$Unique_ID{COW01294} $Pretitle{228} $Title{Ethiopia Chapter 5C. Foreign Military Assistance} $Subtitle{} $Author{Robert Rinehart} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{military soviet ethiopian ethiopia eplf forces states united troops aid} $Date{1980} $Log{Figure 16.*0129401.scf Figure 17.*0129402.scf Figure 18.*0129403.scf } Country: Ethiopia Book: Ethiopia, A Country Study Author: Robert Rinehart Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1980 Chapter 5C. Foreign Military Assistance The use of foreign military advisers has a long history in Ethiopia, going back to the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. French, White Russian, Belgian, and Swedish advisers all contributed to efforts before World War II to build a modern army, and in 1942 Britain assumed responsibility for training and equipping the army. The air force was developed and for a number of years was commanded by Swedish officers. Similarly, Norwegian officers were contracted to organize a navy. American influence first came into play through association with the Kagnew Battalion of the Imperial Bodyguard that served with the United States Army's 7th Division in Korea. When the British military mission departed in 1951, the task of providing assistance to the army was largely assumed by the United States, although Israel trained Ethiopian paratroops and other specialized units, and India furnished instructors for the military academy. United States Aid In 1953 the United States signed a military assistance agreement with Ethiopia and undertook to train and equip Haile Selassie's armed forces in return for a twenty-five-year lease on the Kagnew Communications Center, near Asmera. At the time Kagnew was the world's largest radio relay and receiving station; its facilities, manned by 4,000 American military personnel, were later developed for satellite tracking and monitoring Soviet missile tests. During the more than twenty-three years that the agreement remained in effect, the United States provided military and economic aid amounting to about US $606 million. Military assistance, accounting for one-third of total aid, included direct grants, credits, and guaranteed loans. Ethiopia also acquired excess American military equipment at cost. In 1974 its armed forces were totally dependent on the United States for military hardware and parts. At the peak of the American-Ethiopian involvement in the 1960s, more than 300 personnel were assigned to the United States' Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Nearly 23,000 Ethiopian servicemen, including at least twenty who subsequently became members of the Derg, received advanced training under military education programs, 4,000 of them at facilities in the United States. American aid continued without interruption after the 1974 coup, although it was accompanied by proposals for a negotiated settlement in Eritrea. After the "Bloody Saturday" purge in November 1974, the United States postponed signing a pending aid agreement, but shipments of aircraft and tanks doubled the dollar value of military assistance in 1975 (see Revolutionary Change, ch. 1). Citing the "arms imbalance in the region" resulting from Soviet aid to Somalia, the United States proposed to update Ethiopia's arms inventory over a three-year period by turning over US $200 million worth of surplus materiel originally earmarked for Vietnam. Transfer of a squadron of F-5As from the Iranian air force was also authorized. The PMAC was particularly concerned to ensure a continuing flow of spare parts-"down to the boot-laces" -while the United States sought to prove to other African countries that it could be relied on to keep military aid commitments and that it was "responsive to [political] change" on the continent. Total American arms sales to Ethiopia in 1974 and 1975 amounted to US $35 million. During 1976 further tensions developed between the United States and Ethiopia concerning the ongoing Military Assistance Program. The PMAC rejected a new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit agreement because of the higher interest rate imposed by the United States, and it also complained about delays in arms delivery schedules in the face of growing Soviet military assistance to Somalia. The United States, meanwhile, refused to approve a US $60 million program to replace ammunition expended in Eritrea. In August 1976, however, a United States Department of State official testifying before a congressional committee characterized the Ethiopian government as "not systematically or intrinsically anti-U.S." The first concrete shift in relations between the two countries came in December of that year when a PMAC delegation headed by Mengistu visiting Moscow concluded an arms agreement with the Soviet Union valued at US $385 million that was designed to end the United States' virtual monopoly on arms supplies to Ethiopia. The agreement was the result of negotiations entered into with the Soviets earlier in the year. In February 1977 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance testified before a United States congressional committee, recommending that grant military assistance to Ethiopia be ended because of violations of human rights attributed to the governing regime. Grant military assistance represented only a small portion of the total American military aid program, which totaled US $26 million in FY 1976 and was scheduled to be US $62 million in FY 1977. (These figures contrasted with an annual average of US $10 million in military assistance to the imperial regime.) The United States also informed the PMGSE that it intended to reduce the size of the American military mission and to shut down the Kagnew communications station, where activities had already been phased out, by the end of September. As a result of these actions, the PMGSE concluded that all military assistance would eventually be eliminated, and it responded on April 23 by closing American military installations and giving MAAG personnel a week's notice to leave the country. A large store of equipment was left behind in the rapid American departure. Ethiopia formally abrogated the 1953 Military Defense Assistance Agreement and terminated the lease on Kagnew. In the absence of a bilateral agreement, the United States had no legal basis for the delivery of aircraft, armored vehicles, ships, and a number of Maverick and Sidewinder missiles that had been approved for delivery and on which the PMGSE had made partial down payments. Soviet and Cuban Aid Ethiopia had been assured Soviet aid in 1976 (before it abrogated the military assistance agreement with the United States), and Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu Abate, then vice-chairman of the PMAC, had announced that Ethiopia would in the future restrict its purchases to "socialist countries." Soviet supplies were in the pipeline when in August 1977 Jijiga fell to the Somali, and Mengistu issued an urgent appeal to the Soviets for aid. Deliveries began to arrive the following month. The Soviet supply effort was massive and was efficiently carried forward. In three months time as many as fifty Soviet ships had passed through the Suez Canal to off-load crated fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, and munitions at Aseb-an estimated 60,000 tons of hardware-for delivery to the Ogaden front. Additional Soviet equipment was shipped from Aden. At the height of the buildup between November 1977 and February 1978, Soviet transport aircraft, including the giant An-22, were reportedly landing at twenty-minute intervals at Ethiopian airports. An estimated 225 transports-about 15 percent of the Soviet air fleet-were involved in the operation, which was believed to have been coordinated through a military reconnaissance satellite launched for that purpose in November. The Soviet supply operation in 1977-78 impressed Western observers, who admitted that the display of Soviet transport capability had added a "new strategic element" to the East-West balance. The Soviets drew on large stockpiles of first-line equipment created by high production levels in military hardware. Soviet aid-which included eighty aircraft, 600 tanks, and 300 APCs-had an estimated value of US $1 billion, surpassing in a matter of months all United States aid to Ethiopia over a period of twenty-five years. One-fourth of the total was a gift, and a small part was reportedly financed by the Libyan government. As of mid-1980, the total value to be repaid in hard currency was equivalent to US $1.7 billion to be spread over ten years beginning in 1984 with 2 percent interest to be paid currently on the principal amount. In addition, Ethiopia was repaying a commercial debt equivalent to US $300 million to the Soviet Union for common use items such as trucks and cranes. Ethiopia was meeting its obligations by sending coffee to the Soviet Union and by foreign exchange payments from export earnings elsewhere (see Foreign Trade, Aid, and Balance of Payments, ch. 3). Mengistu had requested assistance in the form of Cuban troops as early as March 1977 during a visit to the Horn by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, who sought to reconcile differences between Ethiopia and Somalia. Castro's mission was a failure, and in May a small party of Cuban advisers arrived in Ethiopia. They were the vanguard of about 17,000 Cubans who would be stationed in the country by the following spring, serving as advisers and in combat units. Between November 1977 and March 1978, Ethiopian Airlines made seventy-eight night flights ferrying Cuban troops from Angola, where they had been similarly involved since mid-1975. Cuban combat units played a decisive role in the Ogaden counteroffensive in February and March. About 2,000 South Yemen personnel, including tank crews and pilots, were also engaged. East German aircrews provided additional support for Soviet and Cuban pilots who flew helicopters and MiG fighter bombers on combat missions. Western observers regarded the Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia as Soviet surrogates. Although estimates of the number of Cuban military personnel remaining in Ethiopia in 1980 ranged from 13,000 to 15,000, Castro has refused to commit them to combat operations in Eritrea, which he considered an internal affair whose solution must be political rather than military. (Cuba had earlier supported the Eritrean secessionists.) In addition to their duties as instructors and advisers, Cubans supervised military construction, provided logistical support, maintained several garrisons, and had primary responsibility for training the People's Militia. According to most informed sources, there were approximately 1,000 Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia in 1980. They were active in training, maintenance of equipment, logistical support, and administration. Soviet warships have, however, provided fire support for Ethiopian operations on the Eritrean coast, and Soviet pilots are believed to have flown some ground support missions. Soviet advisers also have been directly involved in combat operations in Eritrea and are believed to have taken over command of armored and artillery units in the field from time to time. In August 1979 the PMGSE paid honor to Soviet personnel killed and wounded in Ethiopia-the first admission that they had been involved in combat roles. Ports on the Eritrean coast have replaced the bases the Soviet Union lost in Somalia and are used by Soviet naval units operating in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The Soviet navy has stationed warships and surveillance craft at an anchorage in the Dahlac Islands, where a dry dock, towed from Berbera, has been refloated. The Soviet Union has demonstrated that it attaches great significance to its commitment in Ethiopia. Its interests are mixed-geopolitical, strategic, and ideological-but it has chosen to rely primarily on military assistance to gain its objectives. The ongoing Soviet military aid program has been characterized by short lead time between order and delivery and by a willingness to provide first-line equipment from its stockpile. In November 1978 a twenty-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded in Moscow between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia in which Moscow pledged to continue the flow of assistance and to consult in situations that "constitute a threat to or a breach of international peace." In addition to Soviet and Cuban assistance, East Germany signed a military aid agreement with Ethiopia in 1979 to supply a variety of light weapons to the armed forces. About 400 East Germans have been involved in training intelligence and internal security units. Areas of Conflict In 1976 Mengistu admitted that ten of Ethiopia's fourteen regions were in a state of armed rebellion; "our surroundings," he said in Addis Ababa, "do not favor our revolution." A Western journalist reporting that same year on peasant uprisings led by nobles in conservative Amhara districts saw in Ethiopia "a return to the historic situation of a dozen or so hostile provinces being ruled by petty warlords." At no time since the 1974 coup has it been possible to distinguish between measures taken for national security to defend Ethiopia's territorial integrity and internal security operations against a variety of political opponents of the military regime and regionalist opposition to the Ethiopian state. Areas of conflict can be divided into three categories: the first in Eritrea where well-organized, well-equipped secessionist movements have defied Ethiopian forces, both by conventional means and guerrilla tactics, since 1961; the second in the Ogaden where Ethiopia's security is directly threatened by a foreign power (Somalia) supporting the irredentism of the ethnic Somali; and the third in armed opposition from underground leftist and traditionalist groups and from regionalist and ethnic movements (see fig. 16; see table 13, Appendix). Whatever the political complexion or ethnic composition of the insurgent forces, they are typically characterized by the PMGSE as "counterrevolutionaries," "feudalists," shiftas (bandits), and "paid agents of the CIA." [See Figure 16.: Areas of Conflict, 1975-80] The PMGSE officially designated the existence of three military fronts: the northern sector, including Eritrea, the Afar country, and the northern border with the Republic of Sudan; the eastern sector in the Ogaden; and the southern sector in Bale and Sidamo, where government authority is challenged by Somali and Oromo dissidents. To those might be added an internal front in Addis Ababa and the country's other major cities. Eritrea The military arm of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), a nationalist organization committed to self-rule for Eritrea, commenced a small-scale insurgency against Ethiopian security forces in 1961 (see Growth of Secessionist Threats, ch. 1). The level of hostilities accelerated steadily throughout the 1960s, leading to the imposition of martial law in the region in 1971. Ethiopian army personnel deployed there during this period numbered about 20,000-roughly half the force's total-but much of the burden of counterinsurgency operations fell to the paramilitary mobile police. Ideological and ethnic differences split the ELF in 1970 and resulted in the formation of the Marxist-leaning Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Periodic attempts during the 1970s to arrange military collaboration failed, and there were clashes between partisans of the rival groups. In 1977, when secessionists controlled the countryside and most population centers, the ELF claimed to have more than 20,000 effective troops, while the EPLF had an estimated strength of about 15,000. Soviet-backed Ethiopian offensives in 1978 dealt the ELF a crippling blow from which it had not recovered in 1980 and encouraged large-scale defections of survivors to the EPLF, which had emerged as the more determined fighting force. The EPLF and ELF rely on logistical support from bases in Sudan, where they operate hospitals, schools, communications and training centers, and facilities to repair captured equipment and manufacture ammunition. The EPLF and ELF crossed freely between Eritrea and Sudan, where Kassala-headquarters for both organizations-was virtually an Eritrean town. With road crews working at night, the EPLF constructed an elaborate "clandestine highway," consisting of 1,300 kilometers of roads connecting supply centers with the Nakfa-Alghena front. Most outside aid to the EPLF was received through Port Sudan. The basic EPLF fighting unit of twenty-to-thirty troops is characterized by mobility and firepower. A number of these units are sometimes combined into combat teams, several of which in turn may form a combat force. A battalion, composed of several combat forces, is the largest line organization. Although there is no obvious hierarchy and few signs of imposed authority in the EPLF, troops are well disciplined and efficient, and they are capable of showing impressive individual initiative. Unit leaders at each force level are chosen by election. Ranks are filled by Eritreans from varied backgrounds and, despite severe casualties and disruption caused by war, there is no shortage of volunteers. Many are deserters from the Ethiopian armed forces. Women serve beside men in combat without differentiation in their roles. The EPLF has received aid from a variety of Arab sources, but in 1980 its weapons inventory consisted primarily of Soviet equipment captured from Ethiopian forces. The ubiquitous AK-47 rifle is the standard personal weapon, supplemented in small units by hand-held RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and shoulder-fired SA-7 antiaircraft missiles. Western journalists have also observed mobile medium-and long-range artillery pieces, mortars, antitank and antiaircraft guns, as well as large numbers of T-54 tanks used primarily in fixed positions as artillery, which have given the EPLF substantial military clout. Eritrean secessionists took advantage of a temporary cease-fire and turmoil in Ethiopia in 1974 to consolidate their position around Asmera. In January 1975 the city was attacked by commandos who fought their way into its streets. Government forces retaliated with air and artillery attacks on villages that killed thousands of civilians and drove tens of thousands to refuge in Sudan. By early 1977 the EPLF and ELF could claim to dominate as much as 90 percent of the region and by September were in possession of all towns except Asmera, Mitsiwa, Barentu, Adi Caieh, and Aseb, where in April guerrillas destroyed Ethiopia's only oil refinery. With all roads controlled by the Eritreans, embattled Ethiopian army garrisons had to be supplied by airlift. In a bold move in December, the EPLF occupied the approaches to Mitsiwa, but its forces were unable to take the port. The Ethiopian garrison there had to be reinforced by sea for the next eight months. After the withdrawal of Somali troops from the Ogaden in March 1978, 60,000-80,000 Ethiopian troops were redeployed in the northern sector for a succession of carefully planned offensives that battered but did not break Eritrean resistance. During a summer of intense fighting, the Ethiopians recaptured all important towns except Keren, and reopened the road between Asmera and Addis Ababa. The usual Eritrean tactic had been to separate armored vehicles and artillery from infantry and support units and deal with each separately, but the guerrillas were now overwhelmed by the massive use of armor and mechanized infantry in contained areas saturated by Ethiopian artillery fire. A new operating phase was opened in November with the recapture of Keren and the relief of Mitsiwa. These setbacks, coupled with successful Ethiopian landings at Marsa Teklay and Marsa Gulbub, compelled the EPLF and ELF to evacuate their remaining bases in central Eritrea and undertake a "strategic withdrawal" northward to avoid encirclement (see fig. 17). [See Figure 17.: Scenes of Fighting in Eritrea, 1977-80] The Soviet contribution to overall planning was critical to the success of the campaign. Soviet advisers directly intervened to monitor the combat from helicopters and supervised the placement of artillery and armor. According to an EPLF spokesman, "Soviet intervention had totally changed the ratio of forces," giving the Ethiopians "strategic superiority" and putting the Eritreans on the defense for the first time in the war. The Ethiopian drive was halted in the highlands south of Nakfa and at Alghena in the east. The war became one of position fought by conventional means; the Eritreans dug in along an extended front. To break the deadlock-and end the war-the Ethiopians launched simultaneous attacks with 50,000 troops in July against Nakfa and Alghena. The plan called for splitting Eritrean forces by concentrating the maximum amount of armor and mechanized infantry, using artillery and air support, to pierce narrow sectors of the front and then cut off Eritrean units through flank attacks. The July offensive was an unqualified disaster and an embarrassment to Soviet advisers. Despite intense shelling to pin down the Eritreans, the attack broke down and the EPLF closed up holes punched in their lines. Eritrean sources put Ethiopian casualties at 6,000 killed, a claim denied in Addis Ababa. A two-week-long counteroffensive in October was concentrated in the center of the front, driving the Ethiopians back ten kilometers on the first day and forcing the evacuation of 20,000 troops by Soviet ships at Marsa Teklay. In the countryside the EPLF committed itself to a "protracted people's war" on the Maoist principle. Attacks on roads between Asmera and Mitsiwa picked up again in early 1980, and in April an EPLF offensive, supported by armor and heavy artillery, encircled the garrison at Afabet on three sides. Heavy fighting continued along stabilized positions on the Nakfa-Alghena front, where 40,000 Ethiopians faced 25,000 Eritreans. An Ethiopian buildup was reported in April, and the Eritreans braced for a summer offensive. Although meetings have taken place between Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives in East Berlin, the EPLF refuses to compromise on the issue of national independence for Eritrea, and officially the PMGSE rejects a political settlement. In Mengistu's words, "The struggle must be fought to the last man, even if it is hard and bitter." In early 1980 it was estimated that as many as 70,000 had died as a result of the conflict in Eritrea. A crucial factor for the EPLF has been relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. Sudanese President Jaffar al Numayri had close ties with the imperial government which were not transferred to the PMAC in 1974. He accused the Ethiopian military regime of backing the dissident Sudan National Liberation Front and in turn openly assisted the EPLF and ELF. Early in 1977 there was a serious threat of war between the two countries. It became evident late in 1979, however, that refugees in Sudan were being relocated in camps and were not being allowed to join secessionist forces. Visits were exchanged by officials in Addis Ababa and Khartoum, and in May 1980 the two governments agreed in a communique on "joint control of illegal movements across the border." The Ogaden Guerrilla activity by Somali in the Ogaden and the Haud areas of Harerge administrative region flared up sporadically after Somalia became an independent nation in 1960, but it remained essentially a police concern until a brief border war erupted in 1964. Attempts at an understanding between Ethiopia and Somalia were thwarted in 1968 when Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in Mogadishu, pledging to renew efforts for the establishment of a "Greater Somalia" that would encompass about one-third of Ethiopia's total territory. Encouraged by the apparent breakdown of authority in Addis Ababa after the 1974 coup, Somalia promoted the organization of insurgent movements in the Ogaden and the southern Ethiopia regions and provided them material as well as moral support. The Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) operated in the Ogaden and was committed to the "Greater Somalia" concept. The Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF) was a distinct organization but was linked to the WSLF. Its sphere of operations was in Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi, where it advocated union with Somalia or the creation of an independent state in those regions. Somalia equipped both groups with Soviet arms. They had received additional aid and training from various Arab and communist countries, including Cuba. WSLF guerrillas initially engaged Ethiopian troops in combat in 1975, systematically hitting police posts and army garrisons from base camps across the border in Somalia. In June 1977 they were successful in cutting the railroad bridges between Addis Ababa and Djibouti over which about one-third of Ethiopia's external trade was carried, and they claimed effective military control over 60 percent of the Ogaden. At that time the WSLF numbered about 6,000 men in well-disciplined units, an unspecified but reportedly substantial percentage of them "volunteers" from Somalia's armed forces. As the tempo of conflict increased, the WSLF acquired an armored and artillery capability. In July 1977 Somali mechanized units invaded Ethiopia territory in a preemptive thrust at Harer-military command center for the region-that was intended to decide the issue on the Ogaden before Soviet equipment in the pipeline to Ethiopia arrived on the scene (see fig. 18). Jijiga fell to them in September when the Ethiopian mechanized brigade defending it mutinied and fled in panic. The Somali then focused their efforts on the strategic Marda Pass, carrying the attack into the unfamiliar highlands in an attempt to block Ethiopian reinforcements coming into Harerge. The move diverted forces from the main offensive aimed at Harer and Dire Dawa, site of the air base from which strikes were being flown against targets inside Somalia. After weeks of being bogged down by bad weather, the Somali pressed a three-pronged attack in January on Harer where nearly 50,000 Ethiopian troops had been regrouped, backed by Soviet-supplied heavy artillery and reinforced by 10,000 Cuban troops from units hurriedly flown from Angola. Early in February the Ethiopians launched a two-staged counterattack toward Jijiga that was planned and directed by Soviet General Petrov. Moving east and south from Dire Dawa, an Ethiopian column crossed the highlands between Jijiga and the Somalia border, bypassing Somali troops dug in around the Marda Pass. This development was followed by a second offensive strike, joined by Cuban troops, in which Somali forces around Jijiga were caught between helicopter-borne tanks that landed in their rear and a determined frontal assault from Harer. Jijiga was retaken on March 5 after two days of fierce fighting in which four Somali brigades were cut to pieces and 3,000 were killed. Within a week all major towns in the region were once again in Ethiopian hands. Meanwhile, Ethiopian air force F-5s had won complete air superiority in engagements against Soviet-made Somali jets. The undeclared war was brought to an end on March 9 when Siad Barre announced that Somali troops had been recalled from Ethiopian territory. The introduction of Cuban troops and massive quantities of Soviet equipment had decisively altered the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. [See Figure 18.: The Ogaden Campaign, 1977-78] After the withdrawal of the Somali regulars, the WSLF reverted to classic guerrilla tactics-against what their spokesmen characterized as "black Abyssinian colonialists troops" -aimed at cutting supply and communications lines. Western journalists visiting the region early in 1980 confirmed that the WSLF once again controlled the countryside as well as many of the main roads. It was also claimed that Somali "volunteers" had rejoined them. Renewed conventional fighting occurred in June and July when, according to an official spokesman in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian troops repelled an incursion by a strong mechanized Somali force. Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) traces its origin to a clandestine Marxist group formed in the waning days of Haile Selassie's rule. It embodied leftist sentiment in Addis Ababa that to a large extent made the Derg's success possible in 1974. Not numerous but noisy, its members then included academics, foreign-educated technocrats, trade unionists, and armed forces militants, particularly those from the air force. Its ranks were later swollen by restless student radicals idled when the PMAC closed down the schools in 1975. EPRP theoreticians rejected the thesis proposed by progovernment leftists that a popular revolution could emanate from a military takeover. Protesting the military regime's obvious brutality and its apparent incapacity to deal with social and economic problems, they made a bold attempt to channel discontent into a mass movement that could supplant the military regime with a "people's democratic government" run by civilians. Following demonstrations in August 1975 that called for the establishment of a civilian government, the PMAC cracked down on the EPRP, rounding up and imprisoning many of its members and their sympathizers. Driven underground, the organization turned to urban terrorism, sabotaging public utilities, burning government buildings and, with chilling efficiency, assassinating members of the PMAC and its supporters. When an attempt attributed to the EPRP was made on Mengistu's life in September 1976, counterinsurgency squads from the Flame Division were called in to deal with the urban guerrillas, and hundreds of suspects were shot. The war within the city intensified as battles were fought nightly in its streets between progovernment and antigovernment factions, the latter armed by Somalia and identified with the EPRP. In November 1977 Mengistu publicly authorized the kebeles to "spread revolutionary terror" among opponents of the regime and assigned the PMAC's security chief to direct the operation. By February 1978 as many as 5,000 had been killed in Addis Ababa in the government-sponsored campaign commonly referred to as the Red Terror. Most of the victims were young, as anyone of school age became an indiscriminant target for the kebele's strangling squads. Thousands were arrested and tortured, and scores were publicly executed or simply disappeared. Bodies were dumped by the roadsides or stacked on street corners. Many old grudges, some unrelated to politics, appear to have been settled along the way, including the killing of Mengistu's rival, Atnafu Abate, as a "revolutionary measure." In April, however, the PMGSE stepped in when kebele vigilantes seemed to have carried Mengistu's instructions too far, but it was several months before the fury of the Red Terror in Addis Ababa was abated. The military regime asserted that reports of killings during the Red Terror appearing in the Western media were "completely baseless." The EPRP organization in Addis Ababa was decimated but not exterminated as the PMGSE had ordered. Urban guerrillas were reported still active in the capital in early 1979. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army (EPRA), which claims to be an arm of the EPRP, has operated in Tigray since 1976 against both government and rival insurgent forces, and it was reported active in Gonder in 1980. Radical militants linked to the EPRP have also been identified in the southern regions. Ethiopian Democratic Union Armed units associated with the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) became active in Gojam, Gonder, and western Tigray in 1975. Lacking a clear ideological identity, the EDU appealed to the traditionalist Amhara and Tigray peasantry in these regions who were opposed to land reform. Abroad the EDU projected a liberal, even antimonarchist, image. The EDU's "white army," a counterrevolutionary force led by former senior army officers, was composed at the height of its effectiveness of 6,000 army deserters and peasant recruits and operated from bases in Sudan. In early 1977 it defeated government forces, including counterinsurgency units from the elite Flame Division, in sharp fighting in northern Gonder and periodically controlled Humera and Metema. In early 1980 government troops had firm control of the Humera area, and observers considered that as an insurgency movement the EDU was a "spent force." Ethiopian sources, however, continued to report actions in Gojam against "counterrevolutionary bandits," who were identified with the EDU. Oromo Liberation Front Although the Oromo were touted as the real beneficiaries of the 1974 coup, activists belonging to Ethiopia's largest ethnic component redirected their enthusiasm to a nationalist movement, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which looked for the creation of an independent "People's Democratic Republic of Oromo." Leaders of the OLF are predominantly Arssi Oromo, who traditionally have been easily aroused against "great Amhara chauvinism." Important support for the movement also came from Oromo government officials and armed forces officers disillusioned by the PMGSE's failure to grant regional autonomy and from landlords who have used the ethnic issue to defend their property rights. The OLF's insurgency has been largely undirected and founders on personal rivalries. One faction has cooperated with the SALF in Bale and Sidamo; others were active with the WSLF in Harerge during the 1977-78 war. OLF political headquarters in Khartoum had not succeeded in uniting and controlling operations by guerrillas believed to number no more than several hundred in 1980. Tigray People's Liberation Front There is a long tradition of Tigray opposition to Shewan domination, which since the 1974 coup has been transferred to the PMGSE (see Ethnic Relations, ch. 2). The Marxist Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) emerged after the coup as the leading voice for secessionist sentiment in the region. Its program calls for the establishment of an independent state combining Tigray and Eritrea and emphasizes the class character of the struggle against the government in Addis Ababa. The TPLF has 2,000 well-armed effectives in guerrilla units cooperating with the EPLF from bases in Sudan. The TPLF suffered heavy losses during the 1978 Ethiopian offensive in Eritrea. In September 1979, however, its units captured and for a time held the Aksum airport. In 1980 it claimed to control some of the roads leading into Eritrea and continued to inflict casualties in ambushes on border patrols. The TPLF expelled the EDU from Tigray in 1978 and has carried on a separate war there against the rival EPRP. The Afar Separatists The nomadic, pastoralist Afar in eastern Welo and southern Eritrea enjoyed a large measure of autonomy on their tribal lands under Haile Selassie. After the 1974 coup the Afar shaykhs appealed to the new government for continued exemption from taxation and for recognition of their sultanate as the corporate proprietor of tribal grazing land. The military regime responded by imposing land reform in order to liberate them from "feudalism" and, when the Afar resisted, resorted to what tribal spokesmen described as a "genocidal campaign" against them. From his exile in Djibouti, Sultan Ali Mirah formed the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) in 1975 and equipped 5,000 guerrillas from his own stores and with weapons provided by Somalia and Saudi Arabia. The Afar guerrillas, who have a reputation for banditry, were effective in cutting the rail line to Djibouti and the roads used for transporting oil from the refinery at Aseb. The ALF also developed close ties with the ELF and actively cooperated with secessionists. A sweep of southern Eritrea in early 1980 by Ethiopian forces resulted in sharp fighting with ALF guerrillas and reasserted government control over the Aseb road. ALF effectiveness is considered much diminished as a result of this action. The Afar separatist movement has always been subject to factionalism, usually based on traditional, sectional rivalries and more recently on ideological differences. Some members of the Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM), for instance, claim Marxist affiliation. While continuing its demands for Afar autonomy, the ANLM cooperates to some extent with the PMGSE.