$Unique_ID{COW03286}
$Pretitle{286}
$Title{Somalia
Chapter 1C.   The British Military Administration}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{somali
british
syl
political
italian
administration
independence
somalia
government
party}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Country:     Somalia
Book:        Somalia, A Country Study
Author:      Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 1C.   The British Military Administration

     British military administrations were set up in the protectorate and in
both Somalia and the eastern portions of Ethiopia that had been annexed to it
in 1936. Nearly all of the Somalis-except some in southern Ethiopia and the
small number in French Somaliland-had thereby come under British control. No
common administration for the three areas was contemplated, however, and
Britain agreed to an eventual return of the Ogaden to Ethiopian jurisdiction.
In British Somaliland a military governor, assisted by an army council,
carried on the work formerly assigned to civilian colonial service officers.
In Somalia a small corps of army political officers reported to the area
military commander.

     The priority of the British military administration in wartime was
naturally to restore order and provide security in the region. The Somaliland
Camel Corps was reorganized in the protectorate, and five battalions were
raised for the Somaliland Scouts, incorporating former irregular units. In the
south the Italian security organization was dismantled, and the Somalia
Gendarmerie was formed to police the occupied territory under British
officers. Initially manned by askari (African soldiers) from Kenya, serving
with British forces, and reinforced by Somali irregulars, the paramilitary
organization was later composed of local recruits who received training in a
police school established by the military administration. Forces in the two
territories cooperated in rounding up Italian stragglers and in the difficult
task of disarming Somali nomads in the interior who had taken advantage of the
windfall in weapons provided by the war. Combating the well-armed bands of
shifta (bandits), who raided the Ogaden from Ethiopia, remained a troublesome
problem throughout the period of military administration.

     But the British military administrators who controlled the two Somali
colonies from 1941 to 1949 also accomplished more social and political change
than had their Italian and British predecessors since colonial rule was first
imposed. London's reversal of the prewar policy requiring that British
Somaliland be self-supporting allowed additional funds to be made available
for development. The protectorate's capital was moved from Berbera to Hargeysa
(Hargesa), a religious and trading center for the nomadic herders in the
interior, to indicate greater British involvement in Somali problems. Although
the civil service remained inadequate in numbers, efforts were undertaken to
improve agricultural and health services and to influence Somali opinion in
favor of development. The military administration succeeded in opening a
number of secular schools where there had been only subsidized Quranic schools
before 1939.

     The local court system was also reorganized, and local advisory and
planning committees were established in the towns. In 1946 the Protectorate
Advisory Council was created in which districts were represented by Somali
appointees of both modern and traditional orientation.

     In Somalia the military administration ensured better pay and working
conditions for the agricultural labor force. By 1947 the number of pupils in
the elementary schools had increased to twice the prewar figure, and a center
for training elementary school teachers was opened. The British also provided
the opportunity for Somalis to qualify as junior officials in the civil
service and the gendarmerie. In addition the first chance for Somali political
activity opened up as Italian-appointed clan chiefs were gradually displaced
by elected advisory assemblies at the clan level. District and provincial
councils were also created to advise the military administration.

     The military administration continued to depend on Italian civilians in
the colony to keep the economy functioning and to operate public services.
Only those civilians who were regarded as security risks were interned. In
early 1943 Italians were allowed to form political associations. New Italian
organizations of all political persuasions immediately sprung up and began to
agitate for an eventual return to Italian rule. In the face of such pressure
the British and Somalis saw each other as allies. The British accordingly
encouraged the formation of the first modern Somali political organization,
the Somali Youth Club (SYC), founded in Mogadishu in May 1943.

     SYC was strengthened from the beginning by the inclusion of better
educated civil servants and police officers in its membership and leadership.
Under any other British jurisdiction this group would have been prevented from
engaging in politics by civil service rules, but in Somalia they were allowed
to join SYC because it served as a counterweight to the Italian interests.

     The SYC grew rapidly in popularity and had gained an estimated membership
of 25,000 by 1946. Its name was changed to the Somali Youth League (SYL) in
1947, at which time branches operated not only in Somalia but also in British
Somaliland and in the Somali-populated areas of Ethiopia and Kenya. The SYL
had announced as its aims the unification of Somali territory, creation of
widespread opportunity for modern education, development of the Somali
language through the adoption of a standard written form, and general
protection of Somali interests, including opposition to the reimposition of
Italian colonial rule. The organization's thirteen founding members
represented five of Somali's six clan-families, and its members made strong
efforts to promote the concept of a common Somali nationality without regard
for clan divisions, going so far as to refuse to use their clan names. A
second political body, initially called the Patriotic Benefit Union, was
established in the same period. In 1947 it became the Somali Digil Clan Party
(Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali-HDMS). The HDMS represented the agricultural
clans of the regions between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers against what its
supporters saw as the dominance of the SYL by pastoral interests. In its
opposition to these interests, the HDMS was willing to accept considerable
financial support from the Italians. Although the SYL had some northern
supporters, the chief parties in British Somaliland were the Somaliland
National League (SNL), which represented the dominant Isaaq clan-family, and
the United Somali Party (USP), which had the backing of the Dir and northern
Darod.

     Technically, British-administered Somalia remained an Italian possession
at the end of World War II, but at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 the Allies
agreed that Italian colonies seized during the war would not be returned to
Italy. Responsibility for deciding their disposition fell to the Allied
Council of Foreign Ministers, which delegated the Four Power Commission
(composed of representatives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the
United States) to study the question of Somalia's future. In January 1948 the
commission arrived in Mogadishu to hear testimony. The SYL obtained permission
from the military administration for a rally to demonstrate popular support
for its opposition to the reimposition of Italian jurisdiction in any form.
Rioting occurred, and fifty-one Italians and seventeen Somalis lost their
lives when Italian-backed groups attempted to disrupt the rally and discredit
the SYL in the commission's eyes. In spite of the disorder the commission
continued its hearings and was impressed by the program presented by the SYL's
spokesmen, Abdullahi Issa and Haji Mohamed Hussein. In addition to the
unification of all Somali territories, the SYL requested a trusteeship under
an international commission for a ten-year period to be followed by full
independence. The HDMS offered a similar solution, breaking with its stance
that Italy should be the administering power but recommending a thirty-year
trusteeship. Also presenting their views were Somali groups and Italian
interests that favored an Italian trusteeship or even a return to Italian
rule.

     Although the Four Power Commission reported favorably on a trusteeship
similar to that envisioned by the SYL, the Council of Foreign Ministers could
not agree on a formula for guiding the country to independence. The United
States called for international administration of a trusteeship and France,
for a return to Italian control. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin
outlined a plan calling for a British-supervised trusteeship over all
territory then under military administration and leading-on condition of
Ethiopian approval-to eventual independence for Greater Somalia. Bevin's
proposal, which mirrored in most respects the position of the SYL, was
withdrawn when the United States and the Soviet Union accused Britain of
seeking its own aggrandizement at the expense of Ethiopia and Italy. Prospects
that a communist regime might come to power in Italy explained Soviet concern
for Italian interests at that time.

     In 1948 Britain turned over the Ogaden to Ethiopia, in effect dashing
nationalist hopes for an international agreement creating Greater Somalia.
Although it had historical claims to the region, Ethiopia attempted for the
first time to impose effective control over the Ogaden. The blow of the
transfer was softened somewhat for the Ogaden clans, whose chiefs had
unsuccessfully petitioned the British government to retain its jurisdiction
there, by the payment to them of a large indemnity from Britain. The following
year Britain also ended its administration of the Haud but, with Ethiopian
consent, continued to station liaison officers in the so-called Reserved
Areas. Their mission was to ensure the security of nomadic pastoralists who
grazed their herds in the Haud six months out of the year and whose protected
clans made up half the population of British Somaliland.

     Meanwhile the unresolved issue of Somalia was passed by the Council of
Foreign Ministers to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) for a
solution. In November 1949 the General Assembly assigned a trusteeship over
the former colony to Italy for a period of ten years under UN supervision,
with the clear proviso that the Italian administration was to prepare the
former colonial territory for independence before the end of 1960. In coming
to that decision the General Assembly accepted the argument that Italy was the
best qualified power to undertake the task by virtue of political experience
and economic interests in its former colony. Although the SYL had continually
opposed any return to Italian control, the UN decision was accepted without
protest because of the guarantee that independence would be obtained in so
short a period.

Trusteeship and Protectorate: Creating the Somali State

     The Trust Territory of Somalia entered the 1950s under Italian
administration with a political advantage not held by other colonial
territories: it had a date set for independence and the opportunity to prepare
purposefully for self-government. British Somaliland, which was to be merged
with the trust territory in forming the new Somali state, had no such
advantage. Accordingly its development, although greatly accelerated by the
colonial administration, proceeded haphazardly. The marked disparity between
the two areas continued until their independence in 1960.

     In view of the expressed opposition to renewed Italian administration of
Somalia, the Italian trusteeship was carefully circumscribed. The UN
Trusteeship Agreement placed responsibility for the trust territory in the
hands of a special government agency, the Italian Trusteeship Administration
(Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia-AFIS). The agreement also
created the UN Advisory Council, which was based in Mogadishu and reported
directly to the Trusteeship Council. This international panel was empowered to
examine AFIS programs and to recommend further actions to ensure the
implementation of the agreement's objectives. The agreement provided for the
establishment of political institutions, expansion of the education system,
social and economic advancement, and guarantees of complete freedom of speech
and press and the right to petition.

     Despite these guarantees of political and civil rights, relations between
the new Italian administrators and the Somali nationalists were strained. The
Italians, fearing a violent display of opposition to their return, arrived
with a show of military force and immediately attempted to suppress the SYL,
which was seen as the center of anti-Italian feeling. Some SYL leaders were
jailed, and others were dropped from the high civil service positions they had
obtained under the British. The Somalis reacted with rioting that was forcibly
suppressed. The antagonism lasted for three years, until economic and
political development programs began to provide an outlet for the energies of
the nationalists.

     A series of seven-year development programs was inaugurated in 1954.
These programs were based on plans drawn up by the UN and by the United States
International Cooperation Administration (predecessor of the United States
Agency for International Development). They concentrated on efforts to
stimulate indigenous agriculture and to improve infrastructure. Exports were
trebled during the seven-year program period, but a severe balance of payments
deficit persisted, and government revenues, largely dependent on import and
export duties, continued to be wholly inadequate.

     The development plans for education were more successfully implemented.
The number of students in 1957 had risen to double the 1952 figure. Nearly
2,000 were enrolled in secondary, technical, and university-level programs in
Somalia, Italy, and Egypt. In addition attention was directed to the adult
literacy program and to training the civil servants who would be the new
nation's political leaders.

     The development of institutions to serve as bases for the country's
future self-government was also far more encouraging than the economic
picture. In line with the UN resolution, the AFIS established a national
consultative body, the Territorial Council, in 1950. The council immediately
became an active body, engaging in the full-scale debate of proposed AFIS
legislation. The thirty-five-member body, which AFIS was required to consult
on all important issues, included representatives of both traditional
interests and the political parties, the latter gradually gaining a dominant
position during the five years that the council sat. Those who participated in
its deliberations gained experience in legislative and committee procedure, as
well as a first-hand view of the political, social, and economic problems that
the government would confront when Somalia attained its independence. The
council's support for legislation also gave legitimacy to the AFIS operation
in Somali eyes.

     Other Somalis gained executive and legislative experience through
participation in the forty-eight municipal councils created after 1950. With
the aid of secretaries trained in municipal administration, the members
handled matters of town planning, public services, and (after 1956) fiscal and
budgetary matters. The central government retained the power to overrule
council decisions and to dismiss mayors and councilors.

     The district councils, responsible for rural areas, were considerably
weaker than their urban counterparts and were concerned primarily with
settling disputes over grazing and water rights according to customary law.
Attempts to give the councils wider powers were limited by the nature of the
pastoral economy. The nomads' search for pasture for their herds required
nearly constant movement, which made any identification with political
boundaries-even international borders-all but impossible. The Advisory
Council's intention that the district councils could be used as channels for
development proved impossible to fulfill, and the reins of government in
nomadic areas remained largely in the hands of district commissioners.

     The 1954 municipal elections provided the first opportunity for
widespread political participation, and the elections were conducted in a
spirited but orderly fashion. Eleven of the fifteen competing parties won
seats, but only the SYL, which gained approximately 45 percent of the vote,
and the HDMS, winning almost 25 percent, commanded the support of significant
portions of the electorate.

     The first national elections were held in 1956 to choose delegates to the
new seventy-seat Legislative Assembly that replaced the Territorial Council.
Again only the SYL, which won forty-three seats, and the HDMS, gaining
thirteen seats, made significant showings in the ten-party race for sixty
Somali-held posts. Ten seats in the assembly were reserved for elected
representatives of the Italian, Arab, and Indian communities.

     The leader of the SYL in the assembly, Abdullahi Issa, was called on to
become the first premier of a government that included five other
ministers-all Somalis. The new assembly possessed full legislative power in
all domestic matters, although the senior official of AFIS retained the power
of absolute veto as well as the right to issue emergency regulations without
prior assembly approval. The AFIS retained control over external relations
including the sensitive issue of resolving the frontier dispute with Ethiopia.
Foreign financial affairs remained under Italian control until February 1957,
and defense and public order did not pass entirely into Somali hands until
1958.

     The 1956 election was conducted in sedentary areas by secret ballot and
male suffrage. In the interior the nomadic nature of the society made
registration much more difficult, and for this reason a clan voting system was
approved. Nomadic pastoralists of each clan met in an assembly and decided
jointly on the candidate for whom all their votes would be cast. (There were
600 such assemblies.) Clan leaders then informed the authorities of the
assembly's decision and the number of individual votes. The total number of
votes cast in the territory far outnumbered the estimated size of the actual
electorate. This incident did little to diminish the enthusiasm of the Somali
people for their first opportunity at political expression, but it left a
residue of interparty distrust for a number of years. Because the SYL was the
strongest party in the nomadic areas, its opponents charged that it had gained
the most from the alleged irregularities.

     At the time of the 1956 election the clan-family distribution of the
SYL's strength was estimated at 50 percent Darod, 30 percent Hawiye, 10
percent Digil and Rahanweyn, and 10 percent from other groups. (These figures
may be compared with the estimated division of the trust territory's
population: 18 percent Darod, 38 percent Hawiye, and 29 percent Digil and
Rahanweyn.) The HDMS found nearly all of its support among Digil and Rahanweyn
agriculturalists, although the party's strength was primarily along lines of
common economic interest rather than clan ties.

     One of the first acts of the new SYL-dominated assembly was to make it
illegal for political parties to bear the name of clans or clan-families. The
HDMS immediately changed its full title to the Somali Independent
Constitutional Party (Hizbia Dustur Mustaquil Somali), eliminating reference
to a clan while retaining the familiar acronym.

     The Issa government remained in power for four years until independence
and thus was able to oversee the terms under which the new state was created.
Its attitudes were modernist, pan-Somali, and nationalist, although it became
and remained strongly pro-Italian once Italy was no longer seen as a threat to
Somali independence. The government's first concerns were to improve the
country's economic stability so as to ensure foreign assistance to replace the
support Italy would continue to provide until independence. It also fulfilled
its pledge to grant voting rights to women in time for municipal elections in
1958. It strongly supported the promotion of Somalis into all important
government positions, but this did not constitute a major political issue
because Somalization was well under way before 1956. For example all the
sensitive posts of district commissioner had been turned over to Somalis in
1955. All other posts were being Somalized as fast as candidates could receive
the required minimum educational background. Other efforts at modernization
included attempts to weaken clan ties, particularly by limiting the payment of
dia (see Glossary), and to further the breakup of the low status traditionally
ascribed to persons in certain occupations. These changes, however, came
slowly (see The Segmentary Social Order, ch. 2).

     The government's second major concern was to draft the constitution that
would become effective with independence. The most difficult provisions were
those concerning the concept of Greater Somalia, that is, for the ultimate
inclusion of the Somali-populated areas in Kenya, Ethiopia, French Somaliland,
and British Somaliland into the Somali state. Such draft provisions became
embroiled in the controversy over the choice of having either a unitary
structure of government or a federal one that would allow the other parts of
greater Somalia to be incorporated into the state more easily. This choice
was complicated by HDMS support for federalism on a lower level, which might
have lessened the dominance of the numerically superior nomads over the
farmers of the interriverine region, who backed the party. The SYL favored the
concept of a unitary state, fearing that federalism would stimulate divisive
clan interests. The SYL's political strength allowed its position to prevail
without difficulty in framing the new constitution.

     Because of the way in which the SYL dominated the political scene,
conflicts over outstanding political issues gradually began to take place
within the party rather than between the SYL and other groups. Internal
divisions formed as factions within the SYL strove to win a greater voice in
the party for their views or those of their clans. Individual politicians made
efforts to widen the cleavage between the party's Hawiye and Darod supporters.
Others accused the Issa government of being too friendly to the Italians and
of doing nothing to achieve the goal of a Greater Somalia. In July 1957 Haji
Mohamed Hussein, who had been president of the SYL in the early years, was
again elected to lead the party. His own views conflicted strongly with those
of the Issa government and with the party's leader in the legislature,
assembly president Aden Abdullah Osman. Hussein led the party wing that
favored loosening ties with the West and establishing closer relations with
the Arab world, particularly with the United Arab Republic (Egypt).

     In April 1958 Hussein and his supporters were expelled from the SYL
without causing a major split in the party. Hussein then formed a new party,
the Greater Somali League (GSL), and its militant platform incorporated his
pan-Arab and pan-Somali philosophy. Although Hussein remained an important
political figure, the GSL was unable to draw significant support away from the
SYL.

     After its victory in the 1958 municipal elections, the SYL further
strengthened its position on the national level at the expense of the HDMS,
when some Rahanweyn politicians switched their allegiance to what was clearly
the country's real power center. These changes came in time to assist the SYL
in the final preindependence election for the National Assembly, which was
expanded to ninety seats. The GSL and the major portion of the HDMS alleged
interference in their election campaigns and boycotted the election in
protest. As a result sixty-one seats were uncontested and went to the SYL
candidates by default in addition to the twenty-two contested seats won by the
party's candidates.

     The new government formed in June 1959 was again under the premiership of
Abdullahi Issa. The great expansion of the SYL allowed nearly all clans to be
represented in it. Accordingly attempts were made to divide the fifteen
cabinet positions among the representatives of all clan-families, but
conflicts continued within the party and cabinet between conservative elements
and those with a more modern outlook led by Abdirashid Ali Shermarke.

     The civilian colonial administration that had been reinstated in British
Somaliland in 1948 worked to expand educational opportunities in the
protectorate, but the number of Somalis who had qualified for important
administrative positions remained limited. There was little economic
development, and exports were largely confined to livestock, hides, and
aromatic wood and gum. Improvements were made in watering facilities and
agricultural and veterinary services that benefited farming and herding, but
intensified geological surveys failed to reveal exploitable mineral resources.

     Political preparation for assuming responsibility for eventual
self-government did not go beyond the extension of participation in local
government. The SYL opened branches in British Somaliland, but neither it nor
the SNL was able to stimulate widespread interest in party politics. In late
1954, however, a catalyst to popular involvement in political issues was
provided by the withdrawal of British liaison officers from the Reserved Areas
as part of London's agreement with Ethiopia confirming that country's claims
to the Haud under the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty and returning full
jurisdiction there to Ethiopian authorities. British colonial authorities with
responsibility in the region were embarrassed by their government's action,
which some considered a betrayal of the trust put in them by the protected
Somali clans whose herds grazed in the Haud.

     The protest was immediate and massive. The revitalized SNL and SYL
jointly supported the National United Front (NUF), which had been formed under
the leadership of Michael Mariano, a Christian Somali civil servant who had
been active in the formative years of the SYL. The NUF voiced demands for the
return of the Haud to British Somaliland. It sent missions to London and to
the UN in New York in an attempt to win support for its position and to have
the question of the Haud brought before the International Court of Justice.
Britain sought unsuccessfully to purchase the disputed area from Ethiopia,
which filed counterclaims attesting to its historical sovereignty over both
the Somali territories. The Ethiopian move served only to fuel Somali
nationalism still further.

     In 1956 Britain agreed to the gradual introduction of representative
government in the protectorate and accepted eventual independence and union
between British Somaliland and Somalia. As a first step the Legislative
Council was created in 1957, its six members selected by the governor to
represent clan-families. The following year the body was expanded to include a
total of twelve elected members, two appointed members, and fifteen ex-officio
members. As in the trust territory, this first countrywide election was by
secret ballot in the towns and elsewhere by acclamation by each clan assembly.
Elections-the first contested along party lines-were held in February 1960 for
the Legislative Assembly. The SNL and its affiliate, the USP, won all but one
of the thirty-three seats in the expanded body. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was named
to lead a four-man government.

     Ties between the political leaders in both Somali territories had been
strengthened by the Issa government's adoption of Somali unification as a
priority program. Although the leadership of the SNL would have preferred to
postpone unification until British Somaliland had drawn closer to Somalia in
its political development, popular opinion in the protectorate was too
strongly in favor of unity for a delay to be countenanced.

     In April 1960 the British government agreed in principle to end its rule
in time for British Somaliland to unite with the trust territory on the July
independence date that had already been set by the UN. Leaders of the two
territories met in Mogadishu in April and agreed to amalgamate in a unitary
state under a president elected as head of state and a parliamentary form of
government responsible to a democratically elected national legislature
(initially composed of the 123 members of the two territorial assemblies).
British Somaliland was granted independence on June 26, 1960, and merged with
the trust territory to form the independent Somali Republic on July 1, 1960.
Shermarke, leader of the SYL, was called on to form a coalition government in
which his party was joined by the SNL and USP-northern clan-based parties that
had no constituencies in the south. The legislature's appointment of Osman to
the presidency of the republic was confirmed in a national referendum the
following year.

From Independence To Revolution

     During the nine-year period of parliamentary democracy that followed
Somali independence, freedom of expression was widely regarded as being
derived from the traditional right of every man to be heard. The national
ideal professed by the Somalis was one of political and legal equality in
which historic Somali values and acquired Western practices appeared to
coincide. In accord with both traditional and modern democratic values, modern
politics was viewed as a realm not limited to one profession, clan, or class
but open to all male members of society. Politics was at once the Somalis'
most practiced art and favorite sport. A radio was the most desired possession
of most nomads, not for its entertainment value but for news broadcasts. The
level of political participation often surpassed that in many developed
Western democracies. Indeed some observers believed that Somalia's
institutions suffered from a surfeit of democracy.

Problems of National Integration

     Although officially unified as a single nation at independence, the
former Italian colony and trust territory in the south and the former British
protectorate in the north were, from an institutional standpoint, two separate
countries. Italy and Britain had left them with separate administrative,
legal, and education systems where affairs were conducted according to
different procedures and in different languages. Police, taxes, and the
exchange rates of their separate currencies were also different. The
orientations of their educated elites were divergent, and economic contacts
between the two regions were virtually nonexistent. The Consultative
Commission for Integration, an international board headed by UN expert Paolo
Contini, was appointed in 1960 at the behest of the UN to guide the gradual
merger of the new country's laws and institutions and to reconcile the
differences between them. (This body was succeeded in 1964 by the Consultative
Commission for Legislation. Composed of Somalis, it was directed to continue
the former commission's work under the chairmanship of Michael Mariano.) But
the problem of mending the cleavage created by Somalia's disparate colonial
legacies proved more troublesome in the year after independence than had been
anticipated. Many southerners harbored a feeling that because of experience
gained under the trusteeship, theirs was the better prepared of the two
regions for self-government. Northern political, administrative, and
commercial elites were reluctant to accept the fact that they now had to deal
through Mogadishu.

     At the time of independence, the northern region had two functioning
political parties: the SNL, representing the Isaaq clan-family that
constituted a numerical majority there, and the USP, supported largely by the
Dir and the Darod. In a unified Somalia, however, the Isaaq were a small
minority, while the northern Darod were able to join with members of their
clan-family from the south in the SYL. The Dir, having few kinsmen in the
south, were pulled on the one hand by traditional ties to the Hawiye and on
the other hand by common regional sympathies to the Isaaq. The southern
opposition party, the GSL, pro-Arab in outlook and militantly pan-Somali in
attitude, attracted the support of the SNL and the USP against the SYL, which
had adopted a moderate stand before independence and had been responsible for
a constitutional provision calling for unification of all Somali territories
by peaceful means.

     Northern misgivings at being too tightly harnessed to the south were
demonstrated by the voting pattern in the June 1961 referendum to ratify the
constitution, which was in effect Somalia's first national election. Although
the draft was overwhelmingly approved in the south, it was supported by less
than 50 percent of the northern electorate.

     Dissatisfaction at the distribution of power among the clan-families and
between the two regions boiled over in December 1961 when a group of
British-trained junior army officers in the north rebelled in protest over the
posting of higher ranking southern officers (who had been trained by the
Italians for police duties) to command their units. The ringleaders urged a
separation of north and south. The strength of Somali unity was displayed,
however, in the reaction of the northern noncommissioned officers who arrested
the rebels. Despite that action, discontent in the north persisted.

     In early 1962 the GSL leader, Haji Mohamed Hussein, seeking in part to
exploit northern dissatisfaction, attempted to form an amalgamated party, to
be known as the Somali Democratic Union (SDU). It would enroll northern
elements, some of which were displeased with the northern SNL representatives
in the coalition government. Hussein's attempt failed. In May 1962, however,
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and another northern SNL minister resigned from the
cabinet and took many SNL followers with them into a new party, the Somali
National Congress (SNC), which received widespread support in the north. The
new party also gained support in the south when an SYL faction (predominantly
composed of Hawiye) joined it. The move gave the country three major political
parties having national appeal, further serving to blur north-south
differences.