$Unique_ID{bob00458}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Romania
Romanian-Soviet Meetings in 1924}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Mihai Opritescu}
$Affiliation{Embassy of Romania, Washington DC}
$Subject{soviet
german
bukovina
germany
question
baltic
august
states
europe
state}
$Date{1990}
$Log{}
Title:       Romania
Book:        Romanian Military History
Author:      Mihai Opritescu
Affiliation: Embassy of Romania, Washington DC
Date:        1990

Romanian-Soviet Meetings in 1924

     On June 23, 1940, von Schulenburg, the German ambassador to Moscow
informed the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the Soviet determination
to settle the territorial problems with Romania. The German diplomat informed
that the USSR's territorial claims versus Romania extended, too, to Bukovina,
besides Bessarabia, a province inhabited, as it was explained, by
Ukraineans.

     The information took the German officials by surprise as they did not
expect at that time that the Soviets would rise the question of solving the
third point in the additional secret protocol dated August 23, 1939; "As far
as the south-eastern Europe is concerned the Soviet side stresses its
interest to Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political
disinterestedness vis-a-vis these territories". Moreover, the Soviets did
increase their territorial claims over Bukovina too, a territory which had not
been the subject to the Moscow "agreement", what made Hitler declare in a
highly violent temper: "I do not want to be taken by the Russians for an
imbecile". Germany, discontented that Russia had seized upon the Baltic
countries, firmly reacted; the note sent by the Ministry in Wilhelmstrasse to
Kremlin specified that the Soviet claims over Bukovina did represent a novelty
as in the past it belonged to the Austrian crown (then never to Russia - o.n.)
and it was "densely populated with German citizens".

     The Soviets, aware of their going beyond all limits, on June 26, 1940,
would confine their claims to northern Bukovina only, the town of Cernauti
(Czernowitz) included; that day at 12 o'clock p.m. the Soviet ultimatum was
handed to the Romanian minister to Moscow, Davidescu. The Romanian
authorities' surprise was even bigger than of the Germans' but Romania,
isolated herself, lacked of the German support, would eventually cede to the
pressures exerted upon her and would consent to the ultimatum. Then, besides a
predictable revendication, a novelty emerged: Bukovina. A natural question
arises: It was Bukovina an ultimatum at the last moment correlated to the
territorial changes of September 1939 or it was a long-run target?

     While researching the documents of the Vienna Romanian-Soviet conference
in March-April 1924 a sentence arrested our attention; it belonged to
Krestinski, the Soviet ambasador in his interpellation of April 2, 1924.
Reffering to the question of a plebiscite in Bessarabia the Soviet diplomat
made the following assertion: "It is only in this way that the Romanian
government could free from its finding fault with holding Bessarabia forcedly
as it equally holds Bukovina against the will of the Ukrainean peasants, in
their majority, living in this province". The same assertion could be also
found in the memorialistic notes of Gherman Pantea, a member of the Romanian
delegation to the conference held in Austria's capital city. The above quoted
statement is highly telling from two viewpoints at least: first, that in 1924
the Soviet side contested Romania's rights over Bukovina; secondly, that the
question of Bukovina is put in correlation with Bessarabia's appurtenance to
the Romanian State. Then the following question might be put: the assertion
about the majoritary presence of the Ukrainean peasants vis-a-vis the Romanian
population could be presented as a viable argument? Obviously the answer is
negative, although the argument was advanced, too, in the ultimative note of
June 1940. Then, which were the aims that determined the Soviet side make that
statement in 1924? An answer could be offered by the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations in 1917 when Austro-Hungary "completely exhausted... threatened
by famine pursuing to conclude peace" to give her "bread for the next day" did
make numerous concessions, among which the one stipulated in the secret
Austro-Ukrainean agreement envisaging that until July 15, 1918 Austro-Hungary
should unite the "territories of eastern Galicia whose population is Ukrainean
in majority from so far Galicia and joined Bukovine in a country of the
crown". In 1924 Moscow could not refer directly to the question of Bukovina
because the Brest-Litovsk peace had been contested by the Soviets, labelled as
"imperialist" and a direct contest of Bukovina's appurtenance to Romania would
have been equivalent to an action aimed at the revision of treaties at a time
when USSR was normalizing her relations with the Western countries.

     It is possible that the Soviet delegation to have used the Bukovine
argument in order to underline that Romania was also holding other territories
able to be contested through "ethnical" arguments, but their raising the
question of Bukovina, 16 years later, besides the question of Bessarabia makes
us believe that the Soviet diplomacy pursued the possible revendication of
Bukovina from a "multinational considered-State at a favourable time. Beyond
any doubts the favourable moment was June 1940 when Germany, while directing
her efforts westwards with a view of a decisive confrontation with Britain
after Frances's defeat, could not oppose the expansionist Soviet tendencies in
South-East Europe of course, as decisive argument in Bukovina's claiming was
the occupation, in September 1939, of the limitroph Polish territories. The
German guarantees granted to Romania in August 1940 showed a visible change
in the outlook of German diplomacy towards the Balkans, a change to arouse the
deep irritation of Kremlin which would be pointed out by Molotov during his
visit to Berlin in summer 1940; on that occasion he informed his German
collocutors, among others, about the Soviet intentions to get the rest of
Bukovina too. The Soviet hopes would not take shape entirely, but the
territorial modifications, north Bukovina included, of June 1940 would be
accomplished and sanctioned internationally through the Paris Treaty in 1947.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN AUGUST 1939 AND APRIL 1940

MIHAI RETEGAN

     On the 23rd of August 1944 the whole world was amazed to see the coup de
theatre of the Soviet-German pact. Shortly afterwards, some diplomatic
circles, which were generally well informed, discreetly commented on a new
joint coup of the two states that seemed to support irreconciliable
ideologies: the division of eastern Europe, from the Arctic Ocean to the Black
Sea, into spheres of influence according to a typically imperialist procedure.
The short, but intense Soviet-German negotiations, which developed at a speed
that alarmed the European diplomatic chancelleries, resulted in four items of
the agreement: "1. In case of a territorial and political change of the
territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania), Lithuania's northern border will be the border of the spheres of
interest both of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. In connection with this point
both sides admit Lithuania's interest in the Vilno territory. 2. In case of a
territorial and political change of the territories belonging to the Polish
State, the spheres of interest, both of Germany and the U.S.S.R., will be
delimited approximately by the Narev, Vistula and San rivers. The question
whether the interests of both sides make the maintenance of an independent
Polish State desirable and the way the borders of this state will be traced
can only be determined definitely during the subsequent political events.
Anyway, both governments will solve this question by friendly understanding.
3. As for south-eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes its own interest in
Bessarabia. The German side states its total political desinteresement in this
territory. 4. This protocol will be regarded by both sides as strictly
secret."

     From the moment when the last name was put on this act (which by no means
overlooks the contribution of the Nazi Reich to the outbreak of WW II, but
which made it easier for Germany to invade some countries and subdue some
peoples) till the two states began to act, there passed eight days for Germany
and a little over three weeks for the Soviet Union. Then, for almost two
years, by June 1941, things followed a route that evinces the complete absence
of any sign of hazard in these bilateral relations, proving an extremely
minute strategical planning. And in June 1941 the Soviet-German complex went
to pieces after a number of events that did not suit the status of a "partner"
at all. Is it the consequence of an "ideological incompatibility," which had
been frozen partially up to August 1939? The examination of the two states"
action excludes "incompatibility." Or is it the attempt at removing a
"partner" that was more than troublesome and threatened to head for Europe
(and more than that) on its own?

     In history facts, data and people are particularly important, but to know
the inner mechanism making them go, to know why events followed that course is
a fundamental question. Nobody questions nowadays the fact that the
nonaggression pact and especially the additional protocol corresponded to the
two parteners' needs at that moment. Germany secured for itself a more than
benevolent neutrality by the U.S.S.R. in the war it was preparing as well as
the possibility of some economic agreements; the U.S.S.R. won not only the
capacity as a "judge" (the Soviet Government was called upon to appreciate the
quantity and quality of the "offers" made by the two sides) but also the
advantage that, availing itself of these "offers," it should prepare and
practice its own policy. In the long run the agreements favoured the U.S.S.R.,
by enabling it to advance by a few hundred kilometres to the centre of Europe,
the much wished-for Bohemian quadrilateral coveted by all strategists. By
means of the same pacts, of course, Stalin also aimed at giving material form
to Lenin's intentions.

     A compared study of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact with the other
similar acts previously signed by the Soviet State reveals a "technical error"
that changed into an essential problem: the appearance of certain important
mutations in the very nature of the treaty of the 23rd of August 1939. The
previous nonaggression pacts signed by the Soviet Union included two
provisions, which are not to be found in the one signed by Molotov: (1) the
pact came into force after being ratified by both sides and (2) it was no
longer valid the moment one of the counterattacking parties attacked a third
country. Under such circumstances the U.S.S.R. and Germany were able to apply
unimpededly the policy programmed in their own laboratories.

     But hiding behind this clear and real community of interests, one of the
signatories of the August pact triggered off the offensive.

     The first actions were of a special nature. On the 16th of September 1939
Molotov informed Ambassador Schulenburg that, in order to make the Soviet
intervention in eastern Poland plausible to the public opinion and his own
people, it should be motivated by the Soviet Government through the threat of
the Ukrainians and the White Russians by the Germans. The annoyance and
discontent of the German diplomat were given the same answer, namely that,
unluckily, no other motivation could be found. The "excuse" actually contained
a real threat for any German attempt at interfering in the Soviet sphere of
influence. On the 31st of October, Molotov said to the Supreme Soviet that
such concepts as "aggression" and "aggressor" should get a new connotation
and that Germany was in the possition of a state struggling for peace whereas
Britain and France opposed the conclusion of peace. It was obvious that
Molotov mentioned Germany, but meant the U.S.S.R. Indeed, something had
changed in the time elapsing between the London protocols of the 4th July 1944
and Molotov's speech (the people's commisar for foreign affairs was preparing
an excuse for his future deeds). Almost concurrently he initiated a move
aimed at deviating from the spirit of the additional protocol as Ribbentrop
had appreciated that the "sphere of influence" did not mean annexation, only
the exercise of one's domination over some foreign territories. The move under
consideration, in the Baltic region, which fully materialized in 1940, was to
be made in three stages to avoid an immediate outbreak: signing the mutual
assistance treaties with the Baltic States; siting the Soviet military bases
in the three republics; their complete annexation. By occupying the shore of
the Baltic States and siting the garrisons there, the Soviet Union watched the
traffic on the Baltic Sea, thus exerting permanent pressure on Konigsberg and
East Prussia.

     The second means used to reach more comprehensive aims than those
provided for in the protocols of August 1939 revealed a wide range of
diplomatic and military actions. These actions will bring to the fore a
Soviet attitude and superiority that did no longer fit into the additional
protocol; starting the latter half of 1940, Berlin considered that its
fundamental imperialist interests were essentially endangered.

     The first event was occasioned by the Soviet-Turkish negotiations (23rd
September-18th October 1939). Triggered off almost simultaneously with the
Soviet-German negotiations for the friendship and border treaty, they enabled
the Soviet Union to play a "dialectic game": it threatened Berlin with a
bilateral understanding with Turkey that should not consider the provisions of
the treaty of the 23rd of August 1939 with a view to having the Reich make
some changes in the borders of the former Polish State; it threatened Turkey
with the spectre of the Soviet-German alliance to get important concessions as
regards the straits. And the change of the borders proved the efficiency of
this "game."

     The dependence of German industry on the Swedish iron of Kiruna was a
well-known fact. The ore was carried on railway to the port of Lulea and
from there, on the Baltic Sea, to Germany. The route passed by the Aland
Islands, a territory which belonged to Finland, at a 25-mile distance form
the Swedish shore. And in September-October 1939 the Soviet Union suggested
that the Finnish Government should give up these islands to Moscow. This move
was to be backed by the occupation of the seashore of the Baltic States. The
intention was clear: under such circumstances, when the only ore deposits that
could be compared with the Kiruna ones were in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet navy,
with a new basis on the Aland Islands, could easily have cut iron ore supply
to Germany, thus annihilating the Reich's giant industry or compelling Berlin
to pay an exorbitant price for the raising of the naval blockade in the Baltic
Sea or for the delivery of iron ore from the Urals. This way the German
imperialist aims would have been dealt a heavy blow at and the Reich would
really have been defeated. This considerable economic threat was followed by a
military one: the Aland Islands were an extremely favourable bridgehead `or
the penetration into Scandinavia.

     Quite paradoxically, under these circumstances the Reich's attitude was
not favourable to Finland although it had exported to that country important
quantities of weapons and imported nickel before the war. Should one presume
that Berlin had waited to solve the Finnish question by making a cat's paw of
others, that is by an English-French expedition corps? Hard to believe.
Anyway, the German leaders avoided any anti-Soviet tinge in their approaches
during the winter war, moreover they banned the transit of the materiel Italy
had sent to Finland. This attitude was imposed by strategical reasons: the
campaign in the west had initially been planned to begin in late November
1939, whereas the eastern border was to be granted peace and quiet.

     This situation was examined in its entire complexity by experts of the
north department of the Foreign Office, who carefully watched the evolution
of the German-Soviet relations: "The absence of a buffer state and their
conflict of interests in the Balkans and the Baltic Sea make a possible
confrontation quite probable and this reason, as well as the obviously
imperialist ambitions, can influence the Soviet decision-makers to 'save the
Soviet interests in the Baltic Sea.' Thus, it is possible that the
disappearance of Finland should lead to a Soviet-German confrontation as a
result of Germany's and the Soviet Union's competitive interests in northern
Scandinavia. Or, perhaps, the Soviet Government might consider the end of the
Finnish war as a favourable opportunity to lay claims to the Balkans, as long
as it still has the necessary time, and if so, their mutual jealousy and fear
might cause a confrontation between the two dictatorships in this part of the
world."

     Quite surprisingly, the Soviet Union did not use its overwhelming
superiority in number and began peace negotiations at the first sign given by
Finland. Should we think that this hurry was caused only by the heavy losses
(48,745 according to Soviet and about 200,000 according to Finnish
estimates)? Yes, one should, but one can also put forward another hypothesis,
which, even if not yet confirmed, is possible in this case if one takes into
account the way subsequent events developed (Stalin was warned of the Nazi
attack or other actions): the particularly well informed Soviet networks
implanted in various German military structures let Moscow know that the
Wehrmacht was preparing to launch the offensive against the states in northern
and western Europe. Having such information, the Soviet decision-makers
stopped the operations in Finland to be able to use the whole military power
according to a certain outlook. Moreover, they also exerted economic pressure:
in late March 1940 oil and wheat deliveries were suspended and Mikoian took an
extremely hostile stand during his talks with Schulenburg. The German
Government had to intercede with Molotov so that he should order the
resumption of deliveries. It was a sign pointing out an attitude which the
Nazi Government was to consider.