B. The main and nose gear assemblies and aircraft mounting structure were visually and dimensionally inspected after the emergency landing involving the lake overrun. Except for dirt in moving parts and normal wear, no damage was noted which could be attributed to the landing. The following parts were replaced:

D. The RH engine-bay blowout panel was replaced after normal blowout occurred with the bay pressurization caused by the engine fuel scroll-case failure.

E. The NH3 tank vent-valve was replaced because of failure to relieve at the proper pressure.

F. Both APU controllers were replaced to accomplish the 360-day inspection and test.

G. The engine lube oil accumulator was replaced in engine s/w 107 because of suspected bladder leakage. A bench check did not reveal a leak.

H. The pitch-yaw RAS valve was replaced for leakage. A valve from stock was incorrectly wired. The valve mounting holes had been misalined, and slotting of the mounting holes was required to allow installation.

I. A satisfactory engine run was accomplished with engine S/N 107 on 5/31/66. A pump scroll-case fire was experienced on the first pump run. APU, BCS operations were also satisfactorily accomplished.

J. The Autonetics IR Scanner service with LHe was demonstrated, requiring approximately (1) hour. A 12 lb. 3 oz. lead ballast was added to the RH nose-cone to establish the required 40% wing tip chord C.G. limit based on the advertised Autonetics Scanner C.G. located (1) inch forward of the mounting flange, and an experiment weight of 51 pounds. See item II, A 3 d.

K. The aircraft was mated to B-52 #003 at 0330 hours on 6/2/66.

L. Flight l-A-105 was accomplished on 6/2/66 with John B. McKay as pilot. No service problems were experienced; however, takeoff was delayed to 1100 hours by C-130 problems. The IFDS computer would not reset for an extended period after the electrical power transfer from B-52 precision source to APU power. As a result the rate-of-climb indicator was lost. The aircraft systems were sequenced through the engine igniter idle phase. The IFDS recovered eventually and performed well on the return to Edwards.

M. Troubleshooting of the IFDS power-transfer problem resulted in replacement of the internal-external power-transfer relay which showed signs of contact arcing. The IFDS display switch was also changed because of voltage transients which occurred with switch operation resulting in IFDS computer malfunction. The system was preflighted satisfactorily and accepted for flight.

N. The aircraft servicing was completed through liquid-oxygen on 6/7/66 before the flight was canceled for Delamar weather. No service was accomplished on 6/8/66 because of EAFB weather.

O. Questions arose concerning the actual C.G. position for the RH wing pod containing the Autonetics IR Scanner. The experiment was removed for measurement because of uncertainty expressed by Autonetics personnel who specified the C.G. position at 1" aft of the mounting flange. The C.G. measured at 3.5 inches forward of the flange, and it became impossible to maintain the 96.5 lb gross limit for the pod with the 28% to 40% wing tip chord position range.

P. Weather caused flight cancellation on 6/9/66.

Q. Flight l-A-106 was completed on 6/10/66 with John B. McKay as pilot. Servicing was accomplished without incident. A 10 minute turn was accomplished at 15 minutes to launch to allow additional time for C-130 positioning. The IFDS computer malfunction after power transfer would not reset for 2.5 minutes. Inflight tests were conducted after system recovery which included transfer of IFDS electrical power to the B-52 precision inverters and a re-transfer to X-15 bus (then powered by B-52 alternators) with duplicate results. Immediately after flight, an APU run with IFDS operating failed to produce a malfunction. The No. 2 APU electrical load was increased by supplying both busses during the test, which showed that alternator capacity was adequate.

R. The aircraft was demated for extensive IFDS tests. The IFDS computer F-3 was returned to the laboratory for functional tests. Preliminary analysis indicated IFDS conditions:
 

S. The "Generator Out" lights exhibited an intermittent dimming action which were traced to high-resistance contacts in a protective panel unit.

T. Aircraft preflights were initiated on 6/21/66. The RAS and manual pitch-yaw valves were replaced because of leakage.

U. A Goodrich Tire Company representative inspected the 50-odd new 12-ply nose-gear tires recently delivered to X-15 stock to evaluate the weather checking of the sidewall rubber. Apparently, exposure after inflation results in severe weather checking. Use of the tires was not affected; however, the condition will result in premature rejection of the tires.

V. The No. 2 APU tank was replaced because of leakage in the Vicone bladder.

W. The flight plan was changed from the 200K altitude flight with J. B. McKay to a 130K altitude flight with Major W. Knight on 6/24/66.

X. APU runs were accomplished on 6/27/66. SAS, ASAS, preflight effort was increased because of the necessity to loan X-15-2 a SAS servo module, replacement of the yaw SAS servo because of leakage, and return of the ASAS case previously loaned to X-15-2.

Y. The aircraft was mated to B-52 #003 on 7/8/66. After cancellation due to weather, the No. 1 APU pressure switch was replaced because of H202 leakage into the APU propellant system by and overload during jettison procedures.

Z. Engine preflight functionals were again accomplished on 7/11/66.
 

B. The aircraft was landed short of the two-mile mark; however, the lake surface was hard and the conditions of landing were normal. Touchdown was accomplished with a 5° sideslip, 6 feet per second rate of descent, with 20° of speed brake. The pilot made roll inputs to correct direction with a resultant aft fuselage displacement relative to the nose-gear track.

During the nose-gear preflight for the next flight, the nose gear was found to be bent. Comments are included in the Flight Report 1-65-108.