$Unique_ID{COW00015} $Pretitle{265} $Title{Afghanistan Chapter 3C. Infrastructure} $Subtitle{} $Author{Robert S. Ford} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{afghanistan government percent kabul soviet afghan power road labor transport} $Date{1986} $Log{Modern Afghani Art*0001501.scf Packing Boxes of Candy*0001503.scf } Country: Afghanistan Book: Afghanistan, A Country Study Author: Robert S. Ford Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1986 Chapter 3C. Infrastructure [See Modern Afghani Art: Courtesy Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington DC] Afghanistan's networks of transport and power-generating facilities were built mostly after World War II. Before the major development projects under Daoud, an observer wrote that "the economic organization of Afghanistan resembles a wide sea dotted with islands of economic activity, each one more or less limited to its own local market, primarily because of inadequate transportation." The first motorable road over the Hindu Kush was finished only in 1933. The first two development plans of 1956-66 prepared the basic grid of paved, all-weather roads that integrated the nation's economy to a limited extent. The production and distribution of electricity also grew rapidly during this period, although only a fraction of the urban population had access to it. By 1985 the war was seriously reducing the capacity of the country's transport and power sectors. At the same time new transport and power projects planned by the government promised to link Afghanistan more closely with its neighbor to the north (see fig. 6). The dispersion of the Afghan population required mainly low-cost, low-volume roads. The physical features of Afghanistan made this difficult because the rocky, mountainous terrain and the harsh climate raised road construction and maintenance costs. Nonetheless, with substantial foreign assistance, by 1966 Afghanistan had installed a relatively well-developed major highway system that joined together the country's major commercial centers and also linked the country to the outside world. The two superpowers built roads to tie Afghanistan into their own respective commercial and economic spheres. Soviet assistance completed a road linking Jabal os Saraj with Dusti on the Soviet border in 1964. Along this road was located the 1.7-kilometer Salang Tunnel at an altitude of over 3,300 meters above sea level. The tunnel eliminated about 200 kilometers from the previous roundabout route between the Soviet border and Kabul. In 1965 the Soviets finished the road between Jabal os Saraj and Kabul and completed the highway joining the Soviet border town of Kushka with Qandahar. By 1971 the Soviets had also built a road extending from Pol-e Khomri through Mazar-e Sharif to Sheberghan. While the Soviets were linking Afghanistan with their border towns, the Americans put in roads to join Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran. Two roads were completed in 1964 and 1965 extending from Pakistan up to Qandahar and Kabul. In 1965 the Americans also finished surfacing the road between Qandahar and Kabul. In 1967 they completed the road between Herat and Eslem Qaleh on the Iranian border. By 1975, when all the major road projects were completed, Afghanistan had 17,000 kilometers of roads, of which 9,200 kilometers were all-weather roads. There were still only 2,500 kilometers of paved highways, primarily running in a great loop from Sheberghan to Herat via Kabul. Trunk roads extended from this circular network to major population centers, such as Konduz, Jalalabad, and Gardez, as well as points on the Soviet, Pakistani, and Iranian borders. The establishment of this transportation infrastructure rapidly had an effect on the country's economy. Before its construction there had not been a national distribution system but rather autonomous regional markets. Surplus local production could not be traded nationally because of prohibitive transport costs. The new road network quickly reduced transport costs, increased domestic trade between regions, and thus promoted the integration of the national economy. One of the indications of this trend in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the sharp decrease in price differentials between regions. In 1960 prices of the principal commodity traded, wheat, varied as much as 150 percent between regions; by 1966 the variations dropped to approximately 30 percent, and by 1977 prices were roughly equivalent, except for transport costs. This was a result of the road network that increased market sizes for many Afghan producers so that they had incentive to increase their production. Although the creation of the road network was the main success of the Soviet and American development programs in Afghanistan, there were limits to the economic benefits. Because they country's agriculture and industry surpluses were so small, the level of domestic trade was relatively low. The principal beneficiaries of the road network were traders and transport entrepreneurs, rather than the great majority of people, who lived in the rural areas. The government put little emphasis on secondary and tertiary roads joining the rural provinces, towns, villages, and farms with the major highways. The few roads that were built were usually substandard and necessitated higher transport costs. Some major towns and surrounding regions, such as Maymanah and Feyzabad, were not linked with the major highway system and did not share in the benefits of greater trade opportunities. One detailed analysis of the Afghan economy even explained the famine of 1971 as resulting from the country's inability to move surplus grains into the remote regions of Badakhshan and Hazarajat. The transport sector, therefore, continued to constitute a serious bottleneck to the economic development of the hinterlands. The majority of Afghans were located in these areas, and they still had poor access to outside markets as well as to government services. They had little incentive to produce at more than a subsistence level, and their level of productivity remained very low. After the 1978 coup the new government gave renewed priority to the transport and communications sector in its development funds allocation-over 22 percent in 1981 and over 27 percent in 1982. Despite the relatively large share of the total development expenditures, the government built few new roads. Instead, spending was concentrated on the creation of five state transport enterprises, each with 300 imported Soviet Kamaz-type trucks. Another organization was established for the transport of petroleum products and was equipped with Tatra and Maz trucks from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Along with the creation of these state enterprises, the number of trucks operated by the public and mixed sectors was projected to rise from 13,200 in 1981 to 13,770 by the end of 1982. Before the establishment of these state enterprises, the transport sector was dominated by private entrepreneurs, most of whom owned only one or two trucks of generally small load capacity. The road network was augmented by 41 airports or airfields for domestic and international travel, again established with substantial Soviet and American aid. The largest and most important airport was Kabul International Airport, where traffic doubled to over 100,000 passengers annually between 1969 and 1976. Topographical conditions limited the airport's capacity to handle wide-bodied jets, and the government had long wanted an alternative site for a large airport. The Soviets undertook several expansion projects at the Kabul airport and also built jet airstrips at Mazar-e Sharif, Bagrami, and Jalalabad. In 1985 the government was engaged in an Af1.6 billion program to upgrade Kabul airport facilities. The runway was to be lengthened for use by larger aircraft, and a new terminal and hangars were to be built. Passenger movement rose to 127,000 in 1982, up from 106,000 in 1976. The United States had helped build Afghanistan's other international airport, at Qandahar, beginning in 1956. It was initially conceived as a refueling stop for piston engine aircraft on the long flights across South Asia and the Middle East. The introduction of jet aircraft, however, quickly turned the project into a white elephant, and Karachi became the preferred stopover site. The US$15-million, 3,030-meter airstrip and its airport facilities were little used after their completion in 1963. Only 6,000 passengers went through the airport in 1976. The Qandahar airport was operated mainly as an alternative to the Kabul airport when Kabul was fog- or snow-bound. During the mid-1960s the United States also completed smaller regional airports in Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, and Jalalabad. By 1978 several smaller towns located far off the main highway belt, such as Maymanah and Feyzabad, also had airports. In an effort to preclude Soviet influence, the United States also provided technical assistance when Afghanistan established Ariana Afghan Airlines in 1955. In 1957 the Afghan government took a 51-percent share of the company, while Pan American World Airways held 49 percent. The United States Export-Import Bank later helped Ariana buy two Boeing 727s for its flights to Western Europe. After the Soviet invasion, however, Ariana landing rights in Western Europe were revoked. It then flew to Moscow, Prague, Dubai, and New Delhi, but by late 1985 it either had gone out of business or was about to do so. In 1985 only two foreign carriers served Kabul International Airport-Aeroflot and Indian Airlines. Also serving as an internal carrier within Afghanistan was the state-owned Bakhtar Airlines. It had a fleet of two Antonov 24s, three Canadia Twin Otters, and two Yak 40s. In September 1985 the government admitted the loss of one of the company's aircraft in a crash at Qandahar, in which 52 passengers were killed. The government blamed a resistance surface-to-air missile. River traffic along the Amu Darya increased rapidly as trade expanded between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. River ports unloaded 215 tons of cargo in 1975; by 1981 the government gave a figure of over 400,000 tons. Jeyretan was the principal river port, handling 86 percent of the cargo, with Shir Khan and Towraghondi the other major river ports. All three of these ports were scheduled to be enlarged during the 1980s to handle increased traffic. Railroads Afghanistan's difficult terrain made the construction and operation of a railroad extremely expensive. The decision to build a railroad was further impeded by the problem of choosing a track gauge. The Soviet Union, Iran, and Pakistan each operated railroads with different gauges. Despite these obstacles, the Afghan government had long wanted to build a railroad because of the boost it would provide for the establishment of heavy industry, especially in the minerals sector. The seven-year plan of 1976-83 had envisioned building a railroad linking Kabul with both Iran and Pakistan. The railroad was to have followed the main highway's circular path with an extension to Eslem Qaleh on the Iranian border. An Iranian loan was to have paid most of the estimated US$1.2 billion cost. The project died when the Iranian financing collapsed in the wake of the revolution there. After their intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviets began a new railroad capable of both military and merchandise movements across the Amu Darya. In 1982 they completed the first road and rail bridge over the river at Jeyretan. By 1985 they were in the midst of the first stage of the project, which aimed at putting down tracks as far as Pol-e Khomri, an industrial center and military supply depot. The second stage of the project was to extend the railroad on to Bagrami, a major Soviet air base and supply depot. From there it would go on to Kabul. Because of the extremely difficult terrain it would have to traverse, the 3.1 billion-ruble railroad was not expected to be finished for many years. Electric Power Afghanistan's electric power-generating capacity increased steadily before the 1978 coup, from 59 megawatts at the end of the first FYDP to 318 megawatts by 1978. Electric power production also steadily rose from 127 million kilowatt-hours in 1961 to about 840 million kilowatt-hours in 1978. Despite the continued growth in capacity and production, only 5 percent of the population, all in the main urban centers, had access to electricity in 1978. The Afghan Electricity Authority (Da Afghanistan Breshna-DABM) suffered from high levels of energy losses because of the lack of substations and transmission and distribution lines. Low tariff rates and these power losses made DABM a consistent money loser after its establishment in 1966. After the 1978 coup the formerly autonomous DABM was made a department of the Ministry for Water and Power. The government launched an expansion program that planned to increase the country's generating capacity to over 600 megawatts. By 1983 the government claimed that installed capacity totaled 394 megawatts, a figure unchanged in four years. Hydroelectric dams, most notably at Kajaki, accounted for 260 megawatts, but this represented only about 5 percent of the country's total hydroelectric potential. Thermal plants, fired by oil and coal, provided another 134 megawatts of capacity. The number of people with access to electricity remained low, estimated officially at 10 percent of the population in 1982. As part of the expansion program, which foresees 1,000 kilometers of new transmission lines being built, in the mid-1980s the Soviet Union was extending power lines over the border toward Kabul. The lines were planned to connect Balkh, Samangan, Baghlan, Parvan, and Kabul provinces into a national grid. Another set of lines linking the Ghowr region to the Soviet Union was also being built. Despite government efforts to increase electricity output, the ongoing war took a severe toll on the country's power facilities. Power stations and transmission lines were frequent targets of the resistance. The government claimed output rose from 840 million kilowatt-hours in 1978 to 1,025 million kilowatt-hours in 1983, an increase of 22 percent. These success claims contrasted sharply with reports coming from inside the country, which told of serious power shortages. In Kabul, for example, there were frequent blackouts, and in the city's poorer neighborhoods, homes averaged only four to five hours of power per week. More affluent neighborhoods received some power each night, and foreign embassies and the homes of upper-echelon party leaders were reported to receive power regularly, except during major stoppages. Outside Kabul the electric power supply was described as far worse. In Qandahar and Herat power was erratic, if available at all. Labor Force [See Packing Boxes of Candy: Courtesy Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington DC] As the economy developed, the labor force grew steadily, from an estimated 4.2 million in 1966 to 5.1 million in 1975. Despite the exodus of millions of refugees in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government claimed that the labor force surpassed 5.2 million in 1982. Were the security situation to calm, the pool of manpower would be expected to grow more quickly, given the relative youth of the population and the increasing monetization of the economy. Labor statistics, however, especially those after the outbreak of fighting, were inexact at best and useful only for indications of trends. A 1975 national demographic survey showed that almost a quarter of the labor force consisted of nomadic people. The survey also showed that only 14 percent of the settled population's work force was composed of women, and almost three-quarters of these women were engaged in either agriculture or handicrafts (see table 7, Appendix). During the 1960s and 1970s the patterns of employment changed noticeably with the economy's initial industrialization. The share of agriculture in total employment dropped from 70 percent in 1966 to 55 percent in 1982. Agriculture dwarfed industry in terms of employment, but the industrial labor force grew quickly. The number of people engaged in industry, including handicrafts, approximately doubled between 1966 and 1982, and this sector's share of total employment rose from about 0.5 percent in 1966 to 10 percent in 1982. Still, agricultural workers outnumbered their industrial counterparts six to one. Labor in industry was often seasonal, composed of agricultural workers who went to factories during the winters to earn supplemental income. The shares of both trade and construction grew slightly between 1966 and 1982 and by 1982 employed 7 and 3 percent of the labor force, respectively. The unemployment rate conceded by the government was about 15 percent during the 1980s, compared with about 6 percent admitted in the previous decade. Underemployment was probably more widespread and included industrial workers idled by work stoppages resulting from war shortages. In a paradoxical situation common to developing countries, Afghanistan had a large pool of unemployed and underdeveloped manpower at the same time the economy suffered from a continuing and acute shortage of administrators, technicians, and skilled manpower. This was not surprising in view of the prevalence of illiteracy and the low levels of education widespread throughout the society (see Education, ch. 2). Lack of skilled labor delayed implementation of development plans and forced the government to rely on foreign advisers. In the 1980s there were reports of Soviet advisers holding key positions in all of the country's ministries. Although the political overtones were different, Afghanistan had traditionally relied on foreign experts to direct the country's economic development, and Americans and Soviets had been heavily involved since the end of World War II, and Germans before them. Afghan civil servants frequently lacked adequate training. The war exacerbated the shortage of skilled labor in several ways. Many members of the relatively small professional class fled the country. Security in the cities deteriorated so seriously that merchants and ministry staffs also left the country. Meanwhile, the government instituted compulsory conscription, calling up many skilled workers for military service. As a result, the Afghan minister for mines and industries said in a 1983 interview that "the question of skilled labor for our developing economy is . . . more pressing than ever." In response, the government adopted several measures to ease the shortage. Technical workers from certain key industries, such as coal mines and textile mills, were exempted from military service. The government also sought to reorient the education system toward vocational training and guaranteed jobs to university students in technical fields before other students. The petroleum boom of the 1970s and the Persian Gulf states's need for labor attracted many skilled Afghans, further aggravating the skilled manpower shortage in Afghanistan. Many experienced Afghan civil servants, lured by the much higher wages in countries such as Iran, took leaves of absence without pay to work abroad. During the late 1970s a laborer in Iran earned three times the salary of an Afghan school director. Other skilled laborers left Afghanistan upon completion of the large development projects, such as the Helmand Valley Project, where they had learned their skills. Not only technical workers and professionals left the country. Hundreds of thousands of unskilled workers, who were more subject to at least seasonal unemployment, also went to the oil states. The total number of Afghans who worked in the Gulf was unknown; estimates ranged from 250,000 to 700,000. The largest number appeared to be located in Iran, but Afghans also worked in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. The construction industry in those states was the principal employer of Afghans. The relatively unguarded state of the borders between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan easily allowed employment bureaus in Pakistan to smuggle unskilled Afghan migrant workers into Iran. During the 1970s the Iranian and Arab authorities seldom questioned the immigration status of Afghan workers. For its part, the Afghan government did not officially encourage the migration. The remittances of earnings back home, however, significantly reduced the economy's balance of payments problems. By 1979 the remittances sent to Afghanistan were estimated to be about US$20 million per month. The flow of unskilled labor also eased the problem of unemployment in rural areas and improved the well-being of thousands of rural families who received money sent from the Gulf. After several years in the Gulf, Afghan workers usually returned home with the money they had saved. They paid off debts, bought modern consumer goods and real estate, and often tried to set up their own shops. There was little investment in modern industry. However, by the mid-1980s the declining oil market left the future of Afghan guest workers in jeopardy, as Gulf development budgets shrank and construction projects slowed.