$Unique_ID{COW00341}
$Pretitle{370}
$Title{Belgium
Introduction}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Stephan B. Wickman}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{ch
political
belgian
social
belgium
wallonia
catholic
language
belgians
country}
$Date{1984}
$Log{}
Country:     Belgium
Book:        Belgium, A Country Study
Author:      Stephan B. Wickman
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1984

Introduction

     A cartoon character appearing in a French-language Belgian
publication in early 1984 lamented: "The more one knows how things
are going in Flanders and Wallonia, the less one knows how
things are going in Belgium." The same complaint could easily come from an
outside observer struggling to understand this small but complex country.

     Flanders, roughly the northern half of the country, is inhabited
primarily by the Dutch-speaking Flemings, who make up the majority of the
Belgian population (see fig. 1; table 3, Appendix A). Its historical and
cultural identities are distinct from those of Wallonia, home of the
French-speaking Walloons, who account for about one third of the population.
In between lies the national capital, Brussels, where most of the residents
speak French but do not consider themselves to be Walloons. Brussels was
traditionally a Flemish city, as its art and architecture attest, and its
so-called Frenchification has bothered some Flemings, who for years were
treated as second-class citizens throughout the country. The tensions
between these regions and language communities have been the most
outstanding features of the society.

     The origins of the language problem date to well before Belgium's
independence in 1830, but the histories of these early years can suffer
from either of two common biases. On the one hand are historians who stress
the unity of the Belgian peoples in opposing foreign domination. On the other
hand are those who emphasize the separateness of the Dutch speakers and the
French speakers, arguing that Belgium is the unnatural creation of the
European powers who so often battled over its territory.

     The language division occurred gradually after the Germanic Franks
began to invade the territory in the fifth century A.D., wresting it from the
Romans (see Early History, ch. 1). In the northern part of the territory,
where the Germanic influence was strongest, early forms of Dutch developed.
In the southern part, the continued Latin influence gave rise to early forms
of French. During the next millennium, however, the divisiveness inherent
in feudalism (see Glossary) prevented the development of a single center of
power and culture, leaving the various duchies and towns that sprang up
in the territory to their own devices. In particular, the cities and towns
of Flanders flourished during the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance;
the architecture and painting of the Flemish masters were unsurpassed
anywhere else in Europe.

     After the mid-sixteenth century, the territory came under progressively
stronger forms of foreign rule for three centuries (see Foreign Domination,
ch. 1). Although the Netherlands succeeded in throwing out the Spanish
Habsburgs in 1585, the southern part of the Lowlands failed in its attempt
to join the effort. Thereafter the two areas developed separately. The
crucial port of Antwerp, whose access was through the Netherlands, was closed
for more than two centuries. During the ravages of the Inquisition, many
Protestants fled to the Netherlands from the area that eventually became
Belgium. During the period of Austrian rule (1715-95) the old local hierarchy
of the Roman Catholic clergy, the nobility, and the medieval guilds, together
with the growing middle classes of merchants, professionals, and
intellectuals, began to unite in opposing political centralization. Internal
conflicts between the conservative and progressive elements of this primarily
French-speaking opposition, however, undermined the brief Brabant Revolution
(1789-90)-the precursor of independent Belgium-even as Napoleon's armies
swept decisively across the country.

     After Napolean's final defeat in 1815 at Waterloo (located just south
of Brussels), the European powers carried out their plan to unite the Belgian
provinces with the Netherlands under William of Orange. If William had been
receptive to the demands of the opposition in the southern part of his
kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands might have remained one country.
Instead, his obstinacy and incompetence prompted the Belgian elite, still
primarily French-speaking, to take control of the deteriorating economic
and political situation themselves and ultimately to declare independence.
The European powers found the prospect of an independent and neutral
Belgium to their liking and forced William to acquiesce.

     The Dutch-speaking Belgians did not protest the independence movement,
but they gradually realized that history had relegated them to the status
of second-class citizens in a country where they formed the majority. French
had been the language of government and culture since the days of Spanish
rule, and the constitution of 1831 did nothing to ensure equal treatment for
the Dutch languages. Laws recognizing biligualism in Flanders (1873), making
Dutch an official language (1898), and establishing separate Dutch and French
administrations in Flanders and Wallonia (1932) were too long in the making.
The political elite, even that of Flemish parentage, was Fench-speaking. The
situation was exacerbated by the Industrial Revolution, which touched down in
the coalfields and ironworks of Wallonia before spreading elsewhere in Europe,
leaving much of Flanders to languish in relative poverty.

     After the devastation of the two world wars, which again used Belgium
as a battleground, the language issue moved to the center stage of politics.
The controversy reached its worst pass in 1968, when the Flemish students
at the prestigious Catholic University of Louvain (KUL/UCL) took to the
streets to demand the removal of the French half of the university to
Wallonia. The government coalition fell apart during the crisis, and the
political elite, which by then had become primarily Dutch-speaking,
redoubled its efforts to find a permanent solution to the language, or
communities, problem. The politicians agreed among themselves to change
the Constitution, decentralizing some political powers to new regional
and community councils. The changes promulgated in 1971 had to be modified
yet again, amid controversy, in 1980. The status of Brussels was left
unresolved, region governments being set up only in Flanders and Wallonia.
Ironically, economic decline in the aging industries of Wallonia and the
profitable growth of small-scale industry in Flanders had completely turned
the tables in favor of the Flemings by that time.

     Balancing the demands of the Dutch-and French-speaking Belgians remained
the most obvious concern of the Belgian political elite in early 1985. Each of
the traditional political parties had split into two separate parties, one for
the Dutch speakers, the other for the French speakers. In addition, there were
minority parties representing even more strident opinions in favor of extreme
views on regional autonomy (see Political Parties, ch. 4). But there were
other issues of almost equal importance that also had their roots in the
nation's intensely political history. One set of issues pertained to the role
of religion in the society, the other to matters of social and economic
equity. In fact, before the language problem became the major focus of
attention, these issued had dominated Belgian politics.

     Belgium is a Catholic country. (Some historians have argued that the
strong Roman Catholic tradition of the Flemish population was responsible
for its support of the Belgian independence movement against the Protestant
king to the Netherland.) Most Belgians are baptized Roman Catholics, and even
if they are nonpracticing, they must confront the values and attitudes of
Catholicism in their daily lives (see Religion,ch. 2). Organizations
promoting laicism, for example, have felt the need to develop rites of
passage similar to those of Catholicism. Many schools, moreover, are Catholic,
and the values that seem to prevail in the society can perhaps be traced
to its Catholic traditions. But there is also a strong secularist tradition.

     The secularist tradition has been championed by the Liberals, who have
received substantial support from the Freemasons. In 1945 they faced off
against the political party representing the Catholics, who renamed
themselves the Social Christians, severing their formal links to the Roman
Catholic Church. The main battleground of these two parties has been the
school system, which until the nation's independence had been overwhelmingly
Catholic. A political compromise in 1884 established acceptable guidelines
for a separate secular system; the government provided assistance to both
systems (see The First School Conflict, ch. 1). The so-called school conflict
flared up again, however, in the 1950s. It was settled by another compromise
that indexed government assistance to the level of enrollment in each school
(see The Second School Conflict, 1950-58, ch. 1; Education, ch. 2).

     The Socialist, who form the third of the three traditional political
groupings in Belgium, have supported the Liberals in their fight for a strong
secular school system but have quarreled with them over the pace of democratic
and social reform. They championed the cause of the working class, which was
particularly strong in Wallonia, developing their own unions, cooperatives,
and mutual aid societies. As the right to vote was extended to broader
segments of the male population in 1848 and 1919 and to the entire adult
population in 1948, the Social Christians and the Liberals tried to win
popular support by creating institutions similar to those of the Socialists
(see Consolidation of the System, ch. 1). (For the formal names of the three
traditional political groupings, see table A; Political Parties, ch. 4).

     Some Belgian sociologists and political scientists, borrowing a concept
from the Netherlands, have argued that Belgium was thereby carved up into
three ideological pillars (see Glossary) that organized the society into
networks providing cradle-to-grave services to their supports (see Social
Organization and Values, ch. 2). The proclivity of the average Belgian to
affiliate with one or another of these social pillars, however, does not mean
that he or she is less individualistic than other people. The government
dispenses many health and social security benefits through these institutions,
prompting Belgians to affiliate with them only for practical reasons (see
Health and Social Security, ch. 2).

     The economic problems facing the country are similar to those in other
European countries, but they are complicated by the language problem and the
age of much Belgian industry, which survived World War II without being
upgraded or modernized (see Patterns of Development, ch. 3). Unemployment
reached nearly 14 percent of the work force in late 1983, and the country's
relatively high standard of living became harder and harder to maintain (see
Employment and Income, ch. 3). The expense of supporting the comprehensive
social security and unemployment insurance programs caused a fiscal crisis
that had to be met with unpopular austerity measures in 1984 (see Fiscal
Policy, ch. 3). The government has also become involved with the financing and
management of the hardest hit economic sectors: steel, textiles and clothing,
shipbuilding and repair, coal mining, and bottling (see National Sectors, ch.
3).

     The regional distribution of economic activity has been of particular
concern since the 1970s. The advanced technological and service-related
industries located in the Antwerp-Brussels area and elsewhere in Flanders
have grown, while the aging heavy industries of Wallonia have stagnated or
declined. Many Flemings felt that their hard-earned money was unfairly taxed
to bail out the inefficient industries of Wallonia. The complex financial
mechanisms used by the government to support regional industry, however, made
it difficult to assess accurately the incidence of regional subsidies and
taxes. Economic regionalization was proceeding more slowly than political
regionalization, and the central government still controlled more than 90
percent of all national tax revenues (see Regionalization, ch. 3).

     Where in the midst of all the linguistic, regional, and ideological
variation can a sense of Belgian nationalism be found? Perhaps it is in the
area of foreign policy and national security, where the experience of two
world wars and centuries of being run over by greater powers has taught the
Belgians the importance of unity in adversity. History has also convinced the
Belgians of the need for alliances. Belgium has been a strong supporter of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a major force behind the
integration of Europe into the European Communities (see The Postwar Period:
Foreign Policy Activism, ch. 1; Foreign Economic Relations, ch. 3;
Multilateral Relations, ch. 4; Belgium and NATO, ch. 5). Regional
and ideological issues however, have sometimes complicated national
security policy. The decision of the governing coalition of Social
Christians and Liberals to accept ground-launched cruise missiles as part
of a NATO deployment plan, for example, was supported by the
French-speaking Socialists because the missiles would be stationed in
Wallonia and create jobs. But the Dutch-speaking Socialists and even some
Dutch-speaking members of the ruling coalition have expressed increasingly
vociferous antinuclear sentiments.

     Perhaps there is also such a phenomenon as "Belgitude" or "Belgianness"
to be found in the values shared by most Belgians. A cross-national survey
of values conducted in 1981 found that Dutch-speaking and French-speaking
Belgians were more similar to each other than to their counterparts in the
Netherlands and France. The authors of the study pointed out some interesting
contradictions. The Dutch speakers, for instance, attended Catholic mass
more regularly than the French speakers yet seemed more tolerant of some
social behavior condemned by the Roman Catholic Church. The study concluded
that generational differences were more important than language differences
in shaping social, political, and family values. The younger generation tended
to be more permissive regarding sexual mores, more tolerant of social
deviancy, less religious, and more apt to place themselves on the left of the
political spectrum than the older generation.

     In early 1985 the governing coalition of Social Christians and
Liberals had been in power for three years-long by contemporary Belgians
standards (see Major Political Developments, 1980-84, ch. 4). This continuity
of government suggested that the divisiveness of Belgian politics had
subsided, at least temporarily, as the nation pulled together to combat
the economic decline of the past decade and a half.

     When Prime Minister Wilfried Martens visited the United States in
January to explain his government's position on the deployment of cruise
missiles, however, the complexity of Belgian politics seemed to befuddle
the American public. Playing the role of the consummate Belgian politician,
Martens issued apparently contradictory statements carefully tailored to the
different audiences at home and abroad. Facing general elections by the end
of the year, a slim majority in parliament, and fallout from his government's
austerity measures, Martens seemed to be concerned that his unequivocal
acceptance of the missiles on schedule might play into the hands of the
Socialists. During the negotiations, however, there was never a question
of Belgium's support for the NATO alliance. [Indeed, when the time came to
act, the prime minister announced in March his government's final agreement
to the installation of the missiles.] And, as in the past, a Socialist gain
in the elections would most likely result in another coalition, perhaps
between Martens' own Social Christians and the Socialists. Whatever the
outcome of the elections, the pattern of elite compromise and the
willingness of the populace to follow its lead on most issues would
probably continue to preserve the Belgian nation through crisis and
controversy.

February 1985                               Stephen B. Wickman