B. On previous flight and ground operations, pilots have commented on the excessive length of cable pull required to release the landing gear. A differential pulley was designed by NASA and installed prior to this flight. Cable travel was shortened from approximately 13.75 inches to 11 inches.

C. It was decided that enough data had been obtained on nose gear landing loads to permit installation and flight of the Startracker experiment. This equipment was deleted on the last flight in the interest of reducing landing weight.

D. Inspection of nose gear wheel rims after Flight 2-33-56 showed slight yield of the rim attach lugs. This has only occurred on wheels using 295 psi tire pressure. Pressure was reduced to 240 psi for this flight and hi-strength bolts were installed in the rim lugs.

2. Vertical stabilizer rake was installed and hooked up.

3. Nose gear scoop door uplock hook mechanism was redesigned (see Part IA above).

4. Landing gear actuating handle travel was shortened by approximately 2.75" (see Part IB above).

5. AN bolts were replaced with NAS 626 bolts and the nose tire pressure reduced to 240 psi (was 295 psi) to prevent rim lug bending. (see Part ID above).

A reinforced rim is in design and fabrication by NAA at this time. Installation of this new rim will allow use of 295 psi tire pressure again.

6. The high temperature hydraulic compensator was installed on the pilot's seat. (EO's 804069 and 804070).

7. The SAS A.C. power pickup point was moved from #1 bus to #2 bus to reduce noise.

8. T/C's were installed on the inside surface of the RH tunnel base bulkhead to obtain heating data on the panel hot spot.

B. Two captive flights were made to verify proper deployment of the redesigned nose scoop door and nose landing gear after cold soak. During 2-C-58 the nose gear required approximately 5.4 seconds to lock down. Subsequent inspection showed that the nose gear snubber (which controls the deployment rate) had an incorrect orifice installed. The correct orifice was installed and on 2-C-59 deployment time was an acceptable 2.7 seconds. On both these captive flights data was taken on scoop door hook position and scoop door roller loads. Hook movement was negligible (less than 1/16 inch). Roller loads were 46 and 47 pounds respectively for the two captive flights, recorded just prior to gear release.

C. The X-15 was demated on Wednesday, November 18 after a snow storm had caused cancellation of the proposed drop flight on Tuesday, November 17. All system functionals had expired and were repeated.

D. During the repeat of the SAS functional a moderate "buzz" developed in the LH servo system whenever ASAS was engaged. The servo was replaced and the buzz disappeared. Noise in the SAS gyro resulted in replacement of that component. Three spares from stock were found defective and finally the gyro was "cannibalized" from X-15-3.

B. No system malfunctions were noted during flight except for loss of pilot's panel readout of #l mixing chamber temperature. Cooling and cabin pressure were within spec and it was decided to proceed. During engine igniter initiation, pump oscillation was noted but gradually subsided and launch was made as planned. (Post-flight review of data indicates deterioration of the engine pump catalyst bed. It is planned to replace this component prior to next flight).

C. Deployment of landing gear appeared normal and positive, and actual landing was very light at approximately 220 knots. Runout was approximately 9400 feet. Post landing inspection showed both main gear skids to have an obvious "Toe-in" with the RH skid being the more severe. Disassembly was made and both main gear lower clevis fittings were bent. Both pivot pins for the skids showed shear and bearing yield. This matter is now under investigation.

Operation of the nose gear entire system appeared normal. Scoop door hook movement was negligible (.022") throughout the flight until pilot actuation. Scoop door roller loads were not obtained due to failure of the strain gage.