$Unique_ID{COW00096} $Pretitle{244} $Title{Algeria Chapter 4D. Foreign Relations} $Subtitle{} $Author{Jean R. Tartter} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{algeria algeria's morocco arab relations bendjedid western countries mauritania sahara} $Date{1985} $Log{} Country: Algeria Book: Algeria, A Country Study Author: Jean R. Tartter Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1985 Chapter 4D. Foreign Relations The permanent features of Algeria's foreign policy have included alignment with neither East nor West, identification with the Third World and advocacy of the political and economic independence of the developing countries, and support for Arab unity and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). As expressed by Bendjedid in his report to the Fifth Congress of the FLN in December 1983, Algeria's own independence was reinforced by acting in solidarity with "all people who battle to recover their sovereignty, or to free themselves from all forms of dependence, hegemony, or exploitation." Thus, Algeria has striven for a "closing of ranks against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, and racism." In aligning itself against "imperialism," Algeria has conveyed its opposition to Western capitalism, a position determined by its revolutionary history and its ideology. In spite of the country's professed nonalignment, it has found itself closer to the Soviet Union than to the West on most issues and in its voting record in the United Nations (UN). This has not been the result of any affinity for the Soviet Union per se nor for communism but rather because of Moscow's record of anticolonialism and its backing of the Arab states against Israel. Under Bendjedid, Algeria has progressively shifted to a more genuinely nonaligned course in its approach to East-West issues. In the immediate postindependence period between 1963 and 1965, Ben Bella's style was based on revolutionary politics and polemical rhetoric. He blamed domestic problems on external plots and machinations. He promoted not only the overthrow of colonial regimes in Africa and Asia but also the subversion of moderate and conservative independent governments. His vision of Algeria at the head of an Afro-Asian bloc united against the evils of the West went far beyond the new nation's capacities, and in concentrating on this issue he neglected more pressing internal demands. Boumediene at first turned his attention to domestic rather than to foreign issues but gradually took a more pronounced stand on Middle Eastern questions, insisting on Arab unity and intransigence toward Israel. This emphasis shifted during the 1970s to promoting economic independence of the Third World, based on the nationalization of natural resources and the diversification of trading partners. Algeria strongly backed the movement for a new world economic order, which would tie the prices that raw material producers of the developing world received for their goods to those of capital goods imported from the industrialized nations. It also advocated greater "South-South" cooperation, i.e., among developing countries, as a supplemental factor in restructuring world economic relations. Algeria exercised considerable diplomatic initiative in rallying Third World support for its concept of nonalignment and world economic relations at meetings of UN agencies, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Group of 77 (see Glossary), and the Nonaligned Movement. Elaborating on its vision of a new world economic order, Algeria asserted that it should embrace commodity agreements for Third World exports, the conversion of Third World debts to grants, and a modification of terms of trade to benefit the poorer nations. Although Algeria's interest in these issues has receded somewhat under Bendjedid, Algeria was one of 14 developing countries that met with leading Western nations at Cancun, Mexico, in October 1981 to discuss progress on North-South economic issues. It joined eight other nonaligned countries in New Delhi in April 1983 to relaunch global negotiations on the international economic order. This effort was followed by the Sixth Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)in June 1983 at Belgrade, which concluded without agreement on the main objectives of the developing nations. Algeria's activism has also led it to offer its services as intermediary in a number of international disputes. Its senior foreign affairs officers, supported by a professional corps of trained diplomats, have demonstrated considerable skill in handling sensitive negotiations, thereby reinforcing its reputation as a practiced and influential actor on the world political scene. Its most successful mediating role resulted in the release in January 1981 of 52 American hostages held for 15 months by Iran. In the past, however, Algeria's diplomatic initiatives have not always been held in such high esteem, and its tendency to speak as the conscience of the Third World has been unappreciated. Its blunt tactics of confrontation have sometimes proved to be counterproductive. Although still stressing Algeria's role in the Nonaligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the North-South economic dialogue, Bendjedid has subtly recast Algeria's approach, relying less on dogmatic appeals in the search for its goals. Relations with the West have become less volatile owing in part to the establishment of valuable commercial ties anchored by long-term agreements for the sale of natural gas. The Algerian government has lowered its voice on questions affecting the Arab countries but has continued to urge an end to the divisions that have enabled Israel to bring the PLO into disarray. Bendjedid boasted at the Fifth FLN Congress that the country's "good neighbor" policy had as its objective the creation of an exemplary zone of cooperation and stability where the Arab Maghrib and Black Africa came together. A treaty of friendship and concord entered into with Tunisia and Mauritania in 1983 was depicted by the Algerian leader as a significant step in the construction of a Greater Maghrib. His unflagging support for the insurgent movement in the Western Sahara fighting for independence from Morocco prevented rapprochement with Rabat. Algeria's commitment to national liberation movements and its own history instilled a sense of obligation toward the Western Saharan forces, despite the strains produced in its relations with neighboring Morocco. The Western Sahara During the late 1960s and early 1970s Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria formed a united anticolonial front, which pressed for Spanish evacuation from the Western Sahara. In 1968 the UN General Assembly adopted the first of several resolutions calling for self-determination for the Saharawi people. Harboring no territorial aspirations of its own but not wishing the territory to go to any of its neighbors, Algeria has consistently supported the UN position. Spain announced in May 1975 its decision to evacuate the area as soon as possible. Morocco has laid historic claim to the territory, as had Mauritania, although the latter had advocated self-determination by the Saharawi inhabitants. The International Court of Justice, which had been requested by a UN resolution to judge the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, found that historical ties did exist in both cases but that they were insufficient no establish sovereignty. After negotiations among Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco, it was agreed in 1975 that the Saharan territory would be divided, the northern two-thirds coming under Moroccan control and the remainder to be administered by Mauritania (see fig. 14). A number of guerrilla movements had been operating in the area since 1973. The dominant insurgent force, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro-Polisario) advocated Saharan independence and proclaimed the creation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which Algeria recognized in March 1976. Morocco and Mauritania broke relations with Algeria the following day. The diplomatic struggle for recognition of the SADR and its seating in the OAU was waged by Algeria, which also provided a lifeline for the Polisario in the form of supplies, fuel, military equipment, training, and sanctuary. Some of the Saharan civil population had taken refuge from the fighting at camps in the Tindouf area of Algeria. Contesting occupation by Mauritania and Morocco, the Polisario carried out highly effective guerrilla operations, raiding deep into southern Morocco and forcing the Rabat government to increase dramatically its military commitments in the region. Mauritania, crippled economically by the attacks, signed a peace treaty with the SADR in 1979, renouncing its territorial claims and removing its occupation forces. Morocco then moved into the area evacuated by the Mauritanians. Largely as a result of Algeria's diplomatic efforts, a majority of OAU members had by 1980 extended diplomatic recognition to the SADR and voted in favor of its seating in the OAU. Seeing support for his position slipping away, King Hassan II of Morocco reversed his position at the OAU summit in June 1981 by agreeing conditionally to a referendum over the Western Sahara. The seven-nation Implementation Committee appointed by the OAU then drew up the framework of a peace plan based on an internationally supervised referendum enabling the Saharawi to choose between independence and integration with Morocco. Differences over the procedures to be followed in carrying out the referendum, which Morocco refused to discuss directly with the SADR, prevented the execution of the Implementation Committee's plan. In a memorandum to the committee, Algeria had listed the terms it deemed essential to conduct a valid vote: the return of all refugees to the Western Sahara; the holding of a referendum throughout the territory (not just the Moroccan-controlled portion); the exclusion of the Moroccan administration from conducting the vote; the right of the Polisario to campaign freely; the substantial withdrawal of Moroccan troops; and the nonparticipation of Moroccans who had arrived in the territory after 1975. Because the issue of seating the SADR delegation sharply divided the African countries, the conference of the OAU Council of Ministers and the summit meeting planned for 1982 could not be held. But growing impatience with Hassan's temporizing over his 1981 commitment to a referendum produced an overwhelming vote for seating of the SADR at the OAU 1984 summit. Morocco thereupon carried out its long-standing threat to withdraw from the African body. On the military front, however, Morocco was more successful; its new tactics in 1981-82 of concentrating its resources behind a sand wall, or berm, in the "useful triangle" in the northern sector proved to be effective against the guerrilla raids. Algeria's constancy on behalf of the Polisario could be ascribed to its attachment to the principle of self-determination and to its backing for all national liberation movements. Moreover,it suited Algeria's interests in its rivalry with Morocco for the Rabat government to be obliged to shoulder a heavy military and economic burden in the long struggle with the Polisario. Morocco's reluctance to enter into serious negotiations over the future of the Western Sahara has alienated many hitherto friendly African governments. It has also been noted that, should an independent state finally emerge in the Western Sahara (which would be the probable outcome of an impartial referendum), it would probably have a socialist cast and be oriented toward Algeria. The effect would be a shift in the regional balance of power to Algeria's benefit. In private talks, Algerian negotiators have reportedly offered Hassan a facesaving alternative in the form of an autonomous Western Sahara administration under his nominal dominion. The king has rejected this approach, leaving the two countries still fundamentally divided over the issue as of mid-1985. Maghribi Relations The Maghrib, or Western Arab world, embraces the present-day nations of Morocco. Algeria, and Tunisia and the northwest part of Libya known as Tripolitania. The rest of Libya has traditionally been oriented toward the Mashriq, or eastern Arab world. Mauritania and the Western Sahara are not, properly speaking, part of the Maghrib but are intimately involved in the region's politics. The ideal of a unified Greater Maghrib recalls the splendors of the past, and all the states of northwest Africa pay homage to it. In spite of the similarity of society, language, religion, and history, no meaningful steps have been taken in the postcolonial era to advance the unity each country subscribes to. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Algeria attempted to improve its Maghribi relations and was successful in solving long-standing border disagreements with Morocco and Tunisia, although Morocco's failure to ratify an accord remained an irritant. The establishment in 1964 of the Maghrib Permanent Consultative Committee had as its aim the eventual creation of a Maghribi economic community, but liberal differences prevented the realization of this goal. Libya withdrew from the organization and its various specialized study groups in 1970. Mauritania joined in 1975, and a rudimentary secretariat still existed in Tunis in 1985. In his report to the Fifth FLN Congress in December 1983, Bendjedid restated Algeria's attachment to the Greater Maghrib as an "absolute necessity . . . which opens new perspectives of cooperation and economic complementarity . . . reinforces the weight of the region internationally . . . a factor for progress, expansion, and stability." But, added Bendjedid, the problems of the Western Sahara still prevented the achievement of this "gigantic historical design." Before Algerian independence in 1962, Morocco supplied the FLN with military, financial, and political aid, as well as sanctuary for its forces fighting the French. Postindependence relations were strained, however, because of boundary disputes and the incompatibility of Algeria's socialist form of government with Morocco's traditional monarchy. Settlement of the imperfectly demarcated border between the two countries resulted in Algeria's acquisition of undisputed sovereignty over the iron-ore-rich region of Gara Djebilet. However, plans to form a joint company with Morocco to exploit the ore were not realized. New problems soon arose; both countries provided havens for expatriate critics of each other's systems during the 1960s and 1970s. Morocco charged Algeria with involvement in a 1973 insurrection. Bitterness between the two countries mounted over Algeria's role as principal backer of the Polisario movement and as a staging area for guerrilla attacks. Seeking to find a means of defusing the Saharan issue without repudiating his pledges to the Polisario, Bendjedid met with King Hassan in February 1983. Although high hopes accompanied this first serious effort at reconciliation since relations had been dissolved, no real breakthrough occurred. Hassan was persuaded to send his ministers to a secret meeting with the Polisario but would not yield on his stand against formal negotiations with the insurgent forces. Bendjedid has reportedly also proposed a broad regional alliance, which was rejected by the Moroccan ruler because, as formulated by the Algerians, it would have implied that he was conceding self-determination for the Western Sahara. Algeria's relations with Tunisia, its smaller neighbor to the east, had been far less troubled. Their positions on the Western Sahara have not been entirely consonant, Tunisia having initially supported the partition of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania. It subsequently shifted to a more neutral policy, bending its efforts to mediating differences between Algeria and Morocco. Under more normal conditions that have prevailed since 1977, various forms of bilateral cooperation have been adopted or reactivated. Spurred by the threat posed by Libya, Tunisia further cemented relations with Algeria by acceding to the 1983 treaty of friendship and concord. Represented by its two signatories as the preferred framework for regional unity, the pact was to remain open for other Maghribi states to join. Each nation pledged to avoid resorting to force in settling their differences, to respect each other's territorial integrity, to reject alliances or coalitions hostile to either of them, and not to tolerate activities by any group on their soil that threatened the security of the other or that sought to change its government by violence. Mauritania adhered to the treaty later in the same year, but a coup in Nouakchott in 1984 ushered in a new Mauritanian leadership desirous of greater neutrality in relations with both Algeria and Morocco. Another agreement signed at the same time was intended to iron out property ownership questions in previously disputed border areas. A series of collaborative economic ventures, including joint manufacturing enterprises, were also announced by the two countries. The pipeline through which Algerian natural gas flows to Italy across Tunisia and beneath the Mediterranean Sea was inaugurated in the same year. Harmonious relations that had generally prevailed between Algeria and Libya were reinforced after Libya turned to active support for the Polisario in 1975, becoming a leading supplier of arms and financial aid to the insurgent movement. Algeria's informal alliance with Libya gradually unraveled after Bendjedid came to power in 1979 and sought to distance himself from the mercurial and extremist Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar al Qadhaafi. The intervention of Libyan forces in Chad was only one of several actions that the Algerian government could not condone. The Algerians objected to an outside power interfering in a dispute that required conciliation among the Chadian parties and Libya's obstruction of OAU efforts to find a solution. Algeria's suspicions were also heightened by Qadhaafi's efforts to extend his influence in the Sahel (the semidesert southern fringe of the Sahara stretching from Mauritania to Chad) along Algeria's southern borders. Bendjedid implicitly accused Qadhaafi of financing subversive activities by Ben Bella and Muslim fundamentalists. Libya's request to join the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian accord of 1983 was rejected because of unresolved territorial disputes. Libya claimed a strip of territory in the eastern Sahara between Ghudamis and Ghat. Libya also had differences with Tunisia over offshore waters. The reordering of alignments among the countries of the Maghrib was accentuated in August 1984 when it was announced that an "Arab-African Federation" had been secretly negotiated between Morocco and Libya. Algiers regarded the pact binding the radical, Arab socialist Qadhaafi with the conservative, pro-Western Hassan as an unnatural alliance that shifted the regional power balance unequivocally in Morocco's favor. The clause declaring that any aggression against one of the signatories was to be regarded as aggression against the other suggested that under some pretext the combined military weight of Morocco and Libya could be launched against Algeria. The Libyan-Moroccan "federation" had more ambitious goals than did the treaty of fraternity and concord binding Algeria with Tunisia and Mauritania. It foresaw the creation of joint institutions to facilitate widespread economic, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation. The Libyan-Moroccan treaty was in theory to be open to all African and Arab countries, rather than limited to the Maghrib. Whether these newly formalized divisions would harden remained uncertain as of mid-1985. Extensive contacts had taken place in the first part of the year aimed at convening a summit meeting of the five Maghribi heads of state to moderate differences and rekindle the unification movement. For Algeria, the prospect of reconciliation in the Maghrib, while welcome, could not be treated in isolation from the issue of sovereignty over the Western Sahara, on which it found little disposition by Hassan to compromise. Arab Affairs Algeria joined the League of Arab States (Arab League) in 1962. The focal point of its relations with other Arab nations has been the conflict with Israel and the plight of Palestinian Arabs. Algeria condemned the quick cease-fire agreement that ended the fighting in the June 1967 War. Boumediene emerged in the aftermath of the October 1973 War as a leader of Arab intransigence against any settlement with Israel. Algeria has staunchly supported the rights of Palestinian Arabs, seeing their liberation movement as similar to the FLN's war for independence against French colonialism. Algeria reacted bitterly against the peace initiative of Egyptian president Anwar al Sadat that began with his visit to Israel in late 1977. Together with other states of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front that rejected Sadat's efforts, Algeria agreed to a number of sanctions against Cairo. This group had as its other members Iraq, Libya, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Syria, and the PLO. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979 was denounced as a geopolitical triumph for Israeli "expansionism" and a product of the Arab world's disunity. Algeria was prominently involved in the subsequent Arab League decision to sever all formal relations with Cairo. Under Bendjedid, Algeria's position gradually moderated toward Egypt, especially when Husni Mubarak assumed the presidency after Sadat's assassination in October 1981. Algiers in effect abandoned the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front when it supported a Middle East peace plan adopted at a meeting of the Arab heads of state in 1982. Although the Arab proposal called for withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied after the June 1967 War and the dismantling of West Bank settlements, the move was considered a step forward because it would have implicitly recognized Israel's permanence as a Middle Eastern state. The Algerian foreign minister joined a delegation headed by Morocco's Hassan to explain the plan in Washington. Bendjedid has been continually supportive of the main leadership of the PLO under Yasir Arafat. The attacks by PLO dissidents, supported by Syrian units, against the forces controlled by Arafat in the second half of 1983 were strongly denounced by Algeria as "harming the most sacred element of the Arab cause, the liberation of Palestine." Algeria sought to mediate differences between Arafat and the Syrian authorities in 1984, and in 1985 its emissary tried to negotiate an end to the bitter fighting between the Palestinians and the Shia militia in Lebanon. When PLO troops were evacuated from Beirut after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, about 600 of them went to Algeria. An additional 1,100 detainees later released by Israel chose Algeria as their destination. Eager to promote unity among the Palestinians, Algeria acted as host for a session of the Palestine National Council in February 1984 at which the various factions were represented. Algeria acclaimed the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979, declaring its support for the Shia leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the revolutionary orientation of the new regime. Asserting that the war between Iran and Iraq harmed the interests of the Arab and Islamic communities, Bendjedid attempted to mediate an end to the fighting on the basis of a return of the armies to their initial position-a plan that seemed tilted in favor of Iran. In 1982 the Algerian minister of foreign affairs, Mohamed Seddik Benyahia, who was conducting the Algerian peace efforts, was killed along with 12 of his advisers when his official plane was shot down near the Iranian-Turkish border en route to Tehran. No explanation was given of the circumstances, although Iraqi fighter aircraft were in the vicinity. Black Africa Having emerged from its own anticolonial struggle, Algeria has been determined to contribute to the elimination of the remaining racial and colonial vestiges in Africa. Algeria has castigated the apartheid policies of the South African government and participated in efforts to isolate the illegal white regime in Southern Rhodesia before that territory's independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. Algeria has pressed to hasten the independence of Namibia (South West Africa) from South African administration on the basis agreed upon in the UN. The Algerian government also figured in international efforts to induce Portugal to divest itself of Angola, Mozambique, and other African territories. In its backing for various liberation movements, Algiers has nevertheless subscribed to the OAU position that borders inherited from the colonial era were to be retained. It regards efforts to modify boundaries as destabilizing. In his report to the Fifth FLN Congress at the close of 1983, Bendjedid affirmed that Arab-African cooperation was a strategic objective of prime importance. His view of the OAU has been that it should be safeguarded by strictly respecting its charter, by strengthening its structures, and by using its institutions to resolve peacefully whatever conflicts arise. This presupposes respect for the political system each member has adopted. Bendjedid has made a particular effort to cultivate relations with Sub-Saharan Africa in order to reinforce Algeria's diplomacy in the OAU regarding the Western Sahara. Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe were among countries that have tended to be aligned with Algeria in the OAU in taking more militant positions on such matters as recognition of the SADR. Bendjedid's itinerary during a 1981 tour of Black African capitals included these states along with seven others. Harmonious relations have generally been maintained with contiguous countries to the south. During the FLN congress at the close of 1983, Bendjedid was able to announce that remaining border differences had been resolved with Mali, Niger, and Mauritania as a result of the work of joint survey teams. Algeria's construction of the paved Trans-Saharan Road beyond Tamanrasset, the chief town of the south, to link up with Mali and Niger was expected to give a boost to trade and economic relations between North Africa and West Africa. Although at least 20 international commissions had been formed with other African states to conduct periodic examinations of bilateral relations, trade with Sub-Saharan Africa remained negligible, amounting to no more than 1 percent of Algeria's total trade. Bendjedid claimed that three-quarters of Algeria's foreign aid was directed toward African countries. In late 1983 and early 1984, for example, it announced a loan to Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) for importing Algerian hydrocarbons as well as gifts of food and medical supplies to Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, and Tanzania.