$Unique_ID{COW01594} $Pretitle{351} $Title{Honduras Chapter 5A. National Security} $Subtitle{} $Author{Steve C. Ropp} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{military armed forces chief national political general honduran honduras consuffaa} $Date{1983} $Log{Fort of San Fernando de Omoa*0159401.scf } Country: Honduras Book: Honduras, A Country Study Author: Steve C. Ropp Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1983 Chapter 5A. National Security [See Fort of San Fernando de Omoa: On the western end of Honduras' North Coast, was built by the Spanish in the eighteenth century to defend against British invaders.] The 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Honduras gives the armed forces a broad mandate to defend the national territory, maintain internal order, and guarantee the principles of free elections and regular presidential succession. This constitutional mandate ensures that the armed forces play a central role not only in national defense but also in politics. Although there was a change from military to civilian rule in 1982, the military remained the key institution in society, formally and informally offering guidance to civilian political leaders. In mid-1983 there were an estimated 19,800 armed forces personnel organized into three service branches (army, air force, and navy) and the national police force. The army, having 13,500 troops, was the largest, followed by the police, with 4,500 personnel. Although the air force contained only 1,200 people, it wielded considerable influence, owing to its historical importance and public legitimacy won during the 1969 conflict with El Salvador. The navy remained relatively small (600 people) but had grown rapidly during the 1970s and early 1980s because of increased perceptions of threats to Honduran coastal waters. Unlike many other Latin American countries, the Honduran national police, called the Public Security Force, remained an integral part of the armed forces. Honduras has traditionally been affected by regional conflict and has frequently suffered wars fought on its soil, as well as the use of its territory by foreign nationals waging war on neighboring countries. From this perspective, the expanding regional crisis in which Honduras became engulfed during the early 1980s was merely one more demonstration of the country's geostrategic significance. The Honduran military found itself caught in the vortex of regional strife, forced to respond to the Sandinista challenge in Nicaragua and the guerrilla war in El Salvador. The Central American crisis had a significant impact on the military, reinforcing the historical processes that had strengthened the institution and its central role in society. Historical Background One of the most important observations that can be made about the Armed Forces of Honduras (Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras) has nothing to do with their military role per se but rather with the political and economic role that they have historically played in society. In some Central American countries, such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the armed forces emerged during the late nineteenth century as an appendage of the powerful new coffee oligarchies. Their primary function was to maintain peace or restore it to rural areas suffering from the major dislocations that coffee cultivation produced. The Armed Forces of Honduras were also formed to maintain peace, but it was not a peace that had to be maintained due to massive economic dislocation. Rather, the lack of government continuity and the desire of caudillos (political strong men) to control the central government eventually led to the creation of the Honduran military. This distinction concerning origins is important because it can explain differences in contemporary military behavior. The Honduran military never developed a strong and overriding allegiance to a landed oligarchy or to any other single economic interest group. It could thus eventually play a mediating role (as it did during the 1970s) between such interest groups and the less privileged classes. Although there is some continuity in the political role that the armed forces have historically performed, there have been major changes in military organization and structure since independence was achieved in 1838. The evolution of the armed forces took place in three stages. From 1838 until 1922 the military was an instrumental appendage of the political faction or party in power at the time. Between 1922 and 1963 it managed to establish an independent institutional identity (with considerable help from the United States). After 1963 there were a number of developments that moved the armed forces further along the road toward institutional consolidation and organizational maturity. The Armed Forces as Political Instrument, 1838-1922 For the better part of a century the armed forces operated within a chaotic political context dominated by warring factions that sought control of the government largely for personal economic reasons. Because the nation did not possess a single important source of wealth, generating revenues by controlling the central government became an alternative route to personal fame and fortune. The struggle for control of the central government was conducted largely in an institutional vacuum. Instead of institutions, there were factions of various ideological hues, which blindly followed their respective caudillos. By the late nineteenth century these factions had loosely grouped around the two newly formed political parties, the Liberal Party of Honduras (Partido Liberal de Honduras-PLH) and the National Party of Honduras (Partido Nacional de Honduras-PNH) (see table A). During this period the military as an institution did not, in fact, exist. Rather, there were men in uniform who performed largely political functions. Typically, a caudillo who sought control of the central government would form a guerrilla band composed of relatives and friends and declare himself commander in chief. Upon seizing the capital city of Tegucigalpa, the new government would confirm members of the band in their self-designated military ranks. Newly appointed generals and colonels would then drift back to the provinces where they would assume high-level political positions, such as governor, in addition to retaining their military titles. Political and military "command structures" at the regional level were one and the same. During peacetime the nineteenth-century Honduran military performed both security and political functions in the countryside. Each of the 17 departments into which the nation was divided contained a comandancia (command headquarters), which was run by "officers" from the original guerrilla band. A large number of military detachments also existed at the subdepartmental level. In 1914 there were 80 local comandancias, 183 subcomandancias de pueblo, and 672 subcomandancias de aldea. While the instability of the central government no doubt contributed to considerable turnover at the local level, there was a continuing local military presence to keep the peace. Just as importantly, local military units performed critical political functions. This was best demonstrated by the historic role of the militia in relation to national elections. As election time approached, governors and their subordinates would be called back to active duty. These officer-politicians would, in turn, call up the militia of able-bodied males from 21 to 30 years of age. Rather than receiving instruction in the martial arts, militiamen were given voting instructions to pass on to their families. Failure to comply with these instructions constituted a serious breach of military discipline. Development of an Independent Military Identity, 1922-63 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Honduran military institutions were not well developed. Rapid turnover in governments prevented the few professional officers who did find their way into the armed forces from consolidating their position and professionalizing military service. Military schools were established on occasion, but the lack of resources and the poor caliber of students meant that a professional cadre of officers was never really formed. Another problem was the severe inequality in the conscription system. All able-bodied males between the ages of 21 and 30 were legally required to serve, but there were numerous exemptions for members of the middle class. Given these inequalities, militia service came to be viewed as punishment rather than as patriotic duty. It was only in the 1920s and 1930s during the stabilization of the political system under the PNH and its strong man, Tiburcio Carias Andino (1932-49), that this situation began to change. Carias took advantage of foreign aid to create a military organization that could give long-term support to his government. The air corps, established in 1922, was the first of the armed services to benefit from such aid. Carias viewed the corps as an instrument that could be activated to defend Tegucigalpa against attacks from his political enemies and, as a rebel leader, used aerial bombardment as early as 1924. Although the air corps initially received training from an Italian, the United States government began to play a major role during the 1930s. A United States Air Force colonel became the first commandant of the Military Aviation School (formed in 1934), and United States personnel ran the school until the end of World War II. By the end of the war, the United States military mission's role had been expanded to include support for professionalizing the army. The Basic Arms School was established in 1946, and separate schools for enlisted men and officers were formed shortly thereafter. In 1957 the Francisco Morazan Military Academy was established with aid from the United States. United States aid programs led to the establishment of new military institutions, which replaced the traditional militia (see Foreign Military Assistance and Training, this ch.). The Francisco Morazan Military Academy graduated its first class of officers in 1960. Rigorous academic standards introduced in 1956 for officer candidate selection shifted the geographical base of military recruitment to major urban areas. The armed forces also became more geographically centralized with the creation of five new field battalions during the 1950s and 1960s. These battalions, the first large troop concentrations in the history of the armed forces, were the product of changes in United States military doctrine during the Cold War. These internal changes, coupled with the effort during the early 1950s to find a political successor to Carias, led to the emergence of a more independent military establishment during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1956 the military overthrew civilian president Julio Lozano Diaz, thus establishing for the first time in Honduran history an independent military role in the political process. Provisions introduced with the 1957 constitution ensured that the armed forces would never again have to submit to the authority of PNH or PLH politicians. Article 319 stipulated that presidential orders were to be obeyed by the military only if conveyed through the head of the armed forces. Consolidation and Organizational Maturity, 1963-80 During the 1960s and 1970s the Armed Forces of Honduras experienced a number of major changes that had significant military and political effects. There was rapid growth in the size of the armed forces from approximately 8,000 in 1970 to double that number a decade later. Growth was accompanied by a continuation of the trend toward greater professional training, and the officer corps was increasingly filled with academy graduates. The organizational structure of the armed forces was altered through a number of decree-laws promulgated in 1970 and 1975. The most significant structural changes during the 1960s and 1970s were, first of all, incorporation of the senior leadership of the national police into the armed forces following a military coup in 1963; second, increased organizational differentiation and complexity as the various service branches began to add general staffs and support units during the 1970s; and, third, greater balance and standardization of the organizational structure across the various service branches as they developed general staffs and support units. By 1975 the army and air force were the most influential services, and the Public Security Force (Fuerza de Seguridad Publica-FUSEP) had expanded to the point that it required its own general staff (see fig. 11; fig. 12). The primary effects of these organizational changes were to strengthen the military institution and to extend its national reach and influence. The war fought between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 accelerated these changes and led to further thinking about national security (see War with El Salvador, ch. 1). As the armed forces began to grow in size and professional competence, they played a more assertive role in national politics. Air Force General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano seized power from civilian president Ramon Villeda Morales in 1963 and governed until 1971. He seized power again in 1972 after a short civilian interlude, and the armed forces dominated the political arena for the remainder of the 1970s. Growth of the armed forces and organizational differentiation had a number of important effects on internal military politics. As a more professional class of officers emerged to head a growing number of troop commands and service units, they demanded participation in organizational decisionmaking. The Superior Council of the Armed Forces (Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas-CONSUFFAA) was created in 1975 to serve as the main consultative body dealing with all matters of concern to the military. This differentiation also heightened the potential for factionalism within the officer corps, both along interservice lines and within each service. Rapid professionalization of the officer corps created further factional rifts along generational lines, which were manifested in periodic purges of the top military leadership. Although the Honduran military had become a larger and more organizationally diverse bureaucracy by the 1970s, there was as much historical continuity as there was change. Historically, the armed forces had performed political services for the faction in power. By the 1970s the political parties were more likely to perform such services for military leaders. In either case, the Honduran military remained a bureaucracy that played both important military and political roles. Constitutional and Other Legal Provisions The 1982 Constitution and the Constituent Law of the Armed Forces, issued in 1975, form the legal framework within which the military operates. According to Article 272 of the Constitution, the armed forces are "a national institution that is permanent, essentially professional, nonpolitical, obedient, and nondeliberative." Their mission is to "defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic, to maintain peace, public order and the integrity of the Constitution, the principle of free elections and regular presidential succession." Furthermore, the armed forces are directed to cooperate with the executive branch in developmental activities, including education, agrarian reform, extension of the transportation and communications infrastructure, health, and preservation of natural resources. At the top of the military command hierarchy is the president of the republic, who functions as the commander in chief and is given the title of general commander (comandante general) (see fig. 13). According to Article 19 of the Constituent Law, he is empowered to maintain the territorial integrity and inviolability of Honduras and to preserve internal and external security. However, these and other presidential powers are circumscribed by Article 278 of the Constitution, which specifies that presidential orders given through the chief (jefe) of the armed forces (who is the top active-duty military officer) are to be obeyed by the military. Unlike earlier constitutions, the 1982 document contains no article explicitly reserving for the armed forces the right to disobey presidential orders. Lack of such a provision reflects growth in the number of "checks and balances" between military and civilian authorities that have been incorporated into existing legislation. The president can declare war while the National Congress is not in session, but Congress must immediately be convened to confirm the action. He can also permit foreign troops, ships, and airplanes to move through national territory, if Congress has authorized it in advance. The president has the power to send troops abroad in support of existing treaty commitments or other international agreements, also with prior congressional authorization. Further provisions allow him to call up the reserves in time of war or internal unrest and to organize and deploy military units on national territory when these actions are taken through the chief of the armed forces. Honduran presidents have occasionally attempted to construct an independent base of power around control of the Presidential Honor Guard and to manipulate politically the promotion system. For this reason, the military has carefully circumscribed presidential power in both areas by law. The president named personnel to the honor guard, but only with the approval of the secretary of state for national defense and public security (as the Honduran defense minister is formally known). Honor guard officers were selected from among active-duty military personnel who thus remained under the direct control of the armed forces chief. Article 21 of the Constituent Law states that the honor guard "will consist of the number of officers and enlisted men strictly necessary for the accomplishment of its mission." Because this mission was largely ceremonial, the president was effectively prevented from expanding the unit. The Presidential Honor Guard was disbanded with the return to civilian rule in the early 1980s. Article 279 of the Constitution states that the chief of the armed forces must be a senior officer holding at least the rank of colonel or its equivalent, on active duty, and a native Honduran. He is chosen by Congress from a list of three names proposed by CONSUFFAA, serves a five-year term, and can be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of Congress for reasons such as permanent physical or mental incapacity. To prevent the concentration of political power in the hands of the president, the Constitution specifies that no relative of the president to the fourth level of consanguinity can be chosen as chief of the armed forces. Powers of the chief of the armed forces encompass the full range of organizational and administrative activities. He is empowered to "release the directives, instructions and orders that regulate the organization, functioning, and administration of the armed forces," prepare military plans, inspect military installations and troop units, and assign personnel to the various branches. Additionally, it is the armed forces chief who most directly controls, regulates, and manages institutional military relations with foreign governments. He decides which countries should supply military aid and training and to which countries officers and enlisted personnel will be sent for schooling. He also holds ultimate control over officer promotions, although rarely does the armed forces chief overturn a decision of the promotions board. Although the powers of the chief of the armed forces were substantial, they were shared before April 1982 with members of CONSUFFAA. Its members include the armed forces chief (who serves as chairman), the defense minister, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the inspector general, commanders of the various service branches, and commanders of air bases and naval fleets. CONSUFFAA also includes commanders of combat and support units organized at the brigade level, or at the battalion level when independent; the directors of the various service schools; and the armed forces' auditor and paymaster general. Depending on the specific period of time and organizational structure of the armed forces, CONSUFFAA has included from 25 to 40 members. Regular sessions of CONSUFFAA were convoked by the chief of the armed forces at least four times a year. In addition, extraordinary sessions were held if called for by the president of the republic, the armed forces chief, or by one-third of CONSUFFAA's members. CONSUFFAA established its own internal rules, which included the provisions that two-thirds of the members must be present before a meeting could be held, that decisions be reached by majority vote, that ties be broken by the armed forces chief, and that all decisions be binding. CONSUFFAA evolved from a predecessor body called the Superior Defense Council, which was established in 1970 to give legitimacy to the position of General Lopez Arellano and to deal with matters of military succession. Under rules in effect in the early 1980s, CONSUFFAA proposed a slate of three candidates to Congress to fill the unexpired term of the chief of the armed forces should the position fall vacant. If Congress were in recess, it would be called into special session. However, CONSUFFAA has been more than just a body with narrow, if important, procedural powers. Under both military and civilian governments, it became the ultimate authority, determining broad matters of national policy. It had the power to review and approve the national security budget in advance, to form commissions consisting of civilians and soldiers to study any national problem of interest to the armed forces, and to familiarize itself with national development plans. The scope and range of CONSUFFAA powers were evident from a perusal of some of the decisions it made between 1975 and 1980. It was not clear by mid-1983 whether CONSUFFAA's considerable powers could survive the tenure of General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, who had narrowed its prerogatives. Although not technically subordinate to the chief of the armed forces and CONSUFFAA, the secretary of state for national defense and public security occupied a position that responded to their actions. Appointed to office by the president, he countersigned all measures dealing with armed forces organization and personnel matters. He also served as the channel through which measures submitted by the high command for discussion and approval by the executive branch and Congress are conveyed. Each year the secretary reported to Congress concerning the current activities of the armed forces. He headed the Ministry of National Defense and Public Security, which formally controlled FUSEP. Actual control of FUSEP was held by the chief and the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The General Staff of the Armed Forces was the body through which the chief of the armed forces planned, coordinated, and supervised organizational activities. Planning functions included the development of the strategic doctrine and tactics that the military would use in pursuit of national objectives. The general staff was also charged with incorporating these ideas into the programs of study of all military schools and of planning and supervising military exercises that reflected their character. Just as important as the general staff's planning function were the supervisory and coordinating functions that allowed the chief of the armed forces to coordinate and control the activities of the various service branches. The General Staff of the Armed Forces was charged with seeing that the operational orders of the service branch chiefs were carried out and with compiling information concerning the activities and requirements of subordinate commands. The importance of the position held by the chief of the general staff was indicated by the fact that Article 281 of the Constitution stipulates that he will perform the duties of chief of the armed forces while the latter is temporarily absent from duty.