Some of the specific issues addressed in the above discussion have been surfaced in previous work. For example, Bollinger and Pfleeger's [#!BP90!#] Cost-Sharing Domain Banks, and Wolff's [#!Wol92!#] royalties are intended to address the problem of providing an incentive to produce for reuse through, in effect, transfer prices. However, transfer pricing is just one alternative in a range of options for addressing one dimension of the reuse incentive problem. Also, most economics of reuse models (e.g. [#!BB91!#,#!GC92!#,#!PC93!#]) do not consider the strategic, or revenue-side, benefits of reuse. As Wentzel [#!Wen92!#] points out, the various levels of management have different perspectives, and consideration of strategic benefits may be less important in gaining the support of managers with cost center responsibility, but vital to achieving strong backing by higher level management. The organization and it's objectives need to be understood, and a comprehensive approach to motivating reuse among all relevant players in the organization needs to be developed.