$Unique_ID{COW01450} $Pretitle{287} $Title{Greece Chapter 1B. The War of Independence, 1821-29} $Subtitle{} $Author{} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{greek military greece war political powers army greeks system otto} $Date{1986} $Log{Figure 4.*0145001.scf } Country: Greece Book: Greece, A Country Study Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1986 Chapter 1B. The War of Independence, 1821-29 The crucial element in the evolution of a successful rebellion against the Porte was clearly the empire's own internal collapse. Although an independence movement had been growing for sometime, the Greeks considered themselves too weak to take on the Ottoman Empire alone. They tried to coordinate their efforts with revolts by Serbs and Bulgarians. The effort failed, but uprisings in the Peloponnesus coincided with an invasion of the Danubian principalities by the Greek rebel, Alexander Ypsilantis, in the spring of 1821. The rebellion spread rapidly, and on March 25 (Easter Day) Germanos, bishop of Old Patrai, officially proclaimed the revolution, throwing the church's formidable symbolic force on the side of the rebels. Leaders came from the lower clergy, klephts and armatoloi, pirates and merchant captains, and irregular troops all over the mainland. Neither the church, the landowners, nor the merchant class, generally prosperous under the empire, had associated themselves with the independence movement prior to the outbreak of hostilities, but they were moved to join the rebellion because of its obvious popular support. After the initial rash of violence the war settled into a long, drawn-out contest of endurance. Almost immediately the Greek rebels set up three regional assemblies to govern the liberated areas. And just as quickly internal conflicts between the new institutions and among political factions emerged, plaguing the rebellion for the duration of the war and beyond. A constitution, strongly influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, was written in 1822, but attempts to establish a central government failed to resolve the factional strife. During much of 1823 and 1824 a virtual civil war undermined the war against the Turks. The situation was extremely complex and confused, and historians still debate what the actual issues were. There were a number of competing groups and ideologies involved, and frequently shifting coalitions among them complicated the political atmosphere. As in any revolutionary period there were conflicts over the strategy and tactics of fighting the war and over the nature of the postrevolutionary system. To some extent these two sets of issues overlapped. There was a fundamental difference between those who wanted to pursue the war using the traditional klephtic methods of guerrilla war and relying on religious fervor as the motivating force and those, especially those educated in the West, who preferred the European model, using regular armies and set-piece tactics, motivated by a conscious nationalism. The former, known as the "military" party (headed by the klephtic leader Theodore Kolokotronis), also hoped to retain the basic oligarchical structure of society, substituting themselves for the Ottoman authorities while maintaining the central role of the church. The rival "civilian party", or Westernizers, wanted to transform Greece into a secular, liberal, constitutional state. Regional rivalries exacerbated the situation. The European powers, meanwhile, looked upon the Greek rebellion as a threat to the balance of power, only recently reestablished by the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars. The demise of the Ottoman Empire would leave a vacuum, and it was obvious that there would be three rivals to fill it: Russia, Britain, and France. Until mid-1823, therefore, the powers maintained strict neutrality. By then the three powers' commercial interests in the region had begun to suffer. Simultaneously, the Greek rebellion caught the imagination of many of the European intellectual elite, who agitated for support of the effort and in many cases went to Greece to fight (most notably British poet Lord Byron, who died of fever in 1824). The rebellion had shown surprising strength, but it was clear that foreign intervention would be required to tip the balance. Between 1823 and 1825 the three powers maneuvered to place themselves in the best position to guarantee influence beyond the war. As it became increasingly obvious that the powers would eventually intervene, rebel factions, or parties, tied to the powers grew up, further complicating the internal situation. The turning point came in 1825 with the sultan's request for aid from Egypt, a tributary state. Because Egyptian control of the Peloponnesus was unacceptable to the powers, they began the process of negotiating an end to the war, recommending an autonomous status for Greece within the Ottoman Empire. In 1827 when the Turks, flushed with a series of recent military successes, refused mediation, a joint naval force dispatched by the three powers destroyed the Turco-Egyptian fleet in the Bay of Navarino. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, acting in his self-appointed role as protector of Orthodox Christians, declared war on Turkey, and a Russian army pushed to the outer defenses of Constantinople. By the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople Russia compelled Turkey to recognize the independence of Greece, but Crete and Thessaly, though claimed by the Greeks, were left in Turkish hands. To counter Russia's claim to be sole protector of Greece, Britain forced a renegotiation of the border settlement, spelled out in the first London protocol in 1829. Of greater significance, the European powers also gave Greece their formal recognition. Greek leaders protested that 80 percent of the nearly 4 million Greeks in the Ottoman Empire had been left under Turkish rule, and Greece's pro-Russian president, John Kapodistrias, rejected the settlement. Kapodistrias, who had made domestic enemies by his attempts to disarm the kelphts and to centralize the republic's government, was assassinated in 1831, plunging the country into anarchy. The European powers convened once again and in the second London protocol, agreed to in 1831, declared Greece a monarchy under joint British, French, and Russian protection. It was further decided that a foreign monarch was required to avoid identification of the executive with one of the native factions. Although somewhat rankled by the degree of foreign dominance inherent in these protocols, many Greeks, recalling the violent end of Kapodistrias' presidency, nevertheless yielded to the terms. The Kingdom of Greece Otto I, 1831-62 The "protecting" powers gave the Greek crown to Otto, the 17-year-old younger son of the king of Bavaria. Until he reached the age of majority, however, the direction of the Greek government fell to a regency council headed by Count Joseph von Armansperg. The Greek Westernizers' vision was put into place. The new state was designed to be thoroughly European, at least in its institutional structure. The regents imposed a complicated judicial code, modeled on that of Bavaria, ignoring a long history of customary law. They replaced the traditional decentralized forms of local government, inherited from the Ottoman period, with a modern, centralized bureaucracy that the Greeks considered alien and unworkable. The Orthodox church was declared to be "autocephalous," or independent, in 1833, though in practice it was firmly subordinated to the state, and the Roman Catholic Otto was named its head. Tax collection was efficient, and the taxes were no less burdensome than they had been under the Turks. The capital was moved from its original site in Navplion to Athens in 1834. Armed irregulars continued to cause trouble in the early years, and efforts to incorporate them into a Bavarian-style army were disappointing. Many returned to the traditional practice of brigandage and sometimes resorted to violence for political intimidation. Factionalism remained endemic, and parties tied to the foreign powers dominated the political scene until the Crimean War (1854-56). The "English" party favored constitutional rule, which Otto adamantly refused despite the promise of a constitution in 1832 and, above all, maintenance of the Balkan status quo. The "French" party also favored constitutionalism but promoted an irredentist foreign policy. The "Russian" party, however, saw the state domination of the Orthodox church as a direct challenge to Russia's rightful protective role and hoped Otto's abdication would lead to a replacement more solicitous of Russian interests; in short, it hoped to upset the Balkan balance to its own advantage. Otto's position continued to deteriorate as economic crises required increased taxation, and many felt that Otto had betrayed the heroes of the revolution by giving privileged positions not only to Bavarians but also to Greek immigrants (heterochthons) who had not participated in the long war of independence. Furthermore, Otto, facing bankruptcy, failed to aid a Cretan revolt against the Turks in 1841, confirming for many the charges of betrayal leveled against him by the opposition. By the 1840s Otto had managed to alienate practically everybody, and in 1843 a broad-based conspiracy developed. In 1843 leaders of the Russian and English parties brought army officers into the conspiracy, resulting in a bloodless coup, which forced Otto to grant the long-awaited constitution. The March 1844 constitution, patterned after the French constitution of 1830, established a bicameral parliament having a lower house elected by direct ballot (since 1838 any propertied male over the age of 25 had the vote) and a senate, the members of which were appointed for life by the king. The new constitution represented a small opening of the system but in effect left most of the power in the hands of the king, particularly the unlimited authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers at will. The first election in 1844 left an unfortunate legacy of corruption, patronage, and palace interference that conditioned political life for many years to come. Coherent party organizations did not develop; factions were more common and were based not on ideological or programmatic differences but rather on personalistic and clientelistic networks. Deputies tended to be free agents, eager to support whoever had the most to offer, and increasingly in the 1850s that meant the king. The electorate, undereducated and unorganized, tended to be almost totally submissive to the influence of local bosses. Effective participation was limited to this small oligarchy (tzakia; figuratively, "the great houses") who owed their position not to electoral promises but to a reputation of heroism gained during the war or, more commonly, to personal ties with constituents cemented in the practice of ritual kinship (godparenthood) and supplemented by favors (rousfeti). The bureaucracy created by the Bavarians quickly became the principal source of employment and upward mobility and grew out of all proportion to the state's population or resources. Patronage again was the key to appointment and promotion, and bribery became institutionalized. Only the military was insulated from the patronage system. The grafting of European parliamentary forms onto the traditional environment failed (see Relations Outside the Household, ch. 2). Otto tried to use irredentism to offset growing opposition. The "Megali Idea" (Great Idea) of annexing territories inhabited by Greeks outside the borders of the new state had tremendous popular support. During the Crimean War Otto's efforts to annex Thessaly and Epirus-tilting Greek neutrality in Russia's favor-won him popularity but also the undying enmity of the British and the French. The humilitating Anglo-French occupation of the port of Piraeus in 1854 underlined Russia's relative weakness as a patron and transformed the popularity into contempt. Otto's position steadily weakened until in 1862 several popular and military revolts, first in Navplion, then in Athens, emboldened the opposition to depose the king, appoint a provisional government, and call a constitutional convention to write a new constitution and elect a new ruler. Otto left the country, without resistance, on a British ship. George I, 1863-1913 Otto's departure was not mourned by anyone, least of all the British, for whom Otto had become a major obstacle. They and the French, insisting on the retention of the monarchy, sought an appropriate, that is, more accommodating, successor. After a short search that included the candidacies of the tsar's nephew and of Queen Victoria's second son, Alfred, they chose a compromise candidate in William George, son of Christian IX of Denmark and brother-in-law of the heirs to both the British and the Russian thrones. The British made it clear that as king, George I would be expected to maintain the status quo in the eastern Mediterranean and to quash the Megali Idea. As consolation the British rewarded Greek cooperation by ceding the Ionian Islands in 1864. Shortly after George's acceptance the Greek legislature began work on a new constitution. The 1864 charter established a "crowned democracy" by which the royal prerogatives were strictly limited and a unicameral legislature, elected by universal male suffrage, retained all constitutional powers. It was the most liberal constitution in Europe at the time and instituted the broadest suffrage. Foreign powers, particularly the British, continued to play a central role in Greece's domestic politics. King George accused the British ambassador of being responsible for two of the five cabinet crises in 1866. This intervention merely exacerbated the instability caused by the extreme fragmentation of political forces. Personalistic politics became more widespread in the 1860s as a result of procedural changes within the legislature. Parliamentary politics on the European model, which is dependent on parties and coalition politics, became almost impossible in this environment. The only clear-cut issue was relations with Turkey; some factions argued for an aggressive pursuit of the Megali idea, and others advocated caution and patience. Between 1867 and 1870 there were five different governments. Only the king remained a constant figure in the system, and his personal influence grew steadily. Nevertheless, the condition of the people remained remarkably unchanged through the 1870s. About 75 percent of the population still lived in villages, engaged in small-scale agriculture. Poverty was widespread, transportation was primitive, public services, such as running water, were practically nonexistent even in the largest cities, and economic development was painfully slow. Commerce was the major sector, and industrialization was not yet apparent; thus the paths to upward mobility were limited to trade (especially in the diaspora), politics, the civil service, or the army. A significant middle class did not yet exist, and the society was split into two groups: a small, wealthy oligarchy made of affluent merchants, shipowners, high-ranking civil servants, a few absentee landowners, and some senior clergy; and a vast peasant class. Urbanization increased in the 1880s, and with it a petite bourgeoisie appeared, composed of shopkeepers, middle-level servants, teachers, lawyers, physicians, and military officers. George made significant advances in education, both primary and secondary, and the National Technical University of Athens (commonly called the Polytechnic), founded in 1836, and the University of Athens, founded in 1837, were helping to produce an educated elite in the liberal professions as well as some engineers. Athens had grown to a population of 65,000 by 1882 and was becoming a magnet for ambitious villagers, but job opportunities remained limited. Economic conditions were clearly hampering progress on all fronts. Greece suffered from chronic balance of payments and debt problems that forced the European powers periodically to take control of its finances. Almost 40 percent of national revenue was devoted solely to servicing the national debt in he early 1880s; therefore, even the meager public services available outstripped the state's ability to pay for them. In 1882 Kharilaos Trikoupis was appointed prime minister and immediately embarked on an ambitious program to promote development and public works. Debt programs again interfered, however, and the development program had to be abandoned within three years, but tremendous progress had been made in a very short time (see Historical Development, ch. 3). At the same time, Trikoupis tried, with marginal success, to reform the political system by rooting out bribery and routine violence and brigandage, reorganizing the police forces, and ending the traditional spoils system by regularizing civil service appointment procedures. He was particularly incensed at what he called the crisis in Greek politics-the plethora of small, incoherent parties that made ministerial stability impossible to achieve. In an influential article written in 1874, Trikoupis blamed the king's practice of entrusting the government to minority factions that were doomed to be overthrown by competing factions. He contended that a promise by the king to appoint only leaders with avowed majority support in the parliament would ensure greater stability and foster the development of stable party organizations that would be more willing to form lasting coalitions. Trikoupis was thrown in jail for three days for attempting to undermine the constitutional order, but the article provoked public debate on the state of the political system. In 1875 the king agreed to Trikoupis' demand. The salutary effects of the change were obvious when Trikoupis held the office of prime minister uninterrupted for three years, from 1882 to 1885. In the first four decades of constitutional government (1843-83) the average life span for a cabinet had been only about nine months. Between 1864 and 1881 alone there had been nine elections and 17 governments. For the next 20 years something approaching a two-party system appeared, with Trikoupis alternating with Theodore Deliyannis, his arch rival and exact opposite, in the prime minister's post. Irredentism: Expansion and Defeat Irredentism was the most enduring issue in Greek politics. The truncated state erected in 1831 left more than twice as many self-identified Greeks outside its borders as inside. Many Greeks considered the European powers' high-handed intervention as a mortal insult to national honor. John Kolettis, one of the most aggressive advocates of the Megali Idea, announced in 1844: The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece. [It] constitutes only one part, the smallest and poorest. A Greek is not only a man who lives within this kingdom but also one who lies in Jannina, in Salonica [Thessaloniki], in Serres, in Adrianople, in Constantinople, in Trebizond, in Crete, in Samos and in any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race. . . . There are two main centers of Hellenism: Athens, the capital of the Greek kingdom, [and] "The City" [Constantinople], the dream and hope of all Greeks. Almost all Greeks agreed with Kolettis; the only question was how to accomplish the dream and how fast. The more cautious stressed Greece's inadequate resources and unpreparedness to face the inevitable opposition of not only Turkey but also certainly Britain and Russia-the latter having Pan-Slavic dreams of its own for the Balkans. The solution was patient and careful consolidation of the political and economic system and the establishment of a strong military. The militants tended to point out that Greece would remain economically unviable as long as the wealthiest and most productive centers of historic Greece remained outside its boundaries. Greece could not afford to wait. In broad terms, Trikoupis sided with the former, Deliyannis with the latter. Since independence attention had been focused on Crete, Epirus, and Thessaly. Crete was the scene of continuous revolts by the Greek majority against the Muslim landlords. In 1877 war broke out in the Balkans between Russian and Turkey. There were uprisings by Greeks in other Turkish territories, but the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the Russo-Turkish war and provided generously for the aspirations of Serbia and Bulgaria, did not make any concessions to Greek territorial claims. At the Congress of Berlin the next year, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck proposed that the disputed provinces be ceded to Greece, but the suggestions were rejected by the British, who underlined their intransigence on this question by threatening a naval blockade of Greece if the irredentist agitation continued. The issue of these Turkish-held provinces troubled Anglo-Greek relations until 1881, when the British-confident that Russia could gain no advantage from it-obtained the sultan's reluctant agreement to turn over Thessaly and southern Epirus to Greece (see fig. 4). Crete remained "unredeemed," and sporadic rebellions broke out over the next decade and a half. Reports of a massacre of Greeks on the island whipped up public opinion and forced Deliyannis to declare war on Turkey early in 1897. The well-equipped Turkish army, recently reorganized by German advisers, routed the ill-prepared, poorly led Greek forces in a 30-day campaign in Thessaly. The protecting powers intervened to prevent the Turks from pursuing their victory against the demoralized Greeks. Minor territorial adjustments were made in favor of Turkey, and Greece was required to pay an indemnity. An international commission was created by the powers to manage the bankrupt Greek state's finances. But, despite Greece's defeat, the Cretans gained the substance of their original demands for greater self-government. The second son of George I, Prince George, was named high commissioner of Crete and given a mandate by Britain to organize an autonomous regime there under the Turkish flag. The humiliating defeat overwhelmed the fragile stability that had been in place for two decades. Political leadership faltered; Trikoupis had died in 1896, Deliyannis was held responsible for the war, and no one of similar stature emerged to take the reins. The political system sank into immobilism and confusion, and public opinion began to sound menancing. [See Figure 4.: Expansion of Modern Greece Source: Based on information from Leften S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, New York 1965, 662.] The Coup of 1909 The defeat had undeniably shown the weakness of the army, and a series of steps were taken over the next decade to improve the military's leadership, organization, training, and equipment. Although the idea of reorganizing the military had broad support, the methods used were highly controversial. The crown prince, Constantine, was named to the newly created post of commander in chief of the army and given full independence of action in personnel matters, discipline, and reorganization. Lacking significant military training and having little experience in command-and that only in the disastrous war of 1897-many officers questioned the 32-year-old's qualifications for the post, which would have primary responsibility for the reorganization. At the same time, the reforms threatened the career aspirations of many officers, especially noncommissioned officers. The military might have been willing to endure this combination of grievances if there had been some obvious improvement in the fighting ability of the army and the navy. Military expenditures had increased, although not without debate, and by 1907 the army and navy were fairly well equipped. But plans to increase the numbers of conscripts were continually postponed because of economic problems. As a result, there was considerable evidence to suggest that the Greek military had actually fallen behind its Balkan neighbors in combat-ready strength. In absolute terms there had been considerable improvement, but in relative terms the Greek military was actually worse off than it had been in 1897. The failing economy provoked dissatisfaction from all groups, not just the military. Noncommissioned officers, shopkeepers, the educated middle class, workers, and peasants all took to the streets to demand action to address the crisis and, increasingly disgusted with the immobilism of the parliament and the traditional parties, they called for royal intervention to restore order. By 1909 the situation was becoming critical. A secret organization known as the Military League was established. Made up of junior officers, it was inspired by the success of the Young Turks, who had seized power in Turkey in 1908 and had embarked on an ambitious program of social and economic reform. The league's goals were never systematically laid out. The general thrust of its complaints was that the tinkering in which the parliament constantly indulged was no longer adequate to deal with the multitude of problems facing Greece. More substantial changes, not in personnel but in the very structures of government and the armed services, were necessary. Parliamentary politics had to stop its obsession with petty issues of personality and privilege and take up its role as protector of the nation and the people. There was an element of antiroyalism, but it was rooted in the perception that the crown prince had not earned the right to lead the military and did not prevent the league from blaming the king's passivity for the current immobilism. The league demanded his intervention in politics, despite a constitutional prohibition against it. Faced with intransigence by the government, the Military League demonstrated its strength on August 28, 1909, with a massive assembly at the military barracks of Goudi on the outskirts of Athens. It was made unmistakably clear that the military could overthrow the government at will, but the leaders of the league preferred to retain an appearance of legality. For the next seven months the parliament was essentially held hostage and legislated the "revolution" demanded by the league. Many of its demands concerned the organization of the military itself, particularly to safeguard its autonomy and professionalism. Other reform proposals were more vague, couched in irreproachable patriotic terms; respect for religion; honest administration; speedy and impartial justice; education based on practical needs of the country and national military requirements; security of life, honor, and property; reorganization of national finances to allow tax cuts; suppression of political waste and corruption; and the immediate buildup of the army and navy. Initial public response to the coup seemed to be favorable, but within a few weeks spontaneous demonstrations of opposition broke out, focusing on Crown Prince Constantine. In addition, the decision to maintain constitutional forms limited the military's power. The league was dependent on the cooperation of civilian politicians but offered them little incentive to play along, except for the threat of military force. The parliament obliged with an extraordinary amount of legislation but was obviously rankled by its humiliating subordination. Little by little the politicians began to reassert themselves. Finally, factional disputes began to break out within the military, threatening its institutional integrity. By December 1909 the "revolution" was running out of steam. The league turned for help to the one politician who seemed to them at once untarnished by past experience and ideologically compatible-Eleutherios Venizelos, a dynamic Cretan politician who had come to the attention of Greek reformers several years before. His first act was to call a convention to revise the constitution and make parliamentary government effective. Elections the next year-which were also a referendum on the revised constitution-gave Venizelos' newly formed Liberal Party 300 of the 364 seats in the parliament. The day after the convening of the new legislature, the Military League announced its formal dissolution, although it promised that the army would remain "a vigilant guardian of the national honor and ideals." The historic importance of this coup revolves around two features. Although the military, particularly the army, had periodically intervened in Greek politics (1843 and 1862), it had never before placed itself in control of the political system. In 1909 the military entered the political arena to save the nation from the corruption and incompetence of the traditional political leadership. It saw itself "as the savior of the nation"-the ultimate guardian of "Greekness" and justice. Since 1909 the Greek military has been a political actor, intervening at least a dozen times throughout the 1920s and 1930s, in a military dictatorship from 1936 to 1940, and again in a military dictatorship from 1967 to 1974. Each time the same exalted justification was used. Its political influence, whether in power or not, has grown steadily since 1909, and its autonomy is considered inviolate by both civilian and military leaders. The second critical aspect of the 1909 coup was the generational and ideological transformation it brought to Greek politics. Until 1909 the political system had been under the absolute rule of a kind of political aristocracy, whose authority rested not on property or wealth, as in Western Europe, but on control of a clientelistic network. The military's virtual, overthrow of that political elite opened the system up to new social forces-the urban middle class, for whom Venizelos became the messiah. He immediately embarked on an ambitious program of economic modernization and social legislation, including agrarian reform, industrial development, restructuring of the bureaucracy, encouragement of labor union organizations and, not surprisingly, enlargement and modernization of the armed forces. The Balkans Wars Irredentism remained a powerful dogma in Greece, and Venizelos, who had long been in the forefront of the fight for the union (enosis) of Crete and Greece, was a militant irredentist. Since the turn of the century, attention focused increasingly on the north, especially Macedonia. The region lacked any specific national character and had become a quiet battleground for Bulgarian and Greek guerrilla groups since at least 1903-04. Serbia also had a claim on the ethnically mixed area. None of these nations could hope to overthrow Turkish rule in the region single-handledly. In 1912, therefore, an alliance of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria was signed; within a few days the first Balkan war broke out. From the beginning the armies fought to position themselves to best advantage after the war. The Treaty of London, signed in May 1913, ended the war and forced Turkey to surrender to the Balkan allies all its European territory except eastern Thrace and Albania, which was granted independence. Within a month the former allies went to war again-this time against each other to divide the spoils. Serbia and Greece, along with Turkey and Romania, allied against Bulgaria in the second Balkan war. The peace agreement signed at Bucharest in 1913 awarded Crete, the Aegean Islands, and Macedonia (including Thessaloniki), to Greece. As a result of Venizelos' foreign-policy activism, Greece's landmass increased by almost 70 percent, and its population grew from about 2.8 million to 4.8 million. The Balkan triumphs consolidated Venizelos' power and magnified his dynamism as he continued to press for social reform. An unfortunate side effect of the war was King George's assassination in Thessaloniki in 1913. His son, the controversial Constantine, succeeded him.