$Unique_ID{COW02672} $Pretitle{281} $Title{North Korea Chapter 5B. Armed Forces} $Subtitle{} $Author{Stephan B. Wickman} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{north military korea forces korean kim south soviet armed general} $Date{1981} $Log{Figure 29.*0267202.scf } Country: North Korea Book: North Korea, A Country Study Author: Stephan B. Wickman Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 5B. Armed Forces General Setting Before the modern era the use of military means to achieve political ends was largely alien to Koreans. Belligerent behavior and militarism contradicted the traditional value system, which was heavily imbued with Buddhist nonviolence and Confucian scholasticism. Korean history does record some military campaigns and excursions. Struggles between rival kingdoms for domination of the peninsula occurred from time to time, and armed factions contended over dynastic succession (see Origins of the Korean Nation, ch. 1). These experiences did not provide Koreans with an enduring military tradition. They did, however, produce a few notable figures, such as Admiral Yi Sun-sin, who in the late sixteenth century was acclaimed for his efforts to repel Japanese invaders with ironclad "turtleships," which outmaneuvered and destroyed hundreds of enemy vessels. Yet the Yi Dynasty saw constant decline of the military, which was officially disbanded in 1907, shortly before the start of Japanese rule. During the latter part of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, which ended in 1945, numbers of Koreans served with Chinese communist forces in Manchuria or under Soviet military tutelage in Siberia. From these came the cadres of North Korean's post-1945 army, as well as the partisan tradition that has since become official military legend. The first armed force in post-World War II North Korea consisted of public security units activated in February 1946, under the guidance of Soviet occupation authorities, to assume the tasks of domestic order and security. The public security forces comprised both regular police and paramilitary units, which could be likened to a constabulary. By the first half of 1947 these forces were estimated to have totaled between 120,000 and 150,000 men, including two paramilitary divisions equipped with Soviet materiel. Formation of a conventional military force appears to have begun covertly from about the middle of 1946, only a few months after the formation of the public security forces. Initial officer and noncommissioned officer cadre personnel were reportedly drawn at least in part from Korean personnel who served with the Chinese forces in Manchuria. Formal establishment of the Korean People's Army (KPA) was announced by public decree on February 8, 1948, seven months earlier than the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself. Through Soviet sponsorship during this formative stage of the KPA, Kim Il Sung and his supporters secured a controlling position within the military establishment. For the most part, this faction was made up of officers who had spent the war years with Kim in the Soviet Union and had returned to Korea with the Soviet occupation forces in 1945. The dominant position within the armed forces that Kim and the coterie of officers personally loyal to him were able to secure from the first proved crucial in the subsequent political development of North Korea. By the time the Soviet forces had completed their withdrawal from the North at the end of 1948, the KPA had a strength of some 60,000, not including the border constabulary and railroad guards. From that time until the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950-referred to by the North Koreans as the Fatherland Liberation War-the KPA underwent a massive buildup in manpower and Soviet materiel. Troop strength grew to between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Of these an estimated 40,000 were veterans of the former Korean Volunteer Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. As many as 10,000 more were technicians and officers who had received training in the Soviet Union. The impact of the war on North Korea was devastating. Many members of the military elite were killed, including officers close to Kim Il Sung. The extent of the devastation was indicated by the wartime comment of the head of the United Nations (UN) Bomber Command in the Far East, that "there are no more targets in Korea." P'yongyang's population fell from 400,000 to 80,000, that of entire North Korea from 9.6 million in 1949 to 8.5 million in 1953. In all, about 500,000 North Korean troops were killed, and the level of destruction left a bitter legacy of anti-American hatred. Hostilities were ended with the armistice agreement of July 1953, signed by the commanders of the KPA, the UN Command, and the Chinese People's Volunteers. The Republic of Korea (South Korea), however, did not sign the armistice agreement, nor had any form of peace agreement been concluded as of early 1981. Technically the peninsula remained in a state of war. From 1953 until 1958 military emphasis was placed on reorganizing and rebuilding the infantry and on the acquisition of weapons and large numbers of combat aircraft, and the country was dependent upon the military protection of China and the Soviet Union. During the war China's People's Liberation Army had saved Kim Il Sung's forces from almost certain defeat; and the Soviet Union, while not introducing troops into the war, had supplied large amounts of weapons and materiel (see Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.). Both nations aided in postwar reconstruction, but as relations between China and the Soviet Union soured, North Korea was forced into an uneasy balancing act between allies. In October 1958 China completed its phased troop withdrawal. The Soviet Union continued substantial economic assistance and provided a military security screen behind which the North Koreans could concentrate on reconstruction and economic development. The armed force that developed during this period had a strong peasant base and was rooted in loyalty to the KWP and to Kim Il Sung. In July 1961, less than two months after a military coup in South Korea, North Korea concluded a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. The treaty was to be automatically renewed periodically, unless one of the signatories objected one year in advance of the date of termination. Within less than a week, North Korea signed a similar treaty with China. Both documents asserted that if a concerned party were to be invaded, the other party would "render military and other assistance with every available means at its command." The remainder of the decade after the signing of the treaties witnessed volatile swings in relations between North Korea and its two communist neighbors. Both China and the Soviet Union had committed themselves to support North Korea's defense; willingness to fully back its requests for military aid, however, proved to be another matter. In that regard the pattern of conflict on the peninsula during the late 1960s and 1970s provides important background. In the late 1960s, in the context of Kim Il Sung's often and strongly stated intention to "unify the divided fatherland" and to actively support and encourage "the South Korean people in their revolutionary struggle," there began a trend toward active guerrilla operations in South Korea. The 1967 budget allocation for defense was estimated to have tripled. That year and the next, substantial numbers of North Korean agents were captured or killed in the South, and in 1969 more naval violations of the armistice agreement occurred than at any previous time. In January 1968 North Korea seized the U.S.S. Pueblo, imprisoned its crew, and dispatched a commando suicide squad which reached downtown Seoul in an unsuccessful effort to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. In November 1968, there were 120 North Korean commandos killed or captured in a raid on the South Korean coast, and in April 1969 the North Koreans shot down an American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft. In the aftermath of these actions, the Soviet Union appeared to have reconsidered its military aid policy, and after 1972 declined to send further new weapons systems or advanced technology to North Korea (see Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.). Chinese and Soviet support for the defense of North Korea was clearly established, but neither country's leaders sought direct confrontation with the United States over the Korean peninsula. As seen from Seoul, the nature of North Korean aggressive actions against the South has changed dramatically since 1969. Since then allegations of infiltration by North Korean agents have dwindled (to fewer than fifty reported cases in 1979), although reports of truce violations have increased sharply. More than 6000 such incidents were reported in 1979. Role in the National Life The KPA has always been cast in the role of defender of the Party and revolution as well as defender of the national territory. The broadly conceived role of the armed forces as an instrument of socialism was reaffirmed by Kim Il Sung in his new year address in January 1981. The president said that the men and officers of the KPA and the security forces, having boundless loyalty to the Party and the revolution, must be ready at all times to firmly defend the country and its revolutionary gains. The premise of long-term conflict between socialism and imperialism or capitalism, to which the leadership repeatedly referred, provided the theoretical basis for a strong military capability. Of immediate and practical relevance to the importance assumed by the armed forces was the continuing state of mutual distrust and hostility on the peninsula, rooted in the experience of the Korean War, subsequent internal and external political developments, and the divergent reunification policies of the two Korean governments (see Foreign Affairs, ch. 4). Through the enrollment in the Worker-and-Peasant Red Guard of virtually all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five (other than those on active military duty) and many women, military values and party indoctrination have permeated the society. North Korea has been and will continue to be a revolutionary society, owing in part to its fear of confrontation with South Korea and in part to its belief in the inherent irreconcilable conflicts between socialism and communism on the one hand, and capitalism and imperialism on the other. Ideological doctrine is constantly stressed, so that each citizen is prepared to support the maintenance of a garrison state and will unhesitatingly sacrifice his or her life for the "fatherland." Kim Il Sung has declared that North Koreans "must be firmly prepared, both ideologically and militarily, for perfect self-defense," and that in order to "strengthen our defensive power, it is necessary, first of all, to firmly prepare the KPA and the entire people politically and ideologically." Calls for economic progress, social order, and political support are phased and dramatized through military-inspired slogans, such as the "speed battle" (see Glossary) to meet economic targets. The maintenance of internal solidarity requires constant exhortation to vigilance, despite fluctuations in external threat perceptions, and to some degree everyday life in North Korea takes on aspects of military life in the armed services of other nations. The armed forces provide an important element of the party's power base, and the party leadership and Kim personally hold tight control over the military establishment. From the date of establishment of North Korea, military officers have been included in the top leadership around Kim (who must be regarded as a military figure as well) and of the Central Committee of the KWP. The KPA is institutionally subordinate to the Central People's Committee and its National Defense Commission. In practice, however, effective control resides with the Party, exercised by the top leadership through the Military Commission of the Central Committee. Within the armed forces an omniscient party apparatus linked to provincial and county organizations parallels the operational structure at all levels of command (see fig. 28). The national economy has had to be geared to military considerations, resulting in the draining of resources from nondefense sectors. Since the time of the Korean War, the country's leadership, while not excluding the need for outside help, has called for the development of what it terms an independent industrial base for national defense. In the war era the country was substantially dependent on external sources of supply. In intervening decades, however, it has made huge strides in the domestic production of weapons. By 1981 North Korea was able to manufacture AK-47 rifles, mortars, rocket launchers, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, personnel carriers, patrol craft, and submarines; it may also have been producing tanks and possibly even combat jet aircraft. The Second Ministry of Machine Industry appears to be responsible for munitions and weapons production. Strategic Doctrine North Korea's military doctrine has from the beginning been rooted in its particular version of Maoist guerrilla warfare. Simply stated, the postulated conflict was envisioned as a "people's war" of protracted duration in which "socialist" North Korea, the inner core and power base of a revolution on the Korean peninsula, would find itself in mortal struggle with the "imperialist" forces in the South and those allied with them. Looking back at the Korean War, Kim apparently concluded that North Korea's defeat had come about for several reasons, including lack of rear or reserve units, and an inadequate air force. Additionally, military staffs were ill-trained in basic strategy and tactics, and soldiers had been insufficiently prepared in military and ideological matters. Beginning in 1962 Kim put forward a refined doctrine of four main points generally referred to as the party's "four point military line." The new doctrine stressed the need for: training a cadre army in which each man was prepared to assume the responsibilities of the next higher rank-known as cadrification; adapting modern military techniques to the conditions of North Korea's many mountains and long coastlines; raising a nation in arms in which "the entire people, holding a weapon in one hand and a sickle in the other should reliably safeguard our socialist homeland"; and assuring the means of protracted struggle by a program to "build up zones of military strategic importance, develop the munitions industry, and create reserves of necessary materials." In October 1966 Kim called upon the KPA to use flexibly both regular conventional and irregular guerrilla warfare tactics during possible conflict arising out of confrontations with South Korea. Domestic military development policies were tied to plans for the reunification of Korea. According to South Korea's leading military analyst Lee Ki-tak, Kim Il Sung accepted Lenin's definition of "strategy": the determination of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of revolution, the elaboration of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces (main and secondary reserves), and the fight to carry out this plan throughout the given stage of revolution. Therefore, Kim concentrated on four elements of strategy for the successful unification of Korea: "policy objectives, main and reserve forces, direction of main blow, and plan for deployment for forces." In September 1961 Kim told the Fourth Party Congress that unification would follow a three stage program: withdrawal of American forces, seizure of power by South Korean revolutionaries supporting a "revolution for democracy and national liberation," and linking of "patriotic, democratic forces" in the North and South. In the early 1960s a decision was made to establish guerrilla bases in the South and to support revolutionary activity in order to undermine the South Korean government. This strategy of destabilization combined with tremendous defense budget outlays from 1966 through 1969, was singularly unsuccessful and ultimately resulted in a series of purges of military leaders. A period of North Korean-South Korean dialogue followed, culminating in the North Korean-South Korean Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. This agreement stated that reunification "should be achieved independently" and "without recourse to the use of arms against the other side." During the same period Kim argued that despite his independent line of chuch'e (see Glossary), solidarity with international revolutionary forces was required, as was consolidation and development of revolutionary forces in both Koreas. Consequently, North Korea's unification plan continued to emphasize North Korean solidarity with international revolutionary forces (although recent official pronouncements have downplayed this theme) and support for political change in the South. Revolutionary ideology and peaceful reunification thus remained as inherently contradictory keystones of North Korea's foreign policy in the 1980s. External realities have required modification in Kim Il Sung's strategy of "numerical and strategic superiority." The presence of United States military forces in South Korea and the United States' capability to alter the military balance by introducing Seventh Fleet and other Western Pacific forces effectively block Kim's strategy of assured military superiority. Additionally, the United States' confirmations in 1975 and 1977 of possible tactical nuclear retaliation in the event of a North Korean attack, while publicly scoffed at by the North Koreans, have certainly figured in strategic planning. According to Japanese sources in late 1976, the North Koreans had developed important underground production and defense facilities, including base installations for aircraft and antiaircraft units manned by Worker-and-Peasant Red Guard units. Other facilities were situated partially underground or tunneled into hillsides and mountains. Contingency plans called for removal of the facilities to underground locations in time of war. North Korean authorities asserted that antiaircraft defense had been infinitely strengthened and that important facilities had been made capable of surviving floods or nuclear explosions. In another strategic maneuver, North Korean military authorities announced the establishment in August 1977 of what was termed a coastal defense zone, enclosing an offshore area from which foreign ships and planes, including civilian craft, would be banned. The boundary would extend some eighty kilometers off the east coast into the Sea of Japan, but the area affected on the west coast was not absolutely clear. There was no immediate mention of five South Korean islands that lie within sixteen kilometers of North Korea's west coast. Japan and South Korea dismissed the claim, a Japanese spokesman commenting that the act was counter to international law and practice. In early 1981 North Korea continued to develop its munitions industry, strengthen rear military units, and stockpile strategic reserves; but strategic policies focused upon undermining political stability in South Korea, defusing the confrontation on the peninsula, or both. Strategic policies were translated into party programs which continued to emphasize the need to deepen political and ideological education. The army was referred to as the army of the Party, or the army of Kim Il Sung, and soldiers were encouraged to become "each-a-match-for-a-hundred" enemy attackers. Discipline was measured against the five major teachings introduced by Kim in a major party address in February 1975 and other guidelines. The teachings to be observed were: "Five guidelines" and "ten principles among military persons." The five combat readiness guidelines, first adopted in February 1975, are: "tenacious revolutionary spirit; miraculous and elaborate tactics; strong physique; point-blank shooting; and ironbound regulations." A later statement of disciplinary principles issued in 1977 stresses duty, law abidance, keeping military secrets, love of the people, protection of national property, building solidarity, and the need for round-the-clock vigilance. In July 1980 the chief-of-staff reasserted the continuing responsibility of the KPA to "complete the Korean revolution." Military Organization and Leadership In early 1981, under the coordinated authority of the KWP Military Commission and the National Defense Commission, both chaired by Kim Il Sung, the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces exercised jurisdiction over the KPA. Staff and operational functions were accomplished under the guidance of the chief of the general staff, whose office contained sixteen bureaus including: military operations, reconnaissance, combat training, military mobilization, state affairs and the military-industrial bureau. Political activity and indoctrination were the responsibility of the General Political Bureau, which had subordinate units at all levels of command and which was itself responsible to both the general staff and the KPA Party Committee. The General Rear Services Bureau provided logistical support and services in such areas as fuel, transportation, construction and finance. According to sources available in early 1981 the six service arms were the: Missile Command, Armored Command, Artillery Command, Naval Command, Air Force Command, and Special Forces Command. According to announcements at the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980, military officers serving as members or alternate members of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee of the Party included the minister of the People's Armed Forces, General O Chin-u; the chief of the general staff, General O Guk-yol; the director of the General Political Bureau, General So Chol; and the commander of the Worker-and Peasant Red Guard, General O Paekyong. Of the nineteen members of the Politburo, seven were military officers and eleven had military backgrounds. Many of these persons had been associated with Kim Il Sung since his days as an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter. Returned to the leadership roster at the congress was General Ch'oe Kwang, who had been dismissed in the late 1960s. Since he and others purged with him had advocated weapons modernization over the guerrilla operations and ideological training then pressed by Kim, his return could signal a shift in high-level strategic thinking. On the other hand, it was not certain that his views on weapons had been the cause for his dismissal. Because of the close control North Korean authorities have exercised over all information for internal and external dissemination, it is extremely difficult to assess military capabilities. Estimates of the size of North Korea's armed forces and of its stock of major weapons vary widely and, in the general absence of independently verifiable evidence, remain highly uncertain (see table 11, Appendix). Reassessments have produced sharp and sudden escalations of previous figures, as, for example, in the late 1970s when United States Department of Defense analysts upgraded earlier estimates of the number of ground force divisions from twenty-eight or twenty-nine to forty-one. Among the reasons for the new figures were: the reconstitution of formerly disconnected rear infantry squads into larger, unified, yet dispersed divisions; a reevaluation of Kim Il Sung's rear forces strategic doctrine; and the location of previously undetected armed forces and weapons systems. The uncertainty about precise figures notwithstanding, it was clear that in the early 1980s North Korea had a formidable uniformed capability, far superior to that of virtually all countries with a population in the 16-24 million range. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), it had four times the number of men in uniform and at least three times the number of tanks and combat aircraft as other countries of its size, except for the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Ground Force Elements An estimated 600,000 men, or close to 90 percent of the estimated 678,000 regular armed forces, were in the ground forces as of 1980 (see table 12, Appendix). According to South Korean sources, in early 1980 there were eight corps headquarters, of which the first, second, and fifth were deployed adjacent to the DMZ and the fourth in the west between Haeju and Namp'o. The remainder were rear echelon groups (see fig. 29). The assignments of the various infantry divisions-estimates range from thirty-five to forty-one or more-and of the various mechanized, artillery, amphibious, airborne, and other forces was uncertain. The organizational structure of the division was along conventional lines and included regiments, battalions, companies, platoons and squads. Administrative branches included infantry and engineer units as well as transport, medical, legal, and financial offices. [See Figure 29.: The Deployment of Ground and Naval Forces in North Korea Source: Adapted from Chao Xien Di Tu, P'yongyang, 1976; and Gunji kenkyu [Tokyo], No. 166, January 1980, p. 23.] Information on the special forces groups whose formation dated back to the early 1960s was scant. According to one Japanese report published in the late 1970s, these units were specially trained in sabotage, amphibious operations, and special warfare and were deployed both in rear area positions and along the DMZ, under which North Korea was known to have built a network of tunnels, possibly twenty or more. Estimates of the combined strength of special forces groups ranged from 77,000 to 100,000. An English-language journal reported in early 1980 that special forces elements, highly trained in helicopter and glider troop-dropping operations, had been recently reorganized and deployed along the DMZ and were headquartered in Kaesong. The report linked this heightened profile of the guerrilla forces to the elevation of General O Guk-yol to the post of chief of the general staff, suggesting that these elements were ultimately controlled by Kim Jong Il, heir apparent to Kim Il Sung and a close friend of General O Guk-yol. The ground forces were generally well equipped. According to IISS, major arms included about 2600 tanks, 1000 personnel carriers, 4000-5000 artillery guns and howitzers, 9000 mortars, 3,400 various-range rocket launchers, and 5000-6000 antiaircraft weapons (see table 13, Appendix). According to South Korean sources, the artillery had a maximum range of forty kilometers. Reported missilery included twenty-four to more than 100 FROG 5 and FROG 7 surface-to-surface missiles, with a maximum range of sixty-seven to eighty-nine kilometers. The same sources indicated that North Korea had dug in or hardened several of its bases and logistical supply areas in defense against aerial attack. North Korea's military assets were countered by an impressive array of South Korean and United States weapons systems-many of which were viewed as life threatening in the North. Yet in the circular arms race, the country's leaders continued to add offensive capabilities, aware that as they did so combined "enemy" forces were constantly improving the quality and quantity of their own ground and air defense systems. In total capabilities North Korea demonstrated a clear-cut quantitative advantage over South Korea in isolation from its United States ally. The military balance was dramatically altered against North Korea, however, when United States forces were introduced. Similarly, should China or the Soviet Union or both directly support North Korea, the balance would again shift. The Navy Naval forces totaled about 31,000 men, making the navy the smallest of the services. A major strategic problem facing the navy was the necessity for maintaining separate squadrons on the east and west coasts. The east coast was more strategically important and vulnerable. Its ports provided sea access to Vladivostok and other Soviet Siberian ports. It was also more suitable than the west coast for certain operational purposes. Accordingly the naval command is divided into eastern and western fleets. The West Sea Fleet Command was headquartered at Namp'o, with bases at Yongamp'o, Pip'a-got, the island of Ch'o, Sagot, and Haeju. East Sea Fleet Command headquarters were at Wonsan, with bases at Najin, Ch'ongjin, Kimch'aek, Mayang Island, and Changjon. The naval academy was located at Najin. Other training institutions included the Naval Technical Training Center and the Naval College. While South Korea's navy is composed mainly of relatively large ships, that of North Korea includes mainly small, coastal type vessels, including high-speed missile craft and torpedo gunboats (see table 14, Appendix). North Korea's navy also had sixteen submarines, whereas the South Korean navy had none. With at least twenty-five large patrol craft, 317 fast-attack craft, and 150 coastal and amphibious ships, the North could readily mine South Korean harbors, land guerrilla infiltrators, and interrupt supply lines. The Air Force The air force was developed as a separate service in 1948 and was rapidly rebuilt following the Korean War (see table 15, Appendix). Supplied by the Chinese and Soviets, North Korea by 1963 had between 340 and 380 Chinese-manufactured MiG-15s, MiG-17s, and MiG-19s. In early 1981 many of these jet fighter aircraft were still in service, but they were not considered a serious counterthreat to more recent generations of Western combat aircraft. After the 1965 rapprochement between North Korea and the Soviet Union, Moscow supplied P'yongyang with surface-to-surface missiles and the MiG-21, which became the most important weapon in the country's air force inventory. First and second generation MiG-21s were armed with AA-2 Atoll air-to-air missiles. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports, North Korea in 1975 had received permission to manufacture the MiG-21 from the Soviet Union. By manufacturing its own or taking delivery on additional advanced third generation MiG-21s from the Soviets, it was possible that by early 1981 North Korea had as many as 200 of these planes rather than the 120 estimated by the IISS. There was no indication, however, that the Soviets had furnished North Korea with even more advanced models such as the MiG-23, MiG-25, or MiG-27. Also North Korean requests to both the Soviet Union and China for nuclear plant technology had apparently been refused. In any case, weapons and technology transfers to the North served as one important indicator of whether or not either major power would support a North Korean effort to reunify Korea by force. Air force commands included some four fighter wings, a bomber division, a transport division, and a transport corps unit. Estimates of the number of air strips and bases ranged from thirteen to thirty-two. Combat fighter units were stationed on bases close to the DMZ, and bomber or reconnaissance units were in rear areas, nearer to the Chinese border. Most airports and air bases were highly fortified with hardened and underground installations. Reserves and Paramilitary Forces The active military structure was supported by varied reserve forces: 40,000 air force security forces, 40,000 naval reserves, 260,000 army reserves, and the Worker-and-Peasant Red Guard-a militia of more than 2 million men and women. According to one Japanese source, persons discharged from the army at age twenty-five to twenty-eight must perform military service with the militia at assigned working places until about age forty-five. At sea, the naval arm of the Red Guard was made up of the crews of fishing boats armed with machine guns. Other armed vessels disguised as fishing boats, under control of the KWP Liaison Department, were reported to be conducting clandestine guerrilla operations. All militia units were trained in the use of the AK-47 rifle, and some were equipped with more sophisticated weapons, such as anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, and antitank guns; sources in Seoul reported 500 hours of annual training as average for Red Guard units. Because the North Korean reserves are so highly trained, Western analysts calculating the total military potential in combat generally regard them as part of the active armed force. In any event, attempts from any direction to dominate North Korea militarily would be fraught with difficult, if not insurmountable, barriers. Extensive coastal defenses including surface-to-air missile (SAM) installations, a large-if not modern air force-and a series of SAMs and related antiaircraft installations preclude enemy air warfare domination as occurred during the Korean War.