$Unique_ID{COW02636} $Pretitle{357} $Title{Nigeria Chapter 4A. Government and Politics} $Subtitle{} $Author{Robert Rinehart} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{government state federal national president constitution states assembly executive military} $Date{1981} $Log{Brass Statue of an Oni*0263601.scf National Secretariat Buildings*0263602.scf } Country: Nigeria Book: Nigeria, A Country Study Author: Robert Rinehart Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 4A. Government and Politics [See Brass Statue of an Oni: An Ife king of the early fourteenth or fifteenth century] Nigeria entered a second phase of its quest for democratic rule in 1979-a venture that holds profound implications for the future of Western-style institutions of representative multiparty government in an African setting. The political system's initial test of civilian government, which spanned the first five years after independence in 1960, saw regionally dominant groups pitted against each other in increasingly destructive competition for political power, patronage jobs, influence, and financial gains. With each group unprepared to accept the consequences of political defeat, the results were a breakdown of civil order, violations of the constitution, coups d'etat, civil war, and more than thirteen years of military rule. Government under an authoritarian military regime followed a common African pattern. What was unusual was the conscious planning during the latter stages of military rule under General Murtala Muhammed and Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo (1975-79) to lay the groundwork for a revival of civilian authority on conditions that would surmount the bitter regional rivalries of the past. In this they were supported by a popular consensus that a solution to the deficiencies that had brought down the first republic lay in moving toward policies of reconciling group interests without bitter confrontations. The military government called upon fifty well-qualified civilians to draft a constitution based on a strong executive presidency, the transfer of many functions from state to national jurisdiction (many such functions had already been arrogated to the military regime by decree), and the dismantling of ethnically based political divisions by creating nineteen states cutting across geographic strongholds of the major ethnic groups. Political parties were tightly regulated by an independent federal electoral commission and pressed to abandon their regional ties. Local government was reorganized, and local elections were held as a prelude to a partly elective constituent assembly whose review of the draft constitution was completed in mid-1978. This was followed by the lifting of the ban on political party activity in September 1978. The national and state elections in the summer of 1979 brought a narrow victory to the conservative National Party of Nigeria, a party with a northern base, but having broader ethnic and inter-regional acceptance as was intended by the new election rules. While all five legally acknowledged parties sought nationwide popularity, most of them retained the image of regional allegiances of the past, a warning sign of the potential for future polarization should Nigerian politics revert to mobilization of sectional interests. The government of President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, which took office in October 1979, needed cooperation of the third-ranked party, the Nigerian People's Party under the veteran Ibo political leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe. Opposition forces centered on the Unity Party of Nigeria under the energetic but contentious leadership of another longtime political figure, Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba. Shagari's quiet, consensus-building approach carried the government over the shoals of the first year of testing the allocation of powers among the separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. But Shagari's skills were less successful in relations with the governors and assemblies of the twelve states not controlled by the NPN, as the sharing of the public purse-including vast oil revenues-emerged as a prime source of conflict. The Constitutional System The Nigerian independence constitution of 1960 and the republican constitution of 1963 embodied many British parliamentary concepts. But the adaptations to the Westminster model of government incorporated the regional orientation of Nigerian politics, and unrestrained competition among the regionally based parties thwarted the spirit of compromise indispensable to the effective functioning of parliamentary democracy. When the military government assumed power on January 15, 1966, the constitutional system was put in abeyance. The military leaders suspended the offices of the president, the prime minister, and the Council of Ministers, and they closed the parliament, vesting all legislative and executive powers in the Federal Military Government (FMG). The FMG replaced the executive and legislative branches of the four regional governments with military governors responsible directly to the FMG. At the federal level, executive and legislative powers were concentrated in the Supreme Military Council (SMC), composed of various military and police commanders. The SMC determined policy on major national issues and matters of national security, appointed the head of the FMG and other top officers, and had authority to declare war or a national emergency. The SMC met at least every three months-or whenever summoned by the head of the FMG-usually for two to three days. While legislative proposals were fully discussed by the council, decisions were not taken by vote but by the judgment of the head of the FMG as to the council's position. The paramount role of the head of the FMG in council activities and the fact that any decree (law) came into force simply by being signed by the head of the FMG meant that in reality both executive and legislative powers were centered in him. The states' military governors exercised their functions only as delegates of the head of the FMG; thus the Nigerian system was unitary rather than federal during the military regime. After the civil war a Federal Executive Council was formed to serve as the cabinet. Both military and civilian members, called commissioners, headed the various ministries. The head of the FMG also served as president of the Federal Executive Council. Similar bodies were formed at the state level after 1971, although all state commissioners under the military governors were civilians. In spite of the abrogation of major portions of the 1963 constitution by the military regime, other provisions incorporated in various decrees, e.g., those relating to the judiciary, fundamental rights, citizenship, and federal-state distribution of powers, were renewed with or without modification. The FMG had the power to revoke or change by ordinary decree any provisions adopted from the 1963 constitution. Accordingly the human rights provisions were at any time subject to modification by the military authorities. After the ouster of Major General Yakubu "Jack" Gowon in 1975, the military regimes of Muhammed and Obasanjo adopted a staged program for the return to civil government by October 1979. The framework was to be the newly drafted constitution, which had been approved by a Constituent Assembly composed predominantly of members elected by local authorities, many of whom had been prominent in civilian politics of the 1960s. The assembly, which sat from October 1977 until June 1978, based its deliberations on the work of a constitutional drafting committee whose results were published as a draft for public discussion and review in October 1976. Although the FMG did not participate in the preparations, it did instruct the drafting committee to base its efforts on a federal structure that emphasized national unity rather than regional interests. The committee was called upon to devise an executive system headed by a president popularly elected rather than chosen by parliament. To minimize the sectoral antagonisms that had led to the downfall of the earlier civilian government, the drafting committee was charged with producing a plan that would ensure the organization of political parties on a national basis and a cabinet reflecting the federal character of the government. The broad outlines of the draft constitution were preserved intact during the debates by the Constituent Assembly. Contention centered on the appeals channels for Muslim courts and the creation of new states. Efforts to create a sharia (Muslim) court of appeal at the federal level were unsuccessful in spite of a boycott of the assembly by many northern members. Proposals to increase the number of states beyond the nineteen designated by the Muhammed government were rejected, and stringent conditions were imposed for the future creation of new states. The SMC introduced a moderate number of changes after the Constituent Assembly completed its work. Both the assembly and the SMC stiffened the provisions dealing with corruption and outside business interests by public officials. The SMC called for a number of existing provisions of law to be raised to constitutional status and thus be less vulnerable to modification or revocation. Included were the new Land Use Decree bringing all undeveloped land under control of the state governments and funds to ensure continuation of the Public Complaint Bureau (ombudsman), the National Youth Service Corps, and the Nigerian Security Organisation. The 1979 Constitution was brought into force by the FMG as an ordinary decree, entitled the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [Enactment] Decree 1978, No. 25, taking effect on October 1, 1979. In a departure from the British antecedents of its two predecessors, the new law adopted features of the United States Constitution-the establishment of a governmental system predicated on a popularly elected president at the head of a strong executive branch and a separate bicameral legislature. Chapter II of the Constitution is a declaration of fundamental objectives deriving from the principle that sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government assumes its power and authority. It gives the state the duty to foster national integration by ensuring free movement and association of individuals and by encouraging intermarriage, while prohibiting discrimination on the basis of origin, sex, religion, or ethnic and linguistic ties. Although proposals to guarantee employment, free education, and medical care were not adopted, these are included as objectives "as and when practicable." One group of the drafting committee wished to declare that Nigeria's long-term goal was a socialist order, but the language adopted reflected the majority view that Nigeria should pursue a mixed economy. Under this plan the state would manage and operate the major sectors while protecting the right of citizens to engage in business activity outside the major sectors. Chapter IV comprises a comprehensive code of fundamental rights carried over from the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, but it is amplified in the area of rights of persons arrested or detained, privacy of the home, personal thought and expression, and assembly and religion. Secret societies are not covered by these protections. Discrimination on any grounds is prohibited. Freedom of the press is in effect guaranteed by the freedom of expression clause and by a provision entitling anyone to own and operate a medium of information, exclusive of radio and television. Derogation of personal liberties is sanctioned only under strict conditions when a state of temporary emergency has been declared in a state or throughout the country. The Constitution provides for the declaration of a state of emergency by the president in seven specified circumstances, including war, the imminent danger of invasion, and the breakdown of public order and safety, during which the right to personal liberty may be suspended. A state of emergency must be confirmed by a two-thirds vote of all members of the legislature and expires after six months, although it may be rescinded at any time by simple majorities in both houses. Laws may also be passed that suspend the rights to privacy and freedom of thought, expression, assembly, association, and movement when justified to protect the rights and freedoms of others, or in the interests of defense, public safety, order, morality, or health. The Constitution continues the earlier practice of distributing powers between federal and state authorities by means of an exclusive list enumerating where the federal government is to have sole competence and a concurrent list of subjects on which both the federal and state authorities may legislate, federal law prevailing over state law in the event of inconsistency. Residual power over unlisted matters is retained by the states. In conformity with a long-term tendency to aggregate powers at the federal level, the exclusive list contains sixty-six items compared to forty-four under the 1963 constitution. Control over the census, arms and ammunition, and prisons are among those matters shifted to the national level. The federal government also retains exclusive power over defense, immigration, external affairs, banking and currency, regulation of trade, price controls, agricultural marketing, labor and trade unions, police, and the control of political parties. Areas on the concurrent list in which the states may legislate (subject to federal predominance in case of conflict) are the allocation of revenues, including grants to local governments, collection of taxes, electric power, and industrial and agricultural development. Primary education is the responsibility of the states and local councils, but the states have concurrent powers with the federal authorities over university and postprimary education. The Constitution continues the allocation of tax revenues contained in the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, the federal government retaining the proceeds of taxes on companies while the proceeds of taxes on personal incomes, profits, and capital gains are distributed among the states on the basis of derivation. An important distinction is that under the new Constitution the federal government sets the rate and collects these taxes, which are then remitted to the states. Other revenues collected by the federal government, notably the substantial mineral royalties and mining rents and direct profits of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, go into a single Federation Account, to be distributed among federal, state, and local governments on a pro rata basis, as determined by periodic enactments of the National Assembly. The vesting of these powers in the National Assembly enhances further the authority of the federal government, which extends even to the assignment of certain revenues directly to local councils without consulting state authorities (see State Government, this ch.). Under the Nigerian system the states do not have individual constitutions, rather their structures are delineated in the national Constitution. State governments are based on an executive model closely conforming to that of the federal government. Executive authority is vested in a governor while legislative power is bestowed on a single-house legislature. The states have responsibility for establishing local government authorities, subject to the stipulations in the Constitution as to how local governments are to be organized and the functions that are to be conferred on them. The Constitution outlines special procedures for legislation creating new states, which must be preceded by a request supported by two-thirds of the members of the Senate and House representing the area, the state assembly, and local councils of the area, followed by a referendum of the people of the area and approval by the Senate and House by a two-thirds majority. The Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds majority of all members of both houses of the national legislature, in addition to approval by resolution of the legislative bodies of two-thirds of the states. The fundamental rights chapter together with the legislative process for creating new states form a special category that can only be amended by a four-fifths majority of all members of the national legislature plus approval by two-thirds of the state bodies. Structure of Government While the Nigerian political framework bears a marked resemblance to the federal system of the United States, the institutions the republic has adopted carry the imprint of its own experience and needs. The president is intentionally delegated strong executive powers. Special conditions attached to his election are intended to ensure that he will be more than a regional candidate, while his cabinet must, by constitutional direction, include ministers representing all nineteen states. In spite of his wide authority the president cannot govern effectively without collaboration of the directly elected Senate and House of Representatives of the National Assembly, which must approve his legislative program and budget. The task was not made easier in the post-1979 government by the fact that five parties were represented in the two legislative bodies, while the governing National Party of Nigeria (NPN) did not command a majority in either house. A system of standing and conference committees has evolved, following the American pattern, before which ministers and officials can be called upon to appear. The Constitution provides for an intricate allocation of powers between the nineteen state governments and the federal government that overlap in several sensitive areas. The issue of state authority versus federal government control has accordingly been the source of much acrimonious political skirmishing since the new state governments, only seven of which were wholly in the hands of Shagari's NPN, were installed in October 1979. A key element of federal-state relations, the allocation of revenues, including the surging oil income, was left by the constitutional authors to be decided by the National Assembly. The formula adopted, assigning less than a third to the states and an additional 10 percent to local government, has been bitterly contested by most state governors. Nonetheless the state shares are by far the largest source of state income, permitting significant development activity and expanded social services. Federal Government The Constitution sets forth in detail the respective roles of the separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Yet many practical problems have had to be faced as the executive branch and the legislature sought to accustom themselves to interacting within an unfamiliar government structure with few established precedents to fall back on. Added complications were the presence of five parties in the National Assembly and the lack of a majority by Shagari's NPN, necessitating a working alliance with the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) that did not function smoothly. It could therefore be regarded as an accomplishment for both the president and the legislature, which in the end extended a reasonable degree of cooperation, that the basic legislative program cleared the National Assembly in 1980 with serious delays only over budget appropriations. The Executive Branch The president and vice president, whose names appear on the same electoral ballot, are directly elected by the people. The chief executive serves as head of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. His term is four years, and he may be elected for a second term but not a third. It was intended by the framers of the Constitution that the president would exercise strong direction over the federal government with his powers bounded by a system of checks and balances provided by an independent legislature and judiciary. Nevertheless a considerable measure of cooperation and restraint was foreseen as indispensable particularly during the early stages of introducing a form of government new to Nigeria. In a summit meeting of the heads of the five parties called by Shagari in January 1980, agreement was reached on the need for such cooperation and for a continuing dialogue among party leaders. Interparty relations remained good, although meetings at the top party level were not regularized, owing partly to the animosity of Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) toward Shagari and his persistent unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of Shagari's election. The size of the president's executive council or cabinet is not prescribed in the Constitution, nor are the ministries designated. The president is, however, obliged to name an attorney general and to name at least one citizen of each of the nineteen states to his cabinet. The first cabinet of the 1979 government had twenty-four ministers, of whom nineteen were from the president's NPN, while five were from the cooperating NPP. Cabinet ministers may not be members of the National Assembly but are obliged to attend sessions of either house if invited to do so when matters pertaining to their ministries are discussed. Ministers have also appeared before committees along with the director of the budget to explain and defend appropriations proposed for their departments. Prominent among members of the Shagari cabinet of twenty-four ministers were Alhaji Bello Maitama Yusuf, a northerner from Kano State, once minister of internal affairs but shifted to the commerce portfolio in early 1981, and Ishaya Audu, minister of external affairs (see table 13, Appendix). Audu was the senior member of the NPP in the cabinet and was Azikiwe's vice presidential running mate in the 1979 election. The minister of justice and attorney general was Richard Akinjide, whose nomination met with opposition because of his role in the Supreme Court decision confirming Shagari's election. The transport minister, Alhaji Umaru Abdurrahaman Dikko, was regarded as a confidant of Shagari and the cabinet member chiefly responsible for NPN party matters. Malam Adamu Ciroma, a former editor of the New Nigerian and runner-up in the NPN presidential convention, was minister of industries and also reputedly one of Shagari's close advisers. A prominent academic, Sunday Mathew Essang, held the important finance portfolio until early 1981 when he exchanged positions with the minister of works, Victor Masi. In spite of the presence of several influential political figures, the cabinet leaned toward technocratic appointees, and at the same time reflected the need not only to include members from each of the nineteen states but also to provide some ethnic balancing. It was expected that the ministries of defense, finance, internal affairs, external affairs, and national planning, as well as the cabinet office and some parastatal bodies would move to the new capital of Abuja in 1982. The executive branch of government incorporates inputs from nine other federal bodies, some exercising powers independent of the president and some whose functions are only advisory to the chief executive (see fig. 18). The most senior of these is the Council of State composed of the president and vice president, former presidents, the president of the Senate and speaker of the House, state governors, and members appointed by state councils of chiefs. The Council of State advises the president on such matters as the census, the award of national honors, appointments to other executive bodies, and the maintenance of public order. The Council of State is the only body at the national level where the traditional rulers-emirs, obas, and onis (kings)-are represented. Although it met only three times during the new government's first year, the Council of State had symbolic importance as the linking element between the still influential traditional leadership and the national government. [See National Secretariat Buildings: Lagos accommodate many of the federal government ministries. Courtesy Federal Republic of Nigeria Embassy, Washington] The Federal Civil Service Commission and the Police Service Commission have powers of appointment to these services, while the Judicial Service Commission advises the president on senior appointments to the bench. The president is chairman of the National Defence Council and the National Security Council, concerned with external defense and public security, respectively. The vice president chairs the National Economic Council, which includes the state governors as members and functions as the coordinating body for economic planning at the different levels of government. The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), an independent body with a member from each state, organizes elections, registers voters, and registers and supervises political parties. The National Population Commission, also with one member from each state, is responsible for the census, the registration of births and deaths, and advising the president on population matters. While the president has power to appoint members of these bodies (except those who are designated in the Constitution on the basis of official positions they hold), the appointments must be confirmed by the Senate. The appointees are somewhat insulated from political pressures by the fact that they hold office for five-year terms and can be removed by the president only with support of two-thirds of the Senate. The Constitution also permits the president to appoint special advisers with no restriction as to numbers. Shortly after taking office, Shagari announced that he would name nine special advisers and special assistants. Some are personal confidants of Shagari, while others have been chosen for their professional qualifications or to provide the essential ethnic balance. Among the better known advisers are Hayha Dikko, special adviser on petroleum and energy; Theophilus Akinyele, director of the budget; Emmanuel Edozien, special adviser on economic affairs; Chuba Okadigbo, special adviser on political affairs; Michael Prest, chief of personnel staff; and Kingsley Mbadiwe, a senior politician of the NPC in the first republic, in charge of liaison with the National Assembly. Permanent secretaries-senior civil servants usually entrusted with day-to-day operating responsibilities for government ministries-play a vital role in the administration of the executive branch. After Shagari took office, he reappointed the twenty-three permanent secretaries of the military government, while reshuffling their responsibilities, and added eight more for a total of thirty-one. In addition to those assigned to ministries, several were placed at the head of political, economic, police, and other departments of the cabinet office. Early in his term Shagari created another category within the executive branch by naming presidential liaison officers to each of the eighteen states outside of Lagos, purportedly to oversee federal projects in the states and act as the federal government's link with the state governors. These posts, not mentioned in the Constitution, were distributed to NPN politicians. Shagari's action was bitterly criticized by the opposition parties and was not supported by the cooperating NPP on the grounds that the president was seeking to circumvent the authority of state governments in order to reward NPN party workers with lucrative posts. The opposition governors have boycotted the liaison officers, reducing their effectiveness in states where the NPN has not been the governing party. The Legislature Responsibility for legislative action at the federal level rests with the National Assembly, consisting of a Senate with five members from each state for a total of ninety-five, and a House of Representatives with 449 members (one additional seat is reserved for the future federal capital of Abuja). Each of the nineteen states is divided into five senatorial districts, as well as a larger number of House districts, each with roughly 100,000 registered voters. The largest House delegation-forty-six seats-is from Kano State, and the smallest-ten seats-is from Niger State. The assembly sits for four years, after which elections for both houses are held on dates set by FEDECO. The two bodies elect their own leaders. Under the agreement worked out by the NPN-NPP majority coalition, the offices of president of the Senate and deputy speaker of the House were reserved for the NPN; those of speaker of the House and deputy president of the Senate were offered to the NPP. The assembly is required to remain in session for at least 181 days each year. Either house of the assembly may originate a bill. Proposed legislation is subject to review by one of the standing committees in each house. Although only one of these-the Joint Committee on Finance-is stipulated in the Constitution, twenty-seven committees have been established in the House and twenty-two in the Senate. Twenty-five members are assigned to each House committee and eleven to each Senate committee. Lacking regular meeting places, staffs, and other resources, most of the committees did not yet play a major part in the legislative process in 1981. Enactment of a bill requires approval of both houses plus assent of the president. The president has thirty days in which to signify his approval. If the president fails to approve a bill within this period, the bill may still be passed if it gains a two-thirds majority of both houses. Special procedures apply for appropriation bills if, after two months into a financial year, one house has failed to act favorably. The Joint Committee on Finance is then called upon to try to resolve differences. If this step fails, the bill can still be approved by an affirmative vote in a special joint sitting of the National Assembly.