$Unique_ID{COW01032} $Pretitle{222} $Title{Cyprus Chapter 4A. Government and Politics} $Subtitle{} $Author{Margarita Dobert} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{turkish cypriot greek president cypriots government constitution community cyprus court} $Date{1979} $Log{George Vassiliou*0103202.scf } Country: Cyprus Book: Cyprus, A Country Study Author: Margarita Dobert Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1979 Chapter 4A. Government and Politics [See George Vassiliou: President of Cyprus. Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington DC] The Turkish intervention of mid-1974 decisively changed the internal balance of power on the island and the nature of the political administration under which one-fourth of the population lived. The constitutional and governmental arrangements formulated in the Zurich-London agreements of February 1959 gave sovereignty over all but 256 square kilometers of the island to the Republic of Cyprus, the excepted areas reserved by Britain for use as military bases. Since the intervention, however, the island has been divided for all practical purposes into two mutually exclusive political entities. The partition has been upheld by Turkish military forces stationed in the northern, Turkish Cypriot administered area that calls itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and is in effect autonomous. Nevertheless the government of the Republic of Cyprus, composed entirely of Greek Cypriots, claims authority over the entire island. The origins of the de-facto division could be traced to developments preceding partition by more than a decade, when fierce fighting had broken out between the two communities, in the midst of which Turkish Cypriots ceased participating in the national government. During and after the worst of the fighting, the Turkish minority withdrew into segregated enclaves scattered around the island, within which an ostensibly provisional administration was established. After the intervention, that body served as the nucleus of an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration in the north. On February 13, 1975, a little more than a week after the imposition by the United States of an arms embargo against Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktas, proclaimed the existence of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus." The self-proclaimed new state, he asserted, was "not a unilateral declaration of independence" but a first step toward federation with the Greek Cypriot community. Vedat Celik, the Turkish Cypriot representative to the United Nations (UN), stated before the Security Council that the new regime would not seek international recognition as an independent state. The Turkish government declared that the Turkish Cypriots had acted on their own and that the new federated state would safeguard its security and its social and economic life. Greece, however, reacted strongly, calling the action illegal and a danger to peace in a delicate region, while in Nicosia, President Archbishop Makarios III denounced it in equally strong terms. President Makarios had been the guiding hand of the republic for over a decade. No other person approached him in influence among his Greek Cypriot compatriots, commanding as he did both their religious and political allegiance. On his death in the summer of 1977 from a heart attack at age sixty-three, he left no clearly designated political heir, but political leaders from left to right united in a show of Greek Cypriot solidarity to back Spyros Kyprianou, leader of the ruling Democratic Front, as acting president for the remainder of the presidential term. Makarios' ecclesiastical functions were taken over by Bishop Chrysostomos of Paphos who was elected archbishop three months later. Kyprianou was reelected unopposed on January 28, 1978, and announced his new cabinet a month later. In mid-1979 both Greek and Turkish Cypriots continued to proclaim their desire for a peaceful settlement but on terms that were unacceptable to the other side. The Greek Cypriots had come reluctantly to accept the concept of a biregional federation, a permeable border, and limited regional autonomy but insisted on a strong federal government. The Turkish Cypriots sought union of two strong regional governments within a weak federation. Intercommunal talks resumed in the spring of 1979 after a two-year lapse but by the end of June had proved as inconclusive as earlier ones. Government Structure The governmental system of the Republic of Cyprus in mid-1979 evolved from constitutional and practical circumstances surrounding the attainment of the island's independence from Britain and of internal self-government in 1960. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were joined in an independent state whose Constitution and international status derived from agreements reached in Zurich and London in February 1959 (see The Republic of Cyprus, ch. 1.). The agreements, providing for a strongly bicommunal constitution and a jointly guaranteed status of independence that prohibited enosis and partition, were a compromise between conflicting Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot demands. The Constitution entered into effect on August 16, 1960, the day Cyprus became independent. At no time was it ever submitted to popular referendum or plebiscite by the electorate or to ratification by any directly or indirectly elected representative legislature. It remained in force in the republic in mid-1979, although several of its original provisions were modified by unilateral Greek Cypriot action in January 1964 (see Constitutional Crisis: 1963, this ch.). Bicommunal Aspects of the 1960 Constitution The strongly bicommunal Constitution, which called for a government divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches headed by a president, contained elaborate safeguards for the minority Turkish Cypriot community. The first provision stipulated that there be a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president, each elected by his own community. For constitutional purposes, the Greek and Turkish communities were defined, and members of the country's few other small minorities were given the option of joining one or the other. Armenian, Maronite, and Roman Catholic Cypriots-the latter known in Cyprus as Latins-chose soon after the promulgation of the Constitution to be identified as Greek. Greek and Turkish were designated as official languages, and the Greek and Turkish communities were given the right to celebrate respectively Greek and Turkish national holidays. The Constitution further provided that executive power over all except communal affairs be vested in the Greek Cypriot president and the Turkish Cypriot vice president as head and vice head of state respectively, to be elected to five-year terms of office. The two executives had the right of veto, separately or conjointly, over certain laws or decisions of both the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly. The Constitution spelled out in detail their powers and duties. The Constitution further provided that the president and vice president be assisted by the Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek and three Turkish members, the former appointed by the president and the latter by the vice president. Decisions of the council were to be taken by an absolute majority. Of three key portfolios-defense, finance, and foreign affairs-one was to be held by a Turkish Cypriot. The unicameral House of Representatives was designed to legislate for the republic in all matters except those expressly reserved to separate Communal Chambers. The Constitution provided that thirty-five of its members be Greek Cypriots and fifteen Turkish Cypriots, a ratio much out of proportion to communal strength according to which Greek Cypriots outnumbered their Turkish counterparts by four to one. Members, elected from separate communal rolls, were to serve for terms of five years. The president of the House of Representatives was to be a Greek Cypriot, and the vice president of the House a Turkish Cypriot. Voting was to be by majority, except that separate majorities were required from Greek and Turkish Cypriot members in the cases of the imposition of taxes or duties, modification of the electoral law, or laws relating to the separate municipalities in the five main towns. (The establishment of these municipalities became one of the most crucial intercommunal issues. The Constitution called for them, but implementing legislation was never passed. The Greeks were convinced that separate municipalities presented insurmountable management problems and could lead to partition. The Turks claimed that Greek obstructionism indicated a sinister attempt to undermine their separate communal identity). In addition to the Legislative Assembly, the Constitution called for the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers composed of representatives elected by each community. The chambers were empowered to deal with religious, educational, and cultural matters, questions of personal status, and the supervision of cooperatives and credit societies. To supplement an annual provision to the chambers from the government budget, the Constitution enabled the Communal Chambers to impose taxes and fees of their own to support their activities. The judicial system broadly outlined in the Zurich-London agreements and stipulated in detail in the Constitution included the Supreme Constitutional Court, the High Court of Justice, district and assize courts, and communal courts. At the summit was the Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of three judges: a Greek Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot, and a foreigner who would serve as president of the court. Subjects or citizens of Greece, Turkey, or Britain were ruled out as candidates for appointment to the third seat on the court. The president, who was entitled to two votes, would hold office for six years, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges would serve until reaching age sixty-eight. The court was to have final jurisdiction on matters of constitutional interpretation and adjudication of disputes centering on alleged discrimination in law against either of the two communities. This bicommunal structure was duplicated in the High Court of Justice, which exercised appellate jurisdiction over lower courts in civil and criminal matters. The lower courts were assize courts, having criminal jurisdiction, and district courts, having civil jurisdiction except in questions of personal status and religious matters. Where the plaintiff and the defendant belonged to the same community, the dispute was to be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. Where they belonged to different communities, the composition of the tribunal was to be mixed and was to be determined by the High Court of Justice. Civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and religious matters were to be tried in communal courts, composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned. These courts were rigidly limited as to jurisdictions and could not impose restraint, detention, or imprisonment. Other safeguards for the Turkish minority specified in the Constitution were set forth in the sections dealing with the Public Service (or civil service) and the Forces of the Republic. According to the 1960 census, Greek Cypriots comprised 77 percent of the population, Turkish Cypriots 18.3 percent, and other minorities the remainder. The Constitution required that the two groups be represented in the country's Public Service at a 70-30 percent ratio. Additionally the republic was to have an army of 2,000 men of whom 60 percent were to be Greek Cypriot, 40 percent Turkish Cypriot. After an initial period a 2,000-man security force consisting of police and gendarmerie was to be 70 percent Greek Cypriot, 30 percent Turkish Cypriot (see The Republic of Cyprus, ch. 1; Police, ch. 5). The organizational structure and qualifications of the Public Service were laid down on the model of the British civil service, with provisions for tenure, career status, and promotion through a grade-level system. The ten-member Public Service Commission determined the rules of conduct and qualifications for the various positions. Constitutional Crisis: 1963 Rather than providing the framework for a lasting compromise between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the bicommunal features of the Constitution impeded the functioning of the administration, gave rise to continuing controversy and dissension, and culminated finally in the outbreak of armed violence between members of the two communities. Beginning in late 1963 Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government, and by 1965 the Greek Cypriots were in full charge of the administrative apparatus. The Constitution failed to allay the suspicion and distrust that had increasingly divided the two communities, especially since 1958. Greek Cypriot observers noted that members of their own community were generally disinclined to view the Zurich-London agreements as legitimate since they regarded them as having been imposed on Cyprus from outside. Moreover, they felt in the endeavor of the drafters of the Constitution to safeguard minority rights, Turkish Cypriots had been given disproportionate privileges that they abused. The Turkish Cypriots, because of fear of discrimination or persecution, maintained that the constitutional separative provisions were essential to their security and their identity as a separate national community. A number of quarrels broke out over foreign policy, taxation by Communal Chambers, and other matters, bringing the government machinery to a virtual standstill. Primary among the disagreements were those involving the ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the Public Service. The Turkish Cypriots complained that the 70 to 30 ratio was not enforced. The Greek Cypriots felt that the provisions discriminated against them because they constituted almost 80 percent of the population. Another major point of contention concerned the composition of units under the 60-40 percentage ratio decreed for the Cypriot army. Makarios wanted complete integration; Vice President Fazil Kucuk favored segregated companies. On October 20, 1961, Kucuk used his constitutional veto power to halt the development of an integrated force. Makarios then stated that the country could not afford an army anyway. Planning and development of the national army ceased, and paramilitary forces began developing within each community (see Intercommunal Violence, 1963-67, ch. 5). From the start the Greek Cypriots had been uneasy with the idea of separate municipalities that the Turkish Cypriots were determined to preserve. Also, the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber never set up a communal court system, whereas Turkish Cypriot communal courts were established. Still another issue that provoked strong Greek Cypriot criticism was the right of veto held by the Turkish vice president and what amounted to final veto power held by the Turkish Cypriot representatives in the Legislative Assembly with respect to laws and decisions affecting the entire population. Turkish Cypriot representatives had exercised this veto power with respect to income tax legislation with serious adverse effect on government revenues. In November 1963, after three years' experience of unsteady self-government, Makarios declared that there were certain constitutional provisions that "threatened to paralyze the State machinery." Revisions were necessary, he said, in order to remove some of the obstacles that prevented "the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from cooperating in the spirit of understanding and friendship." Therefore, on November 30, 1963, he proposed thirteen amendments to be considered immediately by the leaders of the Turkish community. These proposals, outlined in a presidential memorandum entitled "Suggested Measures for Facilitating the Smooth Functioning of the State and for the Removal of Certain Causes of Intercommunal Friction" reflected all the internal constitutional problems that had arisen. The president's action had serious and far-reaching implications; the proposal to amend the Constitution automatically involved Greece, Turkey, and Britain, because as signatories to the Treaty of Guarantee and The Treaty of Alliance, they had guaranteed the status quo. The proposed amendments would have eliminated most of the special rights of the Turkish Cypriot community (see table B, ch. 1). For instance, they would have abolished many of the provisions for separate communal institutions substituting an integrated state with some limited guarantees for the minority community. The administration of justice was to be unified. The separate municipalities that the Constitution had stipulated in the five largest towns were also to be unified. The veto powers of the president and vice president were to be abandoned along with the provisions for separate parliamentary majorities in certain areas of legislation. Turkish Cypriot representation in the Public Service was to be proportionate to the size of the community. By way of compensation the Turkish Cypriot vice president was to be given the right to deputize for the Greek Cypriot president in case of his absence, and the vice president of the House of Representatives was to be acting president of the House during the temporary absence or incapacity of the president. Kucuk reportedly had agreed to consider these proposals when the Turkish government rejected the entire list. In any case, intercommunal fighting erupted in December 1963, and in March 1964 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of an international peacekeeping force to control the violence and act as a buffer between the two communities. By the spring of 1964 only Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives were attending sessions of the legislature, because Turkish Cypriot members, like their coethnics in the Public Service, were unwilling out of concern for their own safety to venture into the Greek dominated parts of Nicosia to pursue their regular activities. The circumstances that meant effectively the end of Turkish Cypriot participation in the administration left the government of the country in the exclusive control of the Greek Cypriots. The government took the position that it continued to hold legal authority over the entire island and its population, notwithstanding Turkish Cypriot assertions that its acts in their absence were unconstitutional and representative only of the Greek Cypriots. In 1964 the Greek Cypriot-controlled House of Representatives passed a number of important pieces of legislation, including laws providing for the establishment of the National Guard and for the restoration to the government of its right to impose an income tax. Other laws passed in that year and after altered the government structure and some of the preexisting bicommunal arrangements: separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot electoral rolls were done away with; the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber was abolished; and the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice were amalgamated into the Supreme Court. Reaction of the Turkish Cypriot judiciary to this particular change was apparently not unfavorable, especially since a Turkish Cypriot was named president of the new Supreme Court. He assumed his post, and other Turkish Cypriot judges returned to the bench. For about two years, Turkish Cypriot judges participated in the revised court system, dealing with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In June 1966, however, the Turkish Cypriot judges withdrew from the system claiming harassment. Since then the Turkish Cypriot leadership has directed its community not to use the courts of the republic to which, however, they continued to be legally entitled according to the Greek Cypriots. Conversely the judicial processes set up in the Turkish Cypriot community were considered by the Greek Cypriot government to be without legal foundation. The establishment of a separate Turkish Cypriot administration came about at the close of 1967, in the wake of renewed intercommunal hostilities. Turkish Cypriot leaders announced on December 29, 1967, that they had set up a "transitional administration" to oversee the affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community "until such time as provisions of the 1960 Constitution have been fully implemented." The administration was to be headed by Kucuk and Denktas, the former president of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber who had been living in exile in Turkey, as vice president. The fifteen former Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives joined the members of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber to constitute a Turkish Cypriot legislative assembly. Nine of these persons were to function as an executive council to carry out ministerial duties. President Makarios described the administration as totally illegal. He went on to declare "any action deriving from the so called `administration' ... entirely null and devoid of any legal effect." On February 25, 1968, Greek Cypriots reelected Makarios to office in the first presidential election since 1960 by an overwhelming majority. Running against a single opponent campaigning for enosis, Makarios won over 95 percent of votes cast. Intercommunal talks for a solution to the constitutional crisis began on June 24, 1968, and reached a deadlock on September 20, 1971. Talks resumed in July 1972 in the presence of UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and one constitutional adviser each from Greece and Turkey. Both sides realized that the basic articles of the Constitution, intended to balance the rights and interests of both communities, had become moot and that new constitutional arrangements had to be found (see The Quest for Intercommunal Compromise, this ch.). The Administration of the Republic The government of Cyprus in mid-1979 operated under the terms of the 1960 Constitution as amended in 1964. It consisted of the three separate independent branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. Its president was the head of state, and he was assisted by a council of eleven ministers. Kyprianou was assisted by George Ioannides (a minister to the president), ten other ministers, and two deputy ministers. Cabinet posts included foreign affairs, finance, education, commerce and industry, communications and works, labor and social insurance, justice, interior and defense, agriculture and natural resources, and health. In theory the latter three portfolios were reserved for Turkish Cypriots, but to permit the government to operate, the portfolios had been assigned to members of the Greek Cypriot community. Ministers were mainly chosen from the business and professional community. Policymaking was in the hands of administrative directors who were appointed civil servants having lifelong tenure. The legislative body, as provided in the Constitution, consisted of fifty members elected for five-year terms. Only the thirty-five Greek Cypriot members participated, however, the fifteen seats reserved for the Turkish Cypriot community having been vacant since 1964. The 1964 amalgamation of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice into the Supreme Court, combining the functions of the two former courts and eliminating the neutral judge, also led to the establishment of the Supreme Council of Judicature. Assigned the judicatory functions of the former high court, it was composed of the attorney general of the republic, the president and two senior judges of the Supreme Court, the senior president of a district court and a senior district judge, and a practicing advocate elected every six months by a general meeting of the Cyprus Bar Association. As a result of the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot public servants from the government, the Public Service Commission could not function as provided for in the Constitution. Therefore, the Public Service Law of 1967 established a new commission to exercise the same functions. It consisted of five members appointed by the president. At the district level a district officer coordinated village and government activities and had the right to inspect local village councils. The mayors and councils for municipalities were appointed. In 1979 discussions were under way to have them elected at some future date. At the village level there had been, since Ottoman times, councils composed of a village head (mukhtar) and elders (azades; sing., azas). Large villages that had sizeable mixed populations had had two separate councils, one for each community. The village head and elders were elected by the villagers. In the British period and after independence the village head was appointed by the government and then chose the elders. But new legislation in 1979 provided that village government officials should be elected, rather than appointed, and elections for village councils and their presidents were scheduled for early July 1979. The Regime in the North A draft constitution for the self-proclaimed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was prepared by a constituent assembly and approved by an overwhelming majority in a referendum of the Turkish Cypriot community on June 8, 1975. Voters included over 4,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the Greek Cypriot area. The assembly consisted of twenty-five members of the Legislative Assembly and twenty-five members of various trade unions and organizations. The constitution declared the new entity to be a democratic secular republic. Turkish was to be its official language. The constitution called for the Legislative Assembly of forty deputies to be elected by universal suffrage and a president also elected by universal suffrage for periods of seven years who could serve for no more than two consecutive terms. Executive functions were entrusted to a prime minister and a ten-member cabinet, appointed by the president and responsible to him. Judicial powers were to be exercised through independent courts. The Supreme Court was to act as a court of appeals or high administrative court composed of a president and four members. A commission was subsequently set up to work on translating English language laws into Turkish. In some administrative aspects the new state had been assimilated into mainland Turkey in the months after the intervention. Turkish import, export, and customs rules applied. Turkish lira was the accepted currency, and Mersin, a mainland district, was designated as the postal zone for international mail. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on June 10, 1975. Denktas, whose National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi-UBP) won thirty out of forty seats in the Legislative Assembly, was elected president and sworn in on July 3. He chose Nejat Konuk, secretary general of the UBP, as prime minister and announced a ten-member cabinet that included a deputy prime minister holding the portfolio for defense and foreign affairs. In September the Legislative Assembly voted to give Denktas the authority to declare the north a separate state if circumstances warranted it. The Quest for Intercommunal Compromise After the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1963, the United States, for the first time taking a direct and prominent role in the search for a solution to the Cyprus question, proposed a settlement based on the union of the island with Greece. The proposal, known as the Acheson Plan, called for enosis, the provision of a military base for Turkey on the island, and the establishment of two cantons exercising local autonomy for the Turkish Cypriot community. In addition, Turkey was to be given a small Greek island, and any Turkish Cypriots choosing to emigrate were to be compensated (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). President Makarios and the Greek government repudiated the plan, as did the Turkish government, which sought a larger area for the Turkish Cypriot community (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). The second major outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1967, which brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war, put an end to the concept of the union of Cyprus with Greece as a basic plank in the framework for negotiated settlement (see The Republic of Cyprus, ch. 1). Turkish opposition to enosis was viewed as too strong, and the idea was relinquished; the search for a compromise was not understood to envision Cyprus as an independent nation. After the second outbreak the UN made a concerted effort to bring representatives of the two Cypriot communities to the conference table in an effort to reach a constitutional settlement. In the early summer of 1968 Glafkos Clerides, then president of the House of Representatives, met with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the intercommunal talks continued, but no real progress toward settlement was made. The Turkish Cypriots demanded local autonomy, the Greek Cypriots, as they saw it, searched for a way to meet that demand without opening the way for partition. In September 1971 the negotiations stalled entirely, but in June of the next year Waldheim, who had replaced U Thant at the UN, was able to get them once more under way. As the talks resumed, however, other political developments that were to be even more crucial to the future of the island were taking place (see The Republic of Cyprus, ch. 1). After the Turkish intervention, which radically changed the capabilities and objectives of the two sides, talks were resumed in September 1974 between Clerides, then acting president of the Republic of Cyprus, and Denktas. Subject matter at first had been confined to humanitarian issues. Subsequently, however, at the urging of the United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, it was agreed that substantive talks should be resumed; Clerides and Denktas then met in Vienna in January 1975; both sides supported the principle of an independent, nonaligned, demilitarized Cyprus. Beyond that, however, were seemingly unbridgeable differences on an approach and a solution to the problem (see Foreign Policy in the Late 1970s, this ch.). Beyond the central issue over the form of government were questions that included the size of the area to be retained by the Turkish Cypriots; the matter of the return of refugees and compensation for property losses; and finally the timing of the withdrawal of the Turkish military forces from the north. Statements issued after the fifth round of intercommunal meetings held in Vienna in February 1976 asserted that Clerides and Denktas had discussed substantive matters on territorial and constitutional issues and had agreed to exchange written proposals before a scheduled May meeting. Before that meeting, however, Clerides had resigned as negotiator because of the divergence of his own views with those of Makarios and because of the revelation that he had engaged in secret dealings on the negotiations with Denktas. To Makarios and others, Clerides had given the appearance that in principle he was inclining toward acceptance of the idea of a bizonal federation, an idea that Makarios at that time had not been willing to accept. In Clerides' place, Makarios appointed Tassos Papadopoulos, deputy president of the House of Representatives. Denktas, wanting no face-to-face dealing with Papadopoulos who had been an active member of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-EOKA), appointed another Turkish Cypriot leader, Umit Suleyman Onan, to replace himself as negotiator. After intensive efforts by Waldheim, a meeting between Makarios and Denktas took place in his presence on January 27, 1977-the first meeting between the two men since the Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn from the government of the republic in 1964 (see The Republic of Cyprus, ch. 1). By then Makarios was inclining toward negotiation on the basis of a bizonal federation provided that there be some Turkish Cypriot territorial concessions, although he still insisted on a strong central government and freedom of movement for all Cypriots. He demanded 80 percent of the territory, proportional to the size of the Greek Cypriot population, but indicated that he might accept 75 percent if it included Varosha, the formerly prosperous tourist area of Famagusta to which 35,000 Greek Cypriots wanted to return. Denktas apparently indicated readiness to consider about 68 percent. The two met again on February 12 and agreed on four guidelines. The first was an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic. Next the territory under the administration of each community was to be discussed in the light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights. Third, questions of principle such as freedom of movement, settlement, right of ownership, and special matters were to be open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental decision for a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties. Lastly the powers and functions of a central federal government would be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, again having regard for the bicommunal character of the state. After the Makarios-Denktas agreement on guidelines, optimism about the possibilities for settlement began to surface abroad. In August 1977, however, Makarios died, and Kyprianou, his successor, became the chief influence in shaping the Greek Cypriot side of the negotiations. He promised to adhere to the general position he believed Makarios would have taken in the discussions. Among the issues awaiting resolution through the negotiations was the politically sensitive one of persons in the south who had been displaced by, and lost nearly everything during, the Turkish intervention (see Foreign Policy, this ch.; Population, ch. 2). Such persons represented a readymade constituency for Kyprianou, whose advocacy of their right to return ensured him of a substantial bloc of supporters. Accordingly Kyprianou spoke of an unpenetrable border as "national suicide." The question of the border put the Greek Cypriots on one side, calling for a permeable border and the right to unimpeded, free movement and unrestricted settlement, and the Turkish Cypriots on the other, calling for a tightly controlled, firm border and guarantees that the ethnic balance as established by the de facto partition would remain undisturbed. In April 1978 a new set of Turkish Cypriot proposals was made public but was quickly rejected by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, who voiced objections to both their constitutional and territorial aspects. The negotiator at the time was Papadopoulos, whom Kyprianou dismissed two months later after disagreements arose between the two men. The unresolved issues of Cyprus affected the vital interests of Greece and Turkey and thus ultimately the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers. Therefore in November 1978 the United States proposed, with Canadian and British backing, a twelve-point plan for discussion in still another attempt to solve the deadlock. The peace plan was given to Waldheim for transmittal to the two sides. The plan proposed a biregional, independent federal republic of which no part could unite with another state. The plan also included a new constitutional structure, based on the four guidelines agreed on by Denktas and Makarios in February 1977 along with pertinent clauses of the 1960 Constitution. There would be two constituent regions. The federal government would have responsibility for foreign affairs, defense, currency and central banking, interregional and foreign trade, communications, federal finance, customs, immigration and emigration, and civil aviation. Residual functions would rest with the two regions. The federal government's legislative authority would be vested in a bicameral legislature, the upper house evenly divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the lower house based on population. Both houses were to approve legislation, but a two-thirds majority of the lower house could override rejection of a bill by the upper house, provided that 38 percent of each community's representatives were present and voting. The Council of Ministers would be jointly selected by the president and vice president, one of whom must be Greek and the other Turkish. Neither community could have less than 30-percent membership in the council. The president and vice president would have joint veto power over any federal legislation, but this veto could be overridden by two-thirds majorities in both houses. Territorial arrangements would take into account each region's economic productivity and viability, security, population distribution, and historic factors, with the Turkish Cypriot side making significant geographic changes in favor of the Greek Cypriot side. There would be compensation for refugees who could not or might not wish to return to their homes; withdrawal, except for an agreed on contingent, of all foreign military units; and a basically demilitarized republic except for small regional police forces. The Varosha region of Famagusta would be resettled under UN auspices. A special fund would be established for development in areas most in need of financial and social assistance. The fund would be financed by the federal government but administered by the two regions. The Cyprus government found many of the points of the plan unacceptable. The main objection, according to Foreign Minister Nicos Rolandis, was that it "preempts various positions. We prefer, an agenda that is based on prior agreements and resolutions without going into details that would predetermine the final positions of the parties." The plan was also criticized by Archbishop Chrysostomos and various political leaders. Only Clerides urged its acceptance as a basis for talks, although he too criticized the fact that the proposed framework limited the authorities of the central government and failed to define the jurisdictions of the two administrations. In the end both sides rejected the plan as an overall settlement package, but it did stimulate further efforts. In November 1978 the UN Security Council urged that intercommunal negotiations be resumed, and Waldheim proposed an agenda for talks based on the Denktas-Makarios guidelines and on certain features of the United States plan. President Kyprianou had hitherto refused to meet with anyone other than Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, regarding him as the one person in a position to make a final decision for the Turkish Cypriot community. A meeting with his own foreign minister and other party leaders subsequently convinced him to change his mind, however, and in early 1979 he agreed to meet Denktas in mid-May in Nicosia for discussions without a fixed agenda or advance commitment. Intercommunal talks were resumed in Nicosia on June 15 under the auspices of Javier Perez de Cueller, undersecretary general of the UN. The two negotiators, Minister to the President Ioannides for the Greek Cypriots and Onan for the Turkish Cypriots, were lawyers who had once served together as members of the House of Representatives. Talks were broken off after the second session on June 22, with both parties asking for more time to consider various proposals.