$Unique_ID{COW01734} $Pretitle{239} $Title{Indonesia Chapter 5D. Foreign Military Relations} $Subtitle{} $Author{Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{kopkamtib military criminal intelligence new security law political special armed} $Date{1982} $Log{} Country: Indonesia Book: Indonesia, A Country Study Author: Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1982 Chapter 5D. Foreign Military Relations Consistent with its foreign policy of nonalignment, Indonesia maintained no defense pacts with foreign nations. It did, however, have military aid agreements with the United States and various other nations and participated in joint military exercises with several other countries. Indonesia has also supplied troop contingents to the United Nations peacekeeping forces. The nation is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and supports its goals. These include noninvolvement in any rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union or between the Soviet Union and China, and support for the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Zopfan) in the area. ASEAN has no defense aspect, however; military cooperation between Indonesia and its ASEAN partners was conducted on a bilateral basis and was limited to informal ties, to exchanges of military representatives at national defense institutions, and to joint military exercises. Following the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Bali in mid-1979 pledged their nation's support for the security of each of the other ASEAN nations but stopped short of discussing the creation of a military alliance. As of mid-1982 the Indonesian government continued to stress that defense cooperation among ASEAN nations was only a function of each nation's right to protect itself and that bilateral cooperation would not lead to any bilateral or ASEAN-wide defense pact. Indonesia has also held joint military exercises with non-ASEAN nations, including Britain and France. Regular joint exercises with Australia were held in the 1972-82 period, and joint training and exercises with New Zealand air force and naval elements and with the Indian navy took place in 1978-80. In mid-1982 some defense officials suggested that joint border patrols might be set up with Papua New Guinea. That nation supported the idea in principle but stated that it did not have sufficient personnel to put it into practice. Indonesian armed forces personnel have sometimes crossed the border from Irian Jaya into Papua New Guinea in pursuit of armed insurgents being sheltered there. The nation maintained military assistance agreements with several countries. The United States funded security assistance throughout the 1950-82 period, except for the years 1965 and 1966. Grant aid averaged US$13 million per year from 1971 to 1978 and was used mainly for logistics equipment, communications systems, and combat materiel for internal security. The United States also provided training in English and other subjects to armed services personnel in Indonesia and funded the education of some 3,250 in the United States in the 1968-81 period. Foreign Military Sales credits were made available to Indonesia beginning in 1974 and have helped defray the expenses of purchases of United States-made military equipment. In the early 1980s Indonesia also received military aid from Australia, West Germany, and the Netherlands, among others. It also continued to make payments to the Soviet Union for equipment acquired in the early 1960s but largely inoperative by the 1970s. Security and Intelligence Agencies At least four different organizations shared occasional overlapping responsibilities for security and intelligence functions. The foremost was the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), which focused primarily on internal matters and mounted operations and collected intelligence data. The central intelligence-gathering body, however, was the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (Bakin), which studied both domestic and foreign developments. The Special Operations Service (OPSUS) compiled political intelligence and was sometimes used by the president to conduct delicate foreign diplomatic assignments. The armed services' Strategic Intelligence Center was responsible for intelligence relating to defense matters. Kopkamtib was created in late 1965 as a special organ for dealing with internal security problems. Its original function was to purge from the government and the armed forces PKI members and others suspected of complicity with the Communists in the attempted coup of that year. By the late 1960s its initial task had been largely completed. In early 1969, however, Kopkamtib was given new life by a presidential decree that provided it an organizational basis closely interwoven with Hankam. Kopkamtib was assigned a mandate on all matters concerning internal security as defined in its widest sense and quickly began to exercise sweeping powers of supervision over the national political life, using the army's territorial forces. These tasks had previously been performed by the army itself. By the early 1970s Kopkamtib had become a large and powerful body that concerned itself with the activities of every political and social organization in the nation; its powers of interrogation, arrest, and detention were not subject to the restriction of the nation's regular legal channels. As of late 1982 Kopkamtib still had no statutory foundation, but the government held that the legal basis for Kopkamtib had been affirmed by the People's Consultative Assembly in 1973. At that time the agency was assigned the task of "safeguarding the national development" in addition to its previous missions of preventing communist subversion, defending the 1945 Constitution, and upholding the principles of the state philosophy, pancasila. Little was made public about the organization of Kopkamtib. As of mid-1982 it was an autonomous organ within Hankam and had been headed by the deputy commander in chief of the armed forces, Admiral Sudomo, since March 1978. It was unclear whether internal Kopkamtib or Hankam regulations specified that pattern of dual officeholding; Soeharto himself headed Kopkamtib for a few months in 1969 and again later, from 1974 to 1978, after its former head, Lieutenant General Sumitro, was dismissed in the wake of large-scale anti-Japanese riots in early 1974. Organizationally, Kopkamtib was essentially a command structure with regular military officers assigned to it. Below the central headquarters level, Kopkamtib policies were predominantly implemented by officers, army commanders who were appointed concurrently to Kopkamtib positions and whose jurisdictions coincided with the armed forces' territorial organization rather than that of the civilian administration. The most important of these were the 16 army Kodam commanders who, when acting as Kopkamtib functionaries, bore the title of special territorial executive, or Laksusda, and were authorized sweeping powers on security matters within Kodam jurisdictions. Army officers also served as Kopkamtib functionaries as far down as the level of district command, or Kodim. Others included selected police officers and navy and air force officers serving in the four integrated Kowilhan and elsewhere. Kopkamtib had no special uniform, independent personnel recruitment, or troop forces, but it did maintain its own communications channels. The Kopkamtib chain of command evidently ran directly from the president to the deputy commander of ABRI in 1982 and thence to Kopkamtib special executives who were Kowilhan or Kodam commanders-usually but not always bypassing the minister of defense and security and commander of ABRI. By skipping regular command echelons in this manner, Kopkamtib could act in critical situations as a quick-action force within Hankam. The irregular nature of its command chain and the use of regular ABRI personnel as its implementing agents, however, have sometimes led to confusion within the Hankam/ABRI organization. Kopkamtib had both a regular and a special staff that served it on a part-time basis. The regular staff was made up of Hankam staff personnel who served as assistants for intelligence, operations, territorial affairs, social order and security, and sociopolitical affairs. The special staff, which was devoted to policy implementation, consisted of the Intelligence Task Force, the Social Communications Information Service, and the Communications Unit, all of which were filled by regular Hankam staff personnel. It also included the Central Investigative Team composed of directors general and inspectors general of several cabinet departments and the Central Prosecution Team made up of attorneys normally assigned to various positions. Both of these units were assembled only when a situation was deemed to call for them. According to Sudomo, Kopkamtib had two main tasks in the early 1980s. The first was to defend against subversives, who were defined as anyone opposed to the 1945 Constitution, to the principles of pancasila, or to the government and its policies. Kopkamtib directed all security operations against separatist groups, Muslim activists, communists, and any groups that it believed could be used by these subversives. It also collected intelligence regarding these elements on a nationwide basis. The agency had jurisdiction over all political prisoners, including those detained in conjunction with the failed coup of 1965. In 1982 its local executives were responsible for supervising all former political detainees, some 30,000 of whom were released between 1977 and 1979. Kopkamtib's second major mission was more broadly defined: it entailed serving and protecting the people by creating conditions for a society free of fear and apprehension while also safeguarding the smooth implementation of national development. To accomplish this second objective, which according to Sudomo occupied most of the agency's resources in mid-1982, Kopkamtib involved itself in nearly every aspect of social life, for example, screening all political candidates and engaging in surveillance of public demonstrations. It has also banned films and books and, when economic and ordinary crimes became public issues, launched special enforcement campaigns. In 1981 the agency formed a special team to assist in negotiations between workers and employers to prevent the development of labor conflict that might disturb the social order or slow down national economic development. Kopkamtib has also held a broad mandate to advise government departments and subordinate bodies on how their actions might affect public order. This mandate extended over disparate areas, such as education, land reform, transmigration, and unemployment. Only very general information was made public regarding the organization and activities of the nation's other intelligence and security bodies. Bakin was the principal national body responsible for centralizing and coordinating domestic and foreign intelligence gathered by such organizations as the army, the police, and Kopkamtib. It was directly under the control of the president and maintained its own communications network outside the civilian and military administrations. Bakin was headed by an army general, Yoga Sugama, throughout the 1974-82 period but its deputy chief, Lieutenant General L. Benny Murdani, probably held real power in the early 1980s. Armed forces officers were sometimes seconded to Bakin for special duties. Bakin also relied on Kopkamtib's Laksusda to implement its policies. Another body concerned with intelligence gathering was OPSUS, which had originally been a combat intelligence unit set up by Soeharto during the West Irian campaign. As of 1982 it continued to be headed by its original commander, Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo, who was a trusted confidant of the president and served also as the minister of information (see The Power Structure, ch. 4). The legal status of OPSUS in 1982 was obscure, but a network of its operatives continued to gather domestic political intelligence and to conduct political liaison in service of the president. Ali Murtopo and OPSUS were identified with the implementation of the Act of Free Choice, through which the people of West Irian became part of Indonesia in 1969, and involved in negotiations with Portugal regarding East Timor in the mid-1970s (see The New Order under Soeharto, ch. 1). The armed services maintained an intelligence unit unrelated to Kopkamtib, called the Strategic Intelligence Center. This body was Hankam's agency for implementing departmental intelligence functions. It conducted activities and collected information relating to external defense and internal security. The head of the Strategic Intelligence Center, Murdani, served concurrently as head of the Hankam intelligence staff and the deputy chief of Bakin. Like Ali Murtopo and Soeharto himself, Murdani served as an officer in Kostrad in the 1960s. The Criminal Justice System The nation's criminal jurisprudence and its institutions of criminal justice derive both from Indonesia's experience as an independent state and from the European tradition and the Dutch colonial period. The criminal law is one of three systems of law in operation in the nation since the nineteenth century, the other two being a system of European-derived commercial codes and a civil law based on customary law (adat), which included Islamic law (sharia). The criminal law is the only one of the three systems that is essentially codified and applies uniformly throughout the national territory. Criminal justice is administered through a system that includes a hierarchy of trial and appellate courts, a prosecutory arm of the national government, and an independent bar. Several factors limited the actual use of these formal legal channels in dealing with activity defined as criminal. Owing in large part to a general shortage of trained legal personnel, the infrastructure of the criminal justice system was more extensive in urban locales and on Java than in rural or remote areas. In any case, its procedures often did not apply to military, security, and intelligence organizations, which in practice sometimes dealt with both political and ordinary crime. Moreover, Indonesians did not always resort to the formal system to resolve their conflicts because many did not share Western views regarding the nature of individual rights and the efficacy of law and procedural justice but rather preferred to settle disputes by arbitration or accommodation. In rural areas many conflicts, including some (mostly minor) criminal cases, continued to be settled by village chiefs. Even in towns and cities complaints were not often filed with authorities, and cases were frequently settled out of court in order to save time and money or to avoid attracting public or official attention. In criminal cases such settlements typically entailed accommodation between the accused and the police or prosecutors, whose roles in the criminal justice system were generally more critical than those of courts or judges. Wealth and status were apt to be important factors in the outcome. Crime and Political Offenses Like many countries, Indonesia experienced rising crime as a by-product of increased urbanization and the social and economic dislocations associated with national development. The scope of the crime problem was difficult to gauge, but conditions such as the growing numbers of unemployed or underemployed in the nation's cities, the lack of sufficient jobs for school-leavers and university graduates, and the breakdown of traditional systems of social control were often cited as responsible for the crime increase. Of particular concern to law enforcement authorities was the increasing incidence of juvenile delinquency, street gangs, and drug abuse and the rise in thefts and violent crime in general. The situation was most acute in cities: during the 1979-81 period the incidence of reported crime in Jakarta rose about 50 percent per year, and crime rates were highest nationwide in the East Java cities of Malang, Surabaya, and Jember. Largely unrelated to accelerating social change, smuggling and piracy (the latter occurring most often in the waters near Singapore) also became primary targets for official action in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Offenses such as bribery, the assessment of illegal "levies," or the diversion of public funds for private use by business figures or officials formed a special class of crime usually handled under a 1955 statute on economic crimes and a 1971 statute on corruption. Making use of these laws, Kopkamtib conducted anticorruption campaigns in 1976-81, bringing several primarily middle-level offenders to trial and encouraging the retirement of those in more highly placed positions. Corruption was generally regarded to be a serious problem that the government was determined to combat. Political offenses or acts that Indonesian authorities regarded as threats to the national security included offenses against the constitutional order or pancasila (see Pancasila, ch. 4). The exercise of police powers by state organs in dealing with those suspected of subversive actions or associations was evidently based in part on a broad interpretation of executive authority and the internal regulations of the organ involved, and in part on Presidential Decree 11/1963 concerning the eradication of subversive activities. Re-promulgated as a statute in 1969, it grants far-reaching authority in dealing with almost any act that does not conform to government policy. Although little direct official information was available concerning the procedural aspects of the enforcement and judicial organs in security cases, it was evident that the procedural norms of the ordinary criminal justice system did not necessarily apply. Kopkamtib, as the principal security arm of the government, was the major instrument involved in the suppression of political crimes, but elements of the military services and the police also participated at times. Special military courts were sometimes convened to try certain serious cases; others were apparently tried in the regular courts. The most prominent use of the special procedures regarding political offenses involved Kopkamtib's mass arrests and detentions of tens of thousands of persons in connection with the 1965 coup attempt, most of whom were never charged or tried. These prisoners were classified as Category A, B, or C, according to the government's perception of how deeply they had been involved in the events of 1965 or in any of the organizations, including the PKI, that were banned thereafter. The last 30,000 or so of those still not brought to trial were released between December 1977 and December 1979. As of mid-1982 some 100 or more remained unaccounted for. Criminal Law The Indonesian criminal code in force since independence is basically the Netherlands Indies Criminal Code, which was put into effect in 1918. It incorporates certain amendments promulgated by the revolutionary government in 1946. Since 1958 it has been applied uniformly throughout the national territory. The Code of Criminal Law is contained in three chapters. Chapter I defines the terms and procedures to be followed in criminal cases and specifies mitigating circumstances that may affect the severity of a sentence. Chapters II and III, respectively, define the category of crimes and the category of misdemeanors and prescribe the penalties for each type of offense. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors generally conformed to that in Western countries. As of 1982 several other statutes dealing with criminal offenses were in force. The most significant were four concerning economic offenses, subversive activities, corruption, and narcotics. Penalties for major offenses included death, imprisonment or periods up to life, local detention, and fines. Total confiscation of property was not permitted. Penalties for minor crimes and misdemeanors included deprivation of specified rights, forfeiture of personal property, and publication of the sentence of the court. Punishments listed in the code were the maximum allowable; judges had discretionary authority to impose lesser punishment. A public drive for the abolition of the death penalty was launched in 1980 following the execution of two persons convicted of murder. As of 1982, however, the death penalty remained in force, and over 30 persons awaited execution. A new Code of Criminal Procedure was promulgated on December 31, 1981. It assumed effect immediately, except over cases initiated under the old system, which would have to be brought under its provisions within two years. Some time can be expected to lapse before the new code is fully implemented, however, while police, prosecution officials, and judicial officials familiarize themselves with the new regulations. The new code replaced a 1941 revision of an 1848 Dutch colonial regulation that stipulated legal procedures to be used in both criminal as well as civil cases. Both national jurists and government officials had complained that statutory ambiguity in the old code and certain of its provisions in some cases had led to abuses of authority by law enforcement and judicial officials. Under the old system several authorities, including the police, the regional military commands, and the public prosecutors, shared powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation-an often confusing situation that sometimes led plaintiffs to file complaints with the particular agency they believed would deal most favorably with their case. Individuals could be arrested and detained on suspicion alone, and there were wide limits on how long a suspect could be held before being charged or brought to trial. Moreover, an accused could request legal counsel only when his case was submitted to a judge and not during any pretrial proceedings. The new code represents a considerable step forward in the establishment of clear norms of procedural justice. Criminal investigatory powers are vested mainly in the police. A suspect can be held only 24 hours before the investigating officials present their charges and obtain a detention order from a judge. Specific limits are established on how long a suspect can be held before a trial. The new code expressly grants an accused the rights to learn the charges against him or her, to be examined immediately by investigating officials, and to have the case referred to a prosecutor, submitted to court, and tried before a judge. The accused also has the right to obtain legal counsel at all levels of the proceedings. Should it turn out that a person has been wrongly charged or detained under the new code, he or she has the right to sue for compensation and for the restoration of rights and status. The new code was originally promised for 1978 but was delayed for three years owing to disagreement between the government and the legal community over two major issues. The first involved the rights to be given a suspect's legal counsel in witnessing prosecution or police investigations. A compromise established that a legal adviser could be present at all interrogations except those involving state security, in which case the legal adviser could watch the proceedings but not listen to them. The government's wishes prevailed regarding the second issue, which concerned whether the new procedures would apply only to offenses under the penal code, as the government favored, or whether they would also pertain in offenses covered under certain special statutes. According to Article 248 of the new code, the procedures specified in it apply to all cases "with temporary exception for special provisions on criminal procedure as mentioned in certain laws, until they are amended or declared invalid." An accompanying official document elucidating the law notes that the special provisions were included in "among other things" a 1955 law on economic crimes and a 1971 law on corruption. Not specifically referred to was another statute containing provisions for special criminal procedures, the 1963 presidential decree concerning subversive activities, which was made into law in 1969. The government acknowledged in the explanation of the new statute that such laws would "be renewed, amended, or revoked within the shortest possible time." The Administration of Criminal Justice The prosecutory function rested with the Office of Prosecution, an autonomous agency under the direct authority of the president and attached to the office of the attorney general. In 1982 the Office of Prosecution included 16 provincial high prosecution offices. It was headed by a chief prosecutor who supervised all prosecutors and investigated special cases. District prosecutors were assigned in association with each district court, and each high court had a corresponding high prosecutor. The public prosecutor's principal functions were to examine charges of felonious conduct or misdemeanors brought by individuals or other parties, to conduct or coordinate with other agencies the investigation of the charges, and then either to dismiss the charge or to refer it for trial to the state court having jurisdiction. The prosecutor's office was also responsible for presenting the case against the accused in court and for executing the sentence of the court. The matter of control over preliminary investigation has had a history of contention between the prosecuting authorities and the police going far back into the postindependence period. Practice evidently rested on working agreements between the two services under which the police, in principle, conducted primary investigations but deferred to the prosecutor whenever the latter asked to undertake the investigation. There was also a class of assistant prosecutors specially appointed from among higher ranking police officers and from among certain other civil servants, such as customs officials. Under the new system of criminal procedure, these assistant prosecutors were called investigators and assumed most of the investigatory functions formerly executed by the prosecutors. Both prosecutors and assistant prosecutors could issue warrants and had broad powers of arrest, detention, search, and seizure. The unrestrained exercise of such powers has been the subject of charges of abuse of power against particular prosecutors. The new code contains provisions to remedy the situation; it requires that warrants be obtained for all arrests, searches, and seizures, sets limits on how long a suspect can be detained, and introduces the principle of habeas corpus into the national law. The court system comprises four branches: the general courts, the religious courts, the military courts, and the administrative courts (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). All criminal cases (except those involving ABRI personnel) are tried in the general courts. The new criminal procedure law sets forth rules for establishing in which court a case must be tried, should military and general court jurisdictions combine or overlap. Since the late 1960s the Soeharto government, with the strong support of the legal profession, has made efforts to ensure the independence of the judiciary. A Basic Law on Judicial Powers (1970) prohibited all interference in judicial matters by persons outside the judiciary, a prohibition that in principle was also contained in the elucidation of the judicial articles of the national Constitution. In the early 1980s, statutes fully implementing the 1970 law had not been passed. The executive branch exercised some measure of influence over judges through the control by the minister of justice over the appointment, training, promotion, and transfer of judges. In 1981 following an anticorruption drive that turned up evidence of extortion, bribes, and kickbacks in the judicial system, several judges and public prosecutors were dismissed or reprimanded. Graduates of the Military College of Law were subsequently appointed chief justice of the Supreme Court, minister of justice, and attorney general. The president was empowered to grant amnesty or special dispensation to convicted persons. This power has been used on several occasions to declare general amnesties. In late 1981 Soeharto used his powers to commute to life imprisonment the sentences of two prominent persons convicted of involvement in the 1965 attempted coup. Under the new criminal procedure code, cases on which final judgment has been rendered will for the first time be open to reconsideration should new evidence surface. The Penal System Penal institutions were administered by an office in the Department of Justice and included penitentiaries for serious offenders and local prisons for lesser offenders and for detention. At least one prison and one or more local jails were situated in or near each major city. Living conditions within the penal institutions probably varied considerably according to the kind and age of the facility, the degree of overcrowding, and other circumstances. The newest prisons conformed to international standards and contained modern features, such as running water, electricity, separate cells, sports fields, a hospital, and a library. More typically, inmates were crowded into barracks that housed far more than the 100 or so persons for which they were designed. Not all had electric lights or running water. Most were equipped with a covered pit toilet and had small windows at each end for ventilation. Inmates slept on mats spread on the floor. Local jails were typically small, often single-room structures, devoid of all but the barest essentials. Several specialized prisons for women and two for youths were located in Java. Where it was not possible to confine such prisoners in separate institutions, which was usually the case outside of Java, efforts were made to segregate juvenile from adult offenders and females from males in separate sections of the same institution. Ordinarily, prisoners were permitted visits by family members and could receive limited amounts of food and other articles to supplement the minimal supplies they were issued. Under some circumstances prisoners were permitted to spend their nights at home. Most prisons tried to provide medical service of some kind, although it was generally regarded as inadequate. Rehabilitation provisions included literacy classes, moral and religious training, and workshops to teach crafts and skills. Some prisons operated small industries or agricultural enterprises that sold their products on the local market. Proceeds were used to pay a small wage to the working inmates, to buy recreational equipment, and to maintain buildings and grounds. In some prisons, inmates worked in fields outside the prison confines. Although regular prisons often housed both convicted criminals and political prisoners, the latter (generally under the direction of Kopkamtib) were kept isolated from other prisoners. Political prisoners have also been held in Kodam headquarters and in separate labor camps and detention facilities manned by military personnel. According to Amnesty International, except for certain former high officials, conditions under which political prisoners were held were generally worse than those for convicted criminals. Between 1969 and 1979 Kopkamtib ran a separate penal colony on Buru Island for Category B prisoners, who were implicated of indirect involvement in the 1965 attempted coup. In late 1979 following the nationwide release of Category B prisoners, the government announced that the penal colony on Buru Island would be closed and that the island would be designated a transmigration site. As of mid-1982 Kopkamtib continued to maintain a detention camp on Atauro Island off the coast of East Timor near Dili. Many released prisoners faced problems in reintegrating themselves into society because families were often shamed by the prisoner's incarceration or feared they would be discriminated against by officials or neighbors should they continue association with the released prisoners. In 1981 the nation's first prisoner's aid society was privately formed in Jakarta to help released prisoners overcome some of these difficulties and to find employment. Released political prisoners detained in connection with the 1965 attempted coup encountered particular problems upon their return to society. Their identification cards, which all Indonesians carry, had special markings indicating their status. Former political prisoners were denied employment in the civil service, the armed forces, and in "essential industries." They were able to vote but could not hold any elected office. In some parts of the country they were required to check in regularly with local authorities and to inform them of their movements. * * * Several works treat the development of the Indonesian armed forces up until the late 1960s, the most balanced and comprehensive being Ulf Sundhanssen's The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1956-1967. Ernst Utrecht's The Indonesian Army offers a very detailed and often critical view from the perspective of a former insider. Ruth McVey's two-part "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army" focuses mainly on the military's shortcomings in its early years. The Indonesian Tragedy by Brian May and The Army and Politics in Indonesia by Harold A. Crouch are more concerned with the causes and aftereffects of the 1965 coup; they also evaluate the armed forces in a somewhat negative light. The best general coverage of ABRI under Soeharto is Sundhanssen's "The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society," although it is rapidly becoming dated. The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia, a collection of essays by ABRI's official historian, Nugroho Notosusanto, presents the view point of the armed forces and the government regarding ABRI's development, its role, and its doctrine. Current material is usually available in the Far Eastern Economic Review and in the periodically updated "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," compiled by the editors of Indonesia. An especially informative and provocative treatment of the issue of generational change in the armed forces and the power structure as a whole is offered in John A. MacDougall's "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy." The effect of the armed forces on the economy is the subject of The Impact of Military Expenditure and Security Programs on Political and Economic Development in Indonesia by Guy J. Pauker. An interesting, if unstructured, treatment of armed forces activities in business and the attitudes of particular officers regarding a number of issues can be found in "Effect of Ban on Officers' Business Activities Viewed," an article from the Jakarta press translated by the Joint Publications Research Service. Data on the size and composition of the armed forces are collected in the International Institute for Strategic Studies excellent annual, The Military Balance, and in Jane's Fighting Ships. Very little reliable information is made public regarding the institutions involved in maintaining internal security. Sundhanssen's article "The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society," offers a basic historical treatment of Kopkamtib and some sketchy data on its organization; it also gives some insights into the role of Bakin. The annual yearbooks of Amnesty International and its 1977 Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report treat the issues of human rights and political freedom, as does the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices issued by the United States Department of State. An interesting example of the views of those opposed to certain of the government's policies can be found in Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People: Defense Statement at His Trial on Charges of Insulting the Head of State, by Heri Akhmadi. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)