$Unique_ID{COW00128}
$Pretitle{259}
$Title{Angola
Chapter 4A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Eugene K. Keefe}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
portuguese
angola
forces
defense
government
army
national
fapla
african}
$Date{1978}
$Log{Traditional Mask*0012801.scf
}
Country:     Angola
Book:        Angola, A Country Study
Author:      Eugene K. Keefe
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1978

Chapter 4A.   National Security

[See Traditional Mask: Traditional mask in the Chokwe style]

     National security in the People's Republic of Angola has been a daily
concern of the regime established by the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola-MPLA) since early 1976
when it defeated its opponents in a civil war (see Independence and Civil War,
ch. 3). Angola, a single-party state under the presidency of Agostinho Neto,
had evolved from the former Portuguese colony that became independent on
November 11, 1975. Supported by Soviet materiel and Cuban manpower, MPLA had
defeated two rival movements: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola-FNLA) and the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de
Angola-UNITA). The leaders of the defeated groups, Holden Roberto and Jonas
Savimbi respectively, vowed to carry on guerrilla warfare. Roberto and the
remnants of his forces fell back to sanctuaries in Zaire from which they had
operated for several years while Savimbi and his remaining followers
disappeared into the remote interior of the country. Both groups recuperated,
rebuilt their forces, and as of late 1978 had harassed the government in
traditional guerrilla fashion for more than two years (see Increased Warfare,
ch. 3).

     The Neto government has at its disposal the usual means of maintaining
national security-that is, an army, a navy, and an air force, a militia, and
national police forces-but the major factor in the defense of the country
against external or internal threat has been the continuing presence of
approximately 20,000 Cuban troops. The mission of the armed forces is to
protect national integrity and to maintain internal security; in fulfilling
their obligations the forces have been continually engaged in guerrilla
warfare and have been continually supported and sometimes led by Cubans;
often, Cuban units have carried out combat tasks on their own rather than in
support of the Angolans. Many Western observers credit the Cuban military with
keeping the Neto government in power.

     Collectively the army, the navy, and the air force were known as the
People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares
de Libertacao de Angola-FAPLA), a name adopted by the MPLA guerrilla army
more than a year before independence. During the civil war FAPLA became a
conventional army and acquired a navy and an air force, both of which
remained very small in 1978. In late 1977 the International Institute of
Strategic Studies estimated FAPLA strength at 31,500 of which the army with a
strength of 30,000 was by far the largest branch. The navy had a force of 700
and the air force of 800 men. The army and the air force have been well
equipped by the Soviet Union (the seagoing navy consists mostly of
ex-Portuguese patrol craft), but problems have arisen because the servicemen
recruited from a largely illiterate society have difficulties in learning how
to operate and maintain intricate modern weapons and equipment.

     According to the Constitution the commander in chief of the armed forces
was the president of the republic. In that capacity the president was advised
and assisted by the minister of defense. President Neto, who has been the
leader of the MPLA since 1962, was not an active commander of the forces and
left actual military affairs to his military experts. The minister of defense,
Henrique Teles Carreira, had been a commander of guerrilla forces during the
anticolonial war, commander of forces during the civil war, and military
adviser to Neto since the early days of the movement. In 1978 Carreira
appeared to be the overall commander of forces in addition to his position as
minister of defense although he was not publicly designated as such.

     The military situation in Angola in 1978 in many ways could be a replay
of history taken from almost any period during the past 500 years except that
the actors were different. The MPLA-Labor Party controlled the central
government in Luanda, the coastal area, and certain urban centers in the
interior as the Portuguese colonialists did for many centuries. The
present-day government also lays claim to the entire country as the Portuguese
colonial authorities always did, but its control over much of the country
appears to be tenuous as it often was for the Portuguese.

     Threats to internal security in Angola came from the dissident movements
that opposed the government on political, ethnic, and ideological grounds.
Ordinary crime (nonpolitical) did not seem to constitute a major problem to
the country's police although it was difficult for Western observers to learn
much about the situation. From the little that was known, it seemed that
criminal activities were within acceptable bounds, and under Neto's government
news reports of corruption seemed to be low compared to many other emerging
states. Police forces are national organizations under the supervision of the
Ministry of Defense except for a special security force under the office of
the president. The national police force is the People's Police Corps of
Angola (Corpo de Policia Popular de Angola-CPPA). Its strength in 1978 was
unknown.

Armed Forces

     The Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of Angola (Constitution),
which was promulgated by the MPLA on the day that Angola gained its
independence from Portugal, established the military arm of the MPLA as the
country's armed forces. At that time the MPLA was one of three factions
contending for power, and at independence the two opposing groups formed a
rival republic within the borders of Angola. In the civil war that followed
the MPLA was the ultimate victor, and its constitution eventually became the
law of the land. The military arm of the MPLA, which has been known since
August 1974 as FAPLA, consisted primarily of a guerrilla force at
independence; nevertheless it was institutionalized by the Constitution and
became the national army.

     The mission assigned to the FAPLA by the Constitution is the preservation
of Angola's territorial integrity. The designated commander in chief is the
country's president who, by the terms of the Constitution, is also the
president of the MPLA-Labor Party. The constitutionally stipulated
responsibilities of the commander in chief are limited to the appointment and
dismissal of the officers of the military hierarchy, but his responsibilities
as president include the declaration of war or the making of peace "with
prior authorization from the Council of the Revolution" (see The Governmental
System, ch. 3). The president is also enjoined to "exercise superior
leadership in national defense and security, as commander in chief of the
People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola and chairman of the
National Security Commission." The president's chief aide in national security
affairs is the minister of defense.

     Under the Angolan scheme of government, the People's Assembly "will be
the supreme organ of State Government," and as such it will presumably play an
important role in the making of national defense policy, but until enabling
legislation establishes the composition of the assembly and creates an
electoral system, the Council of the Revolution is the major legislative body
and has among its responsibilities the drawing up of the necessary laws
relating to national defense and internal security. Authorization by the
council is required for the declaration of war or for the making of peace. In
addition to the commander in chief, who is a member of the Council of the
Revolution by virtue of his party position, the council membership also
includes the minister of defense, the chief of the general staff, and the
commanders of the military regions, making the military well represented on
this important governmental body.

     The Council of Ministers, which the Constitution refers to as "the
executive organ of government," is ordered to "provide for the national
defense and the maintenance of internal order and security." The Ministry of
Defense is the agency through which these powers are exercised; unlike other
ministries, which are grouped under one of the three deputy prime ministers,
the Ministry of Defense is directly subordinate to the president. It is
charged with the administration, supervision, and support of the entire
military establishment. Despite the intricate governmental structure and the
elaborate constitutional framework, the making of basic defense policy and
other important decisions are party matters as is the case in the Soviet
Union.

     The political leaders of the MPLA and its offspring, the MPLA-Labor Party
have constantly stressed that defense is the business of all the people, and
President Neto has been the strongest advocate of popular defense. Article 3
of the Constitution states, "The popular masses are guaranteed full, genuine
participation in and exercise of political power, through the consolidation,
extension and development of the organizational forms of the people's
government." Neto and other members of the party hierarchy continually remind
"the Masses" that service in the country's defense organizations is an
excellent means by which they may exercise their political rights. The
emphasis that Neto has placed on the arming and training of the members of the
People's Defense Organization (Organizacao de Defesa Popular-ODP) since its
inception has been an indication of the importance he places on the idea that
the entire population constitute a people's army (see People's Militia, this
ch.).

Attitudes Toward the Armed Forces

     In a country that has been torn by warfare for seventeen years it would
be difficult to find anyone whose life has not been touched by that warfare.
Popular attitudes toward the military therefore have probably been
considerably affected by personal experiences, that is, how the people's lives
have been touched by encounters with the colonial armies, the guerrilla
armies, or the present-day government army and the insurgents. Most of the
country's more than 6 million people in 1978 were peasants whose greatest
immediate concern was subsistence; the urban minority was also mostly
concerned with eking out a meager existence in a war-torn economy. In addition
the population was divided among several ethnic groups, the three largest of
which-Ovimbundu, Mbundu, and Kongo-have been actively or passively involved in
warfare for several years. Although there is more than ethnicity involved in
the political divisions of the country, the three named groups do form the
bases of the three factions-UNITA, MPLA, and FNLA-respectively. Given the
problems of daily living, the ethnic and political divisions among the people,
plus the constant insurgency, it is almost impossible to assess public
attitudes accurately.

     The government continually stresses that the armed forces are of the
people and exist for the people. President Neto, in public pronouncements,
often refers to the "glorious fighters" of FAPLA and makes frequent reference
to the MPLA guerrilla forces (FAPLA's predecessors) who won independence for
the country. No doubt the president's (and the government's) intention is to
build national pride in FAPLA and to change popular opinions of the military
that had been formed during the colonial period. The Portuguese army in
Angola, even though its ranks contained more Africans than Portuguese, was
looked on as an instrument of oppression. Near the end of its tenure in Angola
the colonial army made some slight attempts at winning the hearts and minds of
the people; but that had certainly not been its strong point over the
centuries, and from the overall historical record it is obvious that most
people thought of the army as the enforcing arm of the oppressor. Changing
such popular attitudes presents a major problem to the authorities, and their
task is compounded by the high rate of illiteracy throughout the country.

     The emphasis on the idea that FAPLA is a "people's army" indicates the
importance that the government places on forming proper public attitudes. One
newspaper article noted that some members of FAPLA spent "voluntary days"
working in the port facilities of Luanda while others assisted in the
harvesting of the coffee crop out in the provinces. These activities were said
to increase the respect that the people held for the military, and through
working side by side on the docks or in the fields, "the unity of the people
with the FAPLA was becoming consolidated." Another article in early 1978
decried the use of the terms military and civilian, stating that the task of
national reconstruction was the only important occupation and that artificial
barriers should not be allowed to come between soldiers and civilians. In the
new Angola, according to the article, the troops and the workers and peasants
were "intimately linked" in their common objectives whereas in the past the
military was in fact an elite with nothing in common with the people. "The
distinction between `military' and `civilian' is artificial. Whether they
wear the uniform of the FAPLA or work clothes, the citizens of the nation are
contributing to the nation's reconstruction; they are building socialism; and
they are carrying out the revolutionary process."

     Because of their concern with the popular image of FAPLA, the
politicomilitary leaders of the government established public relations
departments at several echelons of the military structure. At the top of this
publicity network was the public relations section of the political
commissariat of the general staff. At lower levels sections were established
in each branch of the forces, in each military region, and in major units
stationed in urban areas. The principal operating theme of all of the public
relations sections was "FAPLA-Popular Unity," and one of the chief assigned
tasks of the military imagemakers was to work closely with the country's mass
organizations-labor, women's, and youth groups-to ensure close cooperation
between civilian and military institutions.

     One indication of popular attitudes toward the military might be the fact
that the conscription law was implemented for the first time in early 1978.
Until that time volunteers filled the ranks of the FAPLA, but for undisclosed
reasons the number of young people volunteering for military service had
dropped below base levels. Although military pay scales had not been published
by the government, it is safe to assume that they were low because of the
chaotic state of the economy. That plus the inherent dangers of the constant
counterinsurgency warfare probably affected the attitudes of young people. The
remainder of the people living under MPLA-Labor Party influence, if they
thought about the FAPLA at all, probably respected the force because of its
long history of anticolonial warfare.

Manpower

     Under ordinary, peacetime circumstances an African country gaining
independence from a colonial power would have maintained a small military
force, but in Angola the civil war of the immediate postindependence period
and the continuing guerrilla insurgency has necessitated the maintenance of
relatively large armed forces. Maintaining a force level of about 31,500, as
FAPLA strength was estimated in 1978, should not have caused a serious drain
on the nation's manpower resources; but a problem must necessarily have arisen
because the central government did not control the entire population, and many
young people were filling the ranks of opposition forces. This problem has not
been acknowledged, nor has it been publicly discussed. Yet the insurgency
continues, and those Angolans who support the insurgent movements certainly
cannot be considered eligible for FAPLA service. Another serious problem in
the available manpower resources concerns the educational qualifications of
the eligible recruits or draftees. The acquisition of modern weapons and
equipment demanded technologically proficient personnel, but such personnel
were needed in every sector of the economy and few were available.

     Article 19 of the Constitution states, "It is the right and loftiest,
most nondeferrable obligation of every citizen of the People's Republic of
Angola to participate in the defense of the nation's territorial integrity and
to increase the gains made by the revolution." By early 1978 the authorities
evidently decided that too few citizens were exercising their rights and
fulfilling their obligations in the defense field, because a conscription
system was implemented as authorized by the Mobilization and Recruitment Law.
For the first time in its short history the Angolan government had resorted to
a draft to fill FAPLA ranks and in so doing became the first black state in
sub-Saharan Africa to initiate compulsory military service. Both men and women
from age eighteen through thirty-five were made eligible regardless of race,
ethnic background, or place of birth. Length of service for draftees in the
various branches of service was not publicized, but it was noted that after
completion of regular tours of duty all personnel were obligated to enroll in
the ranks of the ODP.

     After the call-up of the first draftees an MPLA newspaper carried an
editorial criticizing young people who offered "preposterous" excuses in
attempts to avoid military service. For example, some who were called for
service, "discovered at the last minute that they were the sole support of
their families; others found that they had physical defects." The editorial
heaped the most scorn, however, on those who reported themselves to be
indispensable to their employers. The newspaper implied that the authorities
were not deceived by the would-be draft dodgers.

     In a speech to the graduates of a military school Minister of Defense
Carreira noted that the draft law had been put into effect and that there was
a high incidence of attempted evasion. He reproached employers and supervisors
who classified young workers as indispensable in efforts to avoid vacancies.
Carreira stated that everyone who was physically fit would be required to
serve; if someone was truly indispensable, he would be drafted and then
returned to his place of employment where he would be under military
obligation and discipline. The defense minister said that those trying to
escape their responsibilities were, in every case, of the petty bourgeoisie,
and he was sure that they would "be toughened in the environment of the Armed
Forces" and would lose their bourgeois attitudes.

     Women are eligible for the draft and do serve in the armed forces, but
little is known about their role. Although the government newspaper seems to
carry information about FAPLA on a regular basis, there have been no specific
articles about women in the military, and even brief mentions in news stories
are comparatively rare. The number of women in uniform in 1978 was unknown.

Military Traditions

     Little is known about the military history of the African kingdoms that
occupied the area of present-day Angola before the late-fifteenth century
arrival of the Portuguese. Some of these kingdoms were large, centrally
organized entities holding lesser kingdoms in vassalage. When Portuguese
explorers arrived in 1482, the kingdom of Kongo was dominant in west-central
Africa. Kongo occupied the area bounded by the Congo, Dande, and Cuango rivers
plus parts of the present-day People's Republic of the Congo and Zaire-a
kingdom of well over 100,000 square kilometers. The Portuguese recorded little
concerning the military organizations of the African kingdoms, but the oral
histories of some of the indigenous peoples included stories of armies and
battles and of dynastic struggles that were settled by force of arms (bows
and arrows or spears).

     The Portuguese did not actually take over sovereignty of the region they
called Angola until late in the seventeenth century, but because of their
superior firepower and because the various peoples of the area were not
united, they were able to exercise undue influence. This influence was
generally confined to regions along the Congo River and along the Atlantic
coast; the interior remained in African hands, but the balance of power that
had existed before the arrival of the Portuguese was upset and would never be
the same.

     The story of relations between Portugal and the kingdom of Ndongo was
similar to that of Kongo but, if anything, more difficult. For over 100 years
Portuguese expeditions fought against the forces of the ngola a kiluanje
(king) of the Ndongo, sometimes suffering defeats but persisting until the
kingdom was defeated. By the late seventeenth century the Atlantic seaboard of
Angola, that is, the kingdoms of Kongo, Ndongo, and Loango (in present-day
Cabinda) was under the somewhat tenuous control of the Portuguese crown. The
control was tenuous because, inter alia, the African kingdoms resented
vassalage to a European monarch, the Portuguese never properly staffed or
protected the colonial governments, and the activities of the local Portuguese
were more often than not self-serving rather than serving the interests of
Lisbon. As for military activities, they were unending for both the Portuguese
and the African populations. The Angolans fought continually, either in the
service of the colonialists or against them, and when they were not fighting
against the Portuguese the various groups fought each other. Warfare was a
business the product of which was captives who were sold as slaves. During the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the principal occupation of the colony was
the traffic in human beings.

     In the four centuries of Portuguese occupation of Angola before the
1884-85 meeting of European powers in Berlin, the colony was never truly
pacified. Constant military campaigns were required to maintain trade routes
into the interior, to punish some group or other for an uprising, or simply
to show the flag reminding the indigenous peoples that they lived under
Portuguese hegemony. Portugal rarely had large numbers of its own troops in
the area; military units were generally made up of African auxiliaries, but
officers and noncommissioned officers were white Portuguese, many of whom were
degredados (exiled convicts) who had been sent from prisons in Portugal and
Brazil. The first African auxiliaries in the Portuguese ranks used traditional
weapons-bows and arrows and spears-but they were soon armed with firearms. The
advantage that the Portuguese armies enjoyed because of superior weaponry was
soon overcome as more and more firearms were traded for slaves.

     In the early nineteenth century the Portuguese in Angola were still
confined to the coastal area-the slave trade in the interior had been carried
on generally by mesticos (persons of mixed African and European origin) or
blacks. Even along the coast Portuguese control was often tenuous because of
African opposition, and travel between the ports of Luanda, Benguela, and
Mocamedes was generally by boat because overland journeys were too dangerous.
When the slave trade was decreed illegal and European interest turned to the
exploitation of other resources, Portugal began a gradual program of
expansion into the interior. As always in Angola, the army was the instrument
of expansion because the peaceful spread of settlers was impossible in the
face of opposition from the original inhabitants who resented the encroachment
and contested the advance into their lands. The move inland began in the 1830s
after the promulgation of the anti-slave-trading decree but did not gain
momentum until after mid-century. As the army moved eastward, new presidios
were constructed, but they were not always permanently garrisoned, and the
countryside was not permanently pacified. The Portuguese army that led the way
into the interior consisted primarily of Africans as had been the case since
the beginning of Portuguese activities in the area.

     After the meeting at Berlin had delineated spheres of influence in
Africa, Portugal became much more serious about securing the vast territories
that it claimed. For forty years after 1885 Portuguese military forces in
Angola were almost constantly on campaign, and many battles were fought before
some semblance of pacification was achieved in the late 1920s. To conduct
those military campaigns the authorities relied on the African auxiliaries
who made up the bulk of the army. A change of policy had allowed a few
assimilados (assimilated Africans) to become officers, but for the most part
the commissioned ranks were reserved for whites and a few mesticos. A spirit
of rebellion also prevailed during much of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, becoming more pronounced as the colonialists moved into
the interior. In addition there was a similar spirit growing among some
colonists as well as some assimilados, but only the African nationalism
presented a problem and required a military response.

     The short-lived republic of the early twentieth century was replaced
by a military government in 1926 that led into the authoritarian regime of
Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (see Administration and Development, 1907-26. ch.
1). The last of the so-called pacification campaigns had ended by about 1930,
and from that time until 1961 there was a lull in the interminable colonial
wars that had plagued the Portuguese since the early days of their tenure in
Angola. During the era of the New State (Estado Novo), as Salazar dubbed his
regime, colonial affairs were dominated by the dictator as were most other
aspects of Portuguese government, and in the colonial armies he continued the
policy of using mostly African troops to fill the ranks. The use of African
auxiliaries to fight the colonial wars had been a constant of Portuguese
colonial policy, which also directed that African soldiers would be led by
white officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Until the 1960s the ratio
of black to white in the army in Angola was generally about 70 or 80 percent
to 30 or 20 percent. No black Angolan attained officer rank during the
Salazar era.