$Unique_ID{COW00010} $Pretitle{265} $Title{Afghanistan Chapter 2C. Ethnicity and Tribe} $Subtitle{} $Author{Laurie Krieger} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{ethnic groups pashtuns group afghanistan tribe kirghiz country ethnicity hazaras} $Date{1986} $Log{} Country: Afghanistan Book: Afghanistan, A Country Study Author: Laurie Krieger Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1986 Chapter 2C. Ethnicity and Tribe Afghanistan is home not only to several religious sects but also to a host of different ethnic, linguistic, and tribal groups. Rivalry and even armed hostilities have traditionally been common between and within many of these groups. Historic and geographic factors have led to the creation and preservation of diversity. The relationship between tribe and ethnicity is complex, and by no means do all Afghans, even all rural Afghans, consider themselves tribal members. In addition to social diversity, many different phenotypes may be found in the population, including blond-haired, blue-eyed Afghans; those with darker features and epicanthal folds; tall, olive-skinned, mustachioed tribesmen; and those who combine these features. Although it may be tempting to associate certain physical features with certain ethnic groups, scholars recognize that because all human populations are capable of interbreeding and do so with great regularity, there are more physical differences found within ethnic groups than between them. Canfield has observed that in Bamian, "some Hazaras [who are thought to have "Mongolian" features], especially those from the chiefly families, do not have clearly defined Mongoloid features. Instead, some have heavy beards and lack the typical Mongolian eyefolds and high cheek bones. Conversely, some persons calling themselves 'Tajik' have rather strong Mongoloid features. I consequently doubt that the relationship between phenotype and ethnic identity is very close." Afghanistan's rugged physical environment serves to isolate residential communities and to create microenvironments. Members of the same ethnic group and tribe who reside in different locations must adapt to their own microenvironment, which may result in different kin-based groups within the same tribe and ethnic group using different modes of production. For example, the Durrani Pashtuns that Tapper studied were primarily agriculturalists, while the Sheikhanzai Durrani Pashtuns, who were the subject of Tavakolian's research, were primarily pastoralists. Many Durrani also live in cities, where they may have lost their tribal identity. Distribution The largest and most powerful ethnic group is the Pashtun (see fig. 5). The Pashtuns are primarily Pashtu speaking, although those residing in Kabul are often Dari speaking. Both Pashtu and Dari belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. In 1980 Dupree estimated that there were about 6.5 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan. This ethnic group, like most others in the country, is not limited to the borders of Afghanistan but also constitutes a major ethnic group of about 10 million in Pakistan. Pashtuns are generally Sunni, but there are Twelver Shia Pashtuns as well. In Afghanistan Pashtuns traditionally have resided in a large semicircular area following the Afghan border from north of the Darya-ye Morgab east and southward to just north of 35 degrees latitude. Enclaves of Pashtuns live scattered among other ethnic groups in much of the rest of the country, particularly in the northern regions and in the western interior owing to Amir Abdur Rahman's policy of Pashtun resettlement (see Abdur Rahman Khan, 1880-1901, ch. 1). The Tajiks are also numerous. A problem in discussing this ethnic group lies in the tendency of some non-Tajik groups to classify anyone who is Dari speaking as a member of this group. Some also categorize any urbanite who has become "detribalized" as Tajik. This is particularly true for Kabulis. Tajiks generally live in the west in the area around Herat, in the northwest interior, and (primarily) in the northeast of the country, although not in the Wakhan Corridor. Tajiks speak Dari and Tajik dialects of Dari. Some Tajiks are Sunni, while others (particularly those in the north of the country) are Ismaili. In 1980 Dupree estimated that there were 3.5 million Tajiks resident in the country. Farsiwans (or Persians) are also Dari speaking. They live in western Afghanistan near the Iranian border; their area extends to almost 66 degrees north longitude. Farsiwans, like the majority of Iranians, are Twelver Shia. In 1980 Dupree believed there to be about 600,000 Farsiwans in the country. Qizilbash are remnants of the old Iranian presence. They are Twelver Shia, although Dupree asserts that some use taqiyya to pass as Sunni. They are a very small group found in Afghan urban centers. They are, of course, Dari speakers. Hazaras speak a dialect of Dari and live primarily in central Afghanistan. Among Hazaras are members of every Muslim religious sect in the country-Ismaili, Twelver Shia, and Sunni. Dupree put their number at 870,000 in 1980. Altaic languages are also represented in the country by speakers of Turkic languages. The Uzbeks are Sunni who speak Uzbek, a Turkic dialect. Turkic languages are not in the same family as Indo-European languages (such as Dari and Pashtu). Uzbeks live in a large semicircular area roughly following Afghanistan's northern borders, from Faryab Province almost to Feyzabad. Dupree's 1980 estimate was about 1 million people resident in the country. Turkmen are another Sunni Turkic-speaking group found scattered throughout the northernmost portion of Afghanistan along the Soviet border. The Kirghiz are also Turkic speaking and, until recently, lived in the Pamir mountains of the Wakhan Corridor. In 1985 there were unconfirmed reports that this area was inhabited solely by Soviet and Afghan army soldiers and that the indigenous population had fled or been exiled. The Kirghiz lived in the high mountain valleys of this region, while another ethnic group, the Wakhi, occupied lowland areas. The Kirghiz are Sunnis. The neighboring Wakhi, or Mountain Tajik, are speakers of Iranian dialects. They are often Ismaili but, according to Dupree, some Wakhi Twelver Shia and Sunni exist. They generally live in the same regions as the Kirghiz but at lower altitudes. Nuristanis are Sunni who speak dialects of Dari and often also Pashtu. They live in the Konarha, Nangarhar, Laghman, and Parvan areas of eastern Afghanistan. The area where the Nuristanis live, Nuristan, was the scene of the first armed opposition to the Khalq government (see Political Bases of the Resistance, ch. 4; Resistance Forces, ch. 5). Arabs are a Sunni group living in northeastern Afghanistan, primarily "in an arc extending from Maimana to Kunduz." Here they speak a dialect of Farsi that is mixed with Uzbek vocabulary. Some scholars report that Arabic-speaking Arab communities exist in the area of Balkh. The selection of major ethnic groups in Afghanistan is somewhat arbitrary, as is a classification by language and location. Ethnicity is extremely complicated in the country, and any simple classification is bound to have many exceptions. Furthermore, there are many more ethnic groups than those listed here. Ethnicity has been extensively explored by scholars studying Afghanistan, and they often disagree, further complicating an already labyrinthine phenomenon. Anderson points out the futility of attempting to locate Afghan ethnic groups on a map because "boundaries are not all of a piece ... they vary according to the situation." Scholars disagree about what constitutes an ethnic group. Richard F. Strand, an ethnologist, and Anderson describe ethnicity as a process emerging "in situations where people of different traditions and organizations come together or are brought together in contexts set by terms external to themselves." Anthropologist Hugh Beattie defines ethnic groups as "loose collectivities of people who classify themselves and others for the purposes of social interaction on the basis of varying criteria such as language, ideology of patrilineal descent, origin and history and custom in general." These two definitions need not conflict if the processual nature of social interaction is kept in mind. Patrilineal descent is also notoriously malleable and to some extent may be defined and redefined situationally. Canfield introduces a further complication. His experience in Bamian leads him to assert, unlike many other scholars, the importance of religious sectarian differences which, he contends, take precedence over ethnicity. Ethnicity, then, is based on shared kinship traced through the father, shared customs, tradition, and language. It is most obvious and is to a large extent formed when different groups come into contact in alien situations. The importance of ethnicity as a behavioral and cognitive category is generally extremely important in Afghanistan but, in some areas, at least, may take a backseat to religious sectarianism. Finally, ethnicity, religious sect, tribe, family, and mode of subsistence intermesh and are to some extent indistinguishable. The largest and most politically powerful ethnic group, the Pashtuns (or Pakhtuns, in northern Pakhtu dialects), is very diverse. It is composed of at least seven tribal groups: the Durrani, Ghilzai, Jaji, Mangal, Safi, Mamund, and Mohmand. The Pashtuns have been the subject of several scholars' research. Anderson reports that because Pashtuns have historically dominated government, other ethnic groups have had to learn to deal with them on the Pashtuns' own terms. He refers to the "Pashtunization" of the country's public behavior. Being a Pashtun, at least a male Pashtun, centers around Pashtunwali, or "doing Pashtu." Doing Pashtu" connotes adherence to a code of behavior stressing honor (namus) and its defense, autonomy, bravery, self- respect, and respect for others. It is probable that Pashtunwali is shared by all male Pashtuns. A man's namus is expressed through his ability to dominate and defend his property, including his household and his wife and female relatives. A Pashtun who has suffered a blow to his honor is expected to seek revenge in the form of physical retaliation or compensation in property or money. Such a code of behavior is often in opposition to strict interpretation of sharia. When a conflict occurs, Pashtuns tend to "do Pashtu" instead of following Sunna, believing as they do that Muslim and Pashtun are equivalent. In matters other than Pashtunwali, there may be regional differences. Richard Tapper reports that to be classified as Pashtun in the Saripul district, a man must speak Pashtu, be a Sunni, trace his ancestry to Qays, and marry his sisters and daughters to other Pashtuns. Most Pashtuns in the country tend to follow this marriage pattern. It is a form of hypergamy and is also practiced by other ethnic groups, i.e., a woman may marry within her ethnic status group or above it, but she may not marry below it. Males may marry within or below their group. Because ethnic groups in Afghanistan are ranked in terms of their status and all Pashtuns consider themselves the top-ranked ethnic group, Pashtun women marry only other Pashtuns. Pashtuns practice various modes of subsistence. In the past, many were government bureaucrats and, of course, the monarchy came from the Durrani Pashtun (see Ahmad Shah and the Durrani Empire, ch. 1). Some Pashtuns were nomadic herders. Others practiced mixed herding and farming, while others were primarily agricultural. Still others lived in cities and pursued urban occupations. Although the government has been Pashtun for many years-Babrak Karmal is no exception-Pashtuns have not always received good treatment at its hands. The often forced resettlement of Pashtuns by Amir Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century is only one example. Pashtuns, like other groups, have traditionally responded to central government intervention with hostility. The difference between Pashtuns and other ethnic groups' interaction with government is that local government officials were often Pashtuns and might, at a local level, be more sympathetic to fellow ethnic group members. In the 1980s Pashtuns continued to dominate government. In 1981 Karmal's cabinet was composed of 16 members, 12 of whom were Pashtuns. Uzbeks reside not only in Afghanistan but also in the southern parts of the Soviet Union, especially in the areas of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent. Many Uzbeks living in Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet intervention were originally from the Soviet Union but had fled to Afghanistan shortly after the Russian Revolution or in subsequent years to escape Soviet government control. Some Uzbeks are agriculturalists, while others practice crafts or are tradesmen. In the recent past some Uzbeks have migrated to the city and have received university educations. Although Beattie's definition of ethnicity includes patrilineal descent, in areas of the country where tribal organization is unimportant or absent, such as among Uzbeks in north-central Afghanistan, residence tends to determine ethnicity. If, for example, an Uzbek family moves to a Tajik or Aymaq area, it may assume the ethnic identity of its neighbors. In other parts of the country, Uzbek ethnic and tribal affiliations are more important. Audrey C. Shalinsky, an ethnologist who studied Uzbeks who had migrated from the Soviet Union to Konduz, found that patrilineal descent was extremely important to Pashtuns in the area but not to Uzbeks. For Uzbeks marriage ties were the most important kinship expression of ethnicity. In the words of one of her Uzbek informants, "I would prefer that my sister marry one of our people, a poor man with no job for 5,000 afs. [bride-price], than a Pashtun who is rich and had attended Kabul University for 100,000 afs." Shalinsky also found that the Uzbek language, which unlike Dari and Pashtu was not taught in school, galvanized feelings of ethnic identity. In the past, other ethnic groups had reason to fear Uzbeks, for they conducted slave raids on the Hazaras in Bamian and probably elsewhere as well. Hazaras are the largest, predominantly Shia group in the country, although some Hazaras are Sunni. Twelver Shia Hazaras occupy Hazarajat, the central mountain massif in the midsection of the country; Ismaili Hazaras are associated with the Hindu Kush. Hazaras are reportedly ranked very low in relative ethnic status. Many Hazaras immigrated to Kabul from rural areas in the second half of the twentieth century. These migrants have been very successful in keeping their ethnic identity intact, perhaps because their low status prevented other groups from marrying them. Hazaras in Kabul tend to follow the same unskilled labor occupations, so that some jobs have come to be known as Hazara occupations. Canfield reports that among the Hazaras he studied in the Shebar region of Bamian, generosity-giving to agnatic and affinal kin-is highly valued. Men usually build their reputations on their generosity, although other factors are also important. These factors include possessing a good government job or being gifted at Quranic or poetry recitation. To establish a reputation or "big name," a man must be able to dispose of considerable wealth. He also notes that in the past Hazaras "seemed constantly embroiled in feuds and internecine raiding." Canfield observed the interesting phenomenon of sect changing by Hazara families, from Ismaili Shia to Twelver Shia or vice versa. These sect changes resulted from feuding within the sectarian community. They occurred in Hazara areas that depended on rainfed land instead of irrigated fields (so that no major community cooperation was required) and where members of the other Shia sect lived in close proximity. Such "conversions" are based on political alliance. Canfield even observed one instance of a family from one of the Shia sects that converted to Sunnism. Wealthy families may ally themselves with Sunnis to win a court case. The courts, as the rest of government, are dominated by Sunnis. That religious fluidity between Shia and Sunni is rare is easily understood, given Hazara history. Under Abdur Rahman, jihad was declared against Shia Hazaras and other Shia of the area. The war between the Kabuli Sunni regime and the Hazaras of central Afghanistan was extremely violent, but it served to unite Hazaras for the first time. Anthropologist Thomas J. Barfield conducted research among Arabs living in Konduz Province. They are pastoralists-nomads who practice transhumance and migrate from river valleys to mountains. They raise fat-tailed sheep for most of their subsistence, but wealthier men also raise the karakul sheep that yield karakuli lambskins, for which Afghanistan is renowned. They also farm, producing cotton and wheat. The Arabs are Dari speakers, although they identify themselves as Arabs. Historically, the Central Asian Arabs lived within the old Bukhara khanate and in the plains in the north of that part of Turkestan that lies within Afghanistan. Barfield also relates that these Arabs have not had any contact with Middle Eastern Arabs since the time of Timur (Tamerlane). Most Arabs view geneologies as unimportant; nonetheless, they possess 13 clans (taifa). Kirghiz living in the Pamir Mountains of the Wakhan Corridor were the subject of anthropologist M. Nazif Shahrani's research, as well as a study conducted by Andre Singer, an anthropologist who worked for British television. In 1985 there may well have been no Kirghiz remaining in the Pamirs, so that only their lives before the Soviet occupation may be described. About 3,000 Kirghiz lived in the Pamirs, practicing high-altitude pastoralism. Kirghiz kept fat-tailed sheep, yaks, goats, camels, and horses. As citizens of Badakhshan Province, the Kirghiz inhabited one of the most remote areas of the country, with no roads that were open year-round. Because of the very high altitude, Kirghiz had to adapt to a fearsome climate. They managed this in a variety of ways, including ingenious housing styles and multilayered clothing. Kirghiz possessed two kinds of houses. Traditionally they lived in yurts, which are a kind of Central Asian round tent that can be heated with a fire to produce a very comfortable refuge from the cold. Wealthier Kirghiz might build a stone and mud house. Patrilineages were important, and Kirghiz often married within lineage groups. Wealthy Kirghiz men might practice polygyny. They also followed levirate marriage customs, i.e., a widow who had borne at least one child was entitled to a husband from the same lineage as her deceased spouse. Contrary to sharia, women traditionally did not inherit property, and sons inherited on the basis of their birth order rather than the equality prescribed by Islam. Although lineages might have elders, the Kirghiz khan served as judge, mediator, and political and economic leader. Lineage elders contributed their opinions, to which the khan listened before arriving at important decisions. Nuristanis in eastern Nuristan in Konarha Province practice a mixed economy of agriculture and pastoralism in the mountains and less fertile valleys. Strand worked with the Kom tribe of Nuristanis, which he describes as having the reputation for being the "wildest" Nuristani tribe. It was among the Nuristanis, including the Kom, that the first rebellion against the Marxist regime occurred (well before the Soviet military presence). Interethnic Relations Scholars studying Afghanistan quip that if Afghans were not fighting the soldiers of another country, they would be fighting each other. Relations among Afghan ethnic groups have tended to bear this out. Groups that live in close proximity often have complex and hostile relations, a situation that is exacerbated by the fact that a multiplicity of ethnic groups may reside in the same region. Furthermore, when Pashtuns have trespassed on the property of other ethnic groups, these groups have been able to do little. The Pashtun-dominated government generally sided with Pashtuns, regardless of the merits of the case. Examples of interethnic conflict abound. Two examples will suggest the complexity of interethnic relations. In Nuristan the Kom Nuristanis have been subject to the encroachments of the Gujars (another ethnic group). The Kom let some of their pastures to the Gujars in return for payment in livestock. In the late 1940s the Gujars began to renege on this agreement. Strand reports that "since then hostilities have become perennial with occasional shootings and rustlings on both sides." Government officials attempting to mediate have almost always been biased against the Kom. The Kom leaders feel that this reflected the desire of the government to promote disunity among Nuristani tribes so that it could manage them more easily. This kind of raiding was widespread among many ethnic groups in the country. Occasionally it has erupted into open warfare. Historically, stronger groups have attempted to dominate weaker ones. The weaker groups have had the choice of moving to a harsher, more marginal environment or paying tribute to the more powerful groups. Such has been the case in the Wakhan Corridor. Both Wakhi and Kirghiz occupy this region. The Ismaili Wakhi farm and herd in the lower valleys. In addition, there are Pashtuns and Tajiks in the area who are traders supplying market goods. The traders choose their wares carefully and consciously or unconsciously foster a dependence on tea, opium, and other luxury goods. Their customers, particularly the Kirghiz, are often indebted to them. Shahrani observes that relations between Sunni Kirghiz, who inhabit the high, frigid mountain valleys, and relatively lowland Wakhi are tense. "The Kirghiz refer to Wakhi as sart (a derogatory term) and regard them as "nonbelievers." Feelings of contempt are mutual, yet both groups have developed increased economic dependence on each other." The Kirghiz cannot grow grain in their inhospitable environment and consequently must purchase this from the Wakhi. The Wakhi resort to the Kirghiz for animals and animal products, which they employ for their own use or use to pay traders. Shahrani writes that these two groups "have achieved a successful economic exchange system in a situation filled with social tensions." Ethnic groups are perceived to be ranked in terms of status, although members of the groups in question may not always agree with members of other groups about their own status ranking. Virtually everywhere, Pashtuns are the most prestigious ethnic group, both in their own eyes and usually also in the eyes of others. The subsequent rankings vary by region, but Hazaras are almost always ranked as one of the lowest ethnic groups. They are often placed directly above the despised gypsies. Tapper reports that other groups in north central Afghanistan regard the gypsies (Jats and Juggis) "as blots on the ethnic landscape." In many parts of the country ethnicity is indicated by house style, clothing, and cuisine. Shalinsky notes that "elements of material culture are used by all ethnic groups in Afghanistan as ethnic makers . . . the wearing of the chapan-the loose open quilted coat of cotton or silk worn by adult men-indicates that the wearer is from the north. . .different patterns and colors of stripes on the chapan reflect smaller regional indicators." Foods, such as the distinctive round bread that Uzbek women bake, clearly demarcate ethnicity, as does the style of food preparation even when different groups make the same food. The consumption of either black or green tea is also governed by ethnicity. Tribe The concept of tribe merges with ethnicity and with kinship groups within the tribe. Before proceeding to a discussion of tribes in Afghanistan, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of "tribe." In theory, tribes view themselves as consisting of the descendants of a common ancestor, whose name often provides the name of the group. The internal divisions of the tribe are seen as consisting of the descendants of intermediate descendants of the founder. Thus an entire tribe may see itself as descended from a man 10 or more generations in the past. Smaller segments composed, for example, of the grandsons of the same grandfather or the great-grandsons of the same great-grandfather form the units of residence and strongest personal loyalty. Despite the theoretical importance of genealogy as an organizing principle, however, authorities believe that tribal genealogies reflect the reality of politics rather than of history. And, although they endorse the principle of genealogy, tribesmen also recognize this fact. Tribesmen may rally to the aid of ever more distant relatives, forming ever larger segments of the tribe at higher and higher levels of organization. Thus the grandsons of the same grandfather might oppose one another on a certain issue but join together if necessary to oppose the descendants of the brother of their common great-grandfather. The concept of tribe is denoted as qawm, the Arabic term for tribe. Qawm connotes much more than tribe, however. Canfield defines qawm in Hazarajat as the "common local term for a spatially and socially united group of people . . . The central intent of the word qawm is that members are united by agnatic kinship, have a common home territory, and enjoy warm social fellowship." Political action is taken by the qawm as a unit, and it constitutes a unit for religious rituals. The term may also be used for affinal (related through marriage) kin or friendly families who may eventually become affines, thus invalidating the notion that qawmi (members of the same qawm) are only agnates. "In practice," he writes, "the word qawm is applied to a group, whoever they are, who functionally carry on the activities that express kinship unity, even if this usage masks certain aberrancies in the actual kinship connections." Anderson has extensively described the meaning of qawm to the Ghilzai Pashtuns. His observations have theoretical significance for the meaning of tribe elsewhere. Among the Ghilzai the term qawm "can be applied to any category of common patrilineal descent that persists through time as a group identity from a particular community to the totality of Pashtun. Informants emphasize, however, that most applications are metaphorical and comparative; that the idea refers to any larger category of common patrilineal descent; but that it usually designates the outer limit of common interest and sympathy, or at least the one with greatest salience." Anderson also highlights the corporate nature of tribal responsibility. Fellow tribesmen share in the responsibility for offenses committed by members of the tribe. Revenge may be taken on any tribe member, although usually liability is greatest for those most closely related to the offender. Nevertheless, "involvement in distant or minor affairs is all too imaginable and too often experienced to discount." Tribesmen also share the burden for revenging a wronged tribal member. Tribes stereotype themselves and each other in terms of customs, dress, appearance, and language. Anderson also addresses the issue of tribal-state relations. The Ghilzai are historically a collection of tribes. They view their relation to the state not as an opposition of government to tribe, per se. Instead, they oppose seats of government with their hierarchical organization where there are rulers and ruled, to tribal lands where all are ideally equal and political organization is acephalous (without a paramount chief). Ideally, there are no differences among the members of a Ghilzai tribe. Within the Ghilzai tribes are patrilineages that are segmentary and may be acephalous or may be headed by a leader whose position "amounts to an office." Tribalism in Afghanistan, then, is not a feature of every ethnic group but is extremely important to Pashtuns, particularly to those who live in rural areas, and is essential among certain other groups as well. It is a meaningful concept to those Afghans who are tribal members, but the concept of tribe is plastic and to some extent depends on circumstance and affective relationship. Qawm is an extension of family, as all qawmi are ideally related agnatically. Qawm may also be indistinguishable from ethnic group, which is also based on an extension of family. Ethnicity and tribalism have both served to divide Afghans of different groups from each other and to unite Afghans with similar backgrounds. Neither tribe nor ethnic group is always a harmonious entity, however, and internecine warfare has been common in the country's history. Because both tribe and ethnic group are extensions of family, in order to unite Afghans from divergent groups it might be useful to extend the concept of family as far as it will go in order to include all the citizens in the same group. This is precisely what the mujahidiin have done in appealing to the community of believers (i.e., all Muslims regardless of sect). Although there is no belief that Muslims share a common descent, the shared goals, opposition to other groups (i.e., nonbelieving atheists), affective ties, and group liability of mujahidiin are reminiscent of familial, tribal, and ethnic group construction. As such, the appeal of the mujahidiin must be strongly familiar.