B. The seat booms were reconditioned by the vendor. An increase in the size of the bolt which holds the boom to the seat was made to provide a stronger attachment.

C. A new set of flight nose wheels were built up, balance checked, and installed.

D. The BCS system was inactivated by removal of the flex line from the BCS valves and capping the valves. Both lower BCS motors were removed, the lines purged with deionized water and capped.

E. The bar was removed from the 3 MH-96 AC circuit breakers.

B. The remaining lower bugeye camera was removed.

C. The GE ablative material was left on for a second flight with repair made to the leading edge of the lower ventral stub. An additional patch was installed on the lox tank. The F-3 panel was removed for the heat transfer experiment.

D. The Giannini probe was removed.

E. Installed Mach probe on end of BLN rake in place of pitot tube. Failure of the T/C wire in aircraft during close-out forced deletion of recording of Mach probe data.

F. The bottom center line BCS compartment rake was installed.

G. Green thermopaint was applied just aft of the F-3, F-4 panels and the bottom center line BCS compartment rake.

H. A rubber band and a grease pencil mark was placed on the nose strut to check for travel beyond the shrink lock position

B. Based on satisfactory engine operation on the past flight no engine run was accomplished. A satisfactory APU run was made on 22 July.

C. The F-13 panel internal crack was repaired by NAA by installing a patch over the crack, formed to the internal contour of the panel.

D. The nose strut was disassembled and inspected due to the reported nose wheel shimmy. No strut problem was found which could cause shimmy. The steel upper bearing retainers were found to be rubbing on the cylinder wall and were machined off to prevent further damage. Slight scoring was evident in a non-sealing area and this was feathered prior to reassembly to prevent stress concentration. An "0" ring spacer was also missing, possibly the cause of a trace of oil seepage found before flight.

E. Nose wheel balance was checked and found to be 11-3/4 and 10 inch ounce out of balance (F-104 spec is 6 inch ounce maximum). A new set was built up and checked at 4-1/2 and 1 inch ounce out of balance which was considered satisfactory.

F. The aircraft was mated for flight on 27 July.

G. Flight 3-A-51 was aborted due to depletion of GN2 cooling gas during igniter idle. The extended igniter idle was caused by failure of 2nd stage chamber pressure- indication in the cockpit. This indicator failure was traced to the failure of the amplifier between the transducer and the indicator.

H. An extensive investigation of MH-96 revealed no problem which could definitely have caused the flight problem. (See flight report for flight 3-30-50). During aborted flight 3-A-51, the MH-96 BCS switch was placed in auto position and a failure similar to flight 3-30-50 occurred. Post flight checks revealed a short in the wiring, traced to the cable between the cockpit controller and the MH-96 unit on the elevator. The shorted wire was abandoned and a spare wire used. This particular shorted wire is believed to have caused the MH-96 problem of the previous flight.

I. Poor TM reception during flight 3-A-51 caused by a shorted antenna on the aircraft.

B. No nose wheel shimmy occurred during landing.