Following Flight 2-23-43 it was discovered that the engine lube oil accumulator diaphragm had ruptured allowing lube oil to penetrate throughout much of the He purge system. Significant amounts of oil were discovered in the high pressure He purge lines to the propellant systems. This engine (S/N 104) was removed and replaced with S/N 110.

Following the normal test stand run with S/N 110 installed, it was discovered that the pump/turbine steam seal had failed, (presumably during the run) causing severe steam leakage. The engine was removed and repaired by the AF. After reinstallation this engine was successfully ground run on Monday, 6/25/62 in preparation for Flight 2-24-44.

B. BCS system was inoperative for this flight due to severe BCS valve leakage. Since replacement valves were not available and since BCS was not required for this flight, it was decided to proceed without this system.

B. A "Q~ meter was added to pilots panel in place of the Mach probe indicator. The "Q" meter calibrated in lb/sq ft is plumbed to the ball nose total pressure orifice.

C. An additional static port has been added to the ball nose at 70° to its axis. This pressure is recorded on a modified A/S recorder.

D. The heat flux transducer experiment was installed on the aft bulkhead of the LH tunnel fairing.

E. The National Geographic camera has been removed and both upper bugeyes restored to original configuration.

B. The flight engine (S/N 110) carried two open discrepancies.

D. Communications radio failure caused cancellation of the first attempt to make this flight on Thursday, 6/28/62. The radio was replaced and the flight made on the following day.

B. Smoke was again reported in the cockpit apparently emanating from the forward lower area near the pilot's feet. Post-flight inspection of the nose gear door revealed damage to the ram air seal. Repair of this seal will be made prior to next flight.

C. The pilot reported temporary seizing of the speed brake handle in flight so that operation of the handle was very stiff. This condition disappeared during the later portion of the flight and was not apparent during post-flight operations of the system. Detailed inspection of the cable/pushrod system showed no interferences or binding. It appears that the only remaining possibility is a temporary jamming or build-up of friction in the hydraulic valve and cylinder assemblies or in the cable tension regulator. These suspect assemblies have been removed for lab inspection at NAA and will be replaced with new parts from stock for the next flight.

D. Two SAS trip-outs occurred during flight, at least one of which was probably caused by inadvertent operation of the in-flight test switch and which was successfully reset to restore SAS operation. SAS System Engineers are investigating the other trip-out which occurred just prior to landing. (The pilot did not attempt to reset this last trip-out).

E. The Hycon System failed to operate in flight. Post-flight inspection of the camera equipment by Hycon personnel disclosed a short circuit in the camera harness. Repairs are being made by Hycon for the next flight.

F. Except as noted above operation of the various sub-systems was normal. The lower ventral was recovered and is reusable. No evidence of increase in wrinkling or buckling of airframe structure was noted.