hills where, presumably, they interacted with early Iron Age Bantu already present, although it is not likely that the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro were heavily occupied by the Bantu-speaking Chaga until somewhat later. A remnant of these early Eastern Paranilotes are the Ongamo living on the northeastern slopes of Kilimanjaro. The last and most important incursion of Eastern Paranilotes occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the arrival of the Masai, a pastoral people (see The Eastern Rift and the Northeastern Highlands, this ch.). Elsewhere in mainland Tanzania during the first half of the second millennium Bantu-speaking peoples were gradually and, on the whole, sparsely settling the interior. Some areas in central Tanzania probably were not settled then and remained unsettled into the twentieth century, either because of inadequate and uncertain rainfall (which precluded cultivation) or tsetse fly (which precluded herding). Oliver points out that this central region, although as large as the interlacustrine area (comprising parts of several modern states) has had in modern times only a fifth of the interlacustrine population, and that ratio probably prevailed in the earlier period. For the purposes of this discussion the region's northern and western borders are the interlacustrine area and Lake Tanganyika, and its southern limits the mountainous area stretching from a point just north of Lake Nyasa west to Lake Tanganyika and northeast to the Iringa Highlands. In the east they are set by the western boundary of the eastern Rift Valley; that western boundary then (and now) marked off the Bantu peoples in the central region from the Paranilotic and Southern Cushitic peoples to the east. The central Tanzanian region apparently drew small groups from the more densely settled Bantu-speaking areas to the west and the east (in the latter case Bantu speakers would have had to move through the eastern Rift peopled by Southern Cushitic and Paranilotic groups). Only in the area immediately south of Lake Victoria and a few other places was relatively dense settlement possible. In this early period political organization was small scale, each entity consisting of a few, usually dispersed, communities. Larger scale systems, just beginning in the interlacustrine area and among the Pare in the northeast, did not emerge until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is difficult to identify in these early settlers the specific ancestors of modern ethnic groups: there is no archaeology and oral history going back to this period; moreover there are indications that a good deal of movement and mixture went on in this and later times, and only some of the ancestors of modern peoples could have been present in the area at that time. The ethnic entities that developed out of usually heterogeneous peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (for example, the Sukuma, Gogo, Turu, Iramba, Hehe, and Fipa) had not yet emerged. Chieftainship and slightly larger scale polities may have begun to develop as early as the fourteenth century A.D. in the ecologically and economically mixed highlands south and southeast of the central region. There the partly pastoral Bantu speakers of the drier northeastern sections of these highlands came eventually to mix with the more intensive cultivators of the south and southwest leading to a process of state formation that took several centuries to effect. In any case the states were small. Again movement and mixture preclude the establishment of a clear connection between a fourteenth or fifteenth century group and modern ethnic groups in the same area. In some cases it is quite clear that a degree of ethnic self-consciousness embracing a number of independent communities did not emerge until the late nineteenth century or later. East of the Rift Valley and north of the lower reaches of the Pangani River lies a series of highland areas (Mount Kilimanjaro and the Pare and Usambara mountains) with minor exceptions inhabited in historical times and earlier by Bantu-speaking peoples. In the Pare Mountains early Iron Age sites, presumably associated with Bantu speakers, have been excavated. Although early Southern Cushitic and Eastern Paranilotic peoples may well have preceded the Bantu, by the end of the first half of the second millennium the bulk of the population consisted of Bantu peoples who continued to move into the area for centuries. Oral history and traditions of origin suggest diverse geographic origins for these people. Kilimanjaro in particular seems to have been a refuge for a variety of largely Bantu-speaking groups, although some Chaga descent groups (see Glossary) claim origin among the Paranilotic Masai. In the coastal hinterland north of the Pangani, also the locus of early Iron Age sites, other Bantu-speaking groups (in part the ancestors of the set of ethnic groups sometimes collectively called the Nyika) were certainly present by the end of the first half of the second millennium and may indeed be linked to those early sites. Among the people in the area, however, was at least one pastoral group, the Segeju, perhaps Paranilotic in origin but Bantuized in historical times. Most of these northeastern Bantu groups, whether in the highlands or the coastal hinterland, were in one degree or another influenced by the pre-Masai Paranilotics, the Masai, or the Southern Cushitic speakers. The most marked indication of that influence is the presence among them of a system of age-sets (see Glossary). The northeastern Bantu consisted of relatively small communities until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with one exception, that of the northern Pare who seem to have been organized into a hierarchical political system in the sixteenth century (that polity was called Ugweno). The pattern began when a clan of blacksmiths became to a limited extent the focus not only of a market for iron but for the settling of disputes and the holding of initiation rites. Another clan, the Suyia, then established political overlordship by what oral history depicts as a coup d'etat; the new rulers organized a hierarchy of councils, sent members of the ruling clan to rule over various districts, and made clan (see Glossary) initiation rites into national ones. South of the Pangani River the coastal hinterland, most of it low and hot, stretches into the interior for roughly 150 to 300 kilometers (100 to 200 miles). Except for the area south of the coastal town of Lindi to the Ruvuma River and stretching west to the town of Masasi, this southeastern quadrant of Tanzania is relatively sparsely peopled, a situation that may be attributed largely to its climate but may have been caused in part by the depredations of slave raiders in the nineteenth century (see Raiders and Traders: The Nineteenth Century, this ch.). Most of the groups in this area are and have been organized in small communities and have lacked a ruling group concerned to support its status by the keeping of detailed genealogies and the development of oral history. Moreover there has been very little archaeological research in the area, and no sites dated to the sixteenth century or earlier have been found. The Arab and mixed Afro-Arab settlers on the coast and offshore islands make no reference to these groups although they must have traded with them.