

Economy of Machine Politics, 4 Corruption and Reform 15,
30
(1989) (reporting that Mayor Daley ``sacked'' a black
committee-
man for briefly withholding support for a school board
nominee
whom civil rights activists opposed)).

Of course, we have firmly rejected any requirement that
aggrieved employees ``prove that they, or other employees,
have
been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly,
their
political allegiance.'' Branti, 445 U. S., at 517. What is
at

issue in these cases is not whether an employee is
actually
coerced or merely influenced, but whether the attempt to
obtain
his or her support through ``party discipline'' is
legitimate.
To apply the relevant question to JUSTICE SCALIA's example,
post,

at 18, the person who attempts to bribe a public official
is
guilty of a crime regardless whether the official submits
to
temptation; likewise, a political party's attempt to
maintain
loyalty through allocation of government resources is
improper
regardless whether any employee capitulates.

More importantly, it rests on the long-rejected fallacy that
a
privilege may be burdened by unconstitutional conditions.
See,
e. g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). There
are

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a few jobs for which an individual's race or religion may
be
relevant, see Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.
S.

267, 314-315 (1986) (dissenting opinion); there are many jobs
for
which political affiliation is relevant to the employee's
ability
to function effectively as part of a given administration.
In

those cases--in other words, cases in which ``the efficiency of the public service,' ' Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75,

101 (1947), would be advanced by hiring workers who are loyal to the Governor's party--such hiring is permissible under the hold-ings in Elrod and Branti. This case, however, concerns jobs in

which race, religion, and political affiliation are all equally and entirely irrelevant to the public service to be performed. When an individual has been denied employment for an impermissi-ble reason, it is unacceptable to balance the constitutional rights of the individual against the political interests of the party in power. It seems to me obvious that the government may not discriminate against particular individuals in hopes of ad-vancing partisan interests through the misuse of public funds.

The only systemic consideration permissible in these cir-cumstances is not that of the controlling party, but that of the aggregate of burdened individuals. By impairing individuals' freedoms of belief and association, unfettered patronage prac-tices undermine the ``free functioning of the electoral pro-cess.' ' Elrod, 427 U. S., at 356. As I wrote in 1972:

Indeed, when numbers are considered, it is appropriate not merely to consider the rights of a particular janitor who may have been offered a bribe from the public treasury to obtain his political surrender, but also the impact on the body poli-tic as a whole when the free political choice of millions of public servants is inhibited or manipulated by the selective award of public benefits. While the patronage system is

de-
fended in the name of democratic tradition, its
paternalistic
impact on the political process is actually at war with
the
deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First
Amend-
ment.'" Lewis, 473 F. 2d, at 576.

The tradition that is relevant in this case is the
American
commitment to examine and reexamine past and present
practices
against the basic principles embodied in the Constitution.
The
inspirational command by our President in 1961 is entirely
con-
sistent with that tradition: ``Ask not what your country can
do
for you--ask what you can do for your country.'" This case
in-
volves a contrary command: ``Ask not what job applicants can
do
for the State--ask what they can do for our party.'"
Whatever
traditional support may remain for a command of that ilk, it
is
plainly an illegitimate excuse for the practices rejected
by
the Court today.

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
KENNEDY
join, and with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins as to Parts II
and
III, dissenting.

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Today the Court establishes the constitutional principle
that
party membership is not a permissible factor in the
dispensation
of government jobs, except those jobs for the performance
of
which party affiliation is an ``appropriate requirement.'"
Ante,

at 1. It is hard to say precisely (or even generally) what
that
exception means, but if there is any category of jobs for
whose
performance party affiliation is not an appropriate
requirement,
it is the job of being a judge, where partisanship is not

only
unneded but positively undesirable. It is, however, rare that
a
federal administration of one party will appoint a judge
from
another party. And it has always been rare. See Marbury
v.

Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Thus, the new principle that
the

Court today announces will be enforced by a corps of judges
(the
Members of this Court included) who overwhelmingly owe their
of-
fice to its violation. Something must be wrong here, and I
sug-
gest it is the Court.

The merit principle for government employment is probably
the
most favored in modern America, having been widely adopted
by
civil-service legislation at both the state and federal
levels.

But there is another point of view, described in
characteristi-
cally Jacksonian fashion by an eminent practitioner of the
pa-
tronage system, George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall:

``I ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some
arguments
that nobody can answer.

``First, this great and glorious country was built up by
pol-
itical parties; second, parties can't hold together if
their
workers don't get offices when they win; third, if the
parties
go to pieces, the government they built up must go to
pieces,
too; fourth, then there'll be hell to pay.'' W. Riordon,
Plunk-
itt of Tammany Hall 13 (1963).

It may well be that the Good Government Leagues of America
were
right, and that Plunkitt, James Michael Curley and their ilk
were
wrong; but that is not entirely certain. As the merit
principle
has been extended and its effects increasingly felt; as the
Boss

Tweeds, the Tammany Halls, the Pendergast Machines, the Byrd Machines and the Daley Machines have faded into history; we find that political leaders at all levels increasingly complain of the helplessness of elected government, unprotected by ``party discipline,' ' before the demands of small and cohesive interest-groups.

The choice between patronage and the merit principle--or, to be more realistic about it, the choice between the desirable mix of merit and patronage principles in widely varying federal, state, and local political contexts--is not so clear that I would be prepared, as an original matter, to chisel a single, inflexible prescription into the Constitution. Fourteen years ago, in Elrod

v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976), the Court did that. Elrod was

limited however, as was the later decision of Branti v. Finkel,

445 U. S. 507 (1980), to patronage firings, leaving it to state and federal legislatures to determine when and where political affiliation could be taken into account in hirings and promotions. Today the Court makes its constitutional civil-service reform absolute, extending to all decisions regarding government employment. Because the First Amendment has never been thought to require this disposition, which may well have disastrous consequences for our political system, I dissent.

I

The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i. e., as the regulator of

private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it places upon the government in its capacity as employer. We have recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different constitutional guarantees. Private citizens perhaps cannot be prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v.

Johnson, 425 U. S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have

their property searched without probable cause, but in many circumstances government employees can. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480

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U. S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id., at 732 (SCALIA,

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J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished for refusing to provide the government information that may in- criminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S.

273, 277-278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in partic- ular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired for that reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 147 (1983). Private

citizens cannot be punished for partisan political activity, but federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise pun- ished for that reason. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75,

101 (1947); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 556 (1973);

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 616-617 (1973).

Once it is acknowledged that the Constitution's prohibition against laws ``abridging the freedom of speech'' does not apply to laws enacted in the government's capacity as employer the same way it does to laws enacted in the government's capacity as regulator of private conduct, it may sometimes be difficult to assess what employment practices are permissible and what are not. That seems to me not a difficult question, however, in the present context. The provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to restrain transient majorities from impairing long-recognized personal liberties. They did not create by implication novel individual rights overturning accepted political norms. Thus, when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down.

Such a venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining table and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract principle of First-Amendment adjudication devised by this Court. To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the Court's principles are to be formed. They are, in these uncertain areas, the very points of reference by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices are to be

figured out. When it appears that the latest ``rule,'' or ``three-part test,'' or ``balancing test'' devised by the Court has placed us on a collision course with such a landmark prac-

...tice, it is the former that must be recalculated by us, and
not
the latter that must be abandoned by our citizens. I know of
no
other way to formulate a constitutional jurisprudence that
re-
flects, as it should, the principles adhered to, over time,
by
the American people, rather than those favored by the
personal
(and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions of a
major-
ity of this Court.

I will not describe at length the claim of patronage to
landmark
status as one of our accepted political traditions.
Justice
Powell discussed it in his dissenting opinions in *Elrod* and
Bran-

...ti. *Elrod*, 427 U. S., at 378-379 (Powell, J., dissenting);
Bran-

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...ti, 445 U. S., at 522, n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting). Suffice
it
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to say that patronage was, without any thought that it could
be
unconstitutional, a basis for government employment from the
ear-
liest days of the Republic until *Elrod*--and has continued
unabat-

ed since *Elrod*, to the extent still permitted by that
unfortunate

decision. See, e. g., D. Price, *Bringing Back the Parties* 24,
32

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(1984); Gardner, *A Theory of the Spoils System*, 54 *Public*
Choice
171, 181 (1987); Toinet & Glenn, *Clientelism and Corruption*
in
the ``Open'' Society: The Case of the United States, in
Private
Patronage and Public Power 193, 202 (C. Clapham ed. 1982).
Given
that unbroken tradition regarding the application of an
ambiguous
constitutional text, there was in my view no basis for

holding
that patronage-based dismissals violated the
First
Amendment--much less for holding, as the Court does today,
that
even patronage hiring does so.

II

Even accepting the Court's own mode of analysis, however,
and
engaging in ``balancing'' a tradition that ought to be part
of
the scales, Elrod, Branti, and today's extension of them seem
to

me wrong.

A

The Court limits patronage on the ground that the
individual's
interest in uncoerced belief and expression outweighs the
system-
ic interests invoked to justify the practice. Ante, at 5-9.
The

opinion indicates that the government may prevail only if
it
proves that the practice is ``narrowly tailored to further
vital
government interests.'' Ante, at 10-11.

That strict-scrutiny standard finds no support in our
cases.
Although our decisions establish that government employees do
not
lose all constitutional rights, we have consistently applied
a
lower level of scrutiny when ``the governmental function
operat-
ing . . . [is] not the power to regulate or license, as
lawmaker,
an entire trade or profession, or to control an entire branch
of
private business, but, rather, as proprietor, to manage
[its]
internal operatio[ns]'' Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
v.

McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). When dealing with its
own

employees, the government may not act in a manner that is
``pa-

tently arbitrary or discriminatory," id., at 898, but its
regu-

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lations are valid if they bear a "rational connection" to
the
governmental end sought to be served, Kelley v. Johnson,
425

U. S., at 247.

In particular, restrictions on speech by public employees
are
not judged by the test applicable to similar restrictions
on
speech by nonemployees. We have said that "[a] governmental
em-
ployer may subject its employees to such special restrictions
on
free expression as are reasonably necessary to promote
effective
government." Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 356, n. 13
(1980).

In Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S., at 101, upholding
pro-

visions of the Hatch Act which prohibit political activities
by
federal employees, we said that "it is not necessary that
the
act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed
by
Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public
ser-
vice." We reaffirmed Mitchell in CSC v. Letter Carriers,
413

U. S., at 556, over a dissent by Justice Douglas arguing
against
application of a special standard to government employees,
except
insofar as their "job performance" is concerned, id., at
597.

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We did not say that the Hatch Act was narrowly tailored to
meet
the government's interest, but merely deferred to the judgment
of
Congress, which we were not "in any position to dispute."
Id.,

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at 567. Indeed, we recognized that the Act was not
indispensably
necessary to achieve those ends, since we repeatedly noted

that
``Congress at some time [may] come to a different view.''
Ibid.,

see also id., at 555, 564. In *Broadrick v. Oklahoma*, 413 U.
S.

601 (1973), we upheld similar restrictions on state
employees,
though directed ``at political expression which if engaged in
by
private persons would plainly be protected by the First and
Four-
teenth Amendments,' ' Id., at 616.

To the same effect are cases that specifically concern
adverse
employment action taken against public employees because of
their
speech. In *Pickering v. Board of Education of Township
High*

School Dist., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968), we recognized:

[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating
the
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those
it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of
the
citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive
at
a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
ci-
tizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
in-
terests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
effi-
ciency of the public services it performs through its
employ-
ees.' '

Because the restriction on speech is more attenuated when
the
government conditions employment than when it imposes
criminal
penalties, and because ``government offices could not function
if
every employment decision became a constitutional matter,' '
Con-

nick v. Myers, 461 U. S., at 143, we have held that

government

employment decisions taken on the basis of an employee's
speech
do not ``abridg[e] the freedom of speech,' ' U. S. Const.,
Amdt.
1, merely because they fail the narrow-tailoring and
compelling-
interest tests applicable to direct regulation of speech.
We
have not subjected such decisions to strict scrutiny, but
have
accorded ``a wide degree of deference to the employer's
judg-
ment'' that an employee's speech will interfere with close
work-
ing relationships. 461 U. S., at 152.

When the government takes adverse action against an employee
on
the basis of his political affiliation (an interest whose
consti-
tutional protection is derived from the interest in speech),
the
same analysis applies. That is why both the Elrod plurality,
427

U. S., at 359, and the opinion concurring in the judgment,
id.,

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at 375, as well as Branti, 445 U. S., at 514-515, and the
Court

today, ante, at 8-9, rely on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S.
593

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(1972), a case that applied the test announced in Pickering,
not

the strict-scrutiny test applied to restrictions imposed on
the
public at large. Since the government may dismiss an
employee
for political speech ``reasonably deemed by Congress to
interfere

with the efficiency of the public service,' ' Public Workers
v.

Mitchell, supra, at 101, it follows a fortiori that the
govern-

ment may dismiss an employee for political affiliation if

rea-

sonably necessary to promote effective government.'" Brown
v.

Glines, supra, at 356, n. 13.

While it is clear from the above cases that the normal
``strict
scrutiny'' that we accord to government regulation of speech
is
not applicable in this field,
phasis added). This suggestion is incorrect, does not aid
the
Court's argument, and if accepted would eviscerate the
strict-
scrutiny standard. It is incorrect because even a casual
perusal
of the cases reveals that the governmental actions were
sus-
tained, not because they were shown to be ``narrowly tailored
to
further vital government interests,'' ante, at 10-11, but
because

they were ``reasonably'' deemed necessary to promote
effective
government. It does not aid the Court's argument, moreover,
be-
cause whatever standard those cases applied must be applied
here,

and if the asserted interests in patronage are as weighty
as
those proffered in the previous cases, then Elrod and Branti
were

wrongly decided. It eviscerates the standard, finally,
because
if the practices upheld in those cases survived strict
scrutiny,
then the so-called ``strict scrutiny'' test means nothing.
Sup-
pose a State made it unlawful for an employee of a
privately
owned nuclear power plant to criticize his employer. Can
there
be any doubt that we would reject out of hand the State's
argu-
ment that the statute was justified by the compelling interest
in
maintaining the appearance that such employees are operating

nu-clear plants properly, so as to maintain public confidence in the plants' safety? But cf. *CSC v. Letter Carriers*, 413 U. S. 548,

565 (1973) (Hatch Act justified by need for government employees to ``appear to the public to be avoiding [political partiality], if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded''). Suppose again that a State prohibited a private employee from speaking on the job about matters of private concern. Would we even hesitate before dismissing the State's claim that the compelling interest in fostering an efficient economy overrides the individual's interest in speaking on such matters? But cf. *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U. S. 138, 147 (1983) (``[W]hen a

public employee speaks . . . upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior''). If the Court thinks that strict scrutiny is appropriate in all these cases, then it should forthrightly admit that *Public Workers v. Mitchell*, 330 U. S. 75

(1947), *Letter Carriers*, *Pickering v. Board of Education of Town-*

ship High School Dist., 391 U. S. 563 (1968), *Connick*, and *simi-*

lar cases were mistaken and should be overruled; if it rejects that course, then it should admit that those cases applied, as they said they did, a reasonableness test.

The Court's further contention that these cases are limited to

the ``interests that the government has in its capacity as an
em-
ployer,'' ante, at 7, n. 4, as distinct from its interests
``in

the structure and functioning of society as a whole,'' *ibid.*,
is

neither true nor relevant. Surely a principal reason for
the
statutes that we have upheld preventing political activity
by
government employees--and indeed the only substantial
reason,

with respect to those employees who are permitted to be hired
and
fired on a political basis--is to prevent the party in power
from
obtaining what is considered an unfair advantage in
political
campaigns. That is precisely the type of governmental
interest
at issue here. But even if the Court were correct, I see no
rea-
son in policy or principle why the government would be limited
to
furthering only its interests ``as employer.'' In fact, we
have

seemingly approved the furtherance of broader governmental
in-
terests through employment restrictions. In *Hampton v. Mow*
Sun

Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976), we held unlawful a Civil Service
Com-

mission regulation prohibiting the hiring of aliens on the
ground
that the Commission lacked the requisite authority. We were
wil-
ling, however, to ``assume . . . that if the Congress or
the
President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement,
it
would be justified by the national interest in providing an
in-
centive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even
as
providing the President with an expendable token for treaty
nego-
tiating purposes.'' *Id.*, at 105. Three months after our

opinion,

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the President adopted the restriction by Executive Order.
Exec.
Order No. 11935, 3 CFR 146 (1976 Comp.). On remand, the
lower
courts denied the Mow Sun Wong plaintiffs relief, on the basis
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this new Executive Order and relying upon the interest in
provid-
ing an incentive for citizenship. Mow SunWong v. Hampton, 435
F.

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Supp. 37 (ND Cal. 1977), aff'd, 626 F. 2d 739 (CA9 1980).
We
denied certiorari, sub nom. Lum v. Campbell, 450 U. S.
959

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(1981). In other cases, the lower federal courts have
uniformly
reached the same result. See, e. g., Jalil v. Campbell,
192

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U. S. App. D. C. 4, 7, 590 F. 2d 1120, 1123, n. 3 (1978);
Vergara

v. Hampton, 581 F. 2d 1281 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.
S.

905 (1979); Santin Ramos v. United States Civil Service
Comm'n,

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430 F. Supp. 422 (PR 1977) (three-judge court).
the precise test that replaces it is not so clear; we have
used
various formulations. The one that appears in the case
dealing
with an employment practice closest in its effects to
patronage
is whether the practice could be ``reasonably deemed'' by
the
enacting legislature to further a legitimate goal. Public
Work-

ers v. Mitchell, supra, at 101. For purposes of my ensuing
dis-

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cussion, however, I will apply a less permissive standard
that
seems more in accord with our general ``balancing'' test: can
the

governmental advantages of this employment practice reasonably
be
deemed to outweigh its ``coercive'' effects?

B

Preliminarily, I may observe that the Court today not only
declines, in this area replete with constitutional ambiguities,
to
give the clear and continuing tradition of our people the
dispo-

sitive effect I think it deserves, but even declines to give
it

substantial weight in the balancing. That is contrary to
what
the Court has done in many other contexts. In evaluating
so-
called ``substantive due process'' claims we have examined
our
history and tradition with respect to the asserted right.
See,
e. g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. ---- (1989); Bowers
v.

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Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 192-194 (1986). In evaluating
claims

that a particular procedure violates the Due Process Clause
we
have asked whether the procedure is traditional. See, e.
g.,

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Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Marin County, 495 U.
S.

---- (1990). And in applying the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable-
ness test we have looked to the history of judicial and
public
acceptance of the type of search in question. See, e. g.,
Camara
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v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 537
(1967).

See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
California,

Riverside County, 478 U. S. 1, 8 (1986) (tradition of
accessibil-

ity to judicial proceedings implies judgment of experience
that
individual's interest in access outweighs government's
interest
in closure); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.
S.

555, 589 (1980) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment) ('`Such
a
tradition [of public access] commands respect in part because
the
Constitution carries the gloss of history'); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n

of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 678 (1970) ('`unbroken practice
of
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according the [property tax] exemption to churches''
demonstrates
that it does not violate Establishment Clause).

But even laying tradition entirely aside, it seems to me
our
balancing test is amply met. I assume, as the Court's
opinion
assumes, that the balancing is to be done on a generalized
basis,
and not case-by-case. The Court holds that the
governmental
benefits of patronage cannot reasonably be thought to
outweigh
its ``coercive'' effects (even the lesser ``coercive'' effects
of
patronage hiring as opposed to patronage firing) not merely
in
1990 in the State of Illinois, but at any time in any of
the
numerous political subdivisions of this vast country. It
seems
to me that that categorical pronouncement reflects a naive
vision
of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the systemic
ef-
fects of patronage in promoting political stability and
facili-
tating the social and political integration of previously
power-
less groups.

The whole point of my dissent is that the desirability of

patronage is a policy question to be decided by the people's representatives; I do not mean, therefore, to endorse that system. But in order to demonstrate that a legislature could reasonably determine that its benefits outweigh its ``coercive'' effects, I must describe those benefits as the proponents of patronage see them: As Justice Powell discussed at length in his dissent, patronage stabilizes political parties and

prevents excessive political fragmentation--both of which are results in which States have a strong governmental interest. Party strength requires the efforts of the rank-and-file, especially in ``the dull periods between elections,''' to perform such tasks as organizing precincts, registering new voters, and providing constituent services. Elrod, 427 U. S., at 385 (dissent-

ing opinion). Even the most enthusiastic supporter of a party's program will shrink before such drudgery, and it is folly to think that ideological conviction alone will motivate sufficient numbers to keep the party going through the off-years. ``For the most part, as every politician knows, the hope of some reward generates a major portion of the local political activity supporting parties.''' Ibid. Here is the judgment of one such poli-

tician, Jacob Arvey (best known as the promoter of Adlai Steven-son): Patronage is ``a necessary evil if you want a strong organization, because the patronage system permits of discipline, and without discipline, there's no party organization.''' Quoted in M. Tolchin & S. Tolchin, To the Victor 36 (1971). A major

study of the patronage system describes the reality as follows:

[A]lthough men have many motives for entering political life . . . the vast underpinning of both major parties is made up of men who seek practical rewards. Tangible advantages constitute the unifying thread of most successful political practitioners' Id., at 22.

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`With so little patronage cement, party discipline is relatively low; the rate of participation and amount of service the party can extract from [Montclair] county committeemen are minuscule compared with Cook County. The party considers it self lucky if 50 percent of its committeemen show up at meetings--even those labeled 'urgent'--while even lower percentages turn out at functions intended to produce crowds for visiting candidates.' Id., at 123.

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See also W. Grimshaw, *The Political Economy of Machine Politics*, 4 *Corruption and Reform* 15, 30 (1989); G. Pomper, *Voters, Elections, and Parties* 255 (1988); Wolfinger, *Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts*, 34 *J. Politics* 365, 384 (1972).

The Court simply refuses to acknowledge the link between patronage and party discipline, and between that and party success. It relies (as did the plurality in *Elrod*, 427 U. S., at 369,

n. 23) on a single study of a rural Pennsylvania county by Professor Sorauf, ante, at 13--a work that has been described as

`more persuasive about the ineffectuality of Democratic

leaders
in Centre County than about the generalizability of [its]
find-
ings.'" Wolfinger, *supra*, at 384, n. 39. It is unpersuasive
to

claim, as the Court does, that party workers are obsolete
because
campaigns are now conducted through media and other
money-
intensive means. Ante, at 13. Those techniques have
supplement-

ed but not supplanted personal contacts. See Price,
Bringing
Back the Parties, at 25. Certainly they have not made
personal
contacts unnecessary in campaigns for the lower-level
offices
that are the foundations of party strength, nor have they
re-
placed the myriad functions performed by party regulars
not
directly related to campaigning. And to the extent such
tech-
niques have replaced older methods of campaigning (partly
in
response to the limitations the Court has placed on
patronage),
the political system is not clearly better off. See
Elrod,

supra, at 384 (Powell, J., dissenting); Branti, 445 U. S., at
528

(Powell, J., dissenting). Increased reliance on money-
intensive
campaign techniques tends to entrench those in power much
more
effectively than patronage--but without the attendant benefit
of
strengthening the party system. A challenger can more easily
ob-
tain the support of party-workers (who can expect to be
rewarded
even if the candidate loses--if not this year, then the
next)
than the financial support of political action committees
(which
will generally support incumbents, who are likely to prevail).

It is self-evident that eliminating patronage will
significantly

undermine party discipline; and that as party discipline
waned,
so will the strength of the two-party system. But, says
the
Court, ``[p]olitical parties have already survived the
substan-
tial decline in patronage employment practices in this
century.''
Ante, at 12-13. This is almost verbatim what was said in
Elrod,

see 427 U. S., at 369. Fourteen years later it seems much
less
convincing. Indeed, now that we have witnessed, in 18 of
the
last 22 years, an Executive Branch of the Federal
Government
under the control of one party while the Congress is entirely
or
(for two years) partially within the control of the other
party;
now that we have undergone the most recent federal election,
in
which 98% of the incumbents, of whatever party, were returned
to
office; and now that we have seen elected officials
changing
their political affiliation with unprecedented readiness,
Wash-
ington Post, Apr. 10, 1990, p. A1, the statement that
``political
parties have already survived'' has a positively whistling-
in-
the-graveyard character to it. Parties have
assuredly
survived--but as what? As the forges upon which many of
the
essential compromises of American political life are
hammered
out? Or merely as convenient vehicles for the conducting of
na-
tional presidential elections?

The patronage system does not, of course, merely foster
politi-
cal parties in general; it fosters the two-party system in
par-
ticular. When getting a job, as opposed to effectuating a
par-
ticular substantive policy, is an available incentive for
party-
workers, those attracted by that incentive are likely to work
for

the party that has the best chance of displacing the
`ins,''
rather than for some splinter group that has a more
attractive
political philosophy but little hope of success. Not only is
a
two-party system more likely to emerge, but the
differences
between those parties are more likely to be moderated, as
each
has a relatively greater interest in appealing to a majority
of
the electorate and a relatively lesser interest in
furthering
philosophies or programs that are far from the mainstream.
The
stabilizing effects of such a system are obvious. See Toinet
&
Glenn, Clientelism and Corruption in the ``Open'' Society,
at
208. In the context of electoral laws we have approved
the
States' pursuit of such stability, and their avoidance of
the
``splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism [that] may
do
significant damage to the fabric of government.''' Storer
v.

Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 736 (1974) (upholding law
disqualifying

persons from running as independents if affiliated with a
party
in the past year).

Equally apparent is the relatively destabilizing nature of
a
system in which candidates cannot rely upon patronage-based
party
loyalty for their campaign support, but must attract workers
and
raise funds by appealing to various interest-groups. See
Tolchin
& Tolchin, To the Victor, at 127-130. There is little doubt
that
our decisions in Elrod and Branti, by contributing to the
decline

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of party strength, have also contributed to the growth
of
interest-group politics in the last decade. See, e. g.,
Fitts,

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The Vice of Virtue, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1603-1607
(1988).

Our decision today will greatly accelerate the trend. It is
not
only campaigns that are affected, of course, but the
subsequent
behavior of politicians once they are in power. The
replacement
of a system firmly based in party discipline with one in
which
each office-holder comes to his own accommodation with
competing
interest groups produces ``a dispersion of political
influence
that may inhibit a political party from enacting its
programs
into law.'' Branti, supra, at 531 (Powell, J., dissenting).
