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Country:     Myanmar (Burma)
Book:        Burma, A Country Study
Author:      Frederica M. Bunge
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1983

Front Material

Foreword

     This volume is one of a continuing series of books prepared by Foreign
Area Studies, The American University, under the Country Studies/Area Handbook
Program. The last page of this book provides a listing of other published
studies. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country,
describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and
social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those
systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of
the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static
portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the
cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to
cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to
the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their
dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on
which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the
national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the
social system and political order within which they live.

     The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings
of Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department
of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other
official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted
standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and
suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be
welcomed for use in future new editions.

William Evans-Smith
Director, Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016

Acknowledgments

     The authors are grateful to a number of Burma specialists in the academic
world, in the international community, and in various agencies of the United
States government who gave of their special knowledge to provide data and
perspective for this study. In particular they are grateful to David I.
Steinberg, who shared generously not only valuable personal insights but also
the resources of his specialized library. The contributions of Jon A. Wiant
and Charles B. Smith, Jr., to this book are also gratefully acknowledged.

     The authors also thank members of the Foreign Area Studies staff who
contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These include
Dorothy M. Lohmann, Kathryn R. Stafford, and Andrea T. Merrill, who edited the
manuscript and the accompanying figures and tables; Harriett R. Blood and
Farah Ahannavard, who prepared the graphics; and Gilda V. Nimer, librarian.
The team appreciates as well the assistance provided by Ernest A. Will,
publications manager, and Eloise W. Brandt, administrative assistant.
Margaret Quinn typed the manuscript and gave valuable help in various phases
of production. Special thanks are owed to Gustavo Arce, who designed the
illustrations for the cover of this volume and for the title pages of the
chapters, and to those persons who provided photographs, some never previously
published.

Preface

     This study replaces the Area Handbook for Burma, originally published
in 1968 and updated in 1971, and reprinted in 1982 as Burma: A Country Study.
Sufficient reason in itself for the preparation of a new edition is the
passage of more than 15 years since completion of the research for the 1968
volume. Beyond this, however, there has been a significant liberalization of
the constraints previously imposed on foreign journalists, research scholars,
and others working in the country. This has made source materials more readily
available, although given the long period in which little research was done on
Burma, and some continuing constraints, significant gaps in the data still
remain, especially relating to developments since the military takeover in
1962.

     The purpose of this study is to provide in a compact, convenient,
balanced, and objective form an integrated exposition and analysis of the
dominant social, political, and economic aspects of Burmese society. The
authors have tried to give readers an understanding of the interrelationships
of institutional structures as well as some insight into the attitudes and
problems of the country and of its role in the world around it.

     Spelling of most place-names has followed official United States
government maps and Burma Official Standard Names Gazetteer, No. 96 of the
United States Board on Geographic Names, published in March 1966.

     Burmese practice in the use of personal names has been followed in the
Bibliography and Index of this volume. Those who are unfamiliar with Burmese
practice should note that there are no Burmese surnames, family names, or
married names. Burmese have names of one, two, or three syllables, and these
do not necessarily bear any relation to the name of the father, husband,
sibling, or any other relative. The names are preceded by titles that indicate
sex and that also take account of age and social position relative to the
speaker. The most common adult title used to address or refer to men of
superior age or social status is "U." More modest titles are "Ko" (elder
brother) and "Maung" (younger brother). The female equivalent to "U" is "Daw,"
and that to "Maung" is "Ma." "Thakin," once a title of respect used for
Europeans, was adopted by Burmese nationalist leaders in the pre-World War II
period.

Country Profile

Country

[See Global Map: Map of Burma on the Globe"]

Formal Name: Union of Myanmar (1989).

Term for Citizens: Burmese.

Capital: Rangoon.

Geography

     Size: 678,000 square kilometers; shares boundaries with Bangladesh,
India, China, Laos, and Thailand.

     Topography and Drainage: Tropical environment composed basically of rich
alluvial valleys and drier surrounding hills and high mountains, which
separate country into strips of north-south ridges. Monsoon rainfall heaviest
in lower part of country where wet-rice agriculture common. In upper part
and in mountains, dry rice and other appropriate crops reflect lighter
rainfall. Water also supplied by Irrawaddy, Sittang, and Salween rivers,
flowing south from high heartlands of Asia to rich delta areas. Borders mainly
mountainous, access difficult. Population concentrated near rivers or in
coastline communities.

Society

     Population: Unofficially estimated at 36 million in 1983. Average annual
growth rate 1976-82 estimated at 2.4 percent. Ethnic Burmans about two-thirds
of population. Significant minorities include Shans, Karens, Kachins, Chins,
and Kayahs. Chinese and Indians also numerous.

     Languages: Burmese official language, spoken by nearly all segments of
population. Non-Burmans usually speak own tongue as first language. English
used frequently by older persons and those with higher education.

     Religion: Theravada Buddhism preeminent faith. Nine officially recognized
orders within the First Congregation of the Sangha of All Orders for the
Purification, Perpetuation, and Propagation of the Sasana, with some 113,000
monks. Hinduism and Islam also have substantial numbers of adherents, latter
particularly in Rakhine State. Many Chins, Kachins, Karens, and others
Christian. Animist beliefs persist in some areas.

     Health: Health care delivery systems improving but still limited.
Estimated 0.2 physicians per 1,000 and 0.7 hospital beds per 1,000
inhabitants; sanitation poor and pharmaceuticals in short supply. Less than 20
percent of population has access to safe water.

     Education: Education free in three-tiered government system through
university level. Traditional Buddhist monastic school now largely
overshadowed by secular system. Competitive examinations determine entrance
to postsecondary facilities. Emphasis placed on technical and scientific
knowledge, regional two-year colleges, and correspondence courses, but
prestigious degree from universities at Rangoon and Mandalay still widely
sought by country's 65,000 college students.

Economy

     Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Equivalent of US$5.9 billion in fiscal year
(FY-see Glossary) 1981, or US$180 per capita. Real GDP grew by over 6 percent
per year during FY 1978-81 period-over twice average for 1960s and early
1970s. Improved performance caused by increased foreign aid and credit,
leading to heightened investment equivalent to some 20 percent of GDP in FY
1978-81 period.

     Resources: Tin, antimony, lead, zinc, silver, and other metals; jade and
other precious stones; and petroleum and natural gas. Exploration of mineral
resources far from complete. Fossil fuels mostly for domestic consumption.
Excellent land resources, including some 10 million hectares of cultivated and
fallow agricultural land, almost 9 million hectares of potentially cultivable
land, and nearly 10 million hectares of reserved teak and hardwood forests.
Potentially large offshore fisheries.

     Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry: Produced over 47 percent of GDP in FY
1981 and employed 9.2 million of 13.8 million people in labor force. Almost
all farm production on private farms. Public and cooperative enterprises
important in fishing and forestry. Principal products include rice-by far most
important crop-sesame, pulses, and beans, groundnuts, cotton, maize,
sugarcane, wheat, sunflower, rubber, tobacco, jute, teakwood, and prawns.

     Industry and Services: Mining and manufacturing produced about 11 percent
of GDP in FY 1981 and employed 1.2 million people. Processed agricultural
commodities, textiles, light manufactures, petroleum, and natural gas most
important. Transportation, power, communications, and construction activities
produced 8 percent of GDP and engaged 700,000 people. Remainder of production
and employment in services sector. About 62 percent of mining and
manufacturing, 68 percent of infrastructure services, and 32 percent of
remaining services produced by public enterprises.

     Exports: Merchandise exports US$514 in FY 1981. Major categories based on
FY 1980 ranking: rice and rice products (42 percent), teak and hardwood (25
percent), base metals (15 percent), pulses and beans (5 percent), jute (3
percent), rubber (3 percent), fish and prawns (3 percent), and other
agricultural products (remainder).

     Imports: Merchandise imports US$858 million in FY 1981. Major categories
based on FY 1980 ranking: capital goods (46 percent), raw materials (28
percent), tools and spare parts (16 percent), and consumer goods (remainder).

     Balance of Payments: Current account deficit US$328 million in FY 1981,
about 5.6 percent of GDP. Repayments of interest and principal on foreign debt
equivalent to over 28 percent of all export earnings.

     Exchange Rate: K7.81 per US$1 (November 1982; for value of the kyat-see
Glossary). Pegged to value of special drawing right, an international reserve
currency.

     Transportation: Some 4,385 kilometers of chiefly meter-gauge railroads,
about 22,732 kilometers of roads, and over 2,000 kilometers of navigable
rivers facilitate travel primarily in north-south direction through center of
country. Railroad rolling stock often in poor repair, two-thirds of roads
unpaved, motor vehicles and watercraft antiquated. Main ports: Rangoon and
Bassein. Main airports for small turboprop and propeller fleet: Rangoon,
Mandalay, Sittwe (Akyab), and Meiktila. International airport: Rangoon.

     Communications: Poor telecommunications system but developing rapidly in
early 1980s. In FY 1981 some 14 telephones per 10,000 people, mostly in urban
centers. Overseas satellite linkage. Some 43 radio receivers per 1,000
inhabitants in 1982, but only 400 television receivers in entire country.
Radio transmission from one government-owned station only to populous areas.
Government-owned color television station transmits in evenings and on
weekends.

Government and Politics

     Government: Based on 1974 Constitution. Under President U San Yu since
November 1981, government divided into legislative, executive, and judicial
functions. People's Assembly is top organ, but power actually exercised by
State Council, top decisionmaking body. Governmental mandate renewed every
four years through parliamentary and local elections.

     Politics: One-party political system under Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP-see Glossary). Party Chairman U Ne Win most powerful national
leader, until 1981 also president and head of state. Party provides leadership
at all levels of government; leaders hold overlapping positions in State
Council, BSPP Central Executive Committee, and key units of armed forces.
Ruling elite narrowly based in military. No organized opposition to BSPP owing
to restrictive laws, tight government control of all mass media, and influence
of security and party operatives in all sectors of society. Main threat to
political stability posed by widespread insurgency and ethnic separatism.

     Administrative Divisions: Seven states and seven divisions at top of
three-tier structure; townships in middle; at bottom, wards for urban areas
and village-tracts for rural areas. Government authority tenuous in outlying
border regions controlled by insurgents.

     Judicial System: Courts under Council of People's Justices, highest
judicial authority. Under sweeping reform since 1972, justice administered
under principle of popular participation, and judges from top to bottom of
court hierarchy are elected laymen. In rendering decisions on criminal and
civil cases, judges rely on professional trained lawyers and law officers
attached to court.

     International Affairs: Withdrew from Nonaligned Movement in 1979,
asserting that movement had lost sight of its original purposes. Burma still
nonaligned and neutral, however. Maintains cordial relations with neighbors
and major powers. Receives foreign assistance from international lending
institutions; Japan, China, and Czechoslovakia; Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany), United States, and other major Western nations; and other
nations.

National Security

     Armed Forces: In 1983 People's Armed Forces totaled about 179,000.
Components: army (163,000), navy (7,000), and air force (9,000). Conscription
provided for under law, but in practice services maintained by voluntary
enlistment.

     Major Tactical Military Units: Army had six light infantry divisions, two
armored battalions, 85 independent infantry battalions, four artillery
battalions, one antitank and artillery battalion, and one antiaircraft
battery. Air force had two attack squadrons, two training squadrons, and
various transport aircraft. Navy functioned as fisheries protection and
coastal and riverine patrol fleet.

     Major Military Equipment: Domestic defense production largely limited to
uniforms, small arms, and ammunition. Imported military equipment from variety
of sources. Bulk of equipment aging, short of spare parts, or in need of
repair.

     Defense Expenditures: Over K1.4 billion in FY 1981, representing 19.5
percent of total government expenditures, down from 1950s and 1960s levels
of over 30 percent.

     Police and Paramilitary Forces: People's Police Force organized under
Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs totaled some 58,000. People's Militia
units under control of Ministry of Defense numbered some 35,000. Both forces
assisted armed forces in suppressing persistent armed insurgency by communist
and ethnically based groups.

[See Figure 1.: Administrative Divisions, 1983]

Introduction

     Union Day celebrations in Rangoon in early 1983 drew delegates from
Burma's more than 60 disparate "national groups" to the nation's capital to
participate in government-led ceremonies. Posters marking the occasion
emphasized the spirit of unity among the varied groups, despite their evident
cultural distinctiveness. To many observers, however, there could be no more
vivid reminder that national solidarity in Burma was neither easily come by
nor easily retained. Since independence in 1948, the country had been plagued
by persistent dissension and rebellion arising, in part, from the separatist
aspirations of a number of the minority peoples represented at the gathering.

     In Burma's single-party state, government and party rhetoric proclaimed
the harmonious unity and equality of disparate peoples, yet the preeminence of
the Burman ethnic majority in economic, social, and political affairs was
clear. To the degree that other peoples participated in the mainstream of
national life, it was in the context of Burman dominance. Burmans constituted
perhaps two-thirds of the country's estimated 36 million people in 1983.

     Circumstances of history have contributed to the difficulty of party and
government efforts to unify the nation. Over the past millennium, three
dynasties dominated by ethnic Burmans succeeded for relatively brief periods
in imposing their political authority over the area within the boundaries of
the modern political state, and at times these dynasties expanded to the east
and west considerably beyond those perimeters. Not until the Union of Burma
was formed in 1948, however, had all the diverse peoples within its
ill-defined borders formally been brought together in a single, if somewhat
tenuous, federation. Moreover, among Burma's major ethnic groups, apart from
the Arakanese, only the Burmans themselves are concentrated wholly within
Burma. Shans, Mons, Chins, Karens, and Kachins are also found in various
numbers in neighboring countries. Some ethnic minorities in Burma are also
represented all over southeast Asia.

     The effect of geography in promoting diversity among people within Burma
itself makes nationbuilding difficult, both socially and politically.
Encompassing some 678,000 square kilometers-about the size of Texas-Burma in
the simplest terms consists of two very different kinds of ecological
settings. One is the more or less compact lowland area cut by the Irrawaddy
and Sittang rivers, with which the Burmans and other lowland peoples have
lived in symbiotic alliance as rice-growing farmers for more than 1,000 years.
The other is an elongated horseshoe of high plateau and rugged mountain
country inhabited by various "hill" peoples long settled in the area. For
example, Shans have dominated the high plateau of eastern Burma since the
thirteenth century, living in the alluvial valleys and hills of this upland
region.

     Contact between Burmans and other lowland peoples and between Burmans and
certain of the hill peoples has resulted in varying degrees of acculturation.
Especially with respect to the hill peoples, however, contact has resulted
less often in acculturation than in conflict and the perpetuation and
reinforcement of ethnic differences. To a remarkable degree in 1983 ethnic
minorities retained their own customs, languages, and historical and political
consciousness. Many groups differed from the ethnic Burmans in religion as
well. Some have adopted Christianity, introduced to Burma by Western
missionaries in the nineteenth century, while others adhered to indigenous
beliefs and practices. Among minorities sharing adherence to the uniquely
Burmese form of Theravada Buddhism (see Glossary) practiced in Burma-a form
that exhibits the influence of indigenous beliefs as well as of Hindu-Brahman
doctrine-are the Shans and the Mons. The Mons, whose ancient kingdoms in the
central lowlands may substantially predate those of the Burmans, are believed
by some to have brought Theravada Buddhism to Burma from Ceylon (present-day
Sri Lanka).

     Buddhism has been a pervasive force in Burmese society for millennia,
although popular tradition stresses the eleventh century when it was
established as the state religion by King Anawrahta of Pagan, monarch of the
first and greatest of the Burman dynasties on the Irrawaddy riverine plains.
Although in mid-1983 Buddhism was no longer the state religion, members of the
sangha (monkhood) were deeply revered by laypeople as the ultimate living
expression of the Buddha's teachings, and they continued to provide spiritual
leadership. As the primary source of social values, Buddhism has been an
enduring influence on life and thought and has strongly affected social,
economic, and political institutions and arrangements. Independent Burma's
civilian leaders described their new country broadly as a Buddhist welfare
state; their military successors in the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)
leadership have recognized Buddhism and socialism, with an admixture of
Burmese nationalism, as the sources of their ideology.

     Nationalist spirit runs deep in the society. Burmese are intensely proud
of their history and cultural tradition. Their name for the country bespeaks
that pride: Myanma (literally, fast, strong) refers to the attributes of early
forebears on the central lowland plains. Burmese cherish the recalled
splendors of Pagan, with its myriad pagodas, monasteries, and shrines; and
although the British deposed the last monarch at Mandalay in the late
nineteenth century, Burmese still regard that city as the nation's religious
and spiritual fountainhead. Burmese Buddhists see themselves as spiritually
blessed and, in that sense, regard themselves as incomparably wealthier than
Western societies. Comfortable in the country's nonmodern, non-Western
identity, they are grateful to have escaped what they perceive as the
decadence of modernity evident in some Westernized Asian nations. A corollary
of this intense national pride is a preference for indigenous solutions to the
task of nationbuilding.

     Another persistent theme of the independence period has been the
intermittent insurgency by minority ethnic groups resentful of control
by a Burman-dominated central government. The continuation of insurgency in
many parts of the country-especially in border regions adjoining China, Laos,
and Thailand-by ethnic minorities and members of the outlawed Burmese
Communist Party (BCP), continued to present a serious problem to the regime
in 1983. Many of these groups engaged in drug trafficking, smuggling, and
other illicit activities as a means of support, as did other groups under
local warlords, supplying a thriving black market.

     Apart from ending insurgency and thereby nurturing national solidarity,
the chief priority of the national leadership in 1983 was promoting economic
development on a basis of equity for all elements in the population. Burma's
natural resources are extensive. The central lowlands are a rich and fertile
area, given over in great part to rice cultivation. Raising enough food for
the population has never been difficult except in wartime, leaving sizable
surpluses for export. Teak, precious stones, oil, and minerals are found
elsewhere in the country. Yet Burma numbers among the world's low-income
economies, having a per capita gross domestic product equivalent to only
US$180 in fiscal year 1981.

     The plentiful resources and produce of the country attracted the
interest of British and French trading companies as early as the seventeenth
century. British power in the subcontinent expanded during the seventeenth
and through much of the eighteenth century with only limited interest in
Burma. Meanwhile, however, Burmese royal forces invaded and subjugated Arakan
(now Rakhine State) and made incursions into the Indian border states of
Assam and Manipur. In 1824, after 25 years of border incidents, the British
in India sent forces to resolve the problem militarily. The terms of the
treaty settling the First Anglo-Burmese War forced the Burmese to give up
claims to Assam and Manipur and to cede Arakan and Tenasserim to Britain,
giving it a foothold on Burma's southern rim. Over the next 60 years, British
hegemony over Burma increased by stages, culminating in the takeover of
Upper Burma (see Glossary) and the deposition of the last Burman monarch at
Mandalay in 1885.

     Under colonial rule the Burmese experienced social dislocation and
widespread agrarian distress as foreign interests developed the country's
oil, timber, and mineral resources. The Irrawaddy delta region of Lower
Burma (see Glossary) was opened for rice cultivation, using Burmese
agriculturists to accomplish the difficult and dangerous task of taming the
jungle-covered area. Pioneering farmers soon fell victim to Indian
moneylenders and absentee landlords, however, while Indians and Chinese
monopolized the mid-level posts in the colonial administrative machinery under
senior British officials, leaving only minor posts for Burmese occupancy. The
inevitable result was the development among Burmese of a deep-seated
resentment against these groups. So long lasting was its impact that in 1982
the Burmese legislature enacted a law denying Indians and Chinese citizenship
status on an equal level with Burmans, Shans, Kachins, Kayahs, and other
"indigenous" minorities.

     Resentment of colonial exploitation and maladministration contributed
to the development of a nationalist movement in the early twentieth century,
as Western ideas of nationalism, socialism, and communism found their way into
Burma. A major nationalist organization was formed in 1919-the General Council
of Burmese Associations (GCBA)-incorporating the Young Men's Buddhist
Association, which had been conducting nationalist educational activities
since 1906. During the 1920s the British granted a measure of self-rule, but
a decade or so later, a group of intellectuals and Rangoon University
students, disillusioned about Burma's circumstances and prospects, formed a
revolutionary nationalist organization. This group, the Dobama Asiayone,
launched a major strike at the university in 1936, in the process bringing
to national prominence such men as Thakin Aung San, who was to lead Burma
to independence, and U Nu, who was to become its first prime minister.
Thakin Aung San was among the Thirty Comrades given military training by the
Japanese, who occupied Burma during World War II. The recruits agreed to
serve the Japanese in return for the promised postwar independence for
Burma, but later, disillusioned with prospects for its realization, they
switched to the Allied side.

     Supported by the anticolonial principles of a postwar British Labour
Party government, Thakin Aung San, by then a general in the Burmese army,
became the architect of Burma's independence. Envisioning a union in which
formerly separated peoples would be joined in a framework providing for a
substantial degree of diversity, he won Shan, Chin, and Kachin agreement to
join with the interim Burmese government. Karens declined to do so;
Burman-Karen animosities had been inflamed by colonial policies that granted
Karens a separate voting roll in the national election and had recruited
Christian Karens into the Burma Army to put down Burman-led rebellions.
Before the country's independence was declared, however, General Aung
San was assassinated. His successors emphasized minority participation
within a framework of political and administrative centralization.

     Burma began independence as a parliamentary democracy under the
leadership of U Nu. The 1947 constitution provided for a cross between a
federal and a unitary system of government, and Shan and Kayah states were
given the right to secede after 10 years. A coalition party organization, the
Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), had been formed in 1945,
bringing together individuals and groups of various political
persuasions-nationalists, socialists, and communists-who had shared in winning
freedom for the country. Despite the all-embracing philosophy of the AFPFL,
however, various groups and factions remained outside, gathering forces of
resistance and opposition to the party and the state.

     Given the difficulty of finding an acceptable solution to the problem of
political and ethnic diversity, it was not surprising that the new leadership
was unable to reconcile the differences and that the resilience of the newly
forged union was tested almost immediately. Within several months of
independence, communist bands were in armed rebellion, seeking to overthrow
the central government. Several months thereafter, elements of the Karen
minority-the largest of the discontented ethnic groups-launched their own
revolt, as did members of other ethnic minorities, all seeking a territory for
their own group and greater decisionmaking authority in matters affecting its
future. Wholesale Karen desertions played havoc with Burma's armed forces, and
dissidents soon occupied much of Lower Burma and spread elsewhere. By 1951,
however, in part because the insurgents were never able to unify their efforts
and in part because of U Nu's determined response, the reconstructed armed
forces had brought the insurrection substantially under control, although
insurgents continued to dominate much of the countryside. The infiltration
into Shan State of remnants of Nationalist Chinese forces beginning in late
1949 compounded concern over domestically rooted subversion, arousing fears
that Chinese troops might pursue their defeated opponents into Burma. Burmese
government actions alleviated these pressures to some degree in the mid- and
late 1950s. The government also succeeded in gaining increased loyalty among
certain hill minorities; but Karens and Communists continued to feed
government concern over national stability and to arouse fears among the
grass-roots population for their own personal security.

     Economic development made little headway. Overriding dependence on rice
as a foreign exchange earner continued throughout the era of constitutional
democracy (1948-62), leaving the country still highly vulnerable to
fluctuations on the world market. The failure of AFPFL leaders to agree on
plans and priorities inhibited efforts to carry out reconstruction.

     In the late 1950s troubles for the new state mounted rapidly. The AFPFL
was torn by internal rivalry as opposition strength mounted. Shan dissidents
demanded greater autonomy, mobilizing for a secessionist movement. Under an
18-month military caretaker government they went into open revolt, as did
Kachins, joining forces in some areas with Karen and communist insurgents. The
military amended the constitution to limit some rights of Shan feudal chiefs
and paid them to surrender others. Returned to power in national elections in
February 1960, U Nu formed a new government that set about to formulate new
economic plans and to strengthen the base for democracy. A conference was set
for early 1962 in which representatives of all groups would convene to discuss
domestic problems, especially the issues of federalism and succession. In the
meantime, however, U Nu had made good on a campaign promise to reestablish
Buddhism as the state religion, exacerbating existing tensions by further
alienating Karen and other non-Buddhist minorities.

     The most significant political event in independent Burma's history took
place in March 1962, when forces under the command of General Ne Win assumed
power in a bloodless coup. Calling itself the Revolutionary Council, the group
suspended the 1947 constitution and began rule by decree, citing "economic,
religious, and political crises with the issue of federalism [as] the most
important reason for the coup." Military officers were put in place as
department heads, while General Ne Win, as chairman, assumed full executive,
legislative, and judicial powers. Moving quickly to consolidate its position,
the council imprisoned U Nu, some of his cabinet ministers, and other presumed
opponents, including regional separatists-generally without trial.

     By early 1983 U Ne Win had been in power for some 21 years and, with
open, organized opposition or criticism disallowed and dissidence other than
among communist and ethnic insurgents seldom expressed, his authority was
assured. The Revolutionary Council had been disbanded after the promulgation
of the 1974 Constitution, according to which the government is divided into
legislative, executive and judicial functions; the State Council is the top
decisionmaking body. Having resigned from the military, U Ne Win served as
chief executive from 1974 until late 1981. In August of that year, he
announced plans to retire as president after the October elections. He was
succeeded by U San Yu, a retired army general.

     The real seat of power, however, continued to be the military-led BSPP,
of which U Ne Win remained chairman. Making up the numerically dominant
element in the party's Central Committee, the military manipulated the levers
of power. An elite cadre organization in its formative years under the
Revolutionary Council, the BSPP had been transforming itself into a mass party
since mid-1971 as a means of broadening grass-roots support and political
participation. The process had by no means been smooth, however. In 1973 and
again in 1976 the party leadership had deemed it necessary to undertake mass
purges of regular and candidate members, and an extraordinary party congress
in November 1977 dropped more than 100 members of the Central Committee for
"antiparty" and "antipeople" activities.

     Backed by a powerful security apparatus, whose several arms possessed
wide discretionary powers codified in a 1975 antisubversion law, the BSPP gave
strong emphasis to the maintenance of internal security. Most opposition
politicians and ethnic separatists imprisoned immediately after the military
takeover in 1962, however, were released within a few years, and thousands
of government opponents, including U Nu, returned to the country from exile or
were released from prison under a general amnesty order in 1980. But student
strikes at Rangoon University had been twice rigorously suppressed, most
recently in 1975; and in the early 1980s, in its efforts to maintain political
stability, the leadership continued to close off avenues of criticism and
dissent.

     As indicated in remarks by President San Yu read to Union Day delegates
in 1983 by BSPP Joint Secretary General Brigadier Tin Oo, top political
priority continued to be given to three long-standing objectives. These were
consolidation of national unity, economic development through efforts by all
Burmese in their respective territorial divisions, and elimination of
insurgency through vigilance and continued cooperation with Burma's armed
forces.

     In the intervening two decades since its assumption of power, the
leadership had already taken a number of measures to promote national
solidarity. Not the least of these was the establishment of the Academy for
the Development of National Groups. At the academy, minority customs and
cultures were nurtured and encouraged, and minority students, educated in
these traditions and in other academic subjects to imbue them with "union
spirit," were trained to serve as teachers and to carry out development work
in the border regions.

     Another area of success in consolidation of support for national goals
involved the sangha, whose members, reacting to the fall of the devout U Nu,
had initially remained aloof from the military leadership. In 1965 the sangha
refused to comply with the government-urged concept of membership
registration. Its attitude shifted, however, as the BSPP and the government
took measures to recognize the role of Buddhism in the society by various
means, including the establishment of the governmental Department of Religious
Affairs. Delegates to a mass Buddhist "purification" congregation in Rangoon
in May 1980 agreed to the principle of carrying identification cards, as well
as to form a national Buddhist council, which held powers to excommunicate
monks who violated accepted standards of personal conduct and to discipline
Buddhist orders judged to be teaching heresy.

     Economic development under military rule can be seen as having taken
place in two stages. Programs and policies of the 1960s focused on the growth
of heavy industry in a program emphasizing state ownership of the means of
production and discouraging private investment. A 1963 nationalization law
removed Chinese and Indians from strategic positions in the economy (causing
many Indians to leave the country), and a 1964 demonetization law targeted the
elimination of private savings, further reducing the position of Indians and
Chinese. Failure of the overall program, however-later attributed in part by
the leadership to overly rigid implementation-brought hardship and despair,
especially to the Burmese population in the central lowlands. In the cities
the population rioted over commodity shortages.

     A watershed was reached in 1971, according to Burma specialist David I.
Steinberg, as a result of economic rethinking that took place during the First
Congress of the BSPP. In the aftermath of the deliberations, a crucial
decision favoring a liberalized approach to economic development was agreed
on, which was given specific formulation in a document that continued to
provide the basis for planning some 12 years later. Its pragmatic approach
took cognizance of the plight of the consumer, stressed equity considerations,
and envisioned greater stress on agriculture, mining, forestry, and fishing
to reflect the country's natural advantages. A Twenty-Year Plan was developed
to last until fiscal year (FY) 1993.

     Economic performance was sluggish initially, but by the period of the
incremental Third Four-Year Plan (FY 1978-81), the economy was definitely on
the upswing. The average growth rate rose according to plan by more than 6
percent per year, the agricultural sector alone by more than 8 percent.
Behind the growth lay successful efforts to increase rice production through
improved inputs and a turnabout of former reluctance to accept foreign aid,
now provided as direct assistance and concessionary loans by a consortium
of Western nations.

     This positive note was muted somewhat in 1983 by increasing concern over
the foreign debt service burden and by lagging oil production. Over the long
term there was reason for concern as well over various issues arising from
the complex interaction between private and public production and marketing
systems. The thriving shadow economy supplied a broad spectrum of society with
consumer goods unavailable through legal channels, depriving the government of
much-needed foreign exchange earnings and tax revenues. The migration of rural
inhabitants to Rangoon and other urban centers, bringing additional pressures
on an already overburdened job market, was an additional problem for
authorities.

     Goods from the black market were furnished in part by ethnic insurgents
and by BCP dissidents. By engaging in smuggling and drug trafficking to
supplement whatever funds could be obtained from foreign sources,
antigovernment rebels were able to purchase arms and equipment for insurgency
operations. Although well before early 1983 these operations had been
confined by government forces to remote and sparsely populated border areas,
they nonetheless constituted a steady drain on public resources. Alongside the
insurgent groups were various warlords, supported by private armies, and
common criminals who also engaged in smuggling, banditry, and drug trafficking
motivated purely by greed or lust for power.

     Burma's foreign policy under U Ne Win's leadership continued to be one of
nonalignment, reflecting long-standing Burmese wariness of foreign
entanglements. In September 1979 the country had withdrawn from the Nonaligned
Movement, asserting that that body had deviated from its basic premise of
strict neutrality. The leadership was committed to the establishment and
maintenance of cordial relations with all countries on an equitable basis and
exhibited a strong determination not to be drawn into any regional conflicts.
While maintaining an independent posture and refusing assistance from either
the United States or the Soviet Union on any significant scale, Burma was
using to its advantage substantial help from a consortium of Western aid
donors who offered both aid and concessionary loans. Burma still refused any
form of private joint venture with foreign capital, however.

     In 1982 the country appeared to have no major foreign policy problems.
Relations with China, vastly improved since the low point reached after the
anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon in 1967 and eased by the absence of reports in
1983 of Chinese aid to the BCP, were correct and cordial. India loomed large
in Burma's foreign policy perspective, if only because of its relative size
and because of historic Burmese fears of assimilation. Population pressures in
Bangladesh had made Rakhine State an attraction for those of its citizens who
lived near the Burmese border; Bengali residents in Burma had not been an
issue between the two countries since 1978, however.

     Much speculation centered in early 1983 on the related questions of
post-U Ne Win leadership and the dimensions of possible policy shifts when the
aging senior party official finally stepped down. In the meantime there was
little doubt that U Ne Win enjoyed a considerable measure of popular support
despite the authoritarian methods of his regime. The style of his rule was not
out of keeping with traditional models of political authority in Burma and,
whatever the case, many Burmese were grateful that their country remained
independent and, unlike Afghanistan or Vietnam, had not been drawn into the
orbit of superpower conflict. Beyond this, the strength of the BSPP, the
absence of legitimate channels of opposition, and the significant economic
strides of recent years worked in favor of the man who had succeeded in
maintaining unity and viability for more than two decades.

May 1983

     Shortly after the manuscript for this study was completed, Burma was
jolted by the sudden announcement that Brigadier General Tin Oo, confidant and
possible successor to BSPP chairman U Ne Win, was resigning from his important
government posts. Observers concluded that for one reason or another the
former intelligence chief and third-ranking party figure had fallen out of
favor with the aging U Ne Win, the country's long-time supreme leader.

     The action came amid a corruption scandal involving Tin Oo's close aide,
Minister of Home and Religious Affairs Bo Ni, and charges that Tin Oo himself
had indulged in lavish spending on a son's wedding. Tin Oo's quick defense of
Bo Ni put his own case in a worse light. According to other widely reported
rumors, the general's fall was attributable to his unpopularity with army
field commanders or to disapproval of his zest for enlarging his own political
power base. Many of the close supporters whom he had appointed to important
positions were caught in the political shake-up that followed his resignation.
By late July 1983, the BSPP had formally denounced Tin Oo, and the government
prepared to take legal and disciplinary action against him. In early August he
went on trial, charged with misusing the equivalent of US$250,000 in state
funds and property.

     Tin Oo's fate gave new significance to the long-standing succession
question. While some Burma-watchers opined that the general should not be
written off altogether in the country's political future, nearly all agreed
that rivals in the top leadership, particularly President San Yu and General
Kyaw Htin, had moved up in the power structure as a result of the affair.

     However important, the circumstances on the domestic scene paled in
comparison with another development in 1983-the October 9 terrorist bombing in
Rangoon that killed 21 persons, including four cabinet ministers and other
high officials of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The South Korean
diplomatic mission, headed by President Chun Doo Hwan, had been in the Burmese
capital on the first leg of a five-nation Asian tour and had planned to lay a
wreath at the Burmese Martyrs' Mausoleum where the explosion occurred. Delayed
in arriving, Chun himself narrowly escaped assassination. The bombing was a
source of major embarrassment and deep regret to Burma and to its people, who
were sensitive to the country's failure to provide adequate security to a
visiting foreign delegation and to the grievous consequences of the lapse.

     Burmese security forces immediately mounted an all-out campaign to
identify the perpetrators of the monstrous act and bring them to justice.
Within a few days of the attack, they had pinned down three "Korean" suspects,
one of whom was killed and the two others captured in exchanges between them
and Burmese forces. Both of the captured suspects had sustained serious
injuries from explosions of grenades they had detonated themselves. On the
basis of a voluntary confession from one of the two and other evidence
assembled through intensive investigation-in which Burmese authorities were
aided by South Korean intelligence operatives-the Burmese government soon
announced that it had definitely established North Korean responsibility for
the bombing and immediately severed diplomatic ties with P'yongyang. South
Korea welcomed the Burmese decision to break off formal relations. Meanwhile,
trial proceedings got under way against the two surviving suspects-North
Korean military officers-who in early December were convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. At the United Nations nearly half the member delegations
supported the findings of the Burmese government and its conclusion of North
Korean responsibility for the bombing.

Frederica M. Bunge
December 15, 1983