$Unique_ID{COW00360} $Pretitle{370} $Title{Belgium Chapter 4D. Interest Groups} $Subtitle{} $Author{Rinn-Sup Shinn} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{belgian belgium states economic foreign political countries percent cooperation policy} $Date{1984} $Log{} Country: Belgium Book: Belgium, A Country Study Author: Rinn-Sup Shinn Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1984 Chapter 4D. Interest Groups Influence on public opinion and policymaking is exerted by a multitude of groups covering a wide range of social, cultural, professional, and economic activities. In parliament the interest groups may attempt to pressure party leaders to use their persuasion in obtaining the passage of a particular bill, or an interest-group member may be in parliament and thereby sway others. In relations with the cabinet, the groups may work through the parties that are represented there. If the groups are economically significant, they usually get an audience with the minister whose ministry corresponds with their interests. Generally, the cabinet retains more independence from the lobbyists than do the parties because its ministers, by consensus, make important decisions on national issues. Such consensus may benefit from advance consultation with representatives of nongovernmental groups, but the process of what is known as concertation (see Glossary) may at times be eliminated. A case in point was the decision of the Martens V government in 1981 to modify the terms of indexing without consulting the labor unions, which make up one of the so-called social partners in government, management, and labor. The modification was accomplished under the special powers authority granted the government by parliament. In Belgium there are several kinds of pressure groups: religious or philosophical, cultural, economic, professional, group service, and civil organizations. The first group includes church, Masonic, and free-not state-university organizations. The most influential of these is the Roman Catholic Church, although its political role declined after 1958 when a Social Christian-Liberal compromise on a program of state aid to church-operated primary and secondary schools removed the religious question from the forefront of politics in earlier years (see The Second School Conflict 1950-58, ch. 1.). The church's voice has not been completely stilled, however. It continues to support the candidates of the CVV/PSC, and its position on Catholic education, social policy, and abortion is usually upheld by both Dutch-speaking and French-speaking Social Christians. Cultural groups are usually linked to the Dutch-speaker or French-speaker movements seeking to promote a language-based regional and cultural identity. Their influence has waned considerably since the rise of small regional political parties in the 1970s. Economic groups cover a diverse array of people, such as bankers, employers, middle-class workers, farmers, civil servants, and white- and blue-collar workers, as well as community services and certain professions. In the financial circle the best known and most powerful group is the Societe General de Belgique, the giant private financial conglomerate, which is seen by many to be a source of enormous influence on the government's financial policies (see Financial Services, ch. 3). The official spokesman for management in relations with the government and the labor unions and on the national economy is the Federation of Belgian Enterprises (VBO/FEB), which comprises some 40 major industrial and nonindustrial associations. Among the nonindustrial concerns are banks, insurance companies, distribution firms, and multinational corporations. Middle-class organizations are set up for the protection of artisans, small and medium-sized firms, and shopkeepers. The welfare of these self-employed people is also the primary concern of the Ministry of Public Works and Middle Classes at the national level. For farmers, two organizations-the Farmers League (Belgische Boerenbond, commonly called the Boerenbond) in Flanders and the Belgian Agricultural Alliance (Alliance Agricole Belge-AAB) in Wallonia-are the most influential. The former is linked closely to the CVP/PSC. These organizations act on educational, financial, and political matters. Collective buying and selling, insurance, and savings banks also are among their endeavors. In recent years their scope of operation has expanded to the European level because the EC has empowered them to make certain decisions on agriculture in its member countries (see Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, ch. 3). Liberal professions maintain their own associations covering medicine, law, pharmacy, and architecture. Political activity is also organized for alumni associations of institutions of higher learning. Civil servants are grouped along political and language lines. Blue- and white-collar workers compose three major trade unions: the Federation of Belgian Christian Trade Unions (ACV/CSC), the General Federation of Belgian Labor (ABVV/FGTB), and the General Center of Belgian Liberal Trade Unions (ACLBV/CGSLB). Although these unions claim to be independent of any political party, they are in fact closely linked to the Social Christians, the Socialists, and the Liberals, respectively. At the end of the 1970s they claimed to account for 70 percent of the labor force, the highest rate of unionization in the EC. The intimate ties between the unions and the political parties have yielded favorable labor legislation and social security benefits. Many union leaders have served on party committees at local and national levels. The role of trade unions as pressure groups stems from a 1935 government crisis during which representatives of the unions were consulted for the first time. The organization of trade unions has developed without parliamentary legislation. Workers have been consulted since the 1930s on important social and economic matters relating to their own industry on a national level through various councils. Trade union executives have been able to exert some pressure on the formation of coalition governments, and unions also have been involved in monitoring the implementation of legislation. Pressure has been wielded through strikes, demonstrations, press campaigns, communiques, memorandums, or pressuring the political parties against participating in the coalition government. For decades the major weakness of the trade unions has been the division of the labor movement into partisan lines. Since the late 1970s the ABVV/FGTB and the ACV/CSC have made a concerted effort to present a common front in the labor offensive, but their limited success has been confined mostly to Wallonia. In Flanders the CSC continued to collaborate with the centrist Social Christians. Through the mid-1950s the ABVV/FGTB, which in 1979 comprised about 1,113,000 members, was the largest federation, but in 1959 the ACV/CSC became the front-runner for the first time. In 1979 it had 1,273,000 members; an unknown proportion of this membership belonged to the broadly based (ACW/MOC), founded in 1945. The distant third in union strength was the ACLBV/CGSLB, which had 200,000 members in 1979. Community service groups are organized along religious or political lines and provide services to the members associated with traditional parties. Various groups form mutual aid organizations that operate clinics and health programs throughout the country. These are affiliated with the three traditional parties and play an important role in retaining unity within them or in what are commonly known as "the Catholic world," "the Socialist world," and "the Liberal world." These "worlds" are also referred to as "pillars". The press, radio, and television are another source of influence on public opinion and, possibly, policymaking as well. Most of the important newspapers and periodicals are run by family concerns having distinct political leanings-usually right-of-center-and except for a few "national" newspapers, such as Le Soir and De Standaard, are regionalized. Radio and television, however, are public services run by the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking community councils under the terms of the 1980 reform of the state. The public corporations for radio and television (BRT/RTBF) are supposedly independent and neutral in news and reporting but in actuality are highly politicized. Their governing boards are composed of members elected by the community councils according to proportional representation. Electronic media are considered to be generally left-of-center, especially in Wallonia. Foreign Affairs Belgian foreign policy in 1984 continued to be influenced by the country's geographical and historical setting. As a small nation that twice in the twentieth century was victimized by foreign aggression, the kingdom has since World War II abandoned its so-called free hands policy-a euphemism for its policy of passive neutrality-and has opted for a policy of active and multifaceted cooperation with other nations. The principle underlying Belgian foreign relations was nowhere more aptly and authoritatively expressed than in Minister of Foreign Affairs (and former prime minister) Leo Tindemans' statement of March 1982: So now we come to the paradox of a small country: because of its powerlessness to act alone in a world which has no rules of law, it is forced to resort to alliances in which it enjoys certain prerogatives. If it avails itself of those rights, if it defines its own position and upholds it consistently, it can carry weight in the decisionmaking process. In other words, a small country acting alone-which, outside any alliances, leads to impotence-may, within such alliances, exert a certain amount of influence. Historical and Political Factors At the close of World War II, Belgian leaders were convinced that the kingdom could not hope to have much impact on international affairs if it again tried to stand alone economically and politically. Therefore, they sought to foster the development of a multilateral framework in which Belgium could assert itself out of proportion to its size and population. In 1944 the exiled leaders met in London with representatives of the Netherlands and Luxembourg to sign a joint customs convention. Effective from 1948, this agreement paved the way for the Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg Economic Union (Benelux). Efforts toward multilateral cooperation continued during the 1950s, leading to participation in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), which became the basis for the EC (see Appendix B). On a parallel level the concern for national security led to participation in the regional collective arrangement called NATO in 1949. In joining the NATO alliance the Belgian leaders were of the view that, given their limited military capability, Belgium and the noncommunist states of Europe should forgo the development of their own nuclear weapons and cooperate with the United States in the formation of an effective regional collective defense system (see Belgium and NATO, ch. 5). In the early 1960s, when the rapidly growing worldwide pressure for decolonization prompted Belgium to divest itself of political control over its African possessions, the country became more dependent than ever on international cooperation. Government spokesmen repeatedly expressed the view that the promotion of economic and cultural exchanges between nations would result in a foreign policy environment for improved political relations and for general security. Multilateral Relations In asserting the principles on which its European policy is based, government spokesmen have pointed to the advantages of a united Europe and have opposed the reassertion of strong nationalistic tendencies. Reminding continental leaders that twice in a period of fewer than 25 years Europe was at war within itself, foreign policy spokesmen have advocated increased economic cooperation and the development of a political structure so carefully balanced that none of the component states would be tempted to attain supremacy. Cooperation and continued progress toward integration have been seen as enabling the states of Europe to develop a level of strength and to solve problems that no single nation could accomplish by itself. Of the regional organizations in which Belgium is an active participant, the most significant are Benelux, the EC, and NATO-organizations whose aims coincide with the country's principal foreign policy objectives of economic cooperation and national security. All three organizations are headquartered in Brussels. Benelux evolved out of the realization by leaders of the participating countries that small states would not be able to compete economically with larger countries unless they were able to pool a portion of their economic resources, cooperate, and enter into international negotiations with a single voice. In 1958 the Benelux convention of 1944 was expanded into a formal treaty establishing an economic union that became effective in 1960. The treaty set forth several goals, including the free movement of persons; the abolition of work permits; liberalization of transport regulations; the free exchange of goods, capital, and services; the coordination of economic and social policies; and the pursuance of a common trade policy toward third countries. From the 1960s onward the Benelux states made significant progress toward the achievement of these goals. Particular success was noted in the elimination of trade restrictions, the free movement of labor, and the coordination of economic policies permitting the three states to strike a common negotiating position in dealing with nonmembers. In 1983 the three member states continued to account for 7 percent of the world's total trade turnover, ranking it third after the United States and West Germany and ahead of Japan. Benelux also possesses the top port complex of the world in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Antwerp. Although Benelux has not been able to meet all of its objectives and has been overshadowed by the EC, it has enabled the three states to have an important impact on European and Atlantic affairs. Although many of the organization's problems remain unsolved, its effectiveness is evident in that Benelux has joint commercial treaties with more than 30 countries. There also is evidence that the three Benelux countries are increasingly coordinating their foreign policies. In 1955 Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg proposed to other European states the initial steps toward a new level of economic cooperation. During the next two years Belgium was one of six governments-with France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany-that negotiated the Treaty of Rome, establishing the EEC. A second and related treaty concluded at the same time set up the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). These treaties came into force in January 1958. In 1967 further steps were taken to strengthen regional bodies by setting up common institutions for the EC (see Appendix B). Through the mid-1980s Belgium consistently strove toward the evolution of a stronger and more integrated pattern of mutual cooperation among European states. In the early 1980s nearly 80 percent of Belgian trade was with the EC states. When in the 1950s Belgium was faced with the problem of integrating its outmoded coal production industry into the European community network, it was assisted by the ECSC in the development of new industries and the retraining of workers in order to make possible the closing of inefficient mines without a severe economic dislocation. There was little question that Belgium viewed the community institutions as a step toward full economic and political union of present and future member states. From the outset of the negotiations for the EEC treaty, Belgium has consistently supported the expansion of the original six participants to include others. Particularly strong support from Benelux was given to the inclusion of Britain, a goal that was achieved in 1973, when Britain, Denmark, and Ireland were added to the EC. Significant among the reasons for Benelux support of the EC expansion was the desire to prevent one of the two major European economic powers-France and West Germany-from dominating the organization. The Benelux leaders probably looked to Britain as a means of balancing the two large continental powers. Such a counterbalance was believed to be important for continued stability in the EC and for enhancing the bargaining position of the Benelux states. Despite its ardent advocacy of more supranational executive and legislative powers for the EC institutions, Belgium has tempered its approach with prudence. Belgian historian Michel Dumoulin echoed the prevailing official sentiment in 1980: Belgium has to be careful to intervene only when she has something constructive to offer because, as Pierre Harmel [a former prime minister and foreign minister] once said, 'with countries as small as ours, diplomacy is only effective when the ideas put forward are genuinely useful.' Were Belgium to overstep these limits, were she to be forever demanding something, she would destroy her reputation as a faithful artisan of integration. Belgium gave consistently strong support to the NATO alliance, and one of its best known international statesmen, Paul Henri Spaak, served the organization as secretary general during the 1957-61 period. When France withdrew from NATO in 1967, Belgium provided new headquarters facilities for both the military and the civil wings of the organization in Brussels and near Mons. For years Belgium also has held the view that NATO should broaden its scope to promote active cooperation on the nonmilitary front. As early as 1966, Harmel, then minister of foreign affairs, proposed a plan for increased political cooperation among NATO members, coupled with the opening of consultations between NATO and the communist Warsaw Treaty Organization on East-West detente and mutual and balanced force reductions. Since then Belgian political parties have had conflicting expressions on the question of missile deployment on Belgian territory, but the Martens V government continued to be a most dependable ally of NATO and the United States (see Belgian and NATO, ch. 5). Bilateral Relations In the early 1980s diplomatic relations were maintained with more than 140 countries, 124 of which had resident embassies or legations in Brussels. A number of the foreign ambassadors stationed in Brussels also were accredited to Luxembourg and/or the Netherlands. Generally, a large part of Belgian foreign relations was directed toward West European neighbors, the United States and Canada, and its former African colonies. Belgian foreign relations have a substantial economic slant. West Germany, France, and the Netherlands are the three most important trading partners, both as suppliers and as customers. In 1981 Belgium and Luxembourg signed an agreement on educational, medical, and cultural cooperation and on the development of road and rail communications. The economies of Belgium and Luxembourg are tied together through the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), and trade statistics are reported in combined form. In January 1984 the two countries agreed on a 10-year pact covering production, investment, and commercial cooperation between their steel industries (see Foreign Economic Relations, ch. 3). Relations with the United States are very close and friendly because of a similar worldview, mutual respect, and a common dedication to European security and welfare. Belgium maintains strong political, economic, and cultural ties to the United States-multilaterally through NATO and bilaterally through a series of cultural, technical, and trade agreements. The United States continues to play a significant role in the Belgian economy; in 1982 its investments there accounted for 39 percent of all foreign investments. By comparison, the eight EC member countries had a combined total of 34 percent. During the 1959-82 period the United States share of the foreign investments was 44 percent, compared with 42 percent for EC countries, of which the top three investors were West Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Relations with the United States, however, were not entirely free of discord in 1984. One source of misunderstanding was the sensitive issue of technology transfer to communist countries. This question arose in August-September 1984, when the United States reportedly opposed Belgian sales of highly sophisticated precision machine tools to the Soviet Union. The opposition was based on the view that the tools would be of strategic value because of their potential for speeding up the pace of Soviet missile production. In granting export licenses to a small Belgian firm, the Martens V government concluded that the sales were essentially in compliance with the regulations of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports Controls (Cocom), the Western group-of which Belgium is a member-that monitors trade with communist countries. From the Belgian perspective, the issue had a broader policy implication. The Belgian government evidently desired more leeway-without outside pressure-in determining what was strategic. The sensitive question was again brought into sharp relief between May and October 1984-this time over the Libyan effort to secure Belgian assistance in the design and construction of nuclear plants. In urging the Belgian government to reject the proposal, some United States officials let it be known about their concern that Libya could learn to build nuclear weapons, although the transaction would not involve the transfer of militarily useful technology. These officials were not unmindful of the fact that the lines between the technologies for peaceful civilian use of nuclear energy and militarily useful ones had become increasingly blurred. As the year drew to a close, indications were that Belgium would be willing to forgo nuclear contracts in Libya, should other EC countries do likewise in a joint action. From all indications Belgian perceptions of relations with the United States in 1984 were probably the same as they were in earlier years. In 1982 Minister of Foreign Affairs Tindemans stated that even "in the best of circumstances, there will remain a difference in sensitivity, reactions, and interests between the Europeans and the United States." He opined that this difference was compounded by what he called "our defense relationship," to wit: The average citizen on both Continents tends to see [the NATO alliance] as a sort of protectorate; the United States as protector calls the tune and defines policies which have to be followed in essence, willy-nilly, by the Europeans. This wrong image brings difficulties on both sides: in America, a reluctance to underwrite a defense guarantee for the benefit of ungrateful proteges; and in Europe the sense of not being masters of their own fate, of being brought into disputes which are not entirely their own. Tindemans maintained that to the Europeans (Belgians included), "military power is not and cannot be good in itself; it is only a somewhat repellent necessity." According to him, "while, for most Americans, problems have to be solved by direct action (and, if they are not, Washington is somehow deemed not to be entirely equal to its task), the Europeans tend to circumvent problems, to negotiate them away, or simply to try and outlive them." Both attitudes were said to be equally valid, depending on circumstances, and in any case they are bound to generate frictions between the two sides of the Atlantic. Tindemans acknowledged that there were indeed "very few neutralists or unilateral disarmers in Europe" but that the terms "pacifism or neutralism" as applied to Europe were without merit. He argued that the real crux of the problem was "a general feeling of frustration and impotence due to the economic crisis," not to mention the renewed international tension in the early 1980s. In his words, "Most Europeans, in the face of such developments, are not quite sure that their interests are fully taken into account. And it is true, indeed, that in many cases our interests may differ, as well as our sensitivities and views." Belgian relations with communist states were generally cordial in 1984. Belgium actively supported steps toward East-West cooperation. During the early 1960s it began to pursue a policy of making contact with the communist states of Eastern Europe, and in 1966 Harmel proposed measures for an improved political climate between the two major military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In 1968 Belgian contacts with the communist states were interrupted by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia but resumed in 1970, when Belgium joined a number of communist and noncommunist countries in calling for an all-European conference on security, formally called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the preparatory phase of the conference, which finally opened in 1973, Harmel was the EC unofficial spokesman. The separation between politics and trade continued to be the pragmatic basis for relations with communist countries. Belgian trade with the Soviet Union has showed a steady expansion, but Belgium has remained alert to the fact that the Soviet Union was not only expansionist, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, but was also interventionist, as in the Polish crises. In the eyes of Belgian leaders the Soviet Union was eager to sow division in the NATO alliance and was intent on seizing every opportunity to fish in the troubled waters of the world. Moreover, the Soviet Union was seen as being unable to present itself as a model of development for emerging nations. Again, in Tindemans' assessment, "only the West can provide a realistic model for international cooperation, for an international order based on true sovereignty, on tolerance, diversity, and on a degree of real solidarity and mutual help." He is quick to acknowledge that "detente has earned a bad name due to our own weakness in reacting to Soviet rearmament and to their inroads in the Third World" but that a policy of military confrontation-"the ground on which the Soviet Union enjoys its best advantages" -was not a solution to the problem. In a speech delivered to an American audience in February 1982, Tindemans argued for a case of coexistence with the East: This is not an excuse or being weak for behaving meekly in the face of Soviet abuses of international law and morality. It is only an invitation to adopt a sophisticated attitude, combining the defense efforts needed to strictly maintain our security, strong reactions against reprehensible Soviet actions, and a constant, public, well-advertised readiness to distinguish among Eastern bloc nations and to cooperate with them according to their policies and circumstances. In the early 1980s Belgium renewed and refocused its policy toward Africa, which Belgium regarded as its "gateway" into the Third World. Africa was valued as a major producer of raw materials and as a promising market for consumer goods and technology. The new emphasis was on diversifying Belgian relations with the African states within the framework of a balanced policy embracing the entire continent; this represented a shift from its previous policy, which had been based essentially on its "special relationships" with its former colonies, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. As of 1981 about 49,000 Belgian nationals resided in Africa, nearly 20,000 of them in the three former Belgian colonies. In the early 1960s, when the three colonies became independent, they absorbed nearly all of the bilateral aid from Belgium. Even in 1966 as much as 87 percent of total aid was channeled to the three-some 63 percent to Zaire, 13 percent of Rwanda, and 12 percent to Burundi. In the 1967 budget, however, funds for the three countries decreased to 78 percent, which remained more or less unchanged during the next five years. The drop reflected a gradual effort by Belgium to lay the foundations for a program of cooperation in development with several other new African states. In a study made public in 1973, a Belgian research center criticized the concentration of bilateral aid in the former colonies and called for a revision of the entire assistance program. The study also noted that the aid program for the former colonies supported Belgian investments and had too many strings attached. In response to these criticisms, the government acknowledged that it was necessary to alter the situation but that changes would have to take place cautiously so as not to harm the country's economic interests and to fit the needs of the recipient countries. In the late 1970s the equivalent of about US$6 billion, a major portion of Belgian foreign investments, was in the rich copper mines of Zaire. In 1978 Belgium joined France and the United States in sending troops into Zaire, partly to protect its huge economic interests and partly to rescue its citizens who were threatened by invading Katangese rebels in Angola. In the early 1980s Belgian interest in Africa remained strong. Nearly 71 percent of its total bilateral aid went to Africa, compared with 15 percent for Asia (east of the Suez Canal) and 5 percent for Latin America. Of that total, 48 percent was earmarked for the three former colonies-some 34 percent to Zaire alone. According to a 1983 publication of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Our African role' is also a consequence of the trule receptive audience Belgium encounters in Africa. . . . Belgium's colonial achievements are gaining wider appreciation among a large number of African countries, and have now become one of our most satisfactory 'calling cards." Much of the aid of African countries was directed to technical and educational assistance programs, health care, transport, and communications. In this respect, Belgium in the early 1980s was among the top industrialized countries giving aid toward the development of the Third World. Its bilateral aid to the 31 least developed countries, 21 of which were in Africa, was 23 percent of the total bilateral aid given by all countries in 1981. * * * Among the relatively few English-language works on Belgian politics and government deserving further reading are The Politics of Belgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society by John Fitzmaurice; Martin O. Heisler's "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output Side in Belgium" in Politics in Europe, edited by the same author; Keith Hill's "Belgium: Political Change in a Segmented Society" in Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook, edited by Richard Rose; the two articles on the Belgian civil service by Leo Moulin and Hugo Van Hassel in The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants, edited by Mattei Dogan; and R.E.M. Irving's "Christian Democracy in Belgium" in The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe, also edited by Irving. Succinct insights into the complex dimensions of the Belgian polity are also provided by Martin O. Heisler's "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium" in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; and Maureen Covell's "Ethnic Conflict and Elite Bargaining: The Case of Belgium" in West European Politics. An authoritative interpretation of how the Belgian Constitution works is available in Robert Senelle's The Belgian Constitution: Commentary, in the Memo from Belgium series published in 1974 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development. The very complicated issue of the 1980 reform of the state is authoritatively explained by Senelle in The Reform of the Belgian State, volume 3, published in 1980; and Belgium's foreign policy is covered in Belgian Foreign Policy Aims and Objectives, a collection of speeches delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs Leo Tindemans between January and June 1982. A handy reference to the various governmental and political institutions of Belgium is available in the form of Memento politique, 1983: Martens V, compiled by Clair Ysebaert. Readers also may benefit from the annual political year-book called Politiek Jaarboek/Annee politique, published by Res Publica in Brussels. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.).