$Unique_ID{COW02643} $Pretitle{357} $Title{Nigeria Chapter 5D. Public Order and Internal Security} $Subtitle{} $Author{Robert Rinehart} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{police npf state government forces local armed nigeria nigerian authority} $Date{1981} $Log{} Country: Nigeria Book: Nigeria, A Country Study Author: Robert Rinehart Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 5D. Public Order and Internal Security In the first two decades of Nigerian independence, political unrest has posed recurrent problems for the developing country. In 1981 potential threats to Nigeria's democratic experiment were generated largely by changing socioeconomic conditions. The most obvious source of tension was rooted in ethnically defined resentments that earlier had led to three years of civil war (see Independent Nigeria, ch. 1). Ethnic tensions were much reduced in the country's second decade of independence, but continued widespread ethnic identification was reflected in the continued prominence of regionally linked political leaders and the voting patterns of the 1979 elections (see Politics at National Level, ch. 4). A more important long-term threat to public order derived from the progressive undermining of established social patterns by urbanization and modernization resulting largely from Nigeria's oil-fueled economic growth. The promise of jobs, opportunity, and excitement drew migrants from rural villages and less prosperous neighboring countries to Nigeria's teeming cities. Lagos in particular attracted migration; its population was estimated to have grown from 1 million in 1970 to over 3 million in 1980. But in the cities the supply of jobs for unskilled laborers could not satisfy the demand. Migrants were cut off from a rural life where a world view and set patterns of behavior were imposed by close family and village relations. Human relationships in the city were frequently impersonal, and the migrant faced corruption, high prices in a money economy, vast and visible differences in wealth, and the ideology-especially prevalent in Lagos-of getting ahead by any means possible. In 1981 conditions in the cities were partly responsible for a growing incidence of crime. Although other long-term effects could not be assessed, it seemed likely that the urban situation could lead in the future to further political cleavages corresponding to the sharp socioeconomic differences visible in the cities. The most serious short-term threat to civilian rule came from the contending political parties. Interparty strife and accompanying violence had been one of the major causes of the downfall of the first republic (see Politics in the Crisis years, ch. 1). Partisan political violence in 1981 did not approach the levels reached in the 1960s, but during the fourteen years of military rule it had been virtually nonexistent. Outbreaks of violence between contending parties-generally supporters of Shagari's ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and those favoring one or more opposition parties-were relatively common but were not of alarming proportions. In Kano State, however, which was controlled by the opposition People's Redemption Party (PRP), political unrest was considered sufficiently significant in 1980 for the police to impose a ban on political meetings. In reaction to their lack of control over the police units in the states, the nine governors not associated with the NPN-led ruling coalition threatened to establish local security forces. Similar police forces had been widely discredited during the first republic when they were used by local leaders to intimidate opponents and were disbanded by the FMG (see The Police System, this chapter). Although not allowed under the 1979 Constitution, the formation of the Bendel State Security System by Governor Ambrose Alli, a member of the opposition Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), was heralded in January 1981 as a means "to check subversive activities against the [state] administration." Moreover Alhaji Mallam Aminu Kano, the official leader of the divided PRP who was closer to the NPN than others in his party, announced that "certain clever governors are using experimental farms to train guerrillas with the support of a foreign power." The validity of Kano's claims could not be established, but the concept of local police was strongly opposed by federal officials including Shagari, who noted the "danger of secession" if police forces were controlled by those governors "who claim they have nothing to do with the federal government and insist that their state belongs to them." Student unrest at the country's universities-a feature of the political scene since the civil war and a source of concern in the Shagari government-was continuing, if not increasing, in 1981. The most serious incidents in recent years occurred in April 1978 and then in early 1981. In 1978 a student boycott protested an increase in university fees. The National Union of Nigerian Students was banned, and its leaders were arrested. The Shagari government later pardoned the students, but the ban on their organization remained in effect. Similar disturbances broke out at two northern universities in early 1981, leading to their temporary closure. Again the student rampages were overtly ignited by narrow concerns over the quality of food and accommodations. It was speculated that these upsurges of student violence concealed deeper idealism and frustration over the inequities and corruption in Nigerian society that the students were powerless to redress. Other observers saw student idealism as a passing radical phase that concealed a sense of contempt for the uneducated masses and a preoccupation with the privileges and remunerative careers that were open to the well-educated in Nigeria. The students did not threaten the government directly, but public attitudes toward civilian rule could have been influenced by how the government dealt with the problems at the universities and whether the situation worsened. Symptoms of societal strains could be seen in religious violence, the most spectacular example of which was the bloody riot that broke out in the city of Kano in December 1980. Little was known about the various Islamic fundamentalist groups of northern Nigeria, one of which was at the center of the violence in Kano. According to some observers these religious sects were populist oriented and comprised largely of people who had been displaced or overwhelmed by Nigeria's economic growth and societal change. The sects often included numbers of immigrants from neighboring countries and were unaffiliated with the traditional Muslim leadership. The violence at Kano resulted from a confrontation between local authorities and the Al Masifu sect led by a Muslim scholar, Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine, who was born in Cameroon. Expelled from Nigeria twice in seventeen years for disruptive behavior, Maitatsine decried what he and his followers considered materialism and privilege and sought to purify the practice of Islam. Al Masifu members, who were estimated to number between 3,000 and 5,000, denounced ostentatious displays of wealth such as owning houses or wearing wristwatches and traditional Muslim customs such as facing Mecca while praying. After a two-year period during which sect members increasingly intimidated citizens living near their enclave in Kano and a month after a policeman was killed by Maitatsine followers, Kano State governor Muhammed Abubakar Rimi sent a letter to Maitatsine ordering him and his sect to leave Kano. The violence began three weeks later on December 18 when sect members attacked orthodox Muslims praying outside the city's Grand Mosque. The police intervened but were overwhelmed. When the police were unable to penetrate the Al Masifu enclave, Rimi asked the federal government to send in military troops. Ten days after the sect's initial attack on the "infidels," the army shelled the cultists' enclave with mortars and artillery while orthodox Muslim residents of Kano sought out and killed on sight anyone suspected of belonging to Maitatsine's group. Some of the cultists, armed with bows and arrows and a number of modern weapons, were able to retreat to a nearby village, and the fighting continued until January 3. The death toll was believed to exceed the official government figure of 1,000 and included Maitatsine. As the last elements of Al Masifu were being overcome, Shagari announced the formation of the Kano Disturbances Tribunal of Inquiry, composed of a four-man judiciary panel. The coincidence of the riots with the Libyan intervention in neighboring Chad led Shagari to say that "we have every reason to believe Libya was involved," but lack of supporting evidence later caused him to withdraw his statement. The riots disturbed government officials not only because of the large size of the Al Masifu sect but also because other small religious groups from throughout northern Nigeria tried to come to its aid, indicating relatively wide support. After the riots the governor of Niger State and police officials in Plateau and Bauchi states banned all religious preaching in public places and the use of public address systems for this purpose; other states contemplated similar moves. Because the rioters included a number of foreigners, the Nigerian press and politicians renewed their calls for a review of the country's already controversial immigration policies. Ministry of Internal Affairs statistics for 1979 stated that 44,733 aliens were legally resident and working in Nigeria, but the actual number of illegal immigrants was estimated at nine times that figure. Drawn by economic opportunity or as refugees from the Chadian civil war, foreigners were blamed not only for the religious disturbances but also for much of the country's criminal activity. After the Kano riots, controversy enveloped provisions of an ECOWAS agreement that allowed citizens of signatory states to reside legally for a period of three months in other countries that had signed the agreement. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also announced that all aliens without valid immigration documents would be deported. To make it possible to find and identify aliens, representatives of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government were calling for the institution of a system to provide all Nigerians with identity cards. Customs and immigrations officials also announced that the number of border checkpoints would be increased. The problem of violent crime-most prevalent in southern Nigeria and particularly in Lagos-"far outstrips any social or economic problem that may be facing the country today," according to commentators in West Africa. Violent crime posed a potential threat to the civilian government-if progress were not made in solving the problem, Nigerians might conclude that the civilians were simply not "tough enough" to govern the country. Ironically violent crime first assumed alarming proportions while Nigeria was ruled by the military. Most observers linked the upsurge in crime to the civil war era, when large quantities of imported arms and ammunition were sold or used by hungry and undisciplined soldiers. Statistics on crime in Nigeria were not regularly available after 1966 when the police ceased publishing annual reports. Consequently trends in criminal activity in 1981 were difficult to determine. The general pattern of criminal activity, however, was reflected in the Nigerian press, in statements by public officials, and by various laws enacted by the governments at the federal and state levels. According to the governor of Lagos State, incidents of violent crime-homicide, rape, armed housebreaking, and armed robbery-reported in the city increased from 13,700 in 1979 to 18,000 in 1980. In May 1980 the minister of police affairs stated that in the preceding eight months 4,513 lives had been lost to armed robbery nationwide and that an average of 2.5 million Naira worth of goods had been stolen in armed robberies each day. Official statistics generally were regarded as gross underestimates of the situation because the vast majority of crimes went unreported. More revealing than the statistics were the brazen methods used by Nigerian criminals. Auto theft was frequently accomplished by bandits who walked up to a car, threatened the occupants with a weapon, and then stole the car. Streams of traffic were known to be stopped by armed groups numbering thirty or more who systematically looted every vehicle. Robber gangs posted signs in neighborhoods declaring their intention to raid the area in the future. Such raids sometimes lasted several hours and involved as many as 100 armed bandits. At the ports, groups of armed pirates reportedly swarmed over docked or anchored vessels-sometimes in daylight-looting cargoes and terrorizing the crews. The loss of goods from ships and warehouses was so serious that foreign businessmen were warning Nigerians that increased insurance rates would force them to restrict their trade with the country. The police, who were generally unarmed until the late 1970s, were reluctant to confront the heavily armed criminals. Reports in the Nigerian press stated that the police were sometimes involved in criminal operations: poorly paid policemen would rent their uniforms to criminals, and witnesses to crimes often refused to inform the police out of fear that the criminal would be told the name and address of his accuser. To do the work of a police force perceived to be ineffective, citizens organized neighborhood patrols that were occasionally known to brutalize those who could not prove their identity. Vigilante groups were informally accepted by officials in Lagos until mid-1980 when reports of their assaulting innocent people and extorting money for their services forced a ban on their activities in the capital. Public order and internal security problems have been exacerbated by a large flow of firearms into the country that has disturbed many Nigerians. In 1978 the military government had decreed that it would be illegal for anyone of any nationality to import certain categories of weapons into the country. These included all handguns and associated ammunition, but rifles and shotguns were allowed provided the owner had the proper import license and police permit and was only importing one or two weapons for self-protection. The restrictions, however, were being circumvented according to Nigerian newspapers, which in 1980 and 1981 reported numerous seizures of arms and ammunition but voiced concern that much more was getting through. In early 1981 the international police organization INTERPOL and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation warned that Nigerian citizens were shopping for firearms at "an alarming rate" in Europe and particularly in the United States. Reportedly most of those buying firearms abroad were students and academics motivated by profit. But it was not known how many weapons were being imported or whether Nigerians purchasing the weapons inside the country were doing so to commit crimes or to protect themselves against criminal activities. Customs resources were thought to be inadequate to patrol Nigeria's land borders, its long coastline, and its airports. Moreover customs officers were sometimes accused by the press of cooperating actively with smugglers and even masterminding smuggling operations. Government authorities have sought to combat violent crime by imposing stiff penalties on those convicted of such offenses. The Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Decree was enacted by the Gowon regime in 1970 to deal with the then-new phenomenon of armed robbery. The decree provided that anyone convicted of the offense anywhere in the country would be hanged or shot. On the assumption that they would set an example, these executions were held publicly at first and drew vast crowds. But by the late 1970s Nigerian policymakers generally believed that the deterrent value of executions had declined. The Shagari government has acted ambivalently on the death penalty issue since coming to power. The minister of justice and attorney general announced in January 1980 that convicted armed robbers whose sentences had not been confirmed before the country's return to civilian rule would not be executed before being retried in the Federal High Court. He later emphasized that armed robbery would continue to be punishable by death, but because public executions were no longer held it was unknown how many prisoners had been put to death after the civilians assumed power. The Police System To maintain public order, control crime, and defend government interests, Nigeria has relied primarily on the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). The Constitution clearly defined the NPF as the country's only official police force, excepting specialized police elements that protected waterways, railways, and airfields; these were to be "branches of the Nigerian Police Force." The armed forces were also available for internal security duties if the need arose, but the civilian government has been understandably reluctant to put them to use in that role except in emergencies. The performance of the NPF has been adversely affected by a serious lack of human and material resources. With only 80,000 police personnel in late 1980 to serve a population believed to exceed 80 million, the ratio of one officer for every 1,000 citizens compared unfavorably with proportions of one to 300 or 400 considered necessary by police officials. In 1981 the NPF was embarking on a major recruitment and reequipment program designed to increase force strength to 200,000 by 1985. But even as the NPF was being strengthened, politicians at the federal and state levels sought to improve the police system through functional specialization and decentralization that would effectively undermine the position of the NPF as Nigeria's sole law enforcement authority. The history of the police system has been marked by increasing centralization of national authority in the capital city. The national police, like the army, developed from the early constabularies raised to protect British persons and their interests after they arrived in Lagos in 1861. These early security forces grew in numbers and effectiveness as the British expanded their operations into the interior. After the British government assumed administrative control over the whole of Nigeria, these forces were amalgamated into police establishments corresponding to the three political administrations in the country: the Southern Nigerian Police, the Northern Nigerian Constabulary, and the Lagos Police. In 1930 the three systems were merged to form the NPF. For four decades after its establishment the NPF existed alongside the Native Authority Police. The latter was an outgrowth of law enforcement systems that had existed before colonialism, particularly in the north under the Hausa-Fulani emirs. The British colonial authorities originally found it useful to build upon this system and extended it into all parts of Nigeria. These local police were especially useful for policing remote areas beyond the reach of the NPF. At independence the Native Authority Police constituted virtually the entire force in the north while the NPF was the sole police force in the Eastern Region. In the Western Region the NPF shared responsibility with about fifteen local forces, known as the Local Government Police Force. When the Mid-Western Region was created in 1963, the regional government relinquished its control over local police units which were integrated into the NPF. The local forces' reputation for incompetence, corruption, and abuse of power had made the institution controversial even before 1960. Integration attempts were opposed for many years by traditional leaders and political parties in the Northern and Western regions who recognized that absorption of their forces by the NPF would remove a powerful instrument for establishing and maintaining their power in these areas. The local police also opposed amalgamation as most of them lacked the education to qualify for the NPF and feared the greater regimentation, stricter discipline, and higher standards of conduct in the national force and the loss of certain amenities. Although the local police forces were discredited for being tools of various political factions during the tumultuous period of the first republic, their removal proved politically impossible until the January 1966 military coup. The Gobir Study Group, set up by the military regime to examine police and prisons administration, recommended that the local forces be gradually merged with the NPF after hearing testimony throughout the country. The process was completed in the Western Region by early 1969 and in the rest of the country by 1972. The centralized nature of the police system is specified in the Constitution. At the federal level the inspector general of police commands the NPF and carries out policies prescribed by the president or the minister of police affairs, who acts as the head of state's adviser on police matters. In 1981 Minister of Police Affairs Emmanuel C. Osammor was responsible for drawing up the budget, but his real policymaking authority was uncertain because he was not a member of Shagari's political party. At the state level the lines of authority were not clear-cut. NPF state commands were headed by commissioners of police who took directions from the state governors but were appointed by the Federal Police Service Commission. Any governor's order that was questioned by the police commissioner was referred to the president or his minister of police affairs rather than to the NPF's inspector general. The president thus was firmly in command of the police force, but the state governors were given the opportunity to make their views known. This procedure, however, did not satisfy some state governors, including those of the nine non-NPF states, who were responsible for law and order in their states but were unable to control the police forces. Several threatened to set up their own state forces, and in January 1981 it was announced that Bendel State's Governor Alli had formed the Bendel State Security System. The strength of the force was unknown, but it may have been an outgrowth of traffic patrols that operated under local jurisdiction. The central government was strongly opposed to the creation of local police forces, and Shagari made public statements referring to the abuses of power by earlier local police forces that led to their abolition. In mid-1981 available information did not indicate whether the government would ignore the problem, combat it with force, or eventually agree to amend the Constitution to allow limited operations by local police. The headquarters of the NPF was located in Lagos. Under the inspector general two bodies-the Police Service Commission and the Police Council-maintained administrative control of the national force. The commission served as an advisory panel on matters involving appointments, dismissals, promotions, and discipline. The council, headed by the inspector general, was charged with administration and operational control of the NPF. Various specialized departments operated from the national headquarters. The largest of these was the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), which was responsible for the application of scientific methods to the prevention and detection of crime. The Special Branch, whose activities received little publicity, was concerned with internal security, intelligence gathering, and countersubversive procedures. Other branches dealt with general administration, traffic control, and vehicle registry. The headquarters organization also supervised the activities of all police training schools. The NPF was comprised of nineteen state commands, each under the direction of a police commissioner and the governor and headquartered in the state capital. The size and organizational complexity of the state police commands varied according to the population density of each state and its need for police authority. The largest of the state police commands was, not surprisingly, that of Lagos State which had a modern police laboratory, a CID training school, a division responsible for registering aliens, and several specialized operational groups. These included a mobile unit, a police dog unit, a division of policewomen, and a unit of railway police. (The Lagos State Command had formerly included a branch of the Nigerian Ports Authority Port Police.) Expansion of the NPF from 45,000 personnel in 1975 to 83,500 in 1979 had an adverse effect on the quality of recruits. One of the likely reasons for increasing the size of the NPF under the Third National Development Plan (1975-79) was to provide employment for undereducated soldiers being demobilized from the armed forces. Reportedly the ex-soldiers were generally undisciplined, and many recruits deserted after joining the force. Statistics were unavailable on the large number of volunteers the NPF rejected, but it was forced to lower the qualifications standards to achieve its manpower goals. To be accepted by the NPF a recruit must meet prescribed height and weight standards and pass a medical examination. Traditionally an applicant had to be between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five, but the upper limit was raised so the force could accommodate demobilized soldiers, and the lower limit was lowered to seventeen to attract more recruits. The NPF had long required a Standard VI certificate of education (approximately eighth grade) and the successful completion of oral and written entrance examinations. These requirements were often waived in the 1960s in northern areas where few candidates met the qualifications and in the 1970s to meet increased manpower goals. It was likely that the NPF's planned increase to 200,000 personnel would result in a further deterioration of standards. Unlike the armed forces the NPF was not required by law to achieve regional or ethnic balance in its recruitment, but unofficially it attempted to do so. The ethnic composition of the NPF was now known in 1981, but in the early 1960s it had a reputation for being Ibo-dominated, partly because members of that group were more likely to meet the educational standards and partly because the NPF was the sole police force operating in the Eastern Region. During the civil war about 5,000 police in the Eastern Region joined the Biafran forces, but when the war ended most were restored to duty after a security investigation. The NPF began recruiting women in 1955 when the Women's Division was founded. The unit has proved valuable, particularly in cases involving women and juveniles, and the number of women in the NPF increased. Before being assigned to duty with the active force, each recruit must successfully complete the prescribed six-month course at one of the two police training colleges-Kaduna Police College, established in 1948 to serve the northern part of the country, or the Ikeja Police College outside Lagos, founded the following year to serve the south. The course of instruction at these schools has included the study of police ordinances and regulations, criminal law, laws of evidence, motor traffic ordinances, police and station duties, first aid, fingerprinting, the taking of statements, and the preparation of reports and sketches at the scene of a crime or accident. Interpretation of ordinances and the proper methods of keeping books and records in police stations are also taught. The course has involved both theoretical and practical work, including the preparation of mock cases for court presentation. An intensive physical training program included foot drill, arms drill, parades, marksmanship, unarmed combat tactics, and riot control techniques. Programs of organized athletics are conducted at both colleges. Recruits are attached to a particular police command to gain practical experience during the training period. Some highly qualified candidates are recruited directly into the cadet inspectorate cadre. Other recruits with a university education are allowed to enter the NPF as assistant superintendents, the lowest senior officer rank. Police officers from the lower ranks can rise to the level of inspector and assistant superintendent depending on their performance in the field and in various refresher courses and specialized courses they might take. Schools offering police refresher courses have been established at Ikeja, Kaduna, and Enugu. Instruction is based on the course given at the police training colleges but is more advanced, detailed, and technical. In addition to specialized training within the force, selected senior members have attended courses of instruction in Britain and the United States. Selected NCOs and constables have been sent abroad to be trained in such specialized areas as fingerprinting, handwriting analysis, and photography. After completing their training, NPF personnel are generally assigned to posts outside their home region. This policy has made police officers more dependent on their NPF commanders and less responsible to local leaders, which has reinforced the centralized authority of the force. But the police have been frequently criticized for their aloofness from the population and for the inability of many of them to speak the language of the area in which they serve. Because the NPF had maintained its discipline and organizational integrity during a time when the military was rent by coups, purges, and the civil war, it had enjoyed a relatively good reputation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The police earlier had earned international acclaim for their performance in the Congo in 1960-65, when a contingent of 400 unarmed men operated as part of the UN peacekeeping force. But according to most accounts the performance and status of the NPF had deteriorated by the late 1970s. Partly as a result of the more visible crime problem at the time the civilians assumed power in 1979, concern had increased among politicians, the press, and the general public. The FMG was accused, with some justification, of neglecting the police in the later years of its administration. In the late 1970s when increased recruitment raised police manpower levels, the NPF's capital budget fell from 77.2 Naira in FY 1975-76 to 28.8 million Naira in FY 1979-80. NPF transportation and communications equipment, housing, and other facilities-inadequate to begin with-deteriorated. The NPF manpower problem was not eased by the increased recruitment because the demobilized army veterans recruited by the police lowered the overall quality of the force. Relative pay and conditions of service also deteriorated during the 1970s. Experienced constables were barely earning the national minimum wage, and recruits were receiving far less. Well-educated and well-trained personnel had little incentive to remain with the NPF and were tempted by opportunities for corruption. To remedy police inadequacies and ameliorate the crime problem, the outline for the Fourth Plan earmarked 800 million Naira for police programs, three times the amount allocated during the Third Plan. The centerpiece of the plan was the increase in manpower to 200,000, which would raise the police to population ratio to one to 400 (although it would not improve quality). New police colleges and training institutions were to be established at various locations to train the recruits. In addition the NPF was to be given funds to upgrade its transportation and communications capabilities. The Fourth Plan outline also called for spending nearly 400 million Naira over five years for new barracks to house all police personnel assigned to the state commands. In response to complaints about crime from constituents and foreign businessmen operating in Nigeria, the Shagari administration and the National Assembly in early 1981 accelerated their efforts to remedy police shortcomings. The federal House of Representatives voted 83.2 million Naira in the annual budget "for a war against armed robbery," and Shagari replaced the inspector general who was seen as ineffective. Police salaries were increased between 110 and 700 percent, depending on the rank and experience of the officers. Combined with an earlier offer of a college education to those NPF personnel who could qualify, the government hoped to attract capable recruits and encourage officers to stay on the force. In 1981 it appeared that if the NPF continued to be perceived as ineffective by the public and the legislators, major administrative reorganization could be anticipated. The federal government appeared to have rejected the option of allowing local control over the police forces but unilateral actions by the states could create a fait accompli. It was also possible that the government would move to create more federally controlled specialized police forces, commanded by the NPF in name but under separate administration. The creation of the Nigerian Ports Authority Port Police in early 1981 to combat Nigeria's "piracy" problem provided an example of how the NPF might lose more of its authority in the future. The NPF had taken over the duty of policing the ports in 1978 when a previous Ports Authority security force was disbanded because of labor problems and jurisdictional disputes with the NPF. But because of a lack of equipment and manpower and a concern for other responsibilities, the NPF was unable to police the port effectively. The navy joined the police in carrying out these duties until both were relieved when the Ports Police was recreated. According to the minister of transport, the Ports Police would receive training from the NPF but would serve under the sole control of the Ports Authority.