X-15 OPERATIONS FLIGHT REPORT



FLIGHT NO: 1-44-70 DATE OF REPORT: 4/4/64

PILOT: Major R. Rushworth DATE OF FLIGHT: 1/28/64

CARRIER AIRCRAFT: B-52 #008 LAUNCH LAKE: Delamar

PURPOSE OF FLIGHT: 1. Aircraft Stability Evaluation Using

Upper Speed Brakes Only

I. Discussion of Previous Operations

A. Loss of Rokide in the throat area of engine S/N 104 exposed a sizable gap between tubes where braze material had been eroded away. Operating experience during two ground runs and two flights indicated a stable condition after Rokide loss without additional loss of braze material. PSTS personnel had noted that many of these tube separations did exist after abrasive removal of Rokide as part of the recoating preparation.

B. Maintenance of a leak free forward annulus seal has been difficult due to deterioration of the primary seal which consisted of plastic tape between the faying surfaces of a riveted flange joint. Repair of the seal has been obtained by sliding the FOX tank ahead less than one inch and placing a thick paste mixture of Kel-F powder and Methyl Ethyl-Ketone on the flange joint. At a reduced LN2 cart pressure of 20 psi the leakage is reduced, and is within the capacity of the Kel-F coated fiberglass secondary seal. An extended annulus shock down time and reduced chill rate are necessary on the present X-15-1 configuration.

C. Sustained oscillations of the side stick control handle have been encountered when the unrestrained control handle is given a sharp blow. Contributing components, including master boost cylinder, boost bungees, and feel bungee, were all checked or replaced without eliminating the characteristic.

D. The skid positioning bungees were all found to have reduced force output after one gear cycle. Tests conducted indicated the springs were permanently deformed during the gear stowed condition producing a short spring and a lower force. A revised spring material is in process.

E. Tests were completed on the KS-25 system V/H computers which were found defective during investigations following flight l-A-68. The flight unit (S/N 2) was found to contain a defective terminal connection between a power supply and circuit board. Unit S/N 1 was found to contain a short circuit between the case and a heat sink in the velocity scanning amplifier module. Both units were environmentally tested following repair.

II. Aircraft Configuration Changes A. The speed brake handle interconnect link was removed to allow individual speed brake operation. A larger grip was provided for the upper brake handle to aid in identification. III. Instrumentation Configurations None IV. Preflight Events A. The left hand horizontal hydraulic actuator was replaced because of spalling of the chromium plating on the actuator shaft. The first replacement actuator was unacceptable because of instability caused by the dual system synchronization adjustment.

B. Engine S/N 104 was qualified for flight without a ground run. A period of 45 days elapsed since the previous ground run, however a flight was accomplished on January 8, 1964.

C. Flight rescheduling was required because of rain on January 20, and January 22, 1964.

D. Fuel leakage occurred from the fuel vent valve overboard vent port during initial B-52 taxi. Several tank pressurization and venting cycles were accomplished without leakage to qualify the vent valve for flight. LOX and FOX source topoff was accomplished because of the takeoff delay. Pylon LN2 supply was judged adequate and reservice was not accomplished.

V. Flight Events A. The pylon LN2 supply was depleted during the B-52 outbound track, and ram air was used for cooling for approximately 5 minutes. Adequate cooling was obtained during this period; however, the pilot's suit was pressurized.

B. The SAS pitch channel did not malfunction during the in-flight system check. The in-flight test system has indicated considerable instability in the malfunction signal settings causing concern over the value of the test in defining system condition.

C. After launch the SAS roll channel malfunctioned repeatedly with aircraft inputs including pitch axis motions. ASAS engaged and operated properly. A post flight investigation indicated failure of the monitor isolation amplifier module for the right hand side. The explanation for the failure is quoted from the Operations Branch failure report memo (O-388-64).......... "The unusual thing about this failure is that a pitch signal could cause a roll failure. An explanation of the malfunction system follows. The SAS monitor system compares the servo displacement against command monitor, and, if there is a differential voltage between the monitored points which exceeds the preset level, the system shuts down. The monitor circuits of pitch and roll are fed the same follow-up voltages, and since the preset level for roll was lower than for pitch, roll failed first. After one axis fails there is less total error displacement for the other axis. The nature of this failure requires the good monitor isolation amplifier voltage to almost double to cause malfunction."

D. The prelaunch BCS prime and operational check resulted in a frost coating on the windshield. Inefficiency of the nose BCS rocket catalyst beds caused an excess of "cold" steam or condensed moisture during rocket firing.

E. The pilot reported that a steady state side slip increased proportionately with angle of attack and with extended upper speed brake (lower speed brake closed). A post flight functional did not indicate asymmetric extension or limit position of the upper speed brake.
 
 
 
 

Approved by: Prepared by:

Perry V. Row Ronald S. Waite

X-15 Senior Project Engineer X-15 Project Engineer