$Unique_ID{COW01217} $Pretitle{243} $Title{Egypt Chapter 5A. National Security} $Subtitle{} $Author{Eugene K. Keefe} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{war military forces egyptian armed british egypt service sadat egyptians} $Date{1982} $Log{Hypostyle Hall*0121701.scf Figure 9.*0121703.scf } Country: Egypt Book: Egypt, A Country Study Author: Eugene K. Keefe Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1982 Chapter 5A. National Security [See Hypostyle Hall: Hawk at entrance to the hypostyle hall of the Temple of Idfu] As President Husni Mubarak completed his first nine months in office in early summer 1982, the groups of Islamic religious fanatics that posed the most serious threat to internal security and public order remained relatively quiet. There had been no serious disturbances since the days immediately after the assassination of Mubarak's predecessor, Anwar al Sadat, on October 6, 1981. A state of emergency had been in effect since the assassination, in addition to which a roundup of known extremists had resulted in the detention of as many as 2,500 potential troublemakers. The new president demonstrated that it was his intention to be tough in situations demanding toughness, an attitude that perhaps chilled the ardor of fanatics who had been intent on converting Egypt into an Islamic republic along the lines of that existing in Iran. During eleven years as president, Sadat had lifted some of the tight controls that had previously been exercised by the pervasive police and security forces, but just before his death he had clamped down on opposition groups that he considered responsible for crimes of violence connected with political dissent and religious fanaticism. Egyptians had in general favored Sadat's actions, but when in September 1981 he took action against antiregime activists by ordering the arrest of more than 1,500 opponents, he was roundly criticized at home and abroad. His critics accused him of jailing people for disagreeing with him politically; he argued that the arrestees had threatened state security. One month later, bullets from the guns of religious militants ended the Sadat era, but they did not end the opposing views on Egypt's position in the Arab world and the world at large. In mid-1982 it remained to be seen how the new president would deal with his ideological and political inheritance. Even before he officially became president, Mubarak was designated supreme commander of the armed forces, one of the president's more important duties. In mid-1982 the armed forces that he constitutionally commanded totaled about 367,000 personnel in four services: army, navy, air force, and air defense force. Servicemen are both volunteers and conscripts, although the latter predominate in number. Servicewomen, of whom there were only a small number in 1982, were all volunteers, women not being subject to the draft. Arms and equipment, which from the mid-1950s to 1974 had been supplied almost exclusively by the Soviet Union, were in the late 1970s and early 1980s being procured from the West. Sadat had decided to diversify the sources of supplies, and his successor vowed to continue the same policy. Egyptians in 1982 were using arms and equipment from a half-dozen different countries; in addition, some Egyptian factories were also producing armaments. The inventories of all services were therefore extremely varied. Even though no new armaments had been received from the Soviet Union for several years, Soviet items still made up the bulk of the inventories. Since 1978 the former Ministry of War has been known as the Ministry of Defense. The change of title was intended to demonstrate the new emphasis on peace, which Sadat had personally initiated. Four wars with Israel and the constantly increasing costs of maintaining modern armed forces had convinced Sadat that an extended period of peace was an absolute requisite for rescuing the economy from disaster and for establishing a basis for ending the extreme poverty of most of Egypt's people. Armed Forces The prestige and reputation of the armed forces were greatly enhanced by their successes in the October 1973 War against Israel. In the words of President Sadat, "We the Egyptian people have recovered our pride and self-confidence after the October 1973 battle, just as our armed forces did." The stain of military defeat, rout, and humiliation in the June 1967 War was cleansed by the partial victory of 1973, and nine years later the return of the Sinai Peninsula seemed to confirm the correctness of the war and peace moves made by Sadat before his assassination. Mubarak continued in mid-1982 to subscribe to Sadat's foreign and military policies. Position in Government and Society Constitutional Basis The purpose and role of the armed forces are set forth in several articles of the Constitution, particularly in Chapter VII, "The Armed Forces and the National Defense Council." Armed forces can be formed only by the state, and they are designated as belonging "to the people." The formation of paramilitary forces by private organizations or groups is forbidden. The purpose of the armed forces is "to defend the country, its territorial safety and security, and protect the socialist gains of the people's struggle." The section of the Constitution dealing with citizen's rights and obligations refers to defense of the homeland as a "sacred duty" and establishes compulsory conscription. The president of the republic is designated supreme commander of the armed forces and is empowered to declare war or a state of emergency, both of which require the concurrence of the People's Assembly. The four presidents who have held the office since the revolution in 1952-Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak-have been military officers. Nasser and Sadat, both members of the Free Officers group that overthrew King Faruk in the 1952 Revolution, paid close attention to military affairs during their tenures (see 1952 Revolution, ch. 1). Early assessments of Mubarak's administration predicted that he would follow the lead of his predecessors in dealing with the military, not only because of his own air force background but also because of the dominant position of the military in national politics (see The Military as Political Actor, ch. 4). The National Defense Council, the formation of which is mandated by the Constitution, is directed to consider all "matters related to insuring the country's security." The Constitution does not designate the membership of the council other than the president, who is named chairman. In practice the membership of the council, in addition to the president, has included the prime minister and certain other prominent ministers, e.g., defense and war production, interior, foreign affairs, economy and foreign trade, and others, as well as the chief of staff of the armed forces, the commanders of the separate services, and the director of intelligence. Other articles of the Constitution direct that laws will be enacted to govern mobilization, terms of service for military personnel, and the jurisdictions of military courts. Military Traditions At the end of the age of the pharaohs, some five or six centuries before the time of Christ, Egypt was conquered by foreign armies and then remained under foreign domination until 1952, that is, for about 2,500 years (see table A). The only armed forces in the land were the armies of occupation of the various powers that dominated the country one after another, developing in the Egyptian people the idea that military service was alien to their own culture. Successively conquered and occupied by Persian, Greek, Roman, Arab, Turkish, French, and British forces, the Egyptians also became contemptuous of military personnel, particularly officers, and that opinion continued to be prevalent until the mid-twentieth century. Military service was described by a prominent Egyptian writer in 1951 as "an object of ridicule, a laughingstock which is avoided whenever possible. It is thus left for the poor and uneducated. It is a derisory profession commanding contempt rather than honor or pride." Under Muhammad Ali, Ottoman governor of Egypt in the early nineteenth century, efforts to develop an Egyptian army met with some success during campaigns on behalf of or against the Ottoman sultan (see Muhammad Ali and the Nineteenth Century, ch. 1). Relatively few of the officers were Egyptians, however, and the fellahin (see Glossary) frequently went to great lengths to avoid military service. After the deaths of Muhammad Ali and his son, Ibrahim, in the late 1840s, the Egyptian military declined. Some three decades later Egyptian nationalist forces commanded by an Egyptian officer, Ahmad Urabi, were crushed by British troops as the era of British domination began (see The British Presence and Modern Nationalism, ch. 1). Britain assumed responsibility for the defense of Egypt and the Suez Canal, which was of particular importance to the far-flung British Empire. The Egyptian army was disbanded, then recreated under British control. Egyptian units were incorporated into British commands alongside regular British units. Manpower for the Egyptian units was raised by irregular conscription among the fellahin, who continued their practice of avoiding service in any way possible. Enlisted men were allowed to make a cash payment in lieu of service, a practice that resulted in units composed primarily of the poorest members of the society. Those Egyptians who became officers were from families of wealth and high position, ensuring that the gap between officers and enlisted men would remain wide and firmly fixed. Egyptian nationalist pressures mounted after World War I and, with certain reservations, Britain declared Egypt's independence in 1922. Prince Ahmad Fuad assumed the title of king, and in April 1923 a constitution was promulgated. Command of the armed forces was ostensibly turned over to the Egyptians, but a British inspector general was retained at the highest level until that last vestige of British control was removed by the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The Egyptian army then was expanded, and the commissioned officer ranks were made more generally accessible. Enrollment in the Military Academy and a subsequent army career became not only attainable but desirable by young Egyptians of the middle class. Because of a surplus of university graduates-especially teachers, lawyers, and administrators-in the labor market between 1936 and 1952, many young men entered military service seeking higher education and expanded opportunities. Nasser, for example, had begun to study law but, as he later wrote, became convinced that only through the army could he become involved in the affairs of his country. Sadat and many others later indicated similar feelings (see 1952 Revolution, ch. 1; Rural Society, ch. 2). Before World War II military service was compulsory for men between the ages of nineteen and twenty-seven, but because of the size of the army-about 23,000 in 1939-few were actually conscripted. During the war the force was increased to about 100,000. British influence on the Egyptian forces remained strong, and Egypt continued to depend on Britain for military equipment, instruction, and technicians. Under the terms of the 1936 treaty, British troops remained in the country to defend the Suez Canal, and during the war Egypt became the principal base in the Middle East for the Allies. Egypt severed relations with the Axis powers soon after the outbreak of World War II but remained technically neutral until near the end of the war. The Italians first brought the war to Egypt in 1940 but were fought off by the British. In late 1941 the German Afrika Korps entered western Egypt and posed a threat to the country and to the canal until its defeat at the hands of the British Eighth Army at Al Alamein in October 1942. Some Egyptians flew patrol duty in British planes with British pilots during the hostilities, and a naval service was inaugurated with a few coastal patrol boats supplied by Britain, but Egyptian forces were used primarily for guard duty and logistics tasks rather than for combat. During the war some Egyptian officers favored the Nazis, largely in the hope that a British defeat would bring true independence, which they thought had been denied their country by continuing, strong British influence. (Sadat, for example, had been imprisoned by the British because of pro-Nazi activities.) Aware of such sentiments, the British command was reluctant to employ Egyptian units even after the formal declaration of war against the Axis by King Faruk's government in February 1945. At the end of the war the Egyptian forces were rapidly reduced in size, leading some nationalists to claim later that the deficiencies appearing in the late 1940s were attributable to long-standing British policy. For the most part, however, the failures against the Israeli forces in the 1948 war were more attributable to the venality and ineffectiveness of the Faruk regime than to British policy. A notorious scandal involving defective arms supplied by Egyptian manufacturers was symbolic of the era and, as in the past, a large segment of the population scorned military service. A coup d'etat in 1952 overthrew the corrupt monarchy, sent Faruk into exile, and brought a group of military officers to power. From then on, development of the military was given high priority, particularly after passage in 1955 of the National Military Service Law, which aimed at reform and improvement of the forces. The negative public image of the armed forces also began to change under the new military government. Another defeat at the hands of the Israelis (aided by the British and French) in 1956 revived the earlier cynicism, but the loss was partially ameliorated by the withdrawal of the Israeli, British, and French forces under heavy diplomatic pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations (UN). Nasser's rise to political preeminence in the Arab world, his charismatic hold on the Egyptian people, the fervor of nationalism fueled by hostility toward Israel, and the broadened base of military service brought about a growing respect for the armed forces as representatives of the new Egypt. Intervention in the Yemeni civil war in September 1962 caused a serious financial drain on the national economy and subsequently brought severe criticism, as approximately 75,000 Egyptians were committed to that conflict. Despite the criticism at home, however, the Egyptian forces had demonstrated that they could successfully mount an external operation and support it logistically. Later, the government and the public were unprepared for the shock of total military defeat inflicted by Israel in the brief June 1967 War. During the eleven years since its defeat in 1956, the military had been well supplied with Soviet weapons and equipment and, supposedly, had been well trained for combat; nevertheless, the war was a debacle. The recently acquired reputation of the armed forces among the people disappeared rapidly, and morale within the forces plunged to the lowest level since the military takeover of 1952. Absorbing the impact of defeat, the loss of the Sinai, and the resultant political trauma and consequent changes in leadership, the military began the process of rebuilding and retraining. The Soviet Union began replacing the enormous quantities of arms and equipment lost during the disaster of 1967, and a low-level conflict along the Suez Canal was carried on between the Egyptians and Israelis. During the so-called war of attrition that lasted until 1970, the Soviet Union also supplied a comprehensive air defense missile system and assisted with its installation and manning (see Aftermath of the War to the Death of Nasser, ch. 1). Nasser died in September 1970 leaving his successor, Sadat, to face the international and domestic pressures that seemed to impel Egypt and the Middle East toward another war. By the summer of 1972 Sadat, as well as most of the country's other military leaders, had become wary of the size of the Soviet military contingent in Egypt and its increasing influence on national affairs. In July Sadat dismissed most of the Soviet advisers and began to strengthen his country's ties to other Arab states. In October he appointed General (later Field Marshal) Ahmad Ismail Ali to be minister of war and commander in chief of the armed forces and ordered him to begin preparations for the recovery of the Sinai. In January 1973 the Syrians agreed to participate in the top secret project that was known to its planners as Operation Badr. During the next several months of intensive planning, secrecy was effectively maintained as preparations and troop training took place along the canal. Early in the afternoon of October 6, 1973, Egyptian artillery opened fire on Israeli positions on the eastern side of the canal. Water cannons mounted on pontoons blasted the opposite canal bank to ease the exit of PT-76 amphibious tanks that were first across. Infantry crossed in assault boats under cover of the friendly barrage, and by midnight ten bridges and fifty ferries were carrying Egyptian troops across the waterway. General Ismail launched units of the Second and Third armies from three main staging areas near Qantara (Al Qantarah), Ismailia, and Suez as a Syrian attack against Israeli positions on the Golan Heights began simultaneously. The day of the attack-October 6-was the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur; the subsequent eighteen days of combat are sometimes called the Yom Kippur War. Because that day was also the tenth day of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, among Arabs the war is referred to as the Ramadan War. In addition the Egyptians frequently refer to it as "The Crossing." After twenty-four hours of heavy fighting the Egyptians had breached the Israeli line of fortifications known as the Bar-Lev Line and extended each of their bridgeheads almost ten kilometers. The Soviet-supplied antitank missiles and rockets were effective against Israeli armor and, especially during the first week, the antiaircraft missile defense was particularly effective against Israeli aircraft. The Egyptians made limited advances during the first ten days of fighting, then sought to consolidate their gains before getting beyond the protective cover of the air defense missiles. A counterattacking Israeli force succeeded in crossing the canal and isolating the Egyptian Third Army. An effective cease-fire under UN auspices was established on October 24, 1973. In subsequent negotiations Arab and Israeli officers met face-to-face for the first time to discuss military aspects of the cease-fire and prisoner exchange. As a result of these talks and further diplomatic negotiations, agreement was reached in January 1974 by which the forces of the two countries disengaged. All Israeli forces withdrew from west of the canal, Egyptian forces in limited strength held the east bank to a depth of about eight kilometers, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) occupied a north-south buffer zone of about eight kilometers in width, and Israeli forces in limited strength occupied a similar zone east of the UNEF. To the east of the three occupied zones, the remainder of the Sinai was held by Israel as it had been since the 1967 war (see fig. 9). The Egyptian armed forces suffered severely in the 1973 war, although the losses were not nearly as heavy as in 1967. Approximately 7,700 men were killed in combat, and at least 200 aircraft and 800 tanks were lost in addition to large quantities of other weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The effect of the war on the armed forces, however, was as exhilarating as the defeat of 1967 had been debilitating. Although they had not recovered the Sinai, they had secured the east bank of the canal, had established a basis for negotiating from strength rather than from the abject weakness of the post-1967 period, and above all had proved themselves capable of successful military planning as well as capable of inflicting heavy losses on Israel. After the war Sadat restored diplomatic relations with the United States (broken since 1967) and welcomed visits from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and later from President Richard M. Nixon, thus annoying the Soviet Union. When Sadat declared that Egypt was a nonaligned state that would treat the superpowers evenhandedly, the Soviet leaders ordered an embargo on weapons and slowed deliveries of badly needed spare parts, resulting in a serious deterioration in Egypt's readiness posture. Sadat then sought other sources of armaments, ending two decades of reliance on the Soviet Union as the sole supplier of weapons and military equipment. Personnel, Recruitment, and Conscription Having a population of over 44 million in mid-1982 and an average annual growth rate of almost 3 percent, Egypt had no problem in supplying basic manpower for the armed forces, but serious difficulties in the educational system and in the conscription system continued to affect the ability of the military to acquire personnel with the requisite skills and technological knowledge. In 1981 there were about 10.3 million men in the fifteen-to-forty-nine age-group, and almost 7 million of these were considered fit for military service. Although women served in some capacities in the armed forces-primarily medical and secretarial-they were not conscripted. During the 1970s and early 1980s approximately 450,000 men annually reached age twenty, at which time they were eligible for conscription; proposals to lower the draft age to eighteen were being seriously considered in 1982. The constitutionally ordered mandatory conscription law and its various implementing statutes assure the timely supply of basic manpower. Volunteer service is also provided for by law in basic three-year enlistments. In the early 1980s most noncommissioned officer (NCO) positions in the armed forces were filled by career volunteers, and more than 50 percent of all navy and air force personnel were also volunteers. The army, because of its far larger size and its reputation for more difficult conditions of service, was much more dependent on the draft than were the other services, although enlistments increased after the army's favorable showing against Israel in the 1973 war. [See Figure 9.: Sinai Occupation Zones, 1974] Career enlisted personnel serve until age forty-six or fifty-two, depending on rank. Warrant officers must retire at age fifty-four; commissioned officers to the rank of colonel at fifty-six; brigadiers at sixty; and major generals at sixty-three. Retirement of other generals and field marshals is governed by special regulations. Conscripts serve three-year tours of active duty after which they remain in a reserve category for nine additional years. All males are required to register at age sixteen, but in practice conscription has not occurred before age twenty. The number of women serving in the armed forces in 1982 was not available. For conscription purposes the country is divided into zones from which draftees are selected by zonal councils that assemble annually to name those who will serve. The councils are made up of military officers, civil officials, and medical officers. Local mayors and village leaders participate in the examination of prospective draftees; after exemptions and deferments are ruled on, conscripts are chosen by lot from the names remaining, and lists are submitted to the draft administration in Cairo for final action. The National Military Service Law places military service on a universal basis, making it compulsory for all men not specifically exempted by law. The old inequities, whereby a prospective conscript could buy his way out of his obligation, are eliminated; but the large number of exemptions has resulted in an army in which the bulk of the enlisted force still consists of the poor and illiterate members of society. The law prescribes in detail the age, length of service, and other conditions governing conscription and regulates exemptions, special assignments, and veterans' privileges. Any government employee with three years' tenure can be exempted at the request of his department, and there are several categories of government positions that carry automatic exemption. Essential industry exemptions also exist, and university students may postpone their military service until they finish school or reach age twenty-eight; if they leave school, they become eligible for immediate call-up. Full exemptions are granted to an only son whose brothers have died in service and to the physically disqualified. Until the mid-1960s almost three-quarters of the men in the armed forces were fellahin, most of whom were illiterate and had no mechanical or technical skills. Their peasant background helped them adjust to the rigors and privations of military life, and they became hardy, disciplined soldiers, but advancing weapons technology usually made the illiterate soldier obsolete. The 1967 war demonstrated that soldiers needed technical skills in order to function efficiently on the modern battlefield. In the intervening years, although much larger numbers of young Egyptians were being educated, the problem of illiteracy among the conscripted fellahin continued to be a problem in the armed forces. In late 1981 a dialogue was initiated in the Egyptian press designed to publicize a wide range of opinions on conscription. A consensus had not been made public by mid-1982, but the comments of many prominent citizens, including the minister of defense as well as various other officials, indicated considerable interest in the subject and probably indicated that changes to the National Military Service Law would be forthcoming in 1982 or 1983. Dissatisfaction with the existing system centered mostly on the fact that it does not bring into service sufficient numbers of recruits who can be trained to operate modern weapons. In effect, the system was still bringing in too many illiterate conscripts. One of the proposals favored by Minister of Defense and War Production Abd al Halim Abu Ghazala would lower the conscription age to eighteen, the object being to draft secondary-school graduates before they enrolled in some form of higher education. Field Marshal Abu Ghazala would put severe limitations on exemptions and would include women in the draft. Such a system would provide many more young men and women than needed by the armed forces; therefore, many would serve in alternate forms of national service, for example, in construction brigades and agricultural brigades. Such service would not only aid the national economy but would also provide skills and knowledge to the young people involved. Women would be trained primarily for medical, secretarial, and communications work, some in the armed forces but most in facilities in their home areas. Other women would be employed as teachers in the continuing struggle against illiteracy. Defense Industry The growth of Egyptian industry was stimulated during World War II as the country became a major Allied base of operations. The British and American forces placed orders for items that could be manufactured locally; in addition, local industry expanded to fill the demands of the domestic market for manufactured goods previously supplied by European factories. After the war Egyptian investors, motivated by nationalism as well as by the desire for profit, sought to maintain the industrial base that had developed. In 1949 the government initiated ambitious plans for the development of industries that would produce aircraft and armaments. To promote the aircraft industry, invitations were extended to firms in Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to build aircraft in Egyptian factories under license, and during the 1960s about sixty-five aircraft on the Spanish model were produced. Although West German aircraft engineers also worked in Egypt, that project did not reach the production phase. An attempt was also made to produce the British Vampire jet fighter under license, but relations between Britain and the Nasser government deteriorated, and the project was abandoned. From these modest beginnings, the Egyptian aircraft industry eventually produced about 200 of the Gumhuriya-class trainers. In 1962 development plans for a domestically designed supersonic jet fighter were put in motion, and the project ultimately employed about 4,000 workers, including 100 to 200 West German technicians. The aircraft was to be designated the HA-300, also referred to as the Cairo-300, and was to have a speed of Mach 2. The plane had not become operational by the time of the 1967 war and, because of the severe financial strains imposed by the war, the project was terminated shortly afterward. An attempt to build surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) began under King Faruk, whose government imported a West German team to conduct a pilot study. The program was halted after the 1952 coup, revived in 1953, and then canceled three years later because of funding shortages caused by the 1956 war. A third attempt, again with West German scientists and technicians, was initiated in 1959. Three prototypes produced during the 1960s were named Al Zafir, Al Kahir, and Al Riad. The first, designed to be launched from a mobile platform, carried a 450-kilogram warhead to a range of 375 kilometers. The second had a 680-kilogram warhead and a range of 600 kilometers, and the third had a 900-kilogram warhead (or a scientific module) and a range of 700 kilometers. Enthusiastic claims were made for these missiles, but nine attempted combat launchings during the June 1967 War were unsuccessful. After the 1967 war the missile program received a lower priority, but during the 1973 war Sadat declared that Al Zafir was ready and could be directed against Israel if the Israelis attacked Egyptian cities. In the late 1970s analysts concluded that there were no operational, domestically produced missiles but that Soviet SCUD missiles, which were comparable in characteristics to Al Zafir, had been deployed. Some SCUD missiles were still in the Egyptian inventory in 1982. None of the three domestic missiles was designed for a nuclear warhead, although each was big enough to accommodate such a weapon. Because of the enormous costs and technical requirements involved, Egypt has not attempted to develop nuclear weapons and has opposed international nuclear proliferation. Scientific research, however, was initiated in 1955, and exploration was undertaken for minerals from which fissionable material could be extracted. No substantial deposits were known to have been found. Egypt signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, but ratification by the People's Assembly did not follow until February 1981. Ratification of the treaty enabled the Egyptians to open negotiations with other countries for the construction of nuclear facilities for the production of energy and other peaceful uses. The 1967 war had a sharply limiting effect on indigenous arms production and related research. For some time thereafter, primary military attention was focused on training in the use and maintenance of the complex weapons systems obtained from the Soviet Union. The domestic defense industry concentrated on the manufacture of relatively simple weapons and equipment, but after Nasser's death in 1970 domestic production again received a somewhat higher priority. A presidential decree in 1971 specified that the ministries of war, military production, and marine transport should "form an integrated unit under the supervision of the Minister of War." The members of the unit were directed to coordinate their war production activities with the activities of other ministries and to coordinate civil sea transport capabilities with military sea-transport needs. Egyptian planners for several years had been intrigued with the idea of combining Egypt's managerial ability and industrial labor force, Arab oil money, and foreign technological assistance to develop a joint arms industry. A plan prepared in 1971 for the creation of the Organization for Sophisticated War Industries was accepted by the Defense Council of the League of Arab States (Arab League), but the project later bogged down and was not implemented. In 1975, however, a new plan was tried as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates announced the joint establishment of the Arab Military Industries Organization, with an initial capitalization of the equivalent of more than US$1 billion to be contributed equally by the four member states. Although some plants were to be established in all of the member countries, the bulk of the arms manufacture would take place in Egypt. Sadat's son-in-law, Ashraf Marwan, became the organization's first chairman. The name of the joint venture was changed to Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), but before it was able to develop into a major producer of arms for its member countries, AOI foundered on Arab discontent with Sadat's peace initiatives toward Israel (see Peace with Israel, ch. 1). The Saudi Arabian government proclaimed the dissolution of AOI during the summer of 1979, but the Egyptians claimed that a unanimous decision was necessary for such action and, because they would not vote to dissolve the organization, it could not be ruled out of existence. Without the participation (particularly financial) of the other member states, however, Egypt was hard put to maintain a viable AOI. After the withdrawal of its partners Egypt continued to use the title, and AOI negotiated with various Western companies to engage in joint weapons or equipment production in Egypt. For example, arrangements were made with American Motors Corporation to produce jeeps and with British Aerospace to make Swingfire antitank guided weapons. Arrangements with French companies were expected to lead to coproduction of Alpha Jets, and parts for Mirage aircraft also were to be produced in Egypt under license. Domestically produced items, including the Walid armored personnel carrier (APC), a 23mm twin antiaircraft gun, and several types of ammunition, were intended for Egyptian use as well as for sale to other armed forces in the Middle East and Africa.