$Unique_ID{COW03301} $Pretitle{286} $Title{Somalia Chapter 4E. Western Relations} $Subtitle{} $Author{Jean R. Tartter} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{states united somalia aid military ogaden somalia's million somali soviet} $Date{1981} $Log{} Country: Somalia Book: Somalia, A Country Study Author: Jean R. Tartter Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 4E. Western Relations After the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Somalia in 1977, the country sought to rebuild its former close ties with the countries of Western Europe. The refugee situation and Somalia's deepening economic crisis attracted a mounting flow of aid, not only in bilateral form but also through the European Economic Community (EEC) and UN agencies. But Somalia's urgent efforts to find help in refurbishing its army after the Ogaden war were less successful. Although the United States, Britain, and France had been initially disposed to approve the export of arms for the defense of Somalia's borders and to alleviate the effects of the Soviet cutoff, the three Western countries reinstated their embargo policies when it became apparent by August 1977 that Somalia was embarked on a large-scale offensive in the Ogaden. The success of the Ethiopian counteroffensive in January 1978 with Soviet and Cuban assistance presented the Western powers with the problem that Somalia's belligerency had left it virtually defenseless against a possible Soviet-directed invasion. The United States, joined by the other Western countries, called for a negotiated settlement and extracted assurances from the Soviet Union that the advancing Ethiopian forces would not cross the Somali border in return for agreement by Somalia to withdraw its remaining military units from the Ogaden. While Western military aid was withheld pending Somalia's complete cessation of activity in the Ogaden, economic aid from Western Europe and the United States increased measurably. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), which had been a moderate donor, phased out its assistance in 1970 when Somalia recognized the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Aid was resumed in 1978, initiated by an unconditional loan of the equivalent of US $12 million that was regarded as a token of gratitude from Somalia's cooperation in the overpowering of hijackers of a Lufthansa airliner at Mogadishu airport. Italy has sought to maintain working relations with the parties in the Ogaden dispute, regarding its historic role in the Horn as qualifying it to assist in finding a settlement. Although Italy had cut back its substantial aid program in Somalia after 1970, it was resumed in 1977. Subsequently Somalia has become the single most important beneficiary of Italy, accounting for 20 percent of Italian aid worldwide. During a visit to Mogadishu in mid-1981, the Italian foreign minister signed a three-year agreement promising the equivalent of nearly US $200 million for projects in agriculture, irrigation, and energy development. By virtue of its former ties with Italy, Somalia was entitled to associate status with the EEC. EEC aid allocated through the European Development Fund (1980-85) will be equivalent to US $75-85 million, over half of which is intended for the Baardheere dam hydroelectric and irrigation project. The EEC had also provided food aid equal to US $53 million as of mid-1980. French-Somali relations had long been rancorous, Somalia charging France with "colonialism" for its continued presence in Djibouti, and the French suspecting that Somalia, intent on annexation, would subvert that territory's course toward independence. The successful transition of Djibouti to independent statehood brought an end to Somalia's agitation against France and a measure of reconciliation. A number of French firms have been engaged in development-oriented projects, including a large cement works at Berbera financed with Arab credits, and mining and hydrology surveys have been carried out by France. Somalia's relations with the United States have followed an erratic course, negatively affected by Somalia's use of force, directly or indirectly, in pursuit of its Greater Somalia goal and by its earlier military alignment with the Soviet Union. A decisive turn in relations appeared to have been reached when a military access agreement was signed on August 22, 1980, although abundant possibilities remained for future differences and misunderstandings. During the 1960s the United States was the largest source of nonmilitary aid to Somalia after Italy. Political relations were nonetheless distant owing to Somalia's encouragement of insurrection by ethnic Somalis against Kenya and Ethiopia, countries friendly the United States. United States military aid to Ethiopia, significant by African standards, was in turn an irritant to Somalia. The diplomatic climate became more positive after the shift to a policy of accommodation with Kenya and Ethiopia by the Shermarke-Egal government in 1967. The military coup in 1969 was followed by a long period of strained American-Somali relations. As leader of the capitalist world, as Israel's protector in the Middle East, and as a primary benefactor to Kenya and Ethiopia, the United States seemed antagonistic to the SRC's purposes. Peace Corps volunteers, mostly working as teachers, were expelled on trumped-up espionage charges, as were several officials from the United States embassy and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). United States retaliation took the form of closing its USAID mission and terminating its assistance programs, although two projects already under way-a water supply system for Mogadishu and port improvement at Kismaayo-were completed. The justification for the aid cutoff was a United States legal prohibition against assistance to countries lending their flags to vessels engaged in trade with Cuba and Vietnam. While American aid continued to reach Somalia in the form of contributions to multilateral aid programs and disaster relief grain shipments, official contacts remained at a low ebb until Somalia's differences with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1977 resulted in the visit of an economic aid team to Mogadishu. United States officials, seeking to present Somalia an alternative to its military dependence on Moscow, also responded to Somali government appeals by indicating that the United States was prepared "in principle" to supply a limited amount of defensive weaponry. One possibility was that such aid would be financed by friendly Arab states. While this offer was revoked at the outbreak of open conflict in the Ogaden, other factors were by then also working against the arrangement. Congressional reluctance to become more deeply involved in the Horn, Somalia's anti-Israeli posture, and Mogadishu's unwillingness to break conclusively with Moscow until Western aid was firmly pledged were among the constraints acting on the United States. Somalia later asserted that it had been encouraged by the United States through unofficial channels in committing regular units in the Ogaden and that Washington had agreed to replace the Soviet Union as a major arms supplier because the United States wanted to punish Ethiopia for its defection to the Soviet side. American officials rejected this account, pointing out that the arms transaction had been suspended as soon as the presence of the Somali troops in the Ogaden had been verified. As the Soviet and Cuban role in the Ogaden expanded in early 1978 and the Somali situation became more critical, Siad Barre's appeals for arms continued to be rebuffed by the Western powers. The United States objected strongly to the harmful actions of Moscow in supplying excessive arms to both sides and dispatching Cuban troops to Ethiopia. A warning was issued against invasion of Somalia. The OAU was also urged to bring its weight to bear in securing an end to the fighting in the Ogaden. On March 9, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that in a telephone conversation Siad Barre had promised to withdraw his remaining troops from the Ogaden. Carter called upon Somalia for a renewed commitment not to dishonor the boundaries of Kenya or Ethiopia before the United States would be willing to discuss economic aid or defense supplies. Later that month a delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose visited Somalia for detailed talks. Pledges were sought that the Somali government would not use force against any country and would not use American arms except for internal security or to defend the internationally recognized territory of Somalia. Satisfactory assurances were obtained from Siad Barre, but continued Somali operations in the Ogaden deterred the United States from consummating the agreement. In 1979 increased tension in the Persian Gulf and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impelled the United States to reinforce its presence in the Indian Ocean area and to seek access to military facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. Negotiations were reopened with the regime in Mogadishu in early 1980 but were stalled when the Somalis, in an apparent miscalculation of the importance attached by the United States to the military facilities at Berbera, submitted an initial list of its military needs, the cost was estimated at US $2 billion. Agreement was reached, however, in August 1980 covering the use of the naval installations at Berbera and the adjacent airfield. Refurbishing of the port was expected to be completed by 1983. The United States agreed to provide Somalia US $53 million in economic aid and US $40 million in military credits over two years for the purchase of air defense equipment. Somalia was required to reaffirm the written assurances given in 1978, and the United States Congress added a restriction insisting on verification that all Somali regular forces were out of the Ogaden. Such verification was not made by the United States Department of State until January 1981. The military aid package, although falling short of Siad Barre's expectations, assumed considerable symbolic importance to Somalia because it was regarded as representing a political commitment to the country's safety and territorial integrity. The visible presence of United States forces in Somalia would accordingly have been welcomed, although it was expected that only a small number of American troops would be assigned as support personnel. While the new military superiority of Ethiopia in the Ogaden and Somalia's diminished military effectiveness were in 1981 the main factors discouraging Somali incursions, preservation of the new relationship with the United States acted as a further restraint. It appeared, however, that the Somalis would be greatly disappointed if the small initial commitment by the United States were not followed by future military assistance to alleviate equipment deficiencies within the Somali armed forces. United States economic aid resumed after the USAID mission was reopened in 1977. Development assistance has since averaged about US $12 million annually, and food aid from US $35 to US $45 million annually. For fiscal year 1982, US $78.5 million was requested from Congress, of which US $58.5 million was for economic aid and US $20 million for military credits. In addition the United States had been providing about 75 percent of all food relief to the Somali refugees. Contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees totaled US $53 million while direct food grants were US $32 million in fiscal year 1980. * * * An indispensable introduction to Somalia's political situation is contained in the review of domestic policies of the military government and the circumstances surrounding the Ogaden war of 1977-78 in the final two chapters of I.M. Lewis' A Modern History of Somalia (1980 edition). A comprehensive analysis of the "civilianizing" process of the Somali government since 1976 was not available in 1981, but an interesting interpretation of this period could be found in Abdi Sheik-Abdi's article, "Ideology and Leadership in Somalia" in The Journal of Modern African Studies. Sheik-Abdi, who acknowledges the earlier achievements of Siad Barre's rule, describes the growing demoralization among the elites of the country and the revival of clan politics by the leadership. Scientific socialism in Africa and the extent to which Somalia has conformed to its determinants are examined by Kenneth Jowitt and David Laitin, respectively, in successive articles in Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. The important turning point in the politics of the Horn represented by the Ogaden war and Somalia's realignment of its diplomacy is treated by Mohammed Ayoob in Conflict and Intervention in the Third World. Former American Ambassador to Somalia Raymond L. Thurston gives an authoritative recapitulation of United States-Somali relations in "The United States, Somalia, and the Crisis in the Horn" in Horn of Africa. Scanty treatment of Somalia in the world media makes it advisable to consult the annual Africa Contemporary Record and the monthly Africa Research Bulletin for accounts of the republic's domestic politics and international relations. The periodicals Africa and New African also contain periodic reports on Somali developments. (For further information see Bibliography.)