$Unique_ID{bob00218} $Pretitle{} $Title{Indonesia Chapter 4B. Regional Government} $Subtitle{} $Author{Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{political government soeharto military officers abri abri's economic golkar group} $Date{1982} $Log{} Title: Indonesia Book: Indonesia, A Country Study Author: Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1982 Chapter 4B. Regional Government In 1982 the territorial administration had four tiers. The first level had 24 provinces, or propinsi (also known as regions), and three provincial-level special territories-Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Aceh. Some 250 districts, or regencies (kabupaten), constituted the second level. The third and fourth tiers consisted of 3,350 subdistricts, or kecamatan, and 62,900 villages, respectively. Indonesia inherited a diverse administrative pattern, which had been developed to accommodate the widely divergent regional circumstances. The question of centralization and uniformity, as opposed to decentralization, was therefore a major political issue through the 1950s. Some argued that centralization was essential to the creation of an effective, stable political order, whereas others insisted that the same objective could be achieved through a decentralized political structure, citing the tradition of local self-rule in many of the country's far-flung island territories. Proponents of federalism generally favored the initiation of measures for local self-government. The first step in such a direction was a 1957 law providing the provincial, district, and municipal authorities with popularly elected assemblies, which in turn were to elect executive officers at the corresponding levels. The incipient step was reversed in 1959 when Sukarno reinstated the 1945 Constitution and set in motion the process of Guided Democracy. The elected local assemblies became appointive, as were the positions of locally elected chief executives. The governor of the province became a presidential appointee, and district chiefs, or regents, and municipal mayors were appointed by the minister of home affairs. Since 1966, as part of efforts to encourage more local involvement in developmental activities, local elections have been revived. In 1971 regional representative assemblies (DPRD) were elected at the provincial and district levels, but the governors, district chiefs, and mayors continued to be appointed by the government. These officials are assisted by the provincial-level advisory organ called the Regional Leadership Council (Muspida), which is chaired by the provincial army commander. Other council members include the provincial governor (vice chairman), the chief of police, the chief prosecutor, and the district judge. In 1974 a regional autonomy act was passed so that the governor would henceforth be elected by the provincial-level DPRD from a list of three to five candidates prepared by the minister of home affairs. Under the law, however, the election would become official only when the governor-elect was formally appointed by the president. In the early 1980s all local authorities continued to function as extensions of the central government, serving as they did to ensure Jakarta's tight political and administrative grip on local affairs. There was an unmistakable trend whereby the profile of the central government was getting larger, if a new law on village administration enacted in 1979 was any indication. Under this bill villages were divided into two types: villages outside urban areas and villages within urban areas. This law makes the villages the lowest administrative tier and seeks among other things to bring uniformity to village administration but, more importantly, to make the headmen accountable to the district chiefs, who are empowered under that law to remove incompetent or corrupt headmen. Headmen of villages outside urban areas are still elected by secret ballot, and headmen of those within urban areas are now civil servants, appointed by the district chiefs acting in behalf of the provincial governors. In theory, all headmen are supposed to run their villages, as they have done in the past, but how much autonomy they are allowed was difficult to ascertain in the early 1980s. On balance, it appears that the real purpose of the 1979 law is to bring more government authority to bear on the grass-roots level, so that the village administration can provide the improved infrastructure needed for accelerating rural development. The Government and Mass Media Communication The government has continued to underscore the role of communication as a vital link in its strategy of national development. Its search for unity, consensus, stability, and economic growth is seen as being substantially aided by "free and responsible" mass media. In the government's view, the press can play a constructive role by strictly adhering to the rules governing objectivity, balance, and accuracy. The basic principle behind the government's information policy was restated by Soeharto in February 1981 while addressing a national conference of the Indonesian Journalists Association. He stated that, like other sectors, the Indonesian press should develop in keeping with the nation's identity and needs and should not "imitate the freedom of the press in other countries." The authorities have been concerned about the potential-positive and negative-of the mass media. Friendly and supportive media have been seen as essential to the government effort to convey its intentions and policies to every segment of the population, to minimize the consequences of ethnic and religious diversity, and to improve the country's international image. As a result the government has remained sensitive to the problems of freedom and restraint in public communication and has felt justified in guiding closely the operation of the mass media. Such an effort has had the predictable constraining effect on the mass media. Control of information has been ensured partly by the government operation of television and almost all radio stations and partly by the imposition of sanctions (such as a jail term of up to 20 days and revocation of publication permit) on the offending journalists or media. Information policy is under the central direction of the Department of Information, which has at its disposal the Indonesian National News Service (Antara) and government-subsidized newspapers, weeklies, and other periodicals. Moreover, the department is responsible for coordination of all official public relations activities at the provincial and district levels. The expanding government role in the field of mass communication has also narrowed the scope of the opposition's access to neutralize domestic and foreign news perceived to be favorable to the Soeharto leadership. As of 1979 (the latest year for which information was available) 52 percent of all daily newspaper circulation was attributable to the capital city of Jakarta. The official intention, however, was to increase the availability of newspapers to the provinces, especially the rural areas where roughly 80 percent of the people lived. Generally, there was more emphasis on increasing the radio and television audiences because the electronic media-some 20 million radio receivers and 1.6 million television sets as of August 1980-could reach a much larger proportion of the population than could the printed media. Many villager's illiteracy was another reason for the official emphasis on the electronic media. Officially, Indonesia does not have press censorship, except for foreign films and publications. Many printed media are private, and journalists and publishers have generally followed what is known as "self-censorship"-a function of their prudent sensitivity to limits of free expression and dissent. A notable tendency in the early 1980s was the government's growing displeasure with what it regarded as Western reporters' anti-Indonesian bias. Convinced that some foreign correspondents and newspapers were preoccupied with criticism and not enough praise, the authorities reacted by banning foreign newspapers or by refusing to have these correspondents' visas renewed. The New Order Since 1978 In late 1977, as the Indonesians faced the near certainty of Soeharto's reelection to a third five-year term in 1978 by the MPR, a new wave of antiregime sentiments gained momentum among university students. Student unrest was nothing new. There had been a major student outburst in 1974 and minor ones intermittently thereafter. The targets of student criticism in late 1977 and in January 1978 were wide ranging, and echoes from the past were plentiful. Student protesters, mostly from two institutions-the University of Indonesia and the Bandung Institute of Technology-charged that the Soeharto government was corrupt, politically repressive, intolerant of Islam, overly dependent on foreign aid and investment, insensitive to the plight of the poor urban and village dwellers, and permissive toward the Chinese domination of the economy. Student activists, in the roles of self-appointed critics and reformers, also spoke against what they called "the mere facade of parliamentary representation." Increasingly apprehensive about the possibility of a rerun of the 1974 student riots, the commanding officers of the armed forces in December 1977 issued a statement pledging their unqualified support for the Soeharto leadership, warning at the same time that they would take firm action against anyone trying to destabilize the political system. At the height of student unrest in January 1978, Kopkamtib intervened forcibly, cracking down on protestors and shutting down temporarily seven independent newspapers for reporting the student demonstrations. What disturbed the security authorities most was a statement issued by the students opposing Soeharto's bid for another term. Soeharto was reelected on March 22, 1978, and on the next day Adam Malik, former foreign minister, was elected vice president. Both were unopposed. Soeharto's candidacy was backed by the two opposition parties, PPP and PDI, and by Golkar. A new cabinet was announced a week later. It was notable for three reasons: it showed an increase in the military representation; a reform-minded general was appointed as new minister of defense and security; and for the first time the cabinet included no representatives of the opposition parties. According to the 1979 edition of the Asia Yearbook, published by the Far Eastern Economic Review, apparently Soeharto dropped the opposition representatives because he saw "no reason to pander to the whims of the politically truculent PPP and no reason to waste a seat on the politically emasculated" PDI (see Political Organizations, this ch.). In late March 1978 Soeharto also appointed Sudomo as head of Kopkamtib, a post hitherto held by the president himself. Soeharto's reelection coincided with the inauguration of the third five-year development plan, Repelita III for fiscal years (FY) 1979-83. There was a new emphasis in this plan on the official readiness to distribute the benefits of economic development more equitably. The intention of government planners was to narrow the disparity between urban and rural areas by providing improved housing and health and educational services for the villagers. Apparently, they were aware of the need to address growing popular grievances with deteriorating living conditions, which could be exploited by the opposition groups. During 1979 students and the press were subdued, and both the PPP and the PDI were rent by fractional wranglings over positions and platforms. There were two notable developments during the year, however. One was concerned with the matter of presidential succession and the related question of the transition of power from the older officers of the Generation of 1945 to the younger generation of ABRI officers. These issues surfaced for the first time in May 1979 when General Sumitro, then in retirement and head of Kopkamtib until 1974, publicly stated that the next president should not necessarily be a military man and that the matter of succession should be debated in a constructive and open manner. A month later, General Abdul Haris Nasution, also retired and the former minister of defense and security, indicated, apart from endorsing Sumitro's view, that the question of presidential succession had been discussed frequently by certain military circles "outside the official forum." The two generals were known to be at odds with Soeharto, and thus the topics in question were not to be heard of again in the Indonesian printed media. The other notable development was concerned with ABRI's political role. At issue was the question of whether the armed forces should throw their weight behind Golkar, as had been the case hitherto, or whether they should stand above all political parties as the defense establishment for all segments of the society. Jusuf, the prime moving force since March 1978, in a concerted drive aimed at promoting professionalism, stamping out corruption, and boosting the morale of the common soldier, was among the principal proponents for separating ABRI from Golkar. The issue was hotly debated at a major Golkar conference in October 1979, but Jusuf's view, though applauded by the PPP and PDI, was not widely shared by his peers at the top rung of the power structure. Sudomo was said to have declared that ABRI was "absolutely Golkar," an allusion to the necessity of military support for Golkar in the 1982 elections. Any doubts concerning ABRI's future political role were laid to rest in March 1980 when Soeharto, in a speech to a group of commanding officers, lashed out at unnamed groups that he regarded as still uncommitted to pancasila and still beholden to "Marxism, Leninism, communism, socialism, Marhaenism [Sukarno's brand of nationalism], nationalism, and religion." He went on to urge ABRI to "choose its partners from like-minded groups who truly defend the pancasila." Apparently, Soeharto's speech was an attack on the PPP for its opposition to pancasila and quite possibly also on a group of retired military officers who had been critical of his leadership. Soeharto's statement, repeated in essence in the following month, did not go unchallenged. In May 1980 a group of 50 prominent citizens, including some of the most respected elder statesmen, delivered a signed "statement of concern" to the MPR. In that statement the "Petition 50" signers charged that Soeharto had used pancasila as a tool to attack his political opponents contrary to the original purpose of unifying the nation. The group also criticized Soeharto for urging ABRI "to choose friend and foe on the basis of the opinion of the authorities only" and also for creating the impression that Soeharto was "the personification of pancasila, so that every whisper against him can be interpreted as a stand against pancasila." Kopkamtib and Bakin denounced the petitioners' action as "a constitutional coup d'etat," but no arrests were made, the reasoning being that arrests would exacerbate a situation that did not threaten the security of the nation. Nevertheless, they placed the petitioners under 24-hour surveillance, indicating also that the government would strike back at them sooner or later, one way or another. On a more positive level, however, the government issued its own answer to the petitioners' charges. In his address to the opening session of the DPR in August 1980, Soeharto stated that economic development was not possible without political stability and that to achieve economic development, without neglecting the development of the political, sociocultural, and defense-security sectors, Indonesia must be able to maintain "dynamic national stability." This stability, Soeharto emphasized, could be secured only on the basis of pancasila in a true family spirit of consultation, consensus, and mutual assistance rather than relying on "excessive practical political activities" of a bygone, discredited era. This was why, he continued, ABRI must remain as "the stabilizing and dynamic force in political life and in the execution of development." Thus, it was incumbent on ABRI to "join hands with all our national forces who unhesitatingly defend pancasila...." It was, he stressed, "ABRI's duty to persuade and convince those who still hesitate of the correctness of pancasila based on its experience." During 1980, apart from the "statement of concern" episode, there were tensions between university students and the government. Students continued to defy government efforts to "normalize campus life." There were also social tensions having ethnic-economic implications between the indigenous Indonesian businessmen pribumi (see Glossary) and some 4 million members of the economically powerful Chinese minority. In April anti-Chinese riots broke out in Ujung Pandang, the capital city of South Sulawesi Province, a staunchly Muslim area where pribumi demonstrators attacked Chinese-owned nightclubs and massage parlors. Later in November a new round of anti-Chinese violence spread from Solo in Central Java Province to several other nearby towns, the Chinese community suffering considerable property damage. The year 1981 saw more dissidents' petitions sent to the MPR, asserting that the Soeharto government had failed to develop a truly democratic system. These petitions had no impact, however, partly because the local press was told not to publicize them. Otherwise, politics were concerned, for the most part, with what the government would regard as legitimate business. Particularly noticeable were preliminaries for the coming parliamentary elections in May 1982 and the outpouring of supposedly spontaneous popular support for Soeharto's nomination for another term to begin in 1983. Election campaigning, limited to 30 days before voting day, was marred somewhat by the outbreak of riots in Jakarta, which the authorities said were started by Muslim extremists. The elections were contested by the three political organizations, Golkar, and the two opposition parties, the PPP and the PDI. Of some 82 million voters registered to elect 364 new parliamentary members, about 75 million voters cast ballots. Golkar received 64.3 percent of the valid votes, as compared with 27.8 percent for the PPP, and 7.9 percent for the PDI. Of the 364 seats contested, Golkar captured 246 seats; the PPP, 94; and the PDI, 24 (see table 15, Appendix). These 364 representatives would be joined by 100 more deputies appointed by the president (see Legislative Bodies, this ch.). One notable aspect of the results that was the PPP lost to Golkar in its traditionally safe constituencies in Jakarta and elsewhere. The PDI's already limited strength declined further. In any case the "Petition 50" group challenged the validity of the election results, asserting that there were irregularities in the May 4 poll-official witnesses being prevented from carrying out their poll functions-in the distribution of voting cards and in vote counting. The group also complained that there were no formal institutions through which voters could channel their protests. In July 1982 Soeharto announced that the fourth term of office he would seek in March 1983 would be his last. The fourth five-year plan, due to start in FY 1984, would be his "last dedication to the nation," and the fifth five-year plan would be carried out by "the younger generation." At about the same time, Sudomo stated that the armed forces were ready to ensure the success of the presidential election in 1983. On the issue of the transfer, Soeharto said in August 1982 that the transfer of responsibility from generation to generation was basically a "proper and natural process," in which the younger generation would play an increasingly larger role "in the coming years." The Power Structure Perhaps the most salient feature of the power structure has been the remarkable stability of military predominance, which has been sustained under ABRI's self-imposed doctrine of dual civil and military functions. Institutionalized by both the passage of time and the force of circumstances, the dual function has been held as an essential condition of political stability and national economic development. In March 1981 Soeharto told the graduating army officers of the Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of Indonesia (Akabri) to make themselves ready to carry on the dual mission, which he said should neither be regarded as contradicting the principles of pancasila democracy nor be judged by the standards of "a foreign democracy." In so exhorting these young officers, the president was reconfirming the centrality of ABRI in the political arena as the single most powerful institutional base of support for his leadership and as the nucleus of the power structure that he had presided over since 1966. In 1982 ABRI's privileged status appeared unlikely to be changed in the near future, barring unforeseen circumstances. Its extensive roots in the political and economic structures were deeply embedded, allowing virtually no room for the growth of nonmilitary groups. Generally, the members of the governing elite were of bureaucratic background, were centered in Jakarta and other major cities, and were largely Javanese-traditionally the dominant ethnic group in numerical and political terms. Many of them were nominal Muslims, or abangan, influenced to a degree by a lingering mixture of Hindu-Buddhist and Javanese mystic beliefs (see The Abangan Pattern, ch. 2). Non-Javanese groups from the Outer Islands (see Glossary) and devout Muslims, or santri, who numbered about 20 percent of the population, were underrepresented as well in the top and middle echelons of the power hierarchy. Given the potential that such underrepresentation would be exploited by the opposition, the Soeharto government was striving in earnest to improve its image as the protector for all segments of the population. Grass-roots representation through the existing three political organizations and the efforts to distribute the benefits of economic development more equitably were regarded by the government as sufficient evidence of benevolent official intentions. In 1982, however, Soeharto's credibility still seemed strained, in the eyes of a small number of vocal opponents, because the existing political system was seen as too restrictive and the gap between rich and poor viewed as widening. ABRI's preeminence was owed to many forces at work since 1945, when senior military officers still active in the early 1980s had taken part in the armed struggle against the Dutch for independence (see The National Revolution, 1945-50, ch. 1). The Generation of 1945 has since formed the mainstay of the armed forces, which in turn has been the most effective stabilizing force in times of national emergencies. In adversity, punctuated by the difficulty of forging a consensus out of pluralistic pulls and pressures and by the tentativeness of party politics catering to narrow sectional interests, ABRI has proved to be, as much by default as design, the only cohesive and disciplined institution capable of bringing order and stability. The force of circumstances, plus the strong paternalistic strains in the Javanese political culture, has on balance been conducive to the evolution of bureaucratic authoritarianism under the guidance of ABRI. Once entrenched in positions of influence garnished with opportunities for enrichment, the military officers have found it necessary to legitimize their "civic mission." They have been singularly reluctant to relinquish their privileged positions, and one notable consequence has been their indifference to the training of civilians for future political leadership. For the moment, however, ABRI's domination is not open to challenge by any other sociopolitical group. Undeniably, the armed forces have continued to hold the edge in the level of political, administrative, and managerial skills they collectively acquired after 1966. To be sure, ABRI's professional reputation has been marred somewhat by a refined taste for high living that has been attributed to some of its senior officers; but any precipitous change designed to extricate the military from the political process might well have far-ranging and uncertain consequences. Meanwhile, ABRI's dominance will continue to be tempered somewhat by cooperation with career civil servants and technocrats. If the past is any indication, the civilians as a group will continue their role as junior partner. ABRI's paramountcy has been ensured by extensive representation in top central government positions. Uniformed officers in civilian assignments, or on the civil side of their dual function, have been far outnumbered by civil servants, but a different perspective emerges when it is considered that ABRI has retained a near monopoly of all sensitive government positions. This point is cogently illustrated in an informative study by John A. MacDougall on patterns of military domination in the Indonesian bureaucracy. According to his study, the top 145 positions in the central government were evenly split at the end of 1981 between military and civilian functionaries, but this was misleading in that the military slots were concerned with decisionmaking and supervisory responsibilities, whereas the civilian slots were related for the most part to the highly specialized functions of a technical and supportive nature. The 145 positions identified by MacDougall, the presidency aside, were found in the State Secretariat, the cabinet, and the 17 departments. The military share of these positions generally correlated with the degrees of influence each department could bring to bear on guaranteeing control and loyalty. Thus military representation was 100 percent in the case of the Department of Home Affairs. Departments in charge of information, social affairs, religious affairs, justice, manpower and transmigration, education and culture, foreign affairs, and communications had more military officials at the top levels than the civilians. Realistically, from the standpoint of control and supervision, the most powerful agency, second only to the presidency, was Kopkamtib, widely feared for its secret police functions. This agency had broad powers to deal with any situation or issue that could be seen as affecting political stability. Kopkamtib and Bakin maintained regional branches that worked closely with Hankam's regional defense commands and the territorial administrations answerable to the minister of home affairs. The power structure was maintained also by ABRI's firm grip on Golkar, the government's surrogate party, which lent an appearance of broad popular support for the incumbent regime (see Golkar, this ch.). Another source of support was a group of retired military officers placed as directors of state enterprises in oil, timber, tin and other minerals, and rice distribution. These enterprises were said to be a major source of "extra-budgetary" income for ABRI. In this regard, the pribumi were also supportive of the Soeharto leadership evidently because they depended heavily on government contracts and subsidies. The interests of the pribumi were primarily economic, as were those of their Chinese counterparts with whom they have been in competition and in cooperation as well. In 1982 the Chinese business community held dominant positions in private banking, medium-scale manufacturing, and wholesale and retail distribution (see Entrepreneurship, ch. 3). So influential were the Chinese economically that they have been popularly regarded as the behind-the-scenes partners of some powerful military officials who could grant licenses and concessions and provide protection in exchange for monetary favors. Within the power structure there was a group of mostly American-trained economists-technocrats. As senior members of Bappenas, they have continued to enjoy the trust of Soeharto for their creditable performance as presidential economic aides and formulators of macroeconomic policy since the mid-1960s. Their influence in economic policymaking appeared likely to remain as long as the president was committed to the view that economic growth and political stability were interlocked and mutually reinforcing. There was also another group of intellectuals associated with the private think tank, the Center for Strategic and Intelligence Studies, which had some influence as a major source of innovative thinking on matters of public policy. Some intellectuals on its staff, said to be more "nationalist" than their Bappenas counterparts, concurrently held important government positions. Their "patron saint" was Ali Murtopo, minister of information and one of Soeharto's longtime advisers. As 1982 was drawing to a close, ABRI's future as the centerpiece of the power structure seemed securely in place, but there was speculation concerning a possible generational shift in leadership positions. By law the last of the Generation of 1945 will have been pensioned off by the end of 1985 upon reaching the retirement age of 55. But there was little cause to believe that the old soldiers would simply fade away. On the contrary, if the past was any clue, they appeared likely to remain in control of most, if not all, top civilian assignments by simply retiring in place or by presidential appointment upon or after retirement. If so, young officers may gain control of the staff and command structure, or the military side of the dual function, leaving the civil side largely in the hands of the older officers. In such an eventuality the doctrine of dual function may become moot or diluted in time; but in 1982 it was unclear whether the younger officers might acquiesce in the separation of the dual function or seek to redefine its relevance in a new political environment.