MULTICULTURALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION An Address by Petr Pithart, Speaker of the Senate, Parliament of the Czech Republic Delivered at a conference on ôGovernance and European Integrationö May 28-30, 1997 Rotterdam, The Netherlands European integration will increasingly require coping with, and adjusting to, growing cultural and ethnic diversity. In other words, European integration cannot be narrowed to mere economics and politics. The disappearance of borders between European Union members, and the ensuing free movement of people, will lead to the growing interaction (and, in some cases, permeation) of various cultures and ethnic groups. In fact, this process is already apparent in member states of the Union. My purpose today is to identify several of the most important tasks before us, as we prepare to integrate post-communist Central European countries, and specifically the Czech Republic, into a world of greater ethnic diversity. I will begin by considering the general question of the nature of the challenge posed by ethnic diversity to Democracy itself. In this respect, attention will be paid to the kind of attitudes, and the structures of governance, which ethnic diversity challenges us to create. Following this, there will be a consideration of these matters in the particular context of Central Europe. Then, narrowing our focus further still, I will introduce three burdens, particular to the Czech Republic, with which we Czechs must come to terms, if we are to succeed in integrating ourselves into Europe: (1) the burden of our history, represented today by a virtually ethnically homogenous society; (2) the burden of our ônationalismö; and (3) the burden of our unitarian outlook in matters of governance. How prepared are we, Central Europeans, for the ethnic diversity and multiculturalism to which we will open our doors, when we become members of the European Union? The answer is: Not very well. Just as much work needs to be done, in the coming years, to start changing attitudes in our countries (to open up to, and accept, other influences) as must be done to harmonise our legal, political and economic systems with European standards. The Challenge of Ethnic Diversity to Democracy Above all, multiculturalism represents a healthy, although demanding, challenge to Democracy, in that it intensifies pluralism. Pluralism is foremost among the constituent elements of Democracy: It is its engine. The continuous testing of democratic systems, through finding ways to accommodate ethnic and cultural diversity, is a process that should strengthen Democracy, overall. The alternative, which is to try to evade the challenge of multiculturalism, may lead to a certain atrophying of Democracy. There are, of course, risks involved in this process of testing democratic systems with expanding ethnic diversity. Not all democratic societies, I am afraid, are equally capable of absorbing such changes, as is apparent, for example, by the emergence of various far-right nationalist movements of diverse strengths. In addition, the ability of any society to accommodate increasing cultural and ethnic diversity decreases, as the speed of diversification increases. Accepting the challenge of multiculturalism involves, nevertheless, fewer risks than rejecting it. The nation that wants everyone to be the same, and which strives to maintain ethnic and cultural homogeneity, invites trouble--the kind of trouble which is only bound to worsen with time. The heterogeneity of human societies is in many ways a guarantee of their stability: It can protect them from the weaknesses of uni-dimensionality, such as the extremes of fundamentalism and populism. These demons of democratic society proliferate most easily and quickly in a homogenous environment. I am convinced that, paradoxically, we will best avoid the temptation of sameness if we give democracies harder tasks to solve, rather than easier ones. The challenge of ethnic diversification in a society has two main aspects: to change attitudes toward inalienable differences; and to change structures of governance which would allow such differences to flourish. The more difficult of the two is usually to change attitudes. The altering of attitudes depends not only on a formal acceptance of democratic rules and mechanisms, but also on internalising democratic habits and dispositions. Central among these characteristics of mind and behaviour is Tolerance, and also the ability and willingness to see other ethnic and cultural influences as useful "mirrors"--mirrors that would help us perceive ourselves more completely, and therefore more truthfully. Thus, in the post-communist states of Central Europe, the most important tasks in educating the public about democracy have not to do with the functional aspects of the newly acquired system, but are: to instill in people's minds the positive value of religious, ethnic, cultural, and political diversity; to convince them that heterogeneity can be a source of creativity; and to teach them that nations are not threatened by ethnic and cultural pluralism. The functional aspects of democratic systems are, however, important too. Not that we should assume that a nation's health, or even greatness, has anything to do with its size, or with whether it is a unitary or a federal state. Rather, the question of greatness or smallness is, above all, connected to the question of whether a nation is differentiated enough within itself. In other words, what is really important is whether democratic governance allows there to be enough differentiation within a given society. Differentiation is needed, if there is to be a sufficient number of autonomous spaces, and distinct individuals, to create a climate of enriching communication. Central Europeans need to grasp that, from the point-of-view of accommodating ethnic diversity through democratic governance, the key concepts include: federation, autonomy, decentralisation, devolution, self-administration, region, and, most importantly, "municipality." It is the content of this last word that determines what we mean by the notion of "home": Is "home" the place where we can live only with those, who are the same as us? Or, more importantly, is it also the place where we can live with those who differ from us, ethnically and culturally? The Example of Central Europe in this Century Let us now narrow our focus, as I suggested at the start, from the level of general consideration, to the example of Central Europe in this century. Considering the history of the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, and the subsequent convulsions let lose by fascism and communism, is helpful, not only in better understanding the situation of the Czechs, and several other nations in the region, but also in illustrating the dynamics at play when inadequate space is made to accommodate and reflect ethnic diversity. Only a hundred years ago, Central Europe was still a naturally multicultural territory, in which various ethnic groups and cultural influences interacted in a number of ways. Vienna, the most spectacular mosaic of these various influences, was a truly cosmopolitan centre. It was no accident that it became the birth place of important philosophical ideas and cultural inspiration. The multicultural environment of Central Europe, concentrated in Vienna, produced a conspicuously large number of great European thinkers and cultural figures. Someone called this city, "the capital of self-reflection." But the violent disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire, and the fate of Vienna itself under the Nazi regime, are also telling examples of how difficult (and, at the same time, how important) it is to find forms of governance that are capable of accommodating cultural and ethnic diversity. This story is also a telling example of how diversity has always been unacceptable to dictators, and enemies of democracy. For Hitler, the cosmopolitan Vienna was an unbearable conglomerate of races. He later transformed this hatred toward such diversity into the ideology of racial purity, in the name of which he began to destroy diversity around him. In this century, Central Europe has gone through a process of continuous ôethnic cleansing,ö in which ever smaller nations, and national groups, have claimed the right of self-determination. Clearly, such a process could not have taken place without conflicts and violence. Nationalism has manifested itself as both an understanding of the Nation as an ethnic monolith, and through confrontational attitudes toward the outside "foreign" world. The tribal understanding of Nation, to which this process has led, always looks for enemies both externally and within. The chances of democracy to succeed in such an intolerant environment are, of course, minimal. The Burden of Czech History: Increasing Ethnic Homogeneity In light of this historical context, I would now draw your attention to the Czech situation, and the first of the three burdens with which Czechs must come to terms in facing ethnic diversification: the burden of Czech history, which is increasing ethnic homogeneity. In this century, Czechs have gone from being part of a multicultural environment to being almost entirely ethnically homogenous. In fact, Czech society is currently ethnically more homogenous than at any time in its history. Czechs have decidedly lost their ômirrorsö. This is so for two reasons: one, since 1938 the country has been increasingly ôcleansedö of almost all other large ethnic groups; and two, the country was closed to all outside influences, between 1948 and 1989. Before the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Czechs had, for more than one thousand years, lived in a variety of state formations, which had diverse names, sizes, and sources of legitimacy. All of them, however, had something in common; namely, they involved more ethnic groups, nations, or nationalities than the Czechs alone. Under such circumstances, we Czechs were accustomed to seeing ourselves through the eyes of others. We were always faced by "mirrors" that the others were putting in front of us. It can be said that these mirrors were a part of Czech identity. In this century, however, we have lost "the others" one by one. The Hapsburg Empire disintegrated in 1918, leaving the Czechs in their own state, together with sizable groups of Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Jews, Ruthenians, and Romanies. The end of the existence of the multi-ethnic Czechoslovakia began in 1938. First, came the expulsion of Czechs from the Sudeten lands. Then, the Holocaust started shortly afterwards. Following the end of World War II, three million Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia. In 1945, Stalin took the eastern-most part of Slovakia, inhabited by Ruthenians. After the split of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, we were basically left alone in our own state -- without Slovaks and Hungarians. The only remaining sizable minority are the Romanies, whose number is estimated at between two and four hundred thousand. In addition to this loss of mirrors, Czech attitudes to those who are different have been conditioned by four decades of closedness and propaganda under Communism. That propaganda, which worked hard to manufacture enemies both outside and within, was in some ways extraordinarily successful in promoting xenophobia, in particular with regard to Sudeten Germans. The so-called "German revanchism," and the spectre of Sudeten Germans trying to return to their former "Heimat," were among the most successful propaganda tools of the regime. These two homogenising processes have had devastating effects inside our country, and in particular with respect to CzechoslovakiaÆs disintegration in 1993. That break-up was both a part of the process of shedding mirrors, and a direct, although not inevitable, consequence of both of the above causes. Similar in this sense to the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire, Czechoslovakia disintegrated because the country did not succeed in creating a "political nation" during the seventy-five years of the common Czech-Slovak state. In some ways, the disintegration of Czechoslovakia had to do with a certain lack of national identity among Czechs. Such a lack of identity could be seen as a lack of nationalism. But, unfortunately, the answer is not that simple. Czechs, for a long time, identified with Czechoslovakia as a whole. They had problems seeing themselves as a separate entity. In Slovakia, Czechs' proclivity to identify with the federation was seen not as a lack of Czechs' own national identity, but as a lack of respect towards Slovaks, towards the Slovak identity. It was also seen as Czech paternalism--as yet another piece of evidence that Czechs saw Slovakia, above all, as an backward extension of the Czech Lands, which the Czechs would have, condescendingly, brought up to their own level. The Burden of Czech Nationalism Given the peculiar self-blindness which Czechs have developed, we may well then ask: How can an ethnically homogeneous nation, that is still searching for its own identity, be made to embrace the multiculturalism and ethnic diversity that European integration will undoubtedly usher in? This brings us to the second important burden for we Czechs: our nationalism. After many years of isolation, and repeated instances of ethnic cleansing, many Czechs' attitudes toward foreigners, and toward outside influences, are generally ambivalent. Although we desire to rejoin the larger world, and embrace many of the opportunities which that represents, opinion polls show a great degree of intolerance among ordinary Czechs, not just toward the only remaining large ethnic group in the country--the Romanies--but also toward foreigners. I would suggest that this intolerance may best be understood as the product of a lack of self-examination in Czech society; a lack which we are only now beginning to remedy. Our fear of others, which is often groundless, has perhaps more to do with a fear of ourselves: a fear of coming to terms with our history; of recognising who we are; and of recognising that we have our own form of nationalism that we need to address. To see this clearly, we need only look to the matter of our relations with the Sudeten Germans. The recently adopted Czech-German Declaration is, on the institutional level, a helpful step toward closing this historical chapter; nevertheless, many Czechs fear that opening up their state, within the framework of European integration, may result in an influx of Sudeten Germans. Clearly, these fears have no basis in reality. Closer to the truth is that the expulsion of the three million Sudeten Germans is a sore point in recent Czech history. Although Czechs generally know where the truth lies in this matter, we have been reluctant to speak openly about this, for it would amount to publicly admitting our own responsibility and guilt. What hope may we have of this reluctance lessening? Genuine hope, I believe; but the lessening will take time. The discussion surrounding the Declaration seems to have started a process of introspection. It may take several more years, however, before Czechs are able to deal much more openly with the issue of Sudeten Germans. As has been the case in the first seven years after the November 1989 Revolution, most social energy in our country will continue to be invested in the economic transformation process. As I mentioned, just a moment ago, it is my further hope that our examination of our history will yield an awareness that Czechs have their own form of nationalism, and that this must be overcome. Most Czechs are convinced that nationalism is something they long ago overcame, that it is a thing of the past. While it is somewhat correct to say that outright Czech nationalism is indeed not very visible, it would be more correct to say that it is a kind of ôsleeping nationalism of the satiated.ö It sleeps only because of what nationalists might say was its spectacular ôsuccessö in this century. Early in the Nineteenth Century, Czech nationalism was defensive, and anti-German. Later, in that same century, it was more political, and mainly anti-Austrian. In the Twentieth Century, it satiated itself twice, in a way that far exceeded the most daring dreams of Czech nationalists: first, after World War I, in the form territorial gains sanctioned by the advantageous peace treaties; and second, in the form of the victorious powers' consent to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans after War World II. But what is this nationalism that sleeps? While it sleeps, it is not inactive: perhaps, we should say that it is sleep walking. I would say, quite definitely, however, that its present activity is a kind of defensive collective egoism, not at all based on national identity. This so-called nationalism often takes the form of the egoism of those who, having acquired some long-sought-after property, guard it zealously, not letting anyone else in their yard, let alone in their house, even if those other people might be their kin. How else can one explain CzechsÆ unwillingness to allow their own repatriates to return from exile, or from the long separated enclaves in Volhynia and Kazakhstan? This kind of nationalism is based on the attitude that we have no responsibility for anything external to us. It makes us close ourselves to the outside world, and lose the will to solidarity, on which European civilisation is based. For a period of time in the recent past, the Czech government's policies reflected the general attitude of the public, which refused to recognise that it was part of a larger whole. Czechoslovakia, for example, could have survived only had regional policies toward Slovakia been more generous. The same attitude also governed our lack of cooperation in the framework of the Visegrad group. Only as we free ourselves of this collective egoism, will we find it possible to adapt to Western standards of how one ought to live with those who are different. The Burden of Unitarianism in Czech Politics Having spoken of our ethnic homogeneity, and nationalism, I will now turn to the third burden which we Czechs must overcome, if we are to come to terms with the ethnic diversity of a larger European home: That is the burden of our unitarian approach to matters of self-governance. As I mentioned earlier, with respect to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, Czechs tended to make no distinction between Czech and Czechoslovak. One of the main reasons for this may be that Czechs had, before 1918, a strong tradition of a unitary state. Despite the presence of other ethnic groups, the Czech Lands traditionally had very stable borders. Prague has always been the indisputable capital of the state. The rise of any alternative centres was always precluded by that fact. This is partly why the Czech Lands were never naturally subdivided into regions. Attempts to do so were always condemned by the centre as the ambitions of local politicians who were trying to create posts for themselves. When Czechs looked at Slovakia, through this unitarian prism, it became a major problem for the country. Czechs were simply unable to understand why Slovaks were unhappy about Czech unitarian tendencies. Slovak complaints about Prago-centrism were often rejected as Slovak nationalism, which only served to further strengthen the genuine nationalism brewing in that land. Today, the tendency to see things through this unitarian prism may be an obstacle to integrating the Czech Republic into the European Union, with its emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity and regionalism. Although the Czech Constitution, adopted in 1992, stipulates that the country be subdivided into self-administrative regions, Czech political parties have not been able to agree on a common scenario for decentralisation. The disputes focus on how many regions there should be, and on the division of power between the central government and the regions. The main source of resistance is, however, the traditional Czech emphasis on a unitary state, which is reflected in the opinions of some leading politicians. Arguments can be heard that regional decentralisation could result in dangerous "unravelling" of the state administrative system, or that regions would only serve as bases for particular political interests. The lack of emphasis on regionalism is a particularly important problem, now that the Czechs are no longer confronted with other major ethnic groups within their state. A multiplicity of regional interests can serve to stimulate democratic discussion and refine democratic attitudes, especially towards minorities. If a nation lacks internal "mirrors" in the form of other ethnic groups, it may, nevertheless, generate discussion and dynamism by at least recognizing that various local and regional interests are valid. The Tasks Before Us The conclusion which I draw from the foregoing remarks is that we have a number of clearly identifiable tasks before us. When I speak of ôWe,ö in this respect, I decidedly mean ôWe Czechsö; but also ôWe Europeans.ö For, certainly, the work that must be accomplished is hard, and no one nation can accomplish it alone. Creating the ôNew Europeö is a task for all of us. Allow me briefly to introduce those tasks which I have identified: First: We Czechs need to intensify the level of our domestic pluralism through establishing self-administrative regions. After years of procrastination, there seems to be, at long last, a political consensus, among the major parties, that regional administration is necessary. This is a step in the right direction. These self-administrative regions ought to become partners for similar entities in European Union countries. If the only partner for the Union, and its regions, were the Czech central government, it would create a very impractical asymmetry (for example, within the Euroregions). Moreover, the possibilities for ordinary Czechs to participate in the process of European integration, on a variety of levels, would be limited. Second: We need to open up more to international cooperation, even before joining the European Union. One way to do so is establishing new Euroregions, and improving the work of those already existing. Once again, the Czech government's attitude toward Euroregions was not always welcoming in the past; lately, however, Euroregions, too, have become more acceptable. Membership in other international organizations, outside the European Union (such as NATO), and intensifying regional cooperation, are also ways of making the Czech Republic more integrated into a broader context. We may, thus, gradually overcome the most problematic aspects of Czech provincialism. Third: We need to deal more openly with our own history. This will be a painful process that will require time: perhaps, it is even a matter for the next generation. That process, however, does appear to be starting. Fourth (and finally): Even before Czech membership in the European Union becomes topical, the Czech Republic needs increased active educational assistance from the Union, such as more exchange programmes, which could help prepare Czechs for the wave of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity with which they will have to cope, when the country becomes a member of the Union. Several concrete areas in which help is most required are the following:
Concluding Remarks The Czech Republic is, undoubtedly, one of the prime candidates for membership in the European Union. We Czechs are blessed with a democratic system, a relatively successful economy, a relatively high level of education, and are making increasing efforts to bring our legal system into line with European standards. The attitudes of our citizens, however, will need to change significantly. Some of these changes, we can hope, will result from improvements in the democratic system of governance, made by means of decentralisation, and through the strengthening of civil society. If I may be permitted, in leaving you today, I would like to underline an earlier conclusion: Democracy is refined and strengthened by solving more difficult tasks, rather than easier ones. The radical simplification of the ethnic composition of the population of my country may be only seemingly, and temporarily, advantageous to some. Fortunately, however, we have the option, today, not to evade difficult tasks, which, on the whole, compensate for the irreversible loss of plurality in our society. Thank you. |