$Unique_ID{bob00402} $Pretitle{} $Title{Nepal Chapter 2A. Historical Setting} $Subtitle{} $Author{George L. Harris} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{nepal political century nepalese valley king india moroccan students union} $Date{1973} $Log{} Title: Nepal Book: Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, An Area Study: Nepal Author: George L. Harris Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1973 Chapter 2A. Historical Setting For all but the last several centuries there is an absence of reliable information on the history of the area now known as Nepal. Although there are ancient monuments, coins and other cultural artifacts and archeological remains which have survived as objects of study, they are isolated pieces of evidence which are of little assistance in penetrating the obscurity of the country's past and constructing a continuous narrative of the experience of its people from earliest times. Written materials date only from the fifth century A.D., and even though historical sources gradually increase in volume after that time, they fail to provide a basis for anything more than a vague and fragmentary description of the country's history. An accurate and detailed account of Nepalese history does not become possible until the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the nation became unified under the King of the Gorkhas. The great body of the country's history before that time consists of folklore and legend-handed down through the centuries-in which gods and demons mingle with authentic persons and myths and miracles merge with real events. About the sixteenth century these legendary accounts, sometimes extending back to many centuries earlier, began to be committed to writing in documents known as vamsavalis. These are essentially genealogical chronicles of the kings and dynasties of Nepal, recounting the achievements, real or imaginary, of its monarchs and glorifying their reigns. Despite the fact that what little verifiable data they contain have become heavily encrusted with the accumulated fantasies of centuries of storytellers, the vamsavalis are the single most important category of source material on most of the country's history and the only source for the period before the fifth century A.D. Corroboration for some of the details of the vamsavalis is found in the testimony of foreign writers. There are references to Nepal in the Buddhist literature of India and China, Vedic and Hindu religious and philosophical works-the Puranas, the Mahabharata, and Kautilya's Arthashastra-in the observations of travelers, pilgrims, and traders from China and India and in dynastic histories of China. Nevertheless, because of their inconsistencies, the clarification they provide is only partial. Such information as is available on Nepalese history pertains almost exclusively to the Katmandu Valley; it deals very little, if at all, with all of that part of the Himalayan area which now forms the State of Nepal. The legendary dawn of Nepalese life opens with the story of the supernatural creation of the Valley, and from that time to the present it has been the focal point of the country's history. It has long been the largest population center, the site of a vigorous culture, a major trading entrepot and one of the strongest military and political areas in the central Himalayas. Lying athwart the main Himalayan routes, Nepal's development has been profoundly influenced by its relations with India, Tibet and, to a lesser extent, China. Indian culture manifested through centuries of war, trade, migration and religious pilgrimage has had the greatest impact. However, Nepal has not been simply a passive receiver of the cultural radiations of others, but has played an important role in transmitting elements of the cultures of India, China and Tibet to each of the others. Although it has developed in the process a unique civilization of its own, the dominant theme of Nepalese history is the strong and enduring effects of its relations with other nations. Early History According to the vamsavalis, the Katmandu Valley was once a lake, a contention supported by geological evidence. In the middle of this lake grew a lotus containing a jewel whose brilliance attracted a number of gods to the Valley. One of them, the deity Manjusri, is said to have opened a passage to drain the waters by striking the mountain range to the south of the Valley with a single blow of his sword. The origin and character of the earliest inhabitants of the Katmandu Valley are unknown. Whatever the aboriginal population, however, it was succeeded by a group of people known as the Kiratas who migrated to the Valley from northeastern India in three major waves ending in the seventh century B.C. Racially Indo-Mongoloid and speaking a Tibeto-Burman language, the Kiratas lived under a system of tribal government and appear to have remained undisturbed in the Valley for a period of 700 years. Gautama Buddha was born about 563 B.C. in Lumbini, which is now the Nepalese village of Rummin-dei (Lumbini) in the Tarai, and by the end of the Kirata period Buddhism had become the common faith of the people of the Valley, who in the course of time became the Newar. About the first century A.D., immigrants from India, the Lichavis, established themselves as the rulers of the Kiratas, and from then until the present time all the ruling dynasties of Nepal have been drawn from the plains of northern India. The Lichavis ruled the Valley with brief interruptions from the first to the ninth centuries, and during that period the Indian impact on Nepal was in one of its most extensive and significant phases. Powerful monarchs of India-initially the Kushans and after the fourth century, the Guptas-exercised considerable influence over Nepal without extinguishing its independence. The Guptas, for example, were responsible for the establishment of a monarchical system of government in the Valley, replacing the "republican tribal democracy" which had existed up to that time. Another result of this relationship was the introduction of Hinduism into Nepal. It gained its initial foothold through the conversion of the ruling class about the fourth century and later received acceptance from many of the people. The growth of Hinduism did not result in the displacement of Buddhism, but led to the fusion of the two religions (see ch. 9, Religion). Throughout the latter part of the Lichavi period, Tibet was becoming increasingly powerful and, under the great king Srong btsan sgam po, it eventually came to dominate large areas of China, Central Asia and the Himalayas. For more than a hundred years, between the seventh and the ninth centuries, Tibet held Nepal in vassalage, and for several centuries the influence of Tibet rather than that of India was paramount in Nepal. At this time Buddhists were migrating northward out of India and Nepal mediated much of the transfer of Buddhist culture from India to Tibet; Mahayana Buddhism, the Guptan script, and Sanskrit literature, as well as Nepalese artistic and architectural forms, entered Tibet from Nepal with lasting effect. The seventh and eighth centuries also marked the beginning of fairly frequent contacts not only between Nepal and Tibet but also between Nepal and China. Near the end of the ninth century the Lichavis were replaced by the Thakuri dynasty, which held control of the Valley intermittently for the next several centuries. During the latter part of their reign the Valley was under repeated invasion not only from Indian states to the south but also from the mountain kingdoms to the west. In the thirteenth century yet another dynasty of Indian origin, the Malla, was established in Nepal. Under the Mallas, the Newar culture of the Valley flourished, orthodox Hinduism was strengthened by the introduction of the caste system, and the power of Nepalese kings was extended far beyond its previous limits. The domain of the Mallas reached its greatest extent under Yaksha Malla in the middle of the fifteenth century. Upon his death, however, the kingdom was divided among his descendants and quickly fell into a state of anarchy. Forging the Modern State of Nepal During the sixteenth century the territory now contained within the boundaries of Nepal was fragmented into scores of minor principalities which were gathered into four major groupings. In the east were the various tribal states of the Kiratas; in the Katmandu Valley were the three Newar kingdoms ruled by the Mallas; to the west of the Valley lay a group of petty lordships known as the Chaubisi Rajas; and on the far west was a similar set of states, the Baisi Rajas. Although many of the states of these four groupings nominally recognized the supremacy of several of the more powerful among them or, in the case of the Baisi and Chaubisi Rajas, of the Mogul emperor in Delhi, they were virtually independent and engaged in continual warfare. The absence of any political system embracing these states and the turbulence of their relations made possible the rise of the Gorkhas and; ultimately, the formation of the State of Nepal. In 1559, Drabya Shah, the younger son of the Raja of the Chaubisi Kingdom of Lamjung, brought Gorkha-a small, adjacent principality west of the Katmandu Valley-under his dominion and established the line of kings which later became the monarchs of Nepal. During the next two centuries the position of the dynasty was consolidated by Drabya Shah's successors, and the territory of the kingdom was extended to include most of the area between the Marsyandi and the Trisuli Rivers. The main thrust of Gorkha expansion, however, did not occur until the middle of the eighteenth century with the accession to the throne of the tenth in the Shah line, Prithvi Narayan (r. 1742-75). Extolled as a fierce and resourceful warrior king even among a people renowned for their martial qualities, Prithvi's overriding aim was the conquest of vast areas of the Himalayas and their incorporation into the territories of the House of Gorkha. In the second year of his reign he embarked upon a relentless campaign for the systematic subjugation of the surrounding kingdoms which lasted until his death and, continued by his successors, did not come to a complete halt until almost three-quarters of a century later. The first and most critical phase of this undertaking was the conquest of the Katmandu Valley, a task which required 25 years to accomplish. Katmandu was not taken until 1768, Patan and Bhadgaon fell the following year, and by the end of 1769 the whole of the Valley was under the control of the Kingdom of Gorkha. Moving his capital to Katmandu, Prithvi Narayan established a policy which strictly excluded Europeans from the country, reformed the systems of land tenure and taxation, and executed large numbers of people whom he felt might constitute a potential threat to his position as the first king of Nepal. Domestic affairs occupied his attention only briefly, however, and the Gorkha advance was soon resumed. Meeting only slight opposition, Prithvi's armies subjugated the entire Kirata area to the east and by the time of his death in 1775 were in possession of territory as far east as Darjeeling (now a part of India). The conquests of the Gorkhas continued under the leadership of Prithvi Narayan's descendants, most notably his younger son, Bahadur Shah, who acted as regent for his nephew from 1786 to 1795. The Gorkhas turned west and overran the Chaubisi and Baisi Rajas and, even farther to the west, Kumaon and Garhwal. Most areas were brought by conquest under the direct control of Katmandu. However, to avoid conflict with a few particularly strong adversaries, treaties of subsidiary alliance were concluded which often granted them a large measure of autonomy. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century the territory of the Kingdom of Nepal extended from the southern frontier of present-day Kashmir all along the arc of the Himalayas to the heart of Sikkim. While these conquests were being made in the west, Nepal became engaged in a quarrel with Tibet over a number of questions-primarily the circulation of Nepalese coinage in Tibet and the taxation of goods traveling between India and Tibet-which eventually involved Nepal in war with China. Nepalese invasions of Tibet in 1788 and 1791 challenged the suzerainty which the Chinese Empire, then at the zentith of its power under the Manchu dynasty, had established over the domains of the Dalai Lama during the preceding century and a half. In 1791 a Chinese ultimatum demanded the withdrawal of Nepalese troops. When it was rejected a Chinese army said to number 70,000 entered Tibet, put the Nepalese to flight and then-culminating a campaign regarded as even more extraordinary than Hannibal's crossing of the Alps-passed through the Himalayas and approached withing a day's march of the Nepalese capital. Forced to terms in 1792, Nepal agreed to return territory earlier taken from Tibet and to send a tribute mission to Peking every 5 years, thereby assuming the nebulous tributary relationship to the Manchu Emperor which China had already established over Tibet and such other countries as Siam, Korea and Burma. After this encounter with China, Nepal's expansionist energies, blocked in all other directions, turned toward the south. At the same time, however, the British in India were moving northward. They had arrived in India in the late sixteenth century and by the latter part of the eighteenth century the territory under their control extended up through the area of what is now East Pakistan and the Indian provinces of Bihar and Bengal to the lower reaches of Nepal. During this period their primary interest in the Himalayas lay in exploiting the commercial potential of the mountain states and in acquiring trade routes through them into Tibet and thence, it was hoped, to China. Although the British had been hostile toward Prithvi Narayan, fearing that the extension of his power throughout the Himalayas would jeopardize their plans, by the time of the Sino-Nepalese war they were seeking to put their dealings with Nepal on a more amicable footing. However, treaties of 1792 and 1801 between Great Britain and Nepal providing for the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations were subsequently nullified by the opposition of ruling circles in Nepal. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, therefore, relations between Nepal and Great Britain were distant and unsettled. After continued acquisitions by the British East India Company made its territories contiguous with the southern frontier of Nepal in 1801, Nepalese depredations on British possessions across the frontier caused relations between the two countries to deteriorate still further. Turmoil along the frontier continued for more than a decade and by 1814 it, along with the persistent refusal of Nepal to enter into trade and diplomatic relations, had become intolerable to the British. When Nepal rejected a British proposal that a joint boundary commission be established to recommend a settlement for the disputed territories and ignored an ultimatum which followed, Great Britain sent troops to occupy the contested areas and declared war against Nepal in November 1814. The confrontation with British power decisively brought the course of the Nepalese expansion to an end. Resisting until British troops menaced the Katmandu Valley, Nepal capitulated in 1816 and met Great Britain's demands in a settlement known as the Treaty of Sagauli. The territorial provisions of the agreement greatly reduced the area of Nepal and established the general outline of its present boundaries. Nepal was stripped of all its conquests west of the Kali and east of the Mechi Rivers, as well as large portions of the Tarai. In addition, the treaty gave Great Britain several means of making its influence felt in Nepalese affairs; Nepal was not to employ any European or American nor any British subject, without the consent of the British Government, which was also given the right to mediate any dispute arising between Nepal and Sikkim. Moreover, it was agreed that there would be an exchange of diplomatic representatives between Great Britain and Nepal. Struggle for Domestic Supremacy After 1816 the militancy of the Nepalese expressed itself primarily in a factional struggle for interes the PPS has generally followed the Soviet line. It has openly and vigorously attacked government policies in the parliament, in local councils, and in its press organs. Except for brief periods when its newspaper was suppressed, the PPS has escaped repression by refraining from criticism of the monarchy and by firmly supporting the king on the Western Sahara. As a member of the National Security Council, Yata joined other party leaders on missions abroad to explain the country's position on the Western Sahara; Yata visited capitals in Eastern Europe. Several clandestine fringe groups of Marxist-Leninist or Maoist inspiration had been only partially suppressed by arrests during the mid-1970s, allegedly for plotting to form a so-called Red Army and forcibly replace the monarchy with a socialist "people's democratic republic." They also advocated self-determination for the Saharawis and condemned Moroccan military operations there. One of these groups, Ilal-Amam (Forward), has split off from the PPS. Its leader, Abraham Serfaty, remained in jail, although others had been released. A companion organization, the 3 March Group, which had split off from the UNFP, had splintered into two factions in 1978-79, one joining the USFP and the other remaining outlawed because of its antigovernment position on the Western Sahara. A new leftist party, the Organization of People's Democratic Action (Organisation de l'Action Democratique Populaire-OADP) was formed by Mohamed Bensaid, a political exile who took advantage of a royal amnesty to return to Morocco in 1981. The OADP was said to be composed mainly of former partisans of the 3 March Group. It did not nominate candidates in the 1983 communal elections, advising its followers to vote for the USFP or the PPS. Bensaid was the only OADP member to be elected to the parliament in 1984. Interest Groups In his article "Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance," political scientist Mark Tessler describes the political elites of Morocco in terms of a series of concentric circles. The monarchy is at the center. An inner core of somewhat over 200 individuals is composed of party and union leaders and senior ministry officials. A broader general elite of 600 to 700 individuals includes persons of rural origin who have achieved prominence at the national level, senior army officers, leaders of private associations and religious institutions, and others who are outside the formal political system. The outermost circle consists of the local and rural subelites-qaids, pashas, shaykhs, local council leaders, party officials, and parliamentary deputies with only local influence-perhaps 5,000 Moroccans in all. In addition to these elite groupings and to the formal party structures are various organizations that serve to articulate the political strivings of identifiable groups in the society. Channels for the expression of interests by these groups are not well defined. Those that have been most successful in influencing the political authorities have generally done so through the personal ties their senior members have established at higher political echelons. In some cases these members are themselves part of the governing elite. The business associations tend to be well connected to the leadership ranks, as is the largest labor federation. Student organizations and groups associated with the Islamic revival have been among the primary centers of dissent, denouncing the elite establishment, the social inequities, the bureaucratic mismanagement, and the materialism that they find in the existing order. The army, with its history of intervention and its more recent expansion to prosecute the war in the Western Sahara, remains in the background of civilian politics, latently powerful yet enigmatic. Labor and Employer Organizations The Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocaine du Travail-UMT) was created in 1955 in close association with the Istiqlal. When the leftists abandoned the Istiqlal in 1959 to form the UNFP, the UMT became allied with the latter party. The Istiqlal subsequently formed a new labor confederation, the General Union of Moroccan Workers (Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains-UGTM), to replace the UMT. In 1978 a third union organization, the Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confederation Democratique du Travail-CDT) was established under the auspices of the USFP. The UMT was the largest of the three federations, enrolling over 60 percent of Morocco's 1 million organized workers, mainly from the industrial and commercial sectors. The UMT has been among the largest and strongest trade union bodies of the Middle East and North Africa; it represents Moroccan workers annually at the International Labour Organisation. The UGTM and its federations, representing teachers, hotel and restaurant employees, and railroad and municipal workers, upholds Istiqlal policies, stressing pro-Islamic and pro-Arab elements in its program. CDT affiliates include many public employee unions as well as phosphate miners and farm laborers. The UMT has always been cautious regarding strike actions, especially a strike for political purposes. High unemployment and slender union resources, coupled with a government unsympathetic to extended strikes, have limited the bargaining power of the unions. The UMT and, to an even greater extent, the UGTM have concentrated on jobs, wages, and benefits, rarely intruding on broader political matters. The CDT adopted a more militant approach than did its two predecessors. It has been willing to confront the government over broad social issues, embroiling itself in periodic conflict with the authorities. It was blamed for the riots and subsequent police repression that followed its call for a general strike to protest food price rises in June 1981. The government retaliated by detaining all members of the CDT central bureau and many other unionists. The CDT offices were closed down for a 10-month period. The King's rapprochement with the USFP was followed by amnesties for the imprisoned leaders of the CDT. The CDT was subsequently successful in regaining its standing as the second-ranking federation as a result of victories in plant delegate elections. The unions were not involved in the 1984 demonstrations, fearing official retribution and reluctant to antagonize the king when national elections were pending. The trade union movement nonetheless retained a measure of independence and could find itself in contention with the government again if the austerity program imposed an unacceptable economic burden on working people. Corresponding to the union federations have been a group of associations representing the interests of businessmen and manufacturers by communicating the concerns and objectives of employers to the political authorities. These bodies may be influential in particular areas of activity but are thought to have little effect on overall economic policies, in view of the centralized management of major sectors and foreign trade. Individuals connected with them, however, have held strategic official positions and often carry weight in the king's economic councils. The General Moroccan Economic Confederation is made up of member organizations representing various industrial and commercial interests. Chambers of commerce and industry in Moroccan cities are member bodies of the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce. Many operators of large and medium-sized farms belong to the Moroccan Farmers' Association. Students Education is perhaps the most politicized and radicalized of the social sectors. Alienated by the manifestations of corruption and venality in political life and confronted by declining job prospects after graduation, students have been recruited to leftist causes, often rejecting the USFP and the PPS for illegal and more radical Marxist-Leninist groups. Since the early 1980s many students attracted by religious fundamentalists and disenchanted by the left, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have deserted the Marxist movements. The appeal of militant Muslim sects has been greatest among students of modest means and social background, often from the science and engineering faculties. The concentration of students in Rabat and other centers of power has helped to dramatize their protests. Acting with a strong sense of idealism and less vulnerable to government coercion, the students are among the most politically sensitive forces in society because of their greater means to disrupt the normal course of government. Studies of student attitudes have revealed a cynicism about the possibility of influencing official behavior through legal channels. In the mid-1980s a very small percentage of students were members of political parties, and few acknowledged attending political rallies. Only half as many students troubled themselves to vote as did the general population. The National Union of Moroccan Students (Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains-UNEM) has been in the forefront of student activism since its formation by Mehdi Ben Barka in 1956. Although successful in mobilizing students on behalf of left-wing campaigns, the domination of the movement by radical factions beyond the fringes of national politics, coupled with the government's stern restraints, has prevented the UNEM from extending its influence. As a result of discontent over social and educational conditions, university strikes became endemic in the period 1970-73, and extreme leftists gained control of the UNEM. The union was officially banned in 1973, and many of the student leaders were given long jail sentences. The government's harsh reaction provided the students with new grievances. Reforms were announced in 1976 to meet many of the demands of students and teachers. The Moroccanization of secondary schools by replacing foreign teachers (mainly French) was to be accelerated, teachers' wages and working conditions were to be upgraded, and the universities were to be democratized by giving them autonomy with respect to their management, curricula, and budgets. In 1978 the ban on the UNEM was lifted after the government took measures to ensure that it would be under the control of "responsible" members of the USFP and the PPS. Student unrest broke out again in early 1981 in protest against overcrowding, inadequate accommodations, and the low level of subsistence grants. The students also opposed government plans for selective enrollment, insisting that the baccalaureat (high school diploma) remain the sole qualification for university entrance. As a result of determined efforts by the Marxist extremists, the far left swept the elections to union bodies on the main campuses. The internal struggle reached a climax at the UNEM's congress in September 1981, when the six USFP members on the UNEM executive commission withdrew, leaving two PPS members and three from outlawed leftist factions. After a strike in December that paralyzed the main campuses, three members of the executive commission and many other students were jailed. Less militant and politicized student groups were associated with other political parties. Accordingly, the General Union of Moroccan Students aligned itself with the Istiqlal, the People's Movement of Moroccan Students with the MP, and the Democratic Union of Moroccan Students with the PND. Women Despite having the constitutional right to vote, Moroccan women in 1985 had yet to become an overt, distinct political force. Political parties and labor unions, however, usually had women's branches. The overall management of such women's political auxiliary groups was generally left to a male member of the parent body. Political activity by women has been encouraged by the king and other leaders, although the king continued to observe the traditional Muslim prohibition against allowing a man's wife to be seen in public. The minister of interior attributed the negligible role of women to "shyness" and rural tradition. Throughout society, however, the persistence of male and female subcultures meant that only the most exceptional women were ready to defy the traditions of their communities (see The Individual, the Family, and the Sexes, ch. 2). Where Berber influences were strong, rural women have taken a somewhat more active political role than have their urban counterparts. No woman has ever held a cabinet position in Morocco, nor have there been any women in parliament. Sixteen women are unsuccessful candidates for the Chamber of Representatives in 1984; eight had run in 1977. A considerable increase in the number of female candidates for local office did occur in 1983. Some were elected to communal councils in 1976 and 1983 and to the Consultative Council on the Sahara in the Western Sahara in 1981. The Jewish Community The Jewish community in Morocco in some 2,000 years old. It has always enjoyed a special relationship with the royal dynasty. At the time of Moroccan independence a small group of Jewish activists who had worked with the Istiqlal encouraged Jews to join all parties and to participate in politics. For the most part, however, Jews preferred to remain in the background of politics. Jewish participation in patronage networks required a Muslim patron at some point; their highest patron was the sultan, later the king. Their loyalty to the king was cemented by their fears of any alternative situation without him. In 1984 a Jewish candidate of the UC party, Joseph Ohana, was elected to parliament. Ohana was the first Jewish deputy since Moroccan independence. The size of the Jewish community declined from over 200,000 in 1948 to 11,000 to 14,000 in the mid-1980s. The decline resulted from emigration after the creation of the state of Israel and after such events as the Arab-Israeli wars and the 1971 coup attempt. In 1976 Jewish emigres were officially invited to return. Although few Jews took advantage of the offer, the invitation did reassure the resident Jewish population. Hassan's positive relationship with his country's Jewish community was underscored by his backing of a congress of the Jewish Communities Council in Morocco held in Rabat in 1984. Drawing Jews of Moroccan origin from all parts of the world, it was attended by 40 representatives of Moroccan Jewish settlers in Israel, including 11 members of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. Both the Moroccan prime minister and the crown prince participated in the event, and many private discussions were reportedly held about negotiating Arab-Israeli differences, Hassan's interest in the Jewish community and its expatriates in Israel, combined with his moderate stance on Arab-Israeli issues, has had significant ramifications for Morocco's foreign policy (see Other Arab Countries, this ch.). The Armed Forces Until 1971 the Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armees Royales-FAR), or, more specifically, the senior military officers, were the source of the monarchy's staunchest support. These officers, generally of wealthy, rural Berber families, could be unquestionably relied upon by the king. They were regarded as an important counterweight to the modern elites of the cities and the ambitions of the Istiqlal. The assumptions of political neutrality and unbounded loyalty to the king had to be cast aside, however, when the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts destroyed the special relationship between Hassan and the armed forces. Trials and purges eliminated the immediate problem for the king, although the many executions and the abasement of the army may have resulted in a permanent sense of alienation among officers innocent of complicity in plots against the king (see Loyalty, Deceit, and Royal Control, ch. 5). The warfare in the Western Sahara has focused favorable national attention on the FAR. Benefits and pay supplements granted to enlisted personnel mitigated the boredom and harshness of the desert campaign. Therenal supremacy. The major contestants in this internal competition were two major families of the nobility, the Thapas and the Pandes. Their bitter animosities had resulted in conflict and bloodshed for generations, and their rivalry was directed toward possession of the prime-ministership, a position which had grown increasingly powerful since the days of Prithvi Narayan because of the incompetence or extreme youth of a succession of monarchs. However, the antagonism between the two families involved much more than simply the question of who was to hold the office of prime minister. It also concerned a major issue of foreign policy. The Thapas, responsible for concluding the peace with Great Britain in 1816, had become identified with a comparatively moderate and cautious, though not entirely pacific, foreign policy, while the Pandes were vehemently anti-British and sought a resumption of the wars of conquest to the south. To forestall a demand for more strenuous measures, the Thapa prime minister, Bhim Sen Thapa, who maintained the ascendancy of his family while holding office from 1804 to 1837, pursued a policy of slow, piecemeal encroachment on the south designed to sate the bellicosity of the Pandes and of the army without being excessively provocative to Great Britain. Concern for the security of its frontier in northern India therefore caused Great Britain to take a large interest in Nepalese internal affairs and, through the British Resident in Katmandu, to intervene frequently in Nepalese politics. British recruitment of Gurkha troops also began at this time. Impressed with the martial qualities of the Gurkhas during the war of 1814-16, Great Britain hoped that by providing employment for the otherwise idle troops the belligerence of Nepal's policy might be reduced and another serious conflict avoided. The internal struggle also came to involve the question of who was actually to wield the authority of the throne, enervated though it had become. A single monarch, Rajendra Bikram Shah, reigned from 1816 to 1846 but because of his impotence, initially the result of his youth and later of his passivity, he seldom actually ruled. Consequently, there were continual machinations within the royal family to fill the vacuum around the throne. The conflicts which arose within the royal family became interlocked with the feud between the Thapas and the Pandes, and in the fluid tactical alliances which resulted the Pandes were usually found supporting the king or his legitimate heirs while the Thapas aligned themselves with other members of the royal family. Earlier it was the judicious disposition of the power of the throne which had preserved a semblance of equilibrium between the Thapas and the Pandes and prevented either from dominating the king completely. When the influence of the royal family was dissipated by the widening of the rifts within it, however, these divisions were exploited by a collateral member of the Thapa family to eradicate all remaining vestiges of monarchical power and establish himself as ruler of Nepal. The primacy of the Thapas came to an end in 1837 when Bhim Sen Thapa was toppled from power, and there followed a chaotic decade, punctuated frequently by assassinations, unrest and foreign difficulties, in which the internal struggle for supremacy moved toward a final resolution. It culminated in a bloody slaughter in 1846 when the younger wife of King Rajendra, Queen Lakshmi Devi, gathered the nobles and ministers of the court at the Kot (Royal Court of Assembly) to determine who was responsible for the murder of her lover, a contender for the prime-ministership. Jang Bahadur, nephew of Bhim Sen Thapa and commander of a quarter of the armed forces, seized the opportunity to establish his own predominance. Troops under his command exterminated all those unable to escape the Kot, destroying virtually all of the Nepalese Government, and during the massacre he managed to have the queen appoint him prime minister and commander in chief of the army. Thereafter, with the full backing of the army, he expelled from the country all those from whom he could not expect complete loyalty, confiscated their lands, filled the government with members of his family and conferred on them and on himself the honorific name "Rana." Forcing the king and queen into exile in India, he kept the heir apparent, Prince Surendra, a prisoner in Katmandu to confer the legitimacy of the throne on his thorough and comprehensive control of the government.