B. Concern over the aerodynamic aspects of the wing pod installation affecting aircraft stability and wing leading edge and outer-panel heating resulted in a .02 model wind tunnel test. The aircraft was limited to a velocity of 4300 fps for the first flight. Thermopaint was applied to the pod-wing tip area to attempt a definition of shock impingement and localized heating.

C. An acceptable engine run was accomplished with engine S/N 107 on September 25, 1964. APU flight qualification runs were also accomplished, including an investigation of the IFDS power transfer during generator reset. The IFDS system power was lost during the check, however, the malfunction was traced to an "engine run only" harness which did not contain the necessary complement of wires. The power transfer was accomplished at a later date using two separate power systems.

D. The initial operational phases of the IFDS indicated repeated rework of harness connectors due to print errors plus the method of cockpit gland sealing had produced a deteriorated wiring condition requiring future attention.

E. Two basic problems were encountered during flight preparation of SAS and ASAS. A random high frequency buzz was evident on the LH horizontal stabilizer with ASAS engaged. Attempts to correct the condition included replacement of the entire mixer bellcrank assembly ASAS follow-up potentiometer, and a second ASAS case assembly. The total effect was to increase the frequency indicating a reduction in the system free play. Suspecting the buzz was initiated by a large engagement offset of the servo, the LH SAS servo was replaced and buzz was eliminated. Initially SAS could not be successfully engaged with the IFDS operating because of excessive system transients (approximately 80 mils servo displacement). The largest cause of engagement servo offset was traced to the proximity of the CEU blower motor to the SAS electronics case. A cold-roll iron shield was used in an attempt to reduce the strong electrical field of the motor with no improvement. The offset was reduced to 3/8 horizontal stabilizer displacement by relocating the CEU blower to approximately 4 inches above the RH forward corner of the SAS case. SAS engagements were successfully accomplished with the relocated blower configuration and IFDS operating.

F. Flight day activities included last minute cockpit leak check (80 CFM) and a basic weight measurement (13,938 lb).

G. Verification of proper power transfer procedures and acceptable electrical transients was accomplished after mating, with B-52 engines running. Ground power to B-52 alternator power and precision power ground to B-52 alternator source transients were found to be acceptable. Flight servicing was initiated at the conclusion of the electrical power test

H. Flight l-A-78 was accomplished on October 2, 1964 with B-52 #003 carrier aircraft and John B. McKay as pilot. Erratic operation of the 3 axis ball pitch attitude was experienced during the outbound flight. The 3 axis ball pitched to 80° attitude in a cyclic manner, returning to a normal condition after a short period. After SAS reengagement, following APU start, a +l degree oscillation of the LH horizontal surface was noted. A ten minute turn was initiated after 4 minutes to launch to evaluate the SAS condition. ASAS was normal. Reengagement of normal SAS reinitiated the LH horizontal movement, and the flight was aborted. A flickering pilot's oxygen Lo-light was also noted some period after pilot's selection of X-15 oxygen source.

I. The aircraft was demated after flight l-A-78 to evaluate the SAS problem. The flight oscillation was duplicated using two separate power sources set with a 4 cps frequency differential and the T/M system operating. Control surface movements were noted in all 3 axis; however, the most notable was the ±1° oscillation of the LH horizontal with Pitch/Roll engaged. Corrective action incorporated a MuMetal shield to isolate the SAS modules from other system noise interference. Final results produced a 3/8° roll oscillation. The final change involved moving the SAS to the #2 AC power bus in order to place both T/M and SAS on the same power source. An evaluation test indicated a 3/8 to 1/2 degree offset on both surfaces with SAS engagement and no oscillation (11-18 mil servo retract offset.

J. APU preflight load check runs were accomplished on October 12, 1964.

B. A fuel single-point fill leak was experienced after fuel servicing; several probe connections failed to eliminate the leakage. The X-15 tanks were pressurized to evaluate the condition under pressure. The leakage gradually subsided with the tanks pressurized, and eventually leakage ceased.

C. The #2 mixing chamber temperature was noted to be high during the outbound track. Close scrutiny of the IFDS CEU and computer temperatures and the cockpit altitude indicated insufficient LN2 was supplied after the pilot suit check to obtain a normal 36.5K cockpit altitude. After X 15 LN2 and auxiliary cockpit pressure functions were selected, cockpit altitude continued to rise up to 38K when a sudden recovery of cockpit altitude and cooling effectiveness was observed. After landing, the #2 LN2 control C/B was found popped which results in a closed pneumatic control valve and no LN2 flow through the #2 mixing chamber injector. The delay in altitude recovery in flight with the auxiliary pressurization system is related to system shock down time.

D. The cockpit second stage igniter pressure indicator was extremely slow in responding to the prelaunch pump igniter start sequence. As a result of confirmation communication between the pilot and NASA 1, the "No Drop" light was obtained, indicating 23 seconds of ignition time had elapsed. Launch was made and a normal engine light was obtained.

E. The micrometerorite experiment extended during flight at transonic conditions approaching high key. The pilot noted buffet and rollyaw tendencies to the left. The cockpit arm-off switch was off, however, the power C/B's had been set for elevator closeout. Normal system programming would not have produced opening as it occurred. The spurious electrical condition was not determined during post flight checks