$Unique_ID{COW00505} $Pretitle{220} $Title{Brazil Chapter 4B. State and Local Government} $Subtitle{} $Author{James D. Rudolf} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{political military government state brazilian early federal labor church national} $Date{1982} $Log{} Country: Brazil Book: Brazil, A Country Study Author: James D. Rudolf Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1982 Chapter 4B. State and Local Government The Brazilian system of government is federative in name only. A number of developments, particularly the overwhelming economic power of the federal government and provisions in the Constitution allowing federal authorities to intervene in the affairs of state governments, have led to an ever-increasing concentration of authority in federal officials at the expense of their counterparts in state governments. In addition to the federal government, governmental units in Brazil consisted of 23 states, three federal territories, a Federal District (Brasilia) and, in 1980, 4,011 municipios (see Glossary). The states are granted the power to create their own constitutions and their own government; both must conform, however, to those found at the federal level. The chief state executives, governors, were popularly elected from 1946 to 1965 and indirectly elected by the state assemblies (which, in effect, meant they were appointed by the federal president) from 1966 until 1982, when the first popular elections for governor in 17 years were held. Each governor-whose term of office is four years-has a number of secretaries of state, comparable to the ministers at the federal level. Each state also has a unicameral state assembly, whose members are popularly elected for four-year terms on the basis of proportional representation. Each state also has an independent judiciary headed by an appellate court known as the Court of Justice. The Constitution grants the states all powers not conferred on the federal government or the municipios. In a few areas, most notably education, the states have concurrent powers to legislate along with the federal government. In fact, the real power of each state has depended on its economic resources; states may levy taxes on sales (some 70 percent of their revenue), inheritances, transfers of property, and exports. This power brings significant clout to the governments of rich states, such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul, whose governors may be major national public figures (see fig. 1). Because economic power generates political power, the political power is in turn used to garner a larger share of revenues and services dispensed by the federal government. This system, of course, works to the detriment of poorer states. Municipios are granted autonomy in the 1967 Constitution, although in fact their authority has gradually been encroached upon by state governments much as states have been by the federal government. Municipios are headed by mayors (also called prefects) and quasi-legislative councils, most of which are popularly elected for four-year terms. Under military rule, however, a number of mayors and councilmen have been appointed by state governors with the approval of the federal president. Formally justified in terms of "national security" (mayors were appointed in border areas, areas of major mineral deposits, industrial establishments, and military bases), the appointments were actually used to ensure the control of major cities by supporters of the government political party. Initially, almost 700 local governments were thus appointed; by 1976 the total had been reduced to 175 appointed in key cities and all state capitals. Municipio councils vary in size, though they may have no more than 21 members. Each municipio also has at least one trial court, and most have a justice of the peace. There were three federal territories-Amapa and Roraima in the North and Fernando de Noronha, a group of small islands in the Atlantic Ocean, northeast of the city of Recife. All are remote and sparsely populated. Because of the growing population and economic importance, Rondonia was upgraded from a territory to a state in 1982. Municipal government is administered by a mayor appointed by the governor of the territory who, in turn, is appointed by the federal president. The governor of the Federal District is also a presidential appointee. Brasilia also has an elected, 20-member legislative council (four-year term) and its own system of courts. Interest Group Politics Although in 1982 the nation's attention was focused on electoral politics, a more timeless and, in many respects, more meaningful analysis of Brazilian politics may be pursued by examining various interest groups and the interaction among them. Because Brazil is a large and complex society, these groups are many and varied and rarely are united in their political points of view. Therefore, the following presents a simplification of Brazilian reality for the sake of clarity: groups labeled "conservative" represent, for the most part, those that have benefited from the period of military rule; those labeled "liberal" represent groups that have sought fundamental changes in the policies pursued since 1964. Conservative Groups The Military The armed forces have long played a pivotal role in the nation's politics. As in other nations of Latin America, military officers acted as the moderators of intra-elite disputes, at times temporarily assuming the reins of government in order to facilitate the transfer of political power. On other occasions officers assumed power through the force of arms, then institutionalized a system of personal dictatorship (see The Vargas Era, 1930-45, ch. 1). The post-1964 military regime has been unique in that it has been neither a short-lived transition nor a period of personalistic rule. Rather, the armed forces have ruled as an institution, faithfully adhering to hierarchical principles of discipline, promotions, and retirement in order to preserve the institutional integrity of the officer corps. It has not been an easy task. Most analysts point to inevitable strains on institutional integrity created during almost two decades in power as the primary explanation of the regime's pursuit of abertura, which is designed eventually to remove the military from a direct, if not indirect, role in the political system. The post-1964 military government was by no means run exclusively by military officers. In late 1982, for example, only six of the 21 cabinet members were active-duty officers. The armed forces retained control of the government by holding key positions, most important of which, of course, was the presidency. The presence of active-duty officers in other key positions, most notably as the heads of the CSN, the SNI, and the president's Military Household guaranteed that executive policymaking would reflect the wishes of the military hierarchy who, given a compliant electoral college, would also control the presidential succession (see The Executive, this ch.). By holding high government positions, military officers secured financial security and prestige for their institution, as well as access to patronage jobs for active and retired officers, their families, and friends. An alternate source of power for military officers lay in the command of troops. Some two dozen division generals, brigadiers, and colonels who command troop units must be considered by policymakers. In the event of severe disunity within the officer corps, these commanders have the power to use armed force, or to threaten the use of force, in a coup d'etat (see Administration, Organization, and Training, ch. 5). In many nations military personnel are forbidden from taking part in political activity. This is not the case in Brazil, where officers and noncomissioned officers may vote and, under certain circumstances, run for public office (see Constitutional Basis, ch. 5). This freedom, together with the tradition of political activity within the Brazilian military, leads to a high level of political expression and controversy within the armed forces. Every attempt is made to shield such controversy from the public view in order to preserve a public image of institutional integrity and harmony. Nevertheless, controversy within the military high command frequently has spilled into the open and, taken together, these incidents present a fairly clear picture of the political concerns of the Brazilian armed forces. Interservice rivalries seem to be less of a problem in Brazil than in other military-led governments. The parceling of the military budget inevitably leads each service to extol its special need for a larger share. In mid-1982, for example, the commander of the navy cited the Argentine debacle against the British in the Falklands/Malvinas war as evidence of the need for greater Brazilian naval power. In larger political issues, however, the army has always prevailed over the navy and the air force. This is evidenced most clearly by the fact that all five presidents in the 1964-82 period of the military regime came from the army. Analysts have usually discussed political factions within the contemporary Brazilian military in terms of hard-liners (linhas duras) and moderates. The meaning of these terms changed significantly, however, between 1964 and 1982. During the early years of the military regime, controversy centered on the definition of the regime in terms of political economy. Most of the officers who engineered the 1964 coup, led by the first military president, General Castello Branco (hence sometimes called castellistas), were considered moderates. Highly influenced by the United States as a result of having fought as part of the United States Fifth Army in Italy during World War II and being educated at Brazil's prestigious Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra-ESG), which was founded in 1949 with the assistance of a United States military mission, these officers were anticommunist, developmentalist, and internationalist in political orientation. Their hard-line opposition consisted of more authoritarian and nationalist younger officers who called for stronger military participation in the institutions of government and for development policies more immediately beneficial to Brazilians, thus creating a strong national constituency. The retirement in 1970 of their leading spokesman, General Afonso Augusto de Albuquerque Lima, led to the eclipse of this nationalist group of military hard-liners. During the 1970s the political lines within the military were drawn by one's attitude toward the liberalization of military rule. The hard line was defined by General Medici, whose 1969-74 term of office was the most repressive period of military rule, with the least concern for civil liberties. His successor, General Geisel, was a moderate who launched the decompression under which the worst of the repressive apparatus was dismantled. This ongoing controversy within the military hierarchy came to a head with the process of naming Geisel's successor. After the forced retirement of two hard-line members of the high command, generals Hugo de Abreu and Silvio Coelho da Frota, Geisel was able to prevail and name a fellow moderate, General Figueiredo, to succeed him. Figueiredo continued the process of liberalization under the catch-word abertura, which opened the political system to popular political expression and participation. Such strains within the High Command of the Armed Forces (Alto-Comando das Forcas Armadas-ACFA) undoubtedly caused a modification in the process of political liberalization. The apparent compromise between moderates and hard-liners led to the continuation of the political opening, but under slower and carefully controlled conditions. Such strains also reinforced the need for the armed forces to retreat from its direct control of the government in order to forestall further erosion of the military institution. The governing role was increasingly seen as detrimental to its professional role as a purely military institution. Furthermore, with the end of the period of Brazil's "economic miracle" in 1974, governing was not as enhancing to the public image of the armed forces. This was made clear in the elections of 1974 and 1978, when the governing party lost the public mandate it had held previously. Finally, the original justification of military rule, the need to enforce national security in the face of domestic threats, no longer rang true by the mid-1970s, when guerrillas had been defeated and liberal politicians had lost any effective voice in public life. Despite the continuity of two successive moderate governments, hard-line opposition continued to be voiced from within the armed forces. This fact was brought to light most forcefully in April 1981 when two members of the army intelligence service were implicated when a powerful bomb exploded prematurely outside a stadium in Rio de Janeiro where a rally in favor of abertura was to be held the next day. The government's apparent cover-up of the investigation led to speculation that hard-liners in the military forced the concealment of what had been an attempt by opponents of abertura to discredit the process through the use of terrorism designed to create a hard-line backlash to the liberalization (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). In the early 1980s hard-line opposition to abertura was generally estimated to be supported by one-fourth to one-half of the officer corps. Colonels were commonly thought more likely to be hard-line than were generals. Intelligence and police organizations were said to contain a relatively large number of hard-line officers. This group remained opposed to the reintroduction of civil liberties and political pluralism and felt that conditions demanded a continuation of military rule beyond the timetable prescribed by the Figueiredo government. Analysts agreed in 1982 that hard-liners continued to carry influence, albeit reduced. Should key tests of abertura, such as the 1982 elections or the 1984 contest for the presidency, indicate that the High Command was losing control of the process, then military hard-liners would seek a resurgence of their influence, thus forcing a slowing or reversal of the moderate program of abertura. Technocrats The political power of the technocrats (tecnicos)- the civilian elite of planners, economists, and administrators at the top of Brazil's burgeoning bureaucracy-is partly due to the sheer size of the organizations they oversee. In addition, the above-average educational level, as well as family and political connections, of senior civil servants makes the bureaucracy a formidable pressure group. The bureaucracy also serves as the most important channel for the exercise of influence by other interest groups, owing to the weakness of such institutions as Congress and political parties that perform such functions in other countries (see The Executive, this ch.). Even responsible government officials do not know the number of people on the government payroll. A 1975 study estimated 500,000 for the federal government and twice that figure for state and local government. The lure of patronage and the growth of governmental functions since that time have undoubtedly raised that figure still higher. The government does have a civil service system whereby appointments are made on merit. The system does not function in all areas of government, however, and in addition to patronage, political loyalties often determine the fate of the civil servant. After the 1964 coup there was a widespread purge of career and appointed civil servants whose political leanings did not match those of the military government (see The Takeover, ch. 1). The technocrats, who emerged from the purge as the architects of Brazil's post-1964 development strategy, were supposedly "apolitical." Guillermo O'Donnell, in his brilliant 1973 study of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, defines the frame of mind of the technocrat: "Their training stresses a technical problem-solving approach . . . the ambiguities of bargaining and politics are hindrances to rational solutions; and conflict is by definition dysfunctional . . . That which is 'efficient' is good . . . " Such a point of view may have been apolitical in the pre-1964 context of liberal democratic institutions, but in designing and maintaining the development policies of the military regime-e.g., industrialization, export expansion, foreign investment, political stability, low wages-the technocrats were, by necessity, thrust into the political life of the nation as the primary civilian allies of the military rulers. The myth of an apolitical technocratic establishment at the helm of the nation's giant bureaucracy lasted as long as the combination of brutal dictatorship and economic success kept the development strategy from becoming a subject of national debate. The year 1974 proved to be a watershed on both counts: it was not by chance that the beginning of the political liberalization coincided with the end of the "economic miracle." The attack on the technocrats came primarily from two quarters: nationalists (especially businessmen), who saw the development strategy as favoring international capital to the detriment of domestic private industry, and organized labor, which had seen real wages fall precipitously after 1964. How to control Brazil's endemic problem of price inflation also became a subject of political controversy, as did the problem of Brazil's foreign debt in the early 1980s (see Growth and Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). The bastion of the power of the technocrats was in the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency (previously known as the Ministry of Planning). Delfim Netto, who was named chief of the Planning Secretariat in August 1979 and continued to hold that post in late 1982, had become perhaps the most powerful civilian in Brazil through his role as the nation's economic czar. Delfim (as well as other, less powerful, technocrats) was given a large degree of authority over economic policymaking, although ultimately his power depended on the acquiescence of the armed forces. The increased economic difficulties in 1982 and the election campaign of that year brought unprecedented criticism of the government's economic policies, criticism that ultimately found its way to Delfim. His anti-inflationary policies were attacked from both sides of the political fence: conservatives, such as former planning ministers Roberto Campos and Mario Henrique Simonsen, called for tougher deflationary policies, while liberals, such as Celso Furtado, criticized Delfim's policies as causing unnecessary recession and called for, among other measures, a renegotiation of the foreign debt. Industrialists and Landowners Political groupings of industrialists and landowners in Brazil are not as powerful as one might expect in a nation with such vast economic resources. The largest organizations-the National Confederation of Industries, the National Confederation of Commerce, and the Brazilian Rural Confederation-were originally formed as part of the corporatist structure created under the tutelage of President Vargas. Forty years later these organizations retained their corporatist flavor and their dependence on the state in an essentially paternalistic relationship. Some analysts argue that post-1964 government policies with respect to such issues as wages and land reform are testimony to the influence of the groups. In other areas-particularly the growing importance of the state and of foreign economic interests-the interests of Brazilian businessmen have clearly not been served, however. The preservation of old systems of land tenure is attributed more to the electoral sphere-where the rural tradition of coronelismo guides peasants to vote the dictates of large landowners-than to the effectiveness of the Brazilian Rural Confederation (see Rural Society, ch. 2; Electoral Politics, this ch.). In response to the ineffectiveness of traditional interest groups in combating the inroads made by government corporations and multinational corporations into areas of production previously held by the private sector, a number of new businessmen's associations were formed that by the early 1980s had proved to be more adept at lobbying government policymakers. Three of the more powerful groups were the Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo, the Brazilian Association for the Development of Basic Industry, and the National Federation of Banks. These organizations were small, but they were well funded and highly visible in Brasilia and in the national press. Industrial and landowning interests also retained a direct role in policymaking in semiautonomous enterprises (autarquias), such as the Brazilian Coffee Institute and the Sugar and Alcohol Institute. These and similar autarquias, which function to promote exports and set prices, standards, and quotas for exports, are staffed by civil servants and by representatives of the relevant industries. Liberal Groups In the early 1980s the Roman Catholic Church and a number of incipient independent labor unions were by far the most significant liberal interest groups. Students were the most radical, but their importance diminished markedly after being severely repressed during the late 1960s and early 1970s. A number of less significant organizations, many of which emerged during the post-1974 liberalization, could also be labeled as representing interests in the "liberal" camp. Organizations of women, which in the early 1960s had precipitated demonstrations that helped galvanize opposition to the Joao Goulart regime, assumed a liberal flavor in the 1970s as they sought equal rights for women, a quickened pace of liberalization under the military regime, and just solutions to the economic dislocation created by growing inflation. Blacks also sought equal political, economic, and cultural rights within a number of organizations, the most important of which was the United Black Movement Against Racial Discrimination. The Indigenous Missionary Council, an organization of the Catholic church, was formed in 1974 to defend the rights of indigenous people in Brazil's interior. The Brazilian Order of Lawyers was a professional organization interested in improving the system of justice and has often addressed the regime's abuses of human rights. Brazilians have long been noted as highly individualistic, however, and such organized pursuits of equal rights concerns were relatively new phenomena. Their future effectiveness was probably dependent on continued political liberalization. The Church The church in Brazil has been in the forefront of the growing activism of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America since World War II. The major organ of this activist role has been the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, which was created in 1952 and initially led by Bishop Helder Camara (later named archbishop of Recife and Olinda). The majority of Brazil's bishops deny that their activities are specifically political in nature; rather, they say, the cause of social justice for the poor and the victims of discrimination is a pastoral prerogative and a fulfillment of the teachings of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, in Brazil (particularly during the 15 years following the 1964 coup) such activities inevitably became political in nature, given the lack of political institutions legitimately representing these interests. During the 1970s political observers all pointed to the church-because it was unique as an institution that enjoyed a degree of immunity from government repression-as the most effective voice of opposition to the regime. By the early 1980s abertura had changed that role; if and when the fledgling political parties and interest groups become stronger, the direct political involvement of the church may become redundant. The political leanings of church officials, of course, are by no means homogeneous: sentiments vary from those who openly advocate socialism as a solution to income inequality (detractors of leftist prelates, such as Archbishop Camara and Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, archbishop of Sao Paulo, have dubbed them "red bishops") to ultraconservative bishops associated with the Sao Paulo-based Brazilian Society for the Defense of Traditional Family and Property (an anticommunist lay organization founded in 1960 by Plinio Correa de Oliveira). Disagreement did occasionally surface, particularly with respect to the appointment of new bishops; but on the whole, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops has managed to achieve a high degree of agreement and, after 1967, consistency in its public pronouncements against the military government. Shortly after the coup the bishops issued a statement in favor of "the Armed Forces [which] responded in time and prevented the implantation of a Bolshevik regime from being consummated in our land." This was a reflection of the anticommunist sentiment of the majority of the church hierarchy, which sought to patch up relations with the new government as well as to diminish the influence of the so-called Catholic left, whose adherents had worked closely with radical student and rural labor organizations during the early 1960s. The position of the church soon began to change, however, as its personnel became victims of increased government repression. Harassment of church officials identified with opposition to government policies, charges of subversion against some, the expulsion of foreign priests, and the arrest and torture of numerous laity engaged in church activities increasingly led the Catholic hierarchy to oppose the government in order to defend the sanctity of the religious institution. In November 1967 the same Central Commission of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops that only three and one-half years earlier had praised the new military government issued a document entitled "Why the Bishops Cannot Remain Quiet," in which they strongly criticized the government. By 1970 such public expressions of the church went beyond self-defense to address the human rights concerns of the public as a whole. In that year the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops first publicly criticized torture, illegal imprisonments, judicial restrictions, and denials of habeas corpus. Human rights became a major concern of Cardinal Arns, and the Commission of Justice and Peace, an agency of his archdiocese, became the principal organization actively defending the victims of the regime's security apparatus during the early and mid-1970s. Church-led protests over the deaths of Vladimir Herzog and Manoel Fiel Filho in 1975 led to the definitive end of the practice of torture by government security agencies (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). A May 1973 document entitled "I Heard the Cries of My People," issued by 17 members of the church hierarchy in the impoverished Northeast, signaled the revival of the church in the role of social critic. It criticized the economic miracle, arguing that the regime's economic program had led to an increased concentration of income, structural unemployment, malnutrition, and inadequate housing, education, and health services for the poor. This role was maintained and refined during the next decade, when church officials became the chief activists on behalf of the nation's poor. In urban areas the church worked with labor unions and with residents of the growing shantytowns, called favelas (see Urbanization, ch. 2). In rural areas church officials concerned themselves with questions of land tenure and inadequate social services. Although the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops and other forums of the church hierarchy continued to speak out on such issues, perhaps the most politically significant vehicles for the church's social role were the grass-roots organizations known as ecclesiastically based communities. First appearing in the early 1970s in the wake of Vatican II in order to relieve the workload of overburdened priests, the ecclesiastically based communities grew in number to an estimated 80,000 by 1980, having a membership of some 1.5 million. Attached to local parishes, most have purely religious functions, such as prayer and Bible study, although according to longtime observer Thomas G. Sanders, a large and apparently increasing number are "assuming an active role in articulating group interests, making changes in the community, and putting pressure on politicians and public officials to promote policies benefiting their interests." During the first decade of their existence, the ecclesiastically based communities limited their concerns to local issues, and there was little linkage between the various organizations. Political observers took note, however, of their rapid growth and of the larger potential of the ecclesiastically based communities, which by the early 1980s were the most extensive grass-roots organizations in the nation. Labor Labor unions in Brazil, estimated to encompass 10 to 15 percent of the work force, were, by and large, weak institutions. On only two occasions in its modern history-the early 1960s and the late 1970s-has organized labor been an effective, independent voice of the working class. Otherwise, labor unions have displayed a remarkable continuity since the 1930s, when they were reorganized under the paternalistic, corporate controls of President Vargas' Estado Novo (see The Estado Novo, ch. 1). Labor's growing independence from state controls during the 1960-64 period was seen by some observers as one cause of the political crisis that culminated in the 1964 coup d'etat. After the coup the military government reasserted and refined the corporatist system, whereby the state controlled wages, union leadership, and finances and made strikes essentially illegal. Unions were not eliminated as they were under other South American authoritarian regimes, but activities outside those sanctioned by the government were repressed. Many analysts at the time claimed that authoritarian control of organized labor-enforcing low wages in a growing export-oriented industrial sector-was the key to the viability of the development scheme pursued in these years. High wages, they argued, would cost Brazil its competitiveness in world markets. The 1978-79 period brought a reawakening of independent union activity, but the next three years saw reversals and left doubts among those who had hoped that the growth of independent and representative labor unions would keep pace with the process of political liberalization. The corporatist nature of labor unions was reflected in labor legislation, which in the early 1980s still defined the union as an "organ of collaboration of the State." Unions were supervised and regulated in detail by the Ministry of Labor; comprehensive labor legislation guaranteed benefits, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, and paid vacations; unions were financed by the government (from a union tax collected from workers); and labor courts, rather than collective bargaining, settled labor disputes. Perhaps the most pervasive instrument of state influence, however, lay in the control of union leadership. According to Sanders, the traditional union leader, known as a pelego, "has the mentality of a bureaucrat or administrator, and he is more concerned with maintaining the confidence of employers and government officials than that of the workers whom he theoretically represents. He is loyal to the system because of the access it provides to influence, gifts, and positions in the labor courts and union hierarchy." On numerous occasions since 1964, the Ministry of Labor has removed more independently minded union leadership in order to reinstitute the system of peleguismo. Competition among different unions for membership was precluded by law. Only one union per category of worker (profession) could be formed in any locale. Five or more unions in the same sector of the economy could form a federation; a minimum of three federations was required to establish a national confederation. A national organization of workers from a variety of crafts or skills was forbidden. Peleguismo dominated the leadership of the federations, the confederations, and the smaller unions. The independent leadership that emerged first during the early 1970s as the trade union opposition (oposicao sindical) then blossomed during the late 1970s, was found largely in local unions in the major urban areas. The most prominent of these leaders was Luis Inacio da Silva (known popularly as "Lula"), president of the metallurgical workers union in the Sao Paulo suburb of Sao Bernardo. Often compared to Poland's Lech Walesa, Lula was the principal leader of several hundred thousand strikers who demanded that wages lost from the government's falsification of the inflation index (which determined wage increases) in 1973 be granted retroactively. In addition to metallurgical workers, strikers came to include teachers, television workers, construction workers, garbage collectors, and medical personnel; strikes spread from Sao Paulo to workers in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, Parana, and Acre. The strikes peaked in 1978 and 1979; in the latter year, a week after the inauguration of President Figueiredo, the strike in Sao Paulo was declared illegal, and Lula was placed under arrest. The long-dormant National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederacao Nacional de Trabalhistas Agricola-CONTAG) also became active during this period. In October 1979 some 18,000 sugarcane workers in Pernambuco struck and won large salary increases and a number of improvements in benefits and working conditions. The landowners failed, however, to observe the new contract, and much of the effort of CONTAG continued to be directed toward making landowners uphold these and other legal requirements, such as minimum wages and social security payments. Rural labor had an important ally during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the Catholic church's Pastoral Land Commission, which worked directly with peasants and rural proletariats, particularly in growing concerns over questions of land tenure (see Rural Society, ch. 2). The lack of militancy displayed by workers from 1980 through 1982 was attributed to a variety of causes. Slowed growth, combined with accelerated inflation, led to greater government willingness to repress wage demands; workers, aware of the growing pool of unemployed potential strikebreakers, were more cautious. Also, a new wage law in 1979 partially addressed the worker dissatisfaction of the previous years by making wage adjustments based on inflation and increases in productivity every six months rather than annually. Yet another factor was the growing division among the union leaders. After the successful 1979 strikes the new leadership (independent of the traditional system of peleguismo) had united under the banner of the Labor Union Unity (Unidade Sindical). The subsequent growth of a number of competing political parties, however, each vying for the allegiance of organized labor, led to the splintering of Unidade Sindical along party lines. It was reported in 1982 that the major division was between moderates, who retained the name of Unidade Sindical, and the more militant leaders, linked to Lula's Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT), who called themselves the authentics (autenticos). Students Like students throughout much of Latin America, university students in Brazil have been the most radicaly leftist of organized interest groups. This was particularly true during the mid-1960s, when People's Action (Acao Popular-AP), a radical student group organized in 1962, worked closely with the Catholic left in the organization of workers and peasants until the coup and subsequently was in the forefront of organized opposition to the military regime. Institutional Act Number 5 of December 1968 and Decree-Law 477, issued two months later, prohibited all political activity by students or faculty and effectively quashed student activism until 1977. In the atmosphere of political liberalization that year, students organized protest demonstrations unlike anything seen in Brazil for almost a decade. During the next five years, large public demonstrations by students were not in evidence, although under the political liberalization of abertura leftist students revived the old National Union of Students (Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes-UNE) that had been declared illegal in the wake of the 1964 coup. Like so many of Brazil's associational groups, the UNE had been founded during the Vargas regime as part of the corporatist structure under the aegis of the state. During the Second Republic (1946-64) the UNE came under a variety of influences, and by early 1964 it was dominated by the radical AP. Both groups were officially abolished after the coup, but students reorganized clandestinely and in 1966 and 1968 spearheaded the two largest protest demonstrations during the early years of the military regime. The government formed its own student organization, but it failed to attract supporters and was abolished in 1968. The repression of late 1968 and early 1969 effectively put an end to organized student activism for a period of eight years, although the initial impact was to drive many students into the revolutionary guerrilla groups that plagued Brazilian cities between 1968 and 1972. A 1973 study by Amnesty International reported that students accounted for some 40 percent of the victims of torture and assassination in Brazilian prisons during the early 1970s. The decline in the quality of higher education during the military regime has been widely reported: between 1960 and 1980 enrollment grew from 100,000 to 1.5 million, while the percentage of the federal budget allocated to all levels of education went from 9.2 percent in 1961 to 13 percent in 1964, then declined steadily until 1977, when the percentage was a mere 3.6. By 1980 the federal education budget had reportedly grown to over 5 percent of the total, though tuition and fees in private universities (accounting for over half the total university enrollment) were also rising dramatically (see Education, ch. 2). When organized student protests reemerged in Sao Paulo in March 1977, it was these deteriorating conditions that provided the initial spark. Again in September 1980 all 57 of the nation's public and private universities went on strike for several days to protest increased fees and the general deterioration of university conditions. Student activism with respect to larger political issues during the late 1970s and early 1980s was significantly muted compared with the heady days of the 1960s, however. Between May and August 1977 a number of demonstrations were organized (some of which turned violent) to protest police repression of the student activists. Demonstrators also called for the release of all political prisoners and the restoration of political liberties. The universities were relatively quiet during the next five years. The UNE was formally reconstituted in 1979, and its delegates endorsed a charter pledging to "fight against oppression" and to support "the demands of the working class." Several thousand students attended the annual congresses of the UNE in 1979 and 1980. The leadership elected at each represented a variety of leftist positions.