$Unique_ID{COW02041} $Pretitle{234} $Title{Jordan Chapter 1C. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan} $Subtitle{} $Author{Robert Rinehart} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{jordan arab hussein bank israel government west british united al} $Date{1979} $Log{Figure 6.*0204102.scf } Country: Jordan Book: Jordan, A Country Study Author: Robert Rinehart Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1979 Chapter 1C. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan The population of Transjordan before the war had not exceeded 500,000. As a result of the war, some 500,000 Palestinian Arabs took refuge in Transjordan or in the West Bank. Most of them had to be accommodated in the refugee camps, administered under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), set up in 1949. In addition there were about 500,000 indigenous residents of the West Bank. In December 1948 Abdullah took the title of King of Jordan and in April 1949 directed that the official name of the country-East Bank and West Bank-be changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a term found in the 1946 Constitution but not until then in common use. In April 1950 elections were held in both banks that were considered favorable by Abdullah, and he formally annexed the West Bank to Jordan, an important step that was recognized by only two governments, Britain and Pakistan. Within the Arab League the annexation was not generally approved, and traditionalists and modernists alike condemned the move as a furtherance of Hashemite dynastic ambitions. Abdullah continued to search for a long-term, peaceful solution with Israel, although for religious as well as for security reasons he did not favor the immediate internationalization of Jerusalem. He found support for this position only from Hashemite kinsmen in Iraq. Nationalist propaganda, especially in Egypt and Syria, denounced him as a reactionary monarch and a tool of British imperialism. The Arab League debates after the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank were inconclusive, and Abdullah continued to set his own course. The residual special relationship with Britain continued, helping to keep the East Bank relatively free from disturbance. Although not yet a member of the UN, Jordan supported the UN action in Korea and entered into an economic developmental aid agreement with the United States in March 1951 under President Harry S Truman's Point Four program. On July 20, 1951, Abdullah was assassinated as he entered the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Friday prayers. His grandson, the fifteen-year-old Prince Hussein, was at his side. Before the assassin was killed by the king's guard, he also fired at Hussein. The assassin was a Palestinian reportedly hired by relatives of Haj Amin al Husseini-a former mufti of Jerusalem and a bitter enemy of Abdullah-who had spent World War II in Germany as a pro-Nazi Arab spokesman. Although many radical Palestinians blamed Abdullah for the reverses of 1948, there was no organized political disruption after his murder. The main political question confronting the country's leaders was the succession to the throne. Abdullah's second son Prince Naif acted temporarily as regent, and some support existed for his accession to the throne. Naif's older brother Prince Talal was in Switzerland receiving treatment for a mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia. It was widely believed that Abdullah would have favored Talal in order that the succession might then pass more easily to Talal's son Hussein. Accordingly the government invited Talal to return and assume the duties as king. During his short reign he promulgated a new constitution in January 1952. Talal showed an inclination to improve relations with other Arab states, and Jordan joined the Arab League's Collective Security Pact, which Abdullah had rejected. Talal was popular among the people of the East Bank, who were not aware of his periodic seizures of mental illness. But the king's condition steadily worsened, and in August the prime minister recommended to a secret session of the Jordanian legislature that Talal be asked to abdicate in favor of Hussein. Talal acceded to the abdication order with dignity and retired to a villa near Istanbul, where he lived quietly until his death in 1972. Hussein, who was a student at Harrow in England, returned immediately to Jordan. Under the Constitution he could not be crowned because he was under eighteen years of age, and a regency council was formed to act on his behalf. Before he came to the throne he attended the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. When he was eighteen-years old, by the Muslim calendar, he returned to Jordan and in May 1953 formally took the constitutional oath as king. Hussein's Early Reign The chief influences that guided the young Hussein were the example and teachings of his grandfather and his own education in conservative English schools. As king he had extensive legal powers. Although Jordan was a constitutional monarchy, the Constitution allowed the king to dismiss the National Assembly and to appoint the prime minister and other ministers at will (see The Constitution, ch. 4). In addition, he enjoyed the traditional support of the East Bank beduin tribes. Considered the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy, the Arab Legion was composed of intensely loyal beduin and paid for by a British subsidy. Two-thirds of Hussein's subjects were Palestinians, whereas the government elite were mostly from the East Bank, more conservative and traditional in their political attitudes than the Palestinians whose spokesmen often reflected a radical brand of Arab nationalism. In Cairo the successful coup d'etat carried out by the Egyptian Free Officers Movement headed by Gamal Abdul Nasser had overthrown the monarchy in July 1952 and established a republic. Nasser's image as the new champion of Arab nationalism was highly regarded by Palestinians who generally blamed Britain, the United States, and the Hashemites for their misfortunes. Hussein's problems were magnified by the intensification of border incidents with Israel that escalated into a succession of reprisals and counterreprisals between Palestinian infiltrators and Israeli security forces. The Arab Legion endeavored to secure the armistice line and prevent infiltration, but its numbers were inadequate to provide complete and continuous coverage of the border. In response to the terrorist attacks Israel adopted the technique of massive retaliation and often went deep into Jordanian territory (see Development and Disaster, this ch.). In 1953 and early 1954 an American plan for distribution of the Jordan waters (the Eric Johnston plan) was tentatively accepted by Israel but, although recognized as technically sound from an engineering standpoint, was ultimately rejected by Jordan and the other Arab states concerned because it would involve coordination with and at least the implied recognition of Israel. In the stress of inter-Arab political relationships, it was impracticable for Jordan to initiate a settlement with Israel, even if there were strong incentives to do so. A new financial aid agreement was made with Britain in 1954 in which the British evinced an interest in coordinating military and economic aid to Jordan with Jordanian participation in the context of an overall Middle Eastern defense system. In February 1955 Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan joined Britain in signing the Baghdad Pact, which ultimately became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). A high-ranking British military delegation visited Amman to discuss conditions under which Jordan might also become a participant. The purpose of the visit was generally known, and Arab nationalist propaganda, especially from Palestinians and Radio Cairo, raised a storm of protest denouncing the pact and the monarchy as "tools of Western imperialism" and a "sellout to the Jews." In December Hussein called on Hazza al Majali to form a government. Majali was from a distinguished family of tribal shaykhs and was known to be pro-Western. Shortly after forming his cabinet, he stated without equivocation that he intended to take Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Three days of demonstrations and rioting in Amman began after the announcement. Order was restored by the Arab Legion. The Majali government resigned after only a week in power, and it became clear that Jordan would not become a signatory of the Baghdad Pact. There were other repercussions. In March 1956 Hussein dismissed Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion, precipating a diplomatic crisis that threatened to isolate Hussein from his principal benefactor, Britain. Some observers believed that Hussein was advised to take this step as an act of defiance against Britain in order to identify his regime with the Arab nationalism personified by Egypt's Nasser and win him popularity with his Palestinian subjects. Hussein stated that the decision was his alone, that he had found himself for some time in disagreement with Glubb over military organization and planning, and that the British government ought not to identify this personal action as a change of policy. The British government, however, was not convinced and-although the British subsidy was not, in fact, then withdrawn-relations were strained for several years. Hussein designated Ali Abu Nuwar, an officer known for his nationalist sympathies, as Glubb's successor in the Arab Legion. The name of the force was officially changed to the Jordan Arab Army, and British officers were phased out of the service (see General Development Trends, ch. 5). Border incidents with Israel were a continuing source of anxiety in 1956, and in October an Israeli task force, supported by air and artillery, attacked the West Bank village of Qalqilyah, killing forty-eight persons in reprisal for a guerrilla attack in Israel. The Palestinians clamored for war, and in this atmosphere of crisis Jordanian politics ventured into anti-Western nationalism. In the parliamentary elections of October 21, 1956, the National Socialist Party received a plurality of votes, and its leader Sulaiman Nabulsi was designated by Hussein as prime minister. Several National Front (communist) party members and members of the Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party) also gained seats in the National Assembly, although independents and the older, conservative parties were represented about equally with the leftists and nationalists. Nabulsi was an ardent admirer of Nasser and shaped the policies of his government accordingly. When Israel attacked Egypt in the Sinai on October 29 and after Anglo-French forces landed at Port Said on November 5, Nabulsi proved suddenly indecisive. Hussein proposed that Jordan attack Israel at once but was urged by Nasser not to do so because Jordan's forces would be wasted in a war that by then was already lost. British participation in the attack on Egypt made it politically imperative that Jordan end its special relationship with Britain. Under the Arab Solidarity Agreement emanating from the Arab Summit in Cairo in January 1957, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria undertook, on the ratio of two-to-two-to-one, respectively, to pay Jordan the equivalent of US$35.8 million annually for ten years and thereby free Jordan from the British subsidy. However, Saudi Arabia made only one quarterly payment; no other country paid. An Anglo-Jordanian agreement of March 1957 abrogated the basic Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948, terminated the British subsidy, and initiated the turnover of British installations and the withdrawal of all British troops still in Jordan. The internal political scene in Jordan in early 1957 shaped up as a power struggle between the monarchy and the Egypt-oriented Nabulsi government. Hussein and the conservatives suspected that Nabulsi was maneuvering to abolish the monarchy. Nabulsi began negotiations aimed at opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and securing Soviet arms aid. Political tension increased, and in April Hussein, exercising his constitutional prerogative, demanded the resignation of the Nabulsi government. Abu Nuwar made a statement to Said al Mufti, who was attempting to form a caretaker government, that was interpreted as an ultimatum that any new cabinet be approved by the army. There followed a sequence of dramatic events that became known as the Az Zarqa affair. The public in Amman, sensing the explosive political atmosphere, became restive. Rumors spread at the main army base at Az Zarqa that the king was dead. Taking Abu Nuwar with him, Hussein set off for Az Zarqa. En route he met several truckloads of troops who were overjoyed at seeing him alive but who demanded Abu Nuwar's head. At Abu Nuwar's request, Hussein allowed him to retreat to the safety of the royal palace. Continuing to Az Zarqa, Hussein spent several hours amid wildly enthusiastic demonstrations of loyalty to him and to the throne and returned to Amman after reassuring and quieting the troops. On the next day Abu Nuwar fled the country. During the balance of the month several cabinet crises occurred, as the remnants of the Nabulsi faction fought a rearguard action against Hussein. Ibrahim Hashim, a Hussein loyalist who formed occasional interim governments, successfully formed a government, and all political party activity was outlawed. Hussein had won a remarkable political victory. What had counted was the loyalty of the combat units of the army, and that loyalty clearly belonged to the king. But Jordan was beleaguered-Nasserites were arrayed against the king, the British subsidy was gone, the Arab Solidarity Agreement had evaporated, and the rift was wider than ever between the East Bank and the West Bank. Hussein unequivocally placed his country on the side of the West and sought a new principal source of aid-the United States. Crisis and Realignment The United States replaced Britain as Jordan's principal source of foreign aid, but it did so without a bilateral treaty or other formal alliance mechanisms. In April 1957 the White House officially noted that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles regarded "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital." Although Hussein did not specifically request aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine-in which the United States pledged military and economic aid to any country asking for help in resisting communist influence-he did state publicly that Jordan's security was being threatened by communism. Within twenty-four hours of his request for economic assistance, Jordan received an emergency financial aid grant of US$10 million from the United States-the first of a long series of United States grants. Existing development aid programs were expanded and military aid initiated. In seeking a viable, long-term arrangement for political stability in face of the hostile Nasser-style revolutionary nationalism then prevalent in the Middle East, Jordan turned to neighboring Iraq. Iraq, far larger than Jordan and more populous, was also far wealthier in oil and other resources. It had usually supported Jordan in Arab councils, although without deep involvement since the 1948 war. Its conservative government had taken Iraq into the Baghdad Pact in 1955 to ensure continued Western support against the Soviet Union or, more particularly, against radical Arab movements. On February 1, 1958, the announcement by Egypt and Syria of the integration of their two countries to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) was greeted with great enthusiasm by the new nationalist advocates of Arab unity, but it made the situation of conservative or moderate regimes more perilous. The initial phase of Jordanian-Iraqi negotiation was quickly concluded, and on February 14, 1958, a proclamation was issued in Amman by Hussein and King Faisal II, Hussein's cousin, joining the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan in a federation to be called the Arab Union. Faisal was to be head of state and Hussein deputy head of state. But the Arab Union was short-lived. An Iraqi motorized brigade under the command of Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim seized control of Baghdad on July 14, 1958. King Faisal and other members of the Iraqi royal family were murdered. The Jordanian leader Ibrahim Hashim, deputy prime minister of the Arab Union who was in Baghdad at the time of the coup, was taken by the mob and killed. Hussein, enraged and overcome by shock and grief, threatened to send the Jordanian army into Iraq to revenge Faisal and restore the Arab Union but was advised by his civilian ministers against taking this course. In Iraq the army and police supported the coup, and Qasim became president-dictator, taking Iraq out of the Arab Union and the Baghdad Pact. Jordan was cut off as it had never been before. Hussein appealed to both the United States and Britain for help. The United States instituted an airlift of petroleum, and Britain flew troops into Amman to stabilize the regime. Ironically these planes overflew Israel, because clearances for alternate routes over Arab countries could not be secured in time. These events in Iraq and Jordan coincided with the United States action of landing American troops in Lebanon. For some weeks the political atmosphere in Jordan was explosive, but the government kept order through partial martial law. The army continued its unquestioning loyalty to the king, and the Israeli frontier remained quiet. The two-year period of relative tranquility was broken in August 1960 when pro-Western Prime Minister Hazza al Majali was killed when a time bomb concealed in his desk exploded. Analysts speculated that the conspirators expected the killing to generate a public uprising. It had precisely the opposite effect; order was maintained by beduin troops who moved into Amman, and Hussein appointed a new conservative prime minister, Bahjat al Talhuni. The plot was traced to Syria and further identified with Cairo. Four suspects were caught, convicted, and hanged, and the army made a show of force. Development and Disaster By early 1964 Arab governments and Palestinian spokesmen had become seriously alarmed by an Israeli project to draw water from Lake Tiberias to irrigate the Negev Desert. Israel had announced the intention of taking quantities of water approximating the allocations of the 1953-54 Johnston plan. Nasser invited the Arab heads of state to attend a summit conference in Cairo in January 1964 at which the principal issue was the Jordan water question. Despite Syria's militant rhetoric, the conference rejected the idea of provoking a war because-it was argued-the Arab states lacked a unified military command. Instead, three alternative courses of action were approved: the diversion of the tributary sources of the Jordan River north of Lake Tiberias in Lebanon and Syria; the establishment of the United Arab Command under an Egyptian commander; and the recognition of the new Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by a former Jerusalem lawyer, Ahmad Shukairy, as the representative of Palestinian resistance against Israel. The Cairo Conference of January 1964 ended in an euphoric atmosphere of goodwill and brotherhood. Talhuni became prime minister for the second time in July 1964, pledging his government to implement the spirit of the Cairo Conference "according to the king's instructions." Jordan cultivated friendship with Egypt and entered the Arab Common Market. In May 1965 Jordan joined nine other Arab states and broke relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) because of its recognition of Israel. Jordan and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in August defining for the first time the boundary between the two countries. Under this agreement Jordan gave up some territory in the southeast but was able to gain an extension of about eighteen kilometers down the gulf from the crowded port of Al Aqabah. The PLO's Shukairy, famous for his often hysterical political rhetoric, was to play a role in Palestinian history somewhat analogous to that of the old pro-Nazi mufti Husseini, one of the principal architects of the Arab disasters of 1948. Shukairy had organized the PLO in Jerusalem in 1964 with the objective of liberating Palestine in cooperation with all Arab states but without interfering in their internal affairs or claiming sovereignty on the West Bank. Almost from the start, trouble developed with Hussein's government. Essentially conflict arose because the PLO attempted to assume quasi-governmental functions, such as taxing Palestinians and distributing arms to villagers on the West Bank and among the refugees, acts that infringed on Jordanian sovereignty. With Syrian assistance, the guerrilla organization called Al Fatah was formed in Damascus in December 1964 under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. Al Fatah and the PLO carried out raids and sabotage against Israel without clearance from either the United Arab Command or Jordan. Jordanian policy since 1949 had been and continued to be one of avoiding border incidents and terrorism that would generate Israeli reprisals. Al Fatah attacks, although planned in Syria, were most often launched into Israel by infiltration through Lebanon or Jordan. Israeli reprisals against selected West Bank targets became increasingly severe and frequent from May 1965 onward. Meanwhile, Syrian propaganda against Hussein became increasingly strident, and in July 1966, when Hussein cut off official Jordanian endorsement and support for the PLO, both that organization and the Syrian government turned against him with all the propaganda devices at their disposal. In reprisal for the terrorist attacks by the guerrillas, in November Israel destroyed the West Bank village of As Samu with an assault by a reinforced brigade. Although Israel was censured by the UN, the public clamor and rioting against the Jordanian government that broke out among the inhabitants of the West Bank exceeded any previous experience. As in the past, Hussein used the army to restore public order. Political pressure against Hussein mounted, however, along with armed clashes on the Syria-Jordan border. Tension also mounted on the Syria-Israel border, where a land and air engagement took place on April 7, 1967. Egypt was severely criticized by Syria and Jordan for failing to send support. In mid-May Egypt commenced an extensive military buildup in the Sinai in response to Syrian allegations that it was in imminent danger of invasion by Israel. Nasser declared a state of emergency on May 16 and two days later demanded removal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai, where it had served as a peacekeeping force since 1957. The UN secretary general acceded to Nasser's demand. On May 23-24 Nasser announced that the Straits of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba would be closed to Israeli shipping, an act that Israel immediately declared to be a cause of war. Hussein quickly decided that it would not again be possible, as in 1956, for Jordan to stay out of the impending conflict. He hurriedly proceeded to Cairo and on May 30 signed a military alliance with Egypt. The move on Hussein's part was a response to political pressures at home as well as the fulfillment of basic pan-Arab commitments. As a result of the alliance, the Jordanian army was put under overall Egyptian military command and was assigned an Egyptian general officer as its field commander. On June 5 Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egyptian forces deployed in the Sinai. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol attempted in vain to contact Hussein through UN channels to keep him out of the war. The Egyptian field marshal in overall command of Arab forces ordered Jordanian artillery to open fire on Israeli positions, and Jordan's small air force conducted a bombing raid in the Tel Aviv area. Within hours, however, Israeli warplanes had effectively eliminated the Arab air forces on the ground, including Jordan's twenty-two Hawker Hunters, and Hussein accepted Nasser's explanation that British and American aircraft had taken part in the operation. In forty-eight hours of combat, Jordan's main armored units had been defeated, but hard fighting continued as Hussein determined to hold as much ground as possible in the event that a cease-fire was arranged. By the time he agreed to a truce on June 7, Israeli forces had seized the West Bank. Of all the Arab belligerents, Jordan-which could least afford it-lost most in the war. Government figures listed over 6,000 killed or missing. During the short war, more than 200,000 refugees-many of whom had first been refugees from the 1948-49 war-fled from the West Bank to the East Bank. One-third to one-half of the country's best agricultural land and its main tourist attractions were gone. On June 27 the Israeli parliament (Knesset) formally annexed the Old City of Jerusalem, an act that the United States and many other nations refused to recognize. The Problem of the Holy Places The West Bank, occupied by Israeli forces after the June 1967 War, contained numerous sites sacred to three major religions. Jurisdiction over these sites created sensitive and difficult problems, which extended into the international arena. Although numerous sites associated with biblical figures sacred to Jews or Muslims or both, as well as numerous places associated with incidents in the life of Jesus, are scattered throughout the Israeli-occupied Territory, an astonishing concentration of holy places lies within or near the walled city of Jerusalem (see fig. 6). As the locale of the last days of Jesus, the ancient capital of the Jewish kingdom, and the scene of the Prophet's nocturnal ascent to heaven, the city is without peer in Christianity and Judaism and is the third holiest city in Islam. In 1979 possession of Jerusalem remained a major source of contention. During twenty years of Jordanian administration several ancient synagogues were destroyed, and Jewish religious pilgrimages were not allowed. After 1967 Muslim religious observances were permitted by Israeli authorities, but the number of Muslim pilgrims diminished drastically. The sensibilities of the three faiths converged on Mount Moriah, or Temple Mount. Here, on a flat rock face, was the legendary spot where, according to Judaism, Abraham offered to sacrifice his son Isaac (in the Muslim tradition Abraham's son Ishmael). On this site later stood the Temple of Solomon and then the Temple of Herod, the ritual center of Judaism. The latter was the temple in which Jesus preached and from which he reputedly drove the money-changers. Later still, the sacred rock was covered by a massive Muslim shrine, the Dome of the Rock, which, along with the Al Aqsa Mosque, occupied the Haram al Sharif, or Noble Enclosure. Arson by an Australian Christian religious fanatic severely damaged the Al Aqsa Mosque in 1969 causing consternation and shock to the world's Muslim community. The wall enclosing the Haram al Sharif rested in part on several courses of ancient stone that were the sole remnants of the Temple of Solomon. Thus, a portion of it was the Western (Wailing) Wall, the most sacred place of Judaism. Other locations sacred to more than one faith included the tombs of various prophets and biblical figures, such as the Tomb of David, known to Muslims as Nabi Daud, which lay close to the Coenaculum, the traditional site of the Last Supper. As a result of this extraordinary juxtaposition and intermingling of shrines, administration traditionally had been quite complex. In general, each faith administered its own holy places. A number of Christian churches, including various Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant groups, contributed to the maintenance of various shrines. Nevertheless, animosities were difficult to avoid. For example, various Christian denominations competed over a number of years for prerogatives in such places as the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the traditional site of the tomb of Jesus. Jerusalem may not be considered as merely contested territory because of the ancient attachment to it by three world religions. Its symbolic importance is probably as great as that of any city in the world, and the extraordinary tenacity with which the faithful of each religion cling to their memories of it remove discussion of it from the realm of ordinary international discourse. [See Figure 6.: Principal Holy Places in the Vicinity of the Walled City of Jerusalem]