Igniter detonation occurred on this Flight (2-30-51) similar to that which occurred for the first time during Flight 2-27-47, with the exception that there was no rupture of lines or check valve in the most recent occurrence. The engine has been removed and the igniter inspected. Damage to the igniter is similar to that sustained during the first occurrence. A committee has been formed to investigate this problem. Results of the investigation will be published by the committee in a special report.

B. 1st Stage Propellant Valve Failure

Failure of the first stage igniter propellant valve to open fully on the first start attempt (Flight 2-29-50) was previously described in the report of that flight. Subsequent disassembly and inspection has revealed no flaws in the valve. The valve was replaced on the engine prior to Flight 2-30-51.

B. Rigged SAS trip out sequence; YAW, PITCH, ROLL in that order.

B. Following mating with B-52 #003, a short was discovered in the X-15 to B-52 intercom circuit resulting in a constant mike key on the intercom. It was decided to fly without using the X-15 to B-52 intercom, since time was not available to pin down the location and repair the short.
 
 

B. SAS roll channel tripped out at launch. ASAS engaged normally on the trip out. The pilot reengaged roll and no further unscheduled trip outs occurred. A SAS frequency response check will be made to determine the cause of roll trip out at launch.

C. Except as noted, systems operation was normal.